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Verifying a Secure Information Flow Analyzer

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Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics (TPHOLs 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 3603))

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Abstract

Denotational semantics for a substantial fragment of Java is formalized by deep embedding in PVS, making extensive use of dependent types. A static analyzer for secure information flow for this language is proved correct, that is, it enforces noninterference.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, 07030, USA

    David A. Naumann

Authors
  1. David A. Naumann
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computing Laboratory, Oxford University,  

    Joe Hurd

  2. Computing Laboratory, Oxford University, Wolfson Building, Parks Road Oxford, OX1 3QD, UK

    Tom Melham

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Naumann, D.A. (2005). Verifying a Secure Information Flow Analyzer. In: Hurd, J., Melham, T. (eds) Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics. TPHOLs 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3603. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11541868_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11541868_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28372-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31820-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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