Abstract
We describe a MIX cascade protocol and a reputation system that together increase the reliability of a network of MIX cascades. In our protocol, MIX nodes periodically generate a communally random seed that, along with their reputations, determines cascade configuration. Nodes send test messages to monitor their cascades. Senders can also demonstrate message decryptions to convince honest cascade members that a cascade is misbehaving. By allowing any node to declare the failure of its own cascade, we eliminate the need for global trusted witnesses.
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Dingledine, R., Syverson, P. (2003). Reliable MIX Cascade Networks through Reputation. In: Blaze, M. (eds) Financial Cryptography. FC 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2357. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_18
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