Skip to main content

Efficient Asymmetric Public-Key Traitor Tracing Without Trusted Agents

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2001 (CT-RSA 2001)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2020))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

A new scheme of asymmetric public-key traitor tracing without involvement of trusted third parties will be discussed in our dissertation. Previously, an efficient construction of asymmetric public-key tracing scheme was also presented by Kurosawa and Desmedt, however, their scheme required the involvement of the third trusted party(s) known as agent(s). As far as we know, our scheme is the first concrete construction of a practical asymmetric public-key traitor tracing that does not rely on trusted agents. Moreover, our protocol contains other desirable features: (direct non-repudiation, full frameproof, and black-box traceability for asymmetric scheme) that the previous public-key traitor tracing schemes did not offer. In order to eliminate the dependencies of the trusted agents, we use a novel primitive, recently invented by Naor and Pinkas called, “oblivious polynomial evaluation”.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. K. Kurosawa and Y. Desmedt. Optimum traitor tracing and asymmetric scheme. In Proc. of EUROCRYPT’ 98, pages 145–157, 1998.

    Google Scholar 

  2. B. Chor, A. Fiat, and M. Naor. Tracing traitors. In Proc. of CRYPTO’94, pages 257–270, 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  3. D. Boneh and M. Franklin. An efficient public key traitor tracing scheme. In Proc. of CRYPTO’99, pages 338–353, 1999.

    Google Scholar 

  4. M. Yoshida and T. Fujiwara. A subscriber unauthorizable and traitor traceable broadcast distribution system. In Proc. of SCIS’2000, page C10, 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  5. B Ptzmann. Trials of traced traitors. In Proc. of Information Hiding-96, pages 49–64, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  6. B. Ptzmann and M. Waidner. Asymmetric fingerprinting for larger collusions. In Proc. of ACMCCS’97, pages 145–157, 1997.

    Google Scholar 

  7. D. Stinson and R. Wei. Key predistribution traceability schemes for broadcast encryption. In Proc. of SAC’98, pages 144–156, 1999.

    Google Scholar 

  8. J. Anzai, N. Matsuzaki, and T. Matsumoto. A quick group key distribution scheme with entity revocation. In Proc. of ASIACRYPT’99, pages 333–347, 1999.

    Google Scholar 

  9. M. Naor and B. Pinkas. Oblivious transfer and polynomial evaluation. In Proc. of STOC’99, pages 245–254, 1999.

    Google Scholar 

  10. D. Bleichenbacher and P. Q. Nguyen. Noisy polynomial interpolation and noisy chinese remaindering. In Proc. of EUROCRYPT’2000, pages 53–69, 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  11. D. Chaum and H. van Antwerpen. Undeniable signatures. In Proc. of CRYPTO’89, pages 212–216, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  12. A. Fiat and A. Shamir. How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In Proc. of CRYPTO’86, pages 186–194, 1986.

    Google Scholar 

  13. C. P. Schnorr. Eficient identification and signatures for smart cards. In Proc. of EUROCRYPT’89, pages 688–689, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Y. Desmedt and Y. Frankel. Threshold cryptosystem. In Proc. of CRYPTO’89, pages 307–315, 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Y. Desmedt. Threshold cryptosystem. European Transactions on Telecommunications, 5(4):449–457, 1994.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  16. T. Matsushita and H. Imai. Black-box traitor tracing against arbitrary pirate decoders. In Proc. of WISA’00, to appear, 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  17. T. Yoshida and K. Kurosawa. Is Boneh and Franklin traceability scheme traceable? the rump session of CRYPTO’2000 (available from http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/crypto2k/rump/yk2.ps ), 2000.

  18. M. Yoshida and T. Fujiwara. An efficient traitor tracing scheme for broadcast encryption. In Proc. of IEEE ISIT’2000, page 463, 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  19. D. Boneh. The decision Die-Hellman problem. In Proc. of the 3th ANTS, pages 48–63, 1998.

    Google Scholar 

  20. M. Naor and B. Pinkas. Threshold traitor tracing. In Proc. of CRYPTO’98, pages 502–517, 1998.

    Google Scholar 

  21. S. Brands. Untraceable o-line cash in wallets with observers. In Proc. of CRYPTO’93, pages 302–318, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  22. A. Shamir. How to share a secret. Comm. of ACM, 22:612–613, 1979.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  23. Y. Frankel and M. Yung. Distributed public key cryptography. In Proc. of PKC’98, pages 1–13, 1998.

    Google Scholar 

  24. H. Komaki, Y. Watanabe, G. Hanaoka, and H. Imai. Efficient asymmetric self-enforcement scheme with public traceability. In Proc. of PKC’01, to appear, 2001.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Watanabe, Y., Hanaoka, G., Imai, H. (2001). Efficient Asymmetric Public-Key Traitor Tracing Without Trusted Agents. In: Naccache, D. (eds) Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2001. CT-RSA 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2020. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45353-9_29

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45353-9_29

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-41898-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45353-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics