Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of mixes and dummy traffic policies, which are building blocks of anonymous services. The goal of the paper is to bring together all the issues related to the analysis and design of mix networks. We discuss continuous and pool mixes, topologies for mix networks and dummy traffic policies. We point out the advantages and disadvantages of design decisions for mixes and dummy policies. Finally, we provide a list of research problems that need further work.
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Diaz, C., Preneel, B. (2004). Taxonomy of Mixes and Dummy Traffic. In: Deswarte, Y., Cuppens, F., Jajodia, S., Wang, L. (eds) Information Security Management, Education and Privacy. IFIP International Federation for Information Processing, vol 148. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-8145-6_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-8145-6_18
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