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Sophia Müller

The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in Anti-Subsidy Law

A Study on the WTO, the EU and China

 Springer

Sophia Müller
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Preface

This study is a truly global product of research. Its completion has sent me well around the world—from Passau to Beijing, Shanghai, and finally Brussels. Each stay has left its traces on both work and authoress and has shaped the study’s content in its very unique way. The months and years spent on the completion of my thesis have been challenging academically and personally—but at the same time so diverse and enriching that I would not like to have missed one single moment.

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Sophia Müller

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Abbreviations

ADA	Anti-Dumping Agreement
ASCM	Agreement of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
BASR	Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation
CAP	Protocol of Accession of the People's Republic of China
CIRR	Commercial Interest Reference Rate
CRS	Cold-rolled steel
DSR	Dispute Settlement Reports
DSU	Dispute Settlement Understanding
EC	European Community
ECJ	European Court of Justice
e.g.	<i>exempli gratia</i> (for example)
EU	European Union
F.2d.	Federal Reporter, second series
Fed. Reg.	Federal Register
FIT	Feed-in tariff
GA	General Assembly
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GC	General Court
GDP	Gross domestic product
HRS	Hot-rolled steel
i.e.	<i>id est</i> (that is to say)
ICITO	International Committee for the International Trade Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITO	International Trade Organization
LUR	Land-use right
MES	Market economy situation
MFN	Most-favoured nation
NME	Non-market economy
NMES	Non-market economy situation
No.	Number
OECD	Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation

OJ	Official Journal of the EU
p.	Page
para.	Paragraph
Pub. L.	Public Law
RSC	Revised Statutes of Canada
SCM Agreement	Agreement of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
SIMA	Special Import Measures Act
SLI	Select Legislative Instrument
SOCB	State-owned commercial bank
SOE	State-owned enterprise
Stat.	United States Statutes at Large
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TiSA	Trade in Services Agreement
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNTS	United Nations Treaty Series
USC	United States Code
VCLT	Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
WTO	World Trade Organization