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To my family

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Contents

1	Introduction	1
I	Contract Design and Incentive Provision: Theoretical Studies	9
2	Public versus Private Ownership	11
2.1	Introduction	11
2.2	The model	19
2.3	Quantity contracts and investments	23
2.3.1	Only the manager has investment tasks	23
2.3.2	Only the government has investment tasks	27
2.3.3	Both parties have investment tasks	29
2.4	Optimal governance structures	33
2.5	Concluding remarks	38
2.6	Appendix	40
3	Public-Private Partnerships	45
3.1	Introduction	45
3.2	The model	53
3.3	Public-private partnership	57
3.3.1	No innovation at date 2	57
3.3.2	An innovation at date 2	58
3.3.3	The effort decision at date 1	61

3.4	Traditional procurement	62
3.5	Comparing the modes of provision	63
3.6	Concluding remarks	69
3.7	Appendix	71
4	Endogenous Information Structures	79
4.1	Introduction	79
4.2	The model	81
4.3	Scenario I	82
4.4	Scenario II	86
4.5	Comparison of the scenarios	88
II	Contract Design and Incentive Provision: Experimental Evidence	91
5	Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem?	93
5.1	Introduction	93
5.2	Can contracts solve the hold-up problem?	98
5.2.1	Experimental design	98
5.2.2	Predictions	102
5.2.3	Results	105
5.3	Contracts as reference points	111
5.3.1	Experimental design and predictions	111
5.3.2	Results	114
5.4	Concluding remarks	119
5.5	Appendix	122
6	Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard	129
6.1	Introduction	129
6.2	The model	133
6.3	Experimental design	140
6.4	Qualitative hypotheses	143

6.5	Data analysis	145
6.5.1	Experimental results	145
6.5.2	Individual wage offers and resulting efforts	149
6.6	Discussion	155
6.7	Concluding remarks	158
6.8	Appendix	159
7	Behavioral Biases and Cognitive Reflection	185
7.1	Introduction	185
7.2	Experimental design	186
7.3	Cognitive reflection test	187
7.4	Results	188
7.4.1	Base rate fallacy	189
7.4.2	Conservatism bias	191
7.4.3	Overweighting and underweighting of base rates	192
7.4.4	Overconfidence	193
7.4.5	Endowment effect	194
	References	196