

# The Nature of Truth

# LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE

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VOLUME 29

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María José Frápolli

# The Nature of Truth

An updated approach to the meaning  
of truth ascriptions

 Springer

María José Frápolli  
Philosophy  
University of Granada  
Granada, Spain

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*To Fran, Victoria and Joan*



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# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Some Preliminary Issues</b> .....	1
1.1	The General Purpose.....	1
1.2	Some Features of the Proposal.....	4
1.3	Required Philosophical Assumptions .....	6
1.4	The Content of a Theory of Truth.....	9
1.5	The Pragmatist Ingredient.....	15
1.6	The Structure of the Book.....	17
<b>2</b>	<b>Syntax: Playing with Building Blocks</b> .....	21
2.1	Does Syntax Matter?.....	21
2.2	The Truth Predicate.....	22
2.3	The Truth Operator .....	28
2.4	Truth and Identity.....	31
2.5	Adverbs, Adjectives and Nouns .....	38
<b>3</b>	<b>The Meaning and Content of Truth Ascriptions</b> .....	41
3.1	The Distinction.....	41
3.2	Kinds of Proforms.....	48
3.3	Truth-Ascriptions .....	50
3.4	A Classification of Truth-Ascriptions .....	56
3.5	Special Semantic Tasks .....	58
<b>4</b>	<b>What Do We Do with Truth Ascriptions?</b> .....	65
4.1	Pragmatics and Semantics.....	65
4.2	Assertions.....	67
4.3	Expressivism .....	71
4.4	Particular Pragmatic Functions .....	78
<b>5</b>	<b>The Liar Paradox (And Other Logico-Semantic Issues)</b> .....	87
5.1	Is There a Liar Paradox? .....	87
5.2	Truth Bearers.....	88
5.3	Logical Form.....	94
5.4	The Paradox .....	99

- 6 What Do You Mean by “Redundancy”?** ..... 111
  - 6.1 Ramsey’s View ..... 111
  - 6.2 Redundancy, of What? ..... 113
  - 6.3 Syntactic Redundancy ..... 116
  - 6.4 Semantic Redundancy ..... 120
  - 6.5 Pragmatic Redundancy ..... 123
  
- 7 Obvious Answers for Ready-Made Objections** ..... 127
  - 7.1 Standard Objections ..... 127
  - 7.2 The Epistemic Objections ..... 128
    - 7.2.1 Definitions vs. Criteria ..... 129
    - 7.2.2 The Causal Effect of Truth ..... 130
  - 7.3 The Logical Objection ..... 131
  - 7.4 The Semantic Objection ..... 136
  - 7.5 Mathematical Truth and Other Metaphors ..... 138
  
- References** ..... 143
  
- Index** ..... 151