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The Formation of Adaptive Coalitions

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Advances in Dynamic Games

Part of the book series: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games ((AISDG,volume 8))

Abstract

This chapter develops a framework for analyzing the interaction between individual players (actors) and collective players (coalitions) who mutually adapt the allocation of investment to their values and each other’s decisions. The dynamic process of coalition formation can be described by a coupled evolutionary game of allocation controls. Potential fields of applications are outlined, and an example analyzing the management of energy and carbon emissions is discussed in more detail.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Illinois, 61820, USA

    Jürgen Scheffran

Authors
  1. Jürgen Scheffran
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. ORDECSYS, Place de l’Etrier 4, Chêne-Bougeries, CH-1224, Switzerland

    Alain Haurie

  2. Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1 Ookayama, Tokyo, 152-8552, Japan

    Shigeo Muto

  3. Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, State University of St. Petersburg, 198504, St. Petersburg, Russia

    Leon A. Petrosjan

  4. Department of Mathematics, Statistics, and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL, 60607-7045, USA

    T. E. S. Raghavan

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© 2006 Birkhäuser Boston

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Scheffran, J. (2006). The Formation of Adaptive Coalitions. In: Haurie, A., Muto, S., Petrosjan, L.A., Raghavan, T.E.S. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Games. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 8. Birkhäuser Boston. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-8176-4501-2_9

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