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A Protocol of Member-Join in a Secret Sharing Scheme

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Information Security Practice and Experience (ISPEC 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3903))

Abstract

A protocol of the member-join in a secret sharing scheme is proposed. The proposed protocol can ensure that the original group members’ keys remain invariable after the fresh member joins in the group. It makes the key management convenience. The original members can’t gain the share key of the new member, and the keys of the original members don’t be leaked out when distributing the share key for the new member. In the key’s distributing process, the behavior of the cheaters can be detected, and the new member himself can verify the validity of his share key.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Mathematics and Computer Engineering, Xihua University, Chengdu, 610039, P.R. China

    Xiao Li & Mingxing He

Authors
  1. Xiao Li
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  2. Mingxing He
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 200240, Shanghai, China

    Kefei Chen  & Xuejia Lai  & 

  2. Singapore Management University (SMU), 80 Stamford Road, 178902, Singapore

    Robert Deng

  3. Cryptography and Security Department Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore

    Jianying Zhou

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Li, X., He, M. (2006). A Protocol of Member-Join in a Secret Sharing Scheme. In: Chen, K., Deng, R., Lai, X., Zhou, J. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3903. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11689522_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11689522_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-33052-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-33058-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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