Abstract
A set of new power indices is introduced extending Banzhaf power index and taking into account agents’ preferences to coalesce. An axiomatic characterization of intensity functions representing a desire of agents to coalesce is given. A set of axioms for new power indices is presented and discussed. An example of use of these indices for Russian parliament is given.
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Aleskerov, F. (2006). Power Indices Taking into Account Agents’ Preferences. In: Simeone, B., Pukelsheim, F. (eds) Mathematics and Democracy. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-35605-3_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-35605-3_1
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