

# Pesticide Law and Compliance Decision Making

Huiqi Yan

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A Case Study of Chinese Farmers

 Springer

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For my parents, and Jinyang Fu  
Past, Present and Future

# Preface

Searching for an adequate book topic is always a difficult issue for a young researcher. I feel so lucky that I could do a project I am interested in: pesticide compliance study in a non-Western context. This topic connects what I have learned from my bachelor and master experiences in sociology with what I am interested in, namely law. It also connects a Chinese study with relevant theories and methods that have been developed in the West.

How much does regulation matter in shaping regulated actors' compliance behavior? This book opens up the black box of the regulated entities and shows how vegetable farmers in a non-Western context respond to pesticide regulation pressures. It provides a comprehensive understanding of compliance by directly adopting the existing compliance theories, and provides the most extensive and systematic empirical study of why farmers comply with or disobey the law, which advances understanding of implementation of law in China and adds a Chinese regulatory compliance case to the Western-oriented compliance theory. This book's explorations of the non-state regulators and the role of Chinese acquaintance society have important implications for readers' understanding of regulation throughout China's rural community.

Different from conventional quantitative or qualitative methods, this book takes a new perspective by figuring out interacting compliance variables and underlying compliance dynamics by primarily employing set-theoretical methods and techniques (csQCA). Moreover, broadly, this book takes an interdisciplinary approach, combining law, sociology, psychology, and public administration scholarships. The interdisciplinary nature of the research makes it unique and especially useful. Scholars, environmental scientists, policy practitioners, and especially those who are interested in the role of implementation of Chinese law will all find the book of importance.

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# Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIC	Agricultural Inspection Center
AQSIQ	General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine
CCTV	China Central Television
CMS	Cooperative Medical System
csQCA	Crisp-set QCA
DRC	Development Research Centre of the State Council
FAO	Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
fsQCA	Fuzzy-set QCA
IP	Intellectual Property
LAF	Legislative Affairs Office
LEEC	Law Enforcement Expertise Center
MAAHF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fishery
MLC	Medium or Large Cooperative
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOEP	Ministry of Environmental Protection
MOH	Ministry of Health
NPC	National People's Congress
NPC-SC	NPC Standing Committee
OECD	Organizations for Economic Co-operation and Development
PSC	Politburo Standing Committee
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
SAIC	State Administration on Industry and Commerce
SCA	Small Cooperative or Association
SFDA	State Food and Drug Administration
USITC	US International Trade Commission
USTR	US Trade Representative
WHO	World Health Organization

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