

MIND-BODY: A CATEGORIAL RELATION

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by

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CONTENTS

PREFACE	vii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. Occasions for an Investigation	1
B. Categories and Categorial Accounts	6
C. Programs of Investigation	13
D. Legitimacy of This Investigation	27
II. A PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND AND BODY	28
A. Experience of Mind-Body	29
B. A Phenomenological Outline of an Ontology	60
III. ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS	63
A. Conflicting Ontologies	63
B. Transcendental Requirements	85
IV. A TRANSCENDENTAL ONTOLOGICAL ACCOUNT	89
A. A Dialectical Relation	89
B. The Dialectic of Mind and Body	105
C. Negative and Positive Dialectics and the Identity in Difference	119
D. An Answer to the <i>Quid Juris</i>	123
V. ONTOLOGICAL AND EMPIRICAL STRUCTURES	126
A. Transcendental and Empirical Science	128
B. The Mind's Embodiment	130

C. Structural Integration and Independence of Mind and Body	139
D. Psyche and Soma	148
E. Conclusion	161
 INDEX	 169

PREFACE

The relation of mind and body is one of the central problems of post-Cartesian times. It has precluded a unified theory of the positive sciences and prevented a satisfactory notion of man's psychophysical unity. Generally it has been treated as a problem of causality and solutions have been sought in various schemata of etiological relations. Proposals have ranged from that of reciprocal action between two substances and two causal streams to a reduction of all phenomena to a single causal stream involving a single class of substances. This investigation will abandon such schemata and attempt to start afresh. It will analyze the relation of strata of meaning involved and will be only tangentially concerned with the causal relations of mind and body.

This investigation will view the relation of mind and body no longer as the association of two substances, two things, but as the integration of two levels of conceptual richness. This is a move from hypostatization, reification, to categorialization – a move from the opacity of things to the relative lucidity of their significance. It recognizes that philosophy seeks not new facts about being but rather a way of understanding the integration of widely diverse domains of facts. Here the goal is the explanation of the unity of being, specifically the being of mind and body, in terms of thought – that for which being has significance and that for which incongruities of significance appear as a problem. The issue then becomes that of analyzing the conditions for the unity of two categories in thought, not that of determining the mechanism for the causal integration of two things. The point of departure chosen is phenomenological. The logic rooted in the matter of being is not empty and formal; it concerns the structure of reality. Phenomenology offers itself as a means for discovering categories – concepts essentially ingredient in appearance and apprehendable in thought. Or put another way, this investigation starts with ordinary experience, which provides a ready and accessible

point of departure for the analysis of the presented conceptual structures of existence, the fabric of meanings in appearance which reason can recognize as its own. In short, this work is an endeavor to see questions concerning the structure of being as questions concerning the structure of concrete thought and thus to operate in a domain truly congenial to thought. Thought relieved of the burden of divining the comportment of things can concern itself with the logic of categories.

This approach shows the influence of philosophers such as Hegel, Husserl, and Kant. Though the phenomenological starting point is reminiscent of Husserl if not also of Hegel, it must be understood in its own setting. Similarly, though many concepts have been borrowed from Hegel, they have been altered and employed in ways that are often unorthodox. My in some respects Kantian use of "transcendental" should be an obvious indication of at least a terminological departure from Hegel. But neither is this investigation Kantian. Kantian terminology (e.g., "transcendental," "necessary conditions for the possibility of") appears in a transformed state. Unless otherwise noted, my terminology finds its sense solely in the context of this investigation. In short, this work must stand by itself. Hegel, Husserl, and Kant have been drawn upon only insofar as they provided ideas and suggestions that could be adapted to my needs. In this process of adaptation much was added and everything to some extent changed. The Hegelian project of a pure categorical ontology has been combined with an Husserlian project of discovering concepts through a phenomenology. This combination has then been used to outline the necessary limits and conditions of physiological and psychological accounts of man. Finally, despite the long history of the mind-body debate, the approach will not be historical. This is reflected in the policy of citation. References will be given only when they afford clearly pertinent elaborations of a point, or when the choice of terms or procedures was directly influenced by a particular work. Though I am indebted to many philosophers, I have developed and blended their insights so that most references would require a commentary in order not to imply or suggest a misreading of their works. In particular, I trust that a declaration of my deep indebtedness to Hegel, Husserl, and Kant will alert the reader to their influences.

What success this investigation may have is due to the guidance and criticism of Professors Irwin C. Lieb, Klaus Hartmann, Charles Hartsorne, John N. Findlay, and Richard M. Zaner. They contributed generously in time and insight to the doctoral dissertation, which was the ancestor of this work. But where this work may falter, this cannot be

imputed to them. I am very grateful for a Fulbright scholarship (1969-70), which allowed the development of the dissertation into the present work, as well as for the close and beneficial association with Professor Klaus Hartmann during that period.

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