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On the Security of the Tor Authentication Protocol

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Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4258))

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Abstract

Tor is a popular anonymous Internet communication system, used by an estimated 250,000 users to anonymously exchange over five terabytes of data per day. The security of Tor depends on properly authenticating nodes to clients, but Tor uses a custom protocol, rather than an established one, to perform this authentication. In this paper, we provide a formal proof of security of this protocol, in the random oracle model, under reasonable cryptographic assumptions.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, 200 University Ave W, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1

    Ian Goldberg

Authors
  1. Ian Goldberg
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK

    George Danezis

  2. Palo Alto Research Center, 3333 Coyote Hill Rd, 94304, Palo Alto, CA, USA

    Philippe Golle

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Goldberg, I. (2006). On the Security of the Tor Authentication Protocol. In: Danezis, G., Golle, P. (eds) Privacy Enhancing Technologies. PET 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4258. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11957454_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11957454_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-68790-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68793-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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