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AUTONOMY, FREEDOM AND RIGHTS

A Critique of Liberal Subjectivity

by

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What I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word 'alternative'. I would like to do genealogy of problems, of *problématiques*. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do.

MICHEL FOUCAULT

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