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Event Driven Private Counters

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Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3570))

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Abstract

We define and instantiate a cryptographic scheme called “private counters”, which can be used in applications such as preferential voting to express and update preferences (or any secret) privately and non-interactively. A private counter consists of an encrypted value together with rules for updating that value if certain events occur. Updates are private: the rules do not reveal how the value of the counter is updated, nor even whether it is updated for a certain event. Updates are non-interactive: a counter can be updated without communicating with its creator. A private counter also contains an encrypted bit indicating if the current value in the counter is within a pre-specified range.

We also define a privacy model for private counters and prove that our construction satisfies this notion of privacy. As an application of private counters, we present an efficient protocol for preferential voting that hides the order in which voters rank candidates, and thus offers greater privacy guarantees than any other preferential voting scheme.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Stanford University,  

    Eu-Jin Goh

  2. Palo Alto Research Center,  

    Philippe Golle

Authors
  1. Eu-Jin Goh
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  2. Philippe Golle
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. National Research Council of Canada, 1200 Montreal RD.,, K1A 0R6, Ottawa, ON, Canada

    Andrew S. Patrick

  2. Computer Science Department, Google Inc. and Columbia University, 1214 Amsterdam Avenue, NY 10027, New York, USA

    Moti Yung

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Goh, EJ., Golle, P. (2005). Event Driven Private Counters. In: Patrick, A.S., Yung, M. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3570. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11507840_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11507840_27

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-26656-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31680-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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