

THE DIACHRONIC MIND

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THE DIACHRONIC MIND

An Essay on Personal Identity,
Psychological Continuity and the Mind-Body Problem

by

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PREFACE

The ideas expressed in this book began to evolve from 1995 onwards, while I was writing my PhD dissertation. Chapters 1-5 still follow the basic structure of my thesis. After 1997 I published a number of articles on ideas developed during the writing of my thesis. The comments of colleagues and friend, of the various anonymous referees of the respective journals and the comments and criticism I received after the articles were published and/or when they were presented at conferences have helped me tremendously to modify and sharpen my view on the issues discussed. From 1998 onwards, a grant of the Dutch Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) allowed me to rewrite—at the University of Nijmegen—what are now Chapters 1-5 and to widen the ideas expressed therein through the addition of two further chapters, Chapters 6 and 7, and an appendix. I am grateful to NWO, the University of Nijmegen and Utrecht University for the opportunities they gave me to develop my ideas.

This book would not have existed in its present form without the help, comments, and criticism from a large number of people. I'd very much like to thank Joel Anderson, Lynne Rudder Baker, Ton van den Beld, Jan Bransen, Bert van den Brink, Stefaan Cuypers, Ton Derksen, Robert Heeger, Cynthia and Graham MacDonald, Anthonie Meijers, Wim de Muijnck, Philip Pettit, Marya Schechtman, Maureen Sie, Michael Smith, Gertrudis van de Vijver, and Theo van Willigenburg. I'd especially like to thank my wife Elsbeth Veldpape, to whom I dedicate this book, for her love, support and patience.

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