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94

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INTENTIONALITY,
SENSE AND THE MIND

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*FAIN WOULD I HAUE A PRETIE THING,
TO GIUE VNTO MY LADIE:
I NAME NO THING, NOR I MEANE NO THING,
BUT AS PRETIE A THING AS MAY BEE.*

“The Lamentation of a Woman Being Wrongfully
Defamed. To the tune of Damon & Pithias”. *A
Handefull of Pleasant Delites* by Clement
Robinson and diuers others. London, 1584

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Melbourne, 1983

Maurita J. Harney

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