Abstract
We propose a general framework of secrecy and preservation of secrecy for labeled transition systems. Our definition of secrecy is parameterized by the distinguishing power of the observer, the properties to be kept secret, and the executions of interest, and captures a multitude of definitions in the literature. We define a notion of secrecy preserving refinement between systems by strengthening the classical trace-based refinement so that the implementation leaks a secret only when the specification also leaks it. We show that secrecy is in general not definable in μ-calculus, and thus not expressible in specification logics supported by standard model-checkers. However, we develop a simulation-based proof technique for establishing secrecy preserving refinement. This result shows how existing refinement checkers can be used to show correctness of an implementation with respect to a specification.
This research was partially supported by NSF Cybertrust award CNS 0524059.
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Alur, R., Černý, P., Zdancewic, S. (2006). Preserving Secrecy Under Refinement. In: Bugliesi, M., Preneel, B., Sassone, V., Wegener, I. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4052. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11787006_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11787006_10
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