Abstract
We introduce a definition of a re-encryption mix-center, and a definition of security for such a mix-center. Then we prove that any semantically secure public key system, which allows re-encryption, can be used to construct a secure mix-center.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
M. Abe, Universally Verifiable mix-net with Verification Work Independent of the Number of Mix-centers, Eurocrypt’ 98, pp. 437–447.
R. Canetti, Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols, http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/067and ECCC TR 01–24. Extended abstract appears in 42nd FOCS, 2001.
D. Chaum, Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudonyms, Communications of the ACM, ACM 81, pp. 84–88.
R. Cramer, V. Shoup, A Practical Public Key Cryptosystem Provably Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack, Crypto’ 98, pp. 13–25.
Y. Desmedt, K. Kurosawa, How to break a practical MIX and design a new one, Eurocrypt 2000, pp. 557–572.
D. Dolev, C. Dwork, M. Naor, Non-Malleable Cryptography, In Proceedings of the 23rd Symposium on Theory of Computing, ACM STOC 1991.
T. ElGamal, A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signiture Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 31, 1985, pp. 469–472.
A. Fujioka, T. Okamoto and K. Ohta, A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections, Auscrypt’ 92, pp. 244–251.
S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, Probabilistic Encryption, Journal of Computer Science 28, pp. 270–299, 1984.
M. Hirt, K. Sako, Efficient Reciept-Free Voting Based on Homomorphic Encryption, Eurocrypt 2000, pp. 539–556.
M. Jakobsson, A Practical Mix, Eurocrypt’ 98, pp. 448–461.
M. Jakobsson, D. M’Raihi, Mix-based Electronic Payments, SAC’ 98, pp. 157–173.
M. Jakobsson, Flash Mixing, PODC’99, pp. 83–89.
M. Jakobsson, A. Juels, Millimix: Mixing in small batches, DIMACS Techical report 99–33, June 1999.
S. Micali, C. Racko., B. Sloan, The Notion of Security for Probabilistic Cryptosystems, SIAM J. Computing 1988, pp. 412–426. 371
M. Mitomo, K. Kurosawa, Attack for Flash MIX, Asiacrypt 2000, pp. 192–204.
M. Michels, P. Horster, Some remarks on a reciept-free and universally verifiable Mix-type voting scheme, Asiacrypt’ 96, pp. 125–132.
V. Niemi, A. Renvall, Efficient voting with no selling of votes, Asiacrypt’94, pp. 105–116.
W. Ogata, K. Kurosawa, K. Sako, K. Takatani, Fault Tolerant Anonymous Channel, ICICS’ 97, pp. 440–444.
P. Paillier, Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes, Eurocrypt’ 99, pp. 223–238.
C. Park, K. Itoh, K. Kurosawa, Efficient Anonymous Channel and All/Nothing Election Scheme, Eurocrypt’ 93, pp. 248–259.
B. Pfitzmann, M. Waidner, Composition and Integrity Preservation of Secure Reactive Systems, 7th Conference on Computer and Communications Security of the ACM, pp. 245–254, 2000.
B. Pfitzmann, Breaking an E.cient Anonymous Channel, Eurocrypt’ 94, pp. 332–340.
K. Sako, J. Killian, Reciept-free Mix-Type Voting Scheme, Eurocrypt’ 95, pp. 393–403.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Wikström, D. (2002). The Security of a Mix-Center Based on a Semantically Secure Cryptosystem. In: Menezes, A., Sarkar, P. (eds) Progress in Cryptology — INDOCRYPT 2002. INDOCRYPT 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2551. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36231-2_29
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36231-2_29
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00263-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36231-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive