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Voting in Cooperative Information Agent Scenarios: Use and Abuse

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Cooperative Information Agents X (CIA 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 4149))

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Abstract

Social choice theory can serve as an appropriate foundation upon which to build cooperative information agent applications. There is a rich literature on the subject of voting, with important theoretical results, and builders of automated agents can benefit from this work as they engineer systems that reach group consensus.

This paper considers the application of various voting techniques, and examines nuances in their use. In particular, we consider the issue of preference extraction in these systems, with an emphasis on the complexity of manipulating group outcomes. We show that a family of important voting protocols is susceptible to manipulation by coalitions in the average case, when the number of candidates is constant (even though their worst-case manipulations are \(\mathcal{NP}\)-hard).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Engineering and Computer Science, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

    Jeffrey S. Rosenschein & Ariel D. Procaccia

Authors
  1. Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
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  2. Ariel D. Procaccia
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence, Stuhlsatzenhausweg 3, 66123, Saarbruecken, Germany

    Matthias Klusch

  2. School of Informatics, The University of Edinburgh, P.O. Box, EH8 9LE, Edinburgh, United Kingdom

    Michael Rovatsos

  3. School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

    Terry R. Payne

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Rosenschein, J.S., Procaccia, A.D. (2006). Voting in Cooperative Information Agent Scenarios: Use and Abuse. In: Klusch, M., Rovatsos, M., Payne, T.R. (eds) Cooperative Information Agents X. CIA 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4149. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11839354_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11839354_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-38569-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-38570-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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