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Auditable Privacy: On Tamper-Evident Mix Networks

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Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4107))

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Abstract

We introduce the notion of tamper-evidence for mix networks in order to defend against attacks aimed at covertly leaking secret information held by corrupted mix servers. This is achieved by letting observers (which need not be trusted) verify the absence of covert channels by means of techniques we introduce herein. Our tamper-evident mix network is a type of re-encryption mixnet in which a server proves that the permutation and re-encryption factors that it uses are correctly derived from a random seed to which the server is committed.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Computer Science, Indiana University at Bloomington, IN, 47405, USA

    Jong Youl Choi

  2. Palo Alto Research Center, 3333 Coyote Hill Rd, Palo Alto, CA, 94304, USA

    Philippe Golle

  3. School of Informatics, Indiana University at Bloomington, IN, 47406, USA

    Markus Jakobsson

Authors
  1. Jong Youl Choi
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  2. Philippe Golle
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  3. Markus Jakobsson
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Telcordia Technologies, Piscataway, NJ, USA

    Giovanni Di Crescenzo

  2. Johns Hopkins University (JHUISI), 3100 Wyman Park Drive, 21211, Baltimor, MD, USA

    Avi Rubin

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Choi, J.Y., Golle, P., Jakobsson, M. (2006). Auditable Privacy: On Tamper-Evident Mix Networks. In: Di Crescenzo, G., Rubin, A. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4107. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11889663_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11889663_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-46255-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46256-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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