Abstract
The assessment of credibility and reputation of contractors in online auctions is the key issue in providing reliable environment for customer-to-customer e-commerce. Confident reputation rating system is an important factor in managing risk and building customer satisfaction. Unfortunately, most online auction sites employ a very simple reputation rating scheme that utilizes user feedbacks and comments issued after committed auctions. Such schemes are easy to deceive and do not provide satisfactory protection against several types of fraud. In this paper we propose two novel measures of trustworthiness, namely, credibility and density. We draw inspiration from social network analysis and present two algorithms for reputation rating estimation. Our first algorithm computes the credibility of participants by an iterative search of inter-participant connections. Our second algorithm discovers clusters of participants who are densely connected through committed auctions. We test both measures on a large body of real-world data and we experimentally compare them with existing solutions.
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Morzy, M. (2005). New Algorithms for Mining the Reputation of Participants of Online Auctions. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32293-1
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