Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the gap between auxiliary-input zero-knowledge (AIZK) and blackbox-simulation zero-knowledge (BSZK). It is an interestingop en problem whether or not there exists a protocol which achieves AIZK, but not BSZK. We show that the existence of such a protocol is closely related to the existence of secure code obfuscators. A code obfuscator is used to convert a code into an equivalent one that is difficult to reverse-engineer. This paper provides security definitions of code obfuscation. By their definitions, it is easy to see that the existence of the gap implies the existence of a cheating verifier such that it is impossible to obfuscate any code of it. Intuitively, this means that it is possible to reverse-engineer any code of such a cheating verifier. Furthermore, we consider the actual behavior of such a cheating verifier. In order to do so, we focus on two special cases in which the gap exists: (1) there exists a constant round public-coin AIZK interactive argument for a language outside of BPP. (2) there exists a 3-round secret-coinAIZK interactive argument for a language outside of BPP. In the former case, we show that it is impossible to securely obfuscate a code of a cheating verifier behaving as a pseudorandom function. A similar result is shown also in the latter case. Our results imply that any construction of constant round public-coin or 3-round secret-coin AIZK arguments for non-trivial languages essentially requires a computational assumption with a reverse-engineering property.
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Hada, S. (2000). Zero-Knowledge and Code Obfuscation. In: Okamoto, T. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — ASIACRYPT 2000. ASIACRYPT 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1976. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44448-3_34
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44448-3_34
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