

Alliance Persistence within the Anglo-American  
Special Relationship

Ruike Xu

# Alliance Persistence within the Anglo- American Special Relationship

The Post-Cold War Era

palgrave  
macmillan

Ruike Xu  
Beijing Foreign Studies University  
Beijing, China

ISBN 978-3-319-49618-4      ISBN 978-3-319-49619-1 (eBook)  
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49619-1

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016959555

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Cover image © nicholas belton / Getty

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave imprint is published by Springer Nature  
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG  
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

*This book is dedicated to pay tribute to my inspiring supervisor  
Professor Alex Danchev (1955–2016), a towering scholar on  
Anglo-American relations and a true polymath.*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Undertaking the research for this book was a considerable challenge. I am very fortunate that many people have readily offered their help, and I would like to take the opportunity to thank them here.

I thank Professor Wyn Rees for his invaluable support, encouragement and patient guidance. It has been a joyful experience to work with him over the last four years. I owe Professor Alex Danchev and Dr Rory Cormac a debt of gratitude. Professor Danchev's willingness to accept my criticism of his work on the AASR left a deep impression on me, while Dr Cormac's expertise on intelligence has proved to be an invaluable asset for my research on Anglo-American intelligence cooperation. It is sad that Professor Danchev passed away during the production of this book. This book is in memory of him.

I thank Professor Alan Dobson, Sir David Omand, Lieutenant-General Sir Graeme Lamb, Air Vice-Marshal Michael Harwood, Professor Lucy Sargisson, Dr Matthew Rendall and Dr Peter Cruttenden, who provided enlightening comments on my research at different stages. In addition, I am indebted to Professor John Dumbrell and Andrew Mumford, whose comments helped refine this book. I am also thankful to the two anonymous reviewers and the editorial team of Palgrave Macmillan.

I acknowledge the University of Nottingham and China Scholarship Council for their generous financial support during my undertaking of this research project.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank my parents. Their unconditional love and support have helped me remain confident when facing challenges in both work and life.

# CONTENTS

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	1
1.1	<i>The AASR as a Special Alliance</i>	2
1.2	<i>Defining the Term “Special Relationship”</i>	3
1.3	<i>Historical Background: The AASR in the Cold War</i>	6
1.3.1	<i>The AASR Under Atlee (1945–1951)</i>	6
1.3.2	<i>The AASR Under Churchill and Eden (1951–1957)</i>	7
1.3.3	<i>The AASR Under Macmillan and Douglas-Home (1957–1964)</i>	8
1.3.4	<i>The AASR Under Wilson (1964–1970)</i>	9
1.3.5	<i>The AASR Under Heath, Wilson and Callaghan (1970–1979)</i>	10
1.3.6	<i>The AASR Under Thatcher (1979–1990)</i>	11
1.4	<i>Methodology</i>	12
1.5	<i>The Contribution of This Book</i>	14
1.6	<i>Structure of This Book</i>	16
	<i>Notes</i>	17
<b>2</b>	<b>Explaining the Persistence of the AASR: An Alliance Persistence Perspective</b>	19
2.1	<i>Introduction</i>	19
2.2	<i>Debate Over the Persistence of the AASR</i>	20
2.2.1	<i>Traditional Categorisation of Different Schools in Anglo-American Relations</i>	20
2.2.2	<i>An Updated Categorisation of Different Schools in Anglo-American Relations</i>	23

2.3	<i>A Theory of Alliance Persistence</i>	32
2.3.1	<i>Current Alliance Theories</i>	32
2.3.2	<i>Constructing a Theory of Alliance Persistence</i>	34
2.3.3	<i>A Theory of Alliance Persistence versus Traditional Model of Interests and Sentiments</i>	36
2.4	<i>The Persistence of the AASR: An Alliance Persistence Perspective</i>	38
2.4.1	<i>Distribution of Power and the Persistence of the AASR</i>	38
2.4.2	<i>Collective Identity and the Persistence of the AASR</i>	39
2.4.3	<i>Institutionalisation and the Persistence of the AASR</i>	41
2.4.4	<i>Common Threats and the Persistence of the AASR</i>	44
2.4.5	<i>The Four-Dimensional AASR</i>	45
2.5	<i>Conclusion</i>	46
	<i>Note</i>	47
<b>3</b>	<b>Asymmetrical Distribution of Power and the Persistence of the Utilitarian AASR in the Post-Cold War Era</b>	49
3.1	<i>Introduction</i>	49
3.2	<i>Distribution of Power Within the AASR</i>	50
3.2.1	<i>Distribution of Hard Power</i>	50
3.2.2	<i>Distribution of Soft Power</i>	55
3.2.3	<i>Implications of the Asymmetrical Distribution of Power</i>	56
3.3	<i>Mutual Reciprocity Between the UK and the US</i>	58
3.3.1	<i>Utility of the UK in Hard Power</i>	61
3.3.2	<i>Utility of the UK in Soft Power</i>	64
3.4	<i>The “Americans Benignly Lead and British Optionally Follow” Behaviour Model</i>	67
3.4.1	<i>Three Types of Asymmetrical Alliances in Terms of Leadership and Followership</i>	67
3.4.2	<i>Yugoslav Wars and the AASR in the 1990s</i>	70
3.4.3	<i>Military Operation in Afghanistan After 9/11</i>	73

3.4.4	<i>The American-Led Military Operation in Iraq</i>	76
3.4.5	<i>NATO Intervention in Libya</i>	79
3.5	<i>Conclusion</i>	82
	<i>Notes</i>	83
<b>4</b>	<b>Collective Identity and the Persistence of the Fraternal AASR in the Post-Cold War Era</b>	85
4.1	<i>Introduction</i>	85
4.2	<i>Contributors to Anglo-American Collective Identity</i>	86
4.2.1	<i>Common Sentiments</i>	86
4.2.2	<i>Repeated Cooperative Acts</i>	90
4.3	<i>Strength of Anglo-American Collective Identity</i>	91
4.3.1	<i>Anglo-American Collective Identity at the Public Level</i>	92
4.3.2	<i>Anglo-American Collective Identity at the Elite Level</i>	99
4.4	<i>Impacts of a Strong Collective Identity on the Persistence of the AASR</i>	104
4.4.1	<i>Anglo-American Common Threat Perceptions</i>	105
4.4.2	<i>Embedded Trust</i>	107
4.4.3	<i>Norms of Appropriate Behaviour</i>	109
4.5	<i>Conclusion</i>	110
	<i>Notes</i>	111
<b>5</b>	<b>Institutionalisation and the Persistence of the Sticky AASR in the Post-Cold War Era</b>	113
5.1	<i>Introduction</i>	113
5.2	<i>Why Institutionalisation Matters in the Persistence of the AASR</i>	114
5.3	<i>The Institutionalised Anglo-American Intelligence Relationship</i>	116
5.4	<i>The Institutionalised Anglo-American Nuclear Relationship</i>	124
5.5	<i>The Institutionalised Anglo-American Military Relationship</i>	133
5.6	<i>Conclusion</i>	142
	<i>Notes</i>	142



<b>6</b>	<b>Common Threats and the Persistence of the Vigilant AASR in the Post-Cold War Era</b>	<b>145</b>
6.1	<i>Introduction</i>	145
6.2	<i>Why Common Threats Matter in the Persistence of the AASR</i>	146
6.3	<i>The Proliferation of WMD</i>	148
6.4	<i>Islamist Terrorism</i>	161
6.4.1	<i>Reinvigoration of the AASR after 9/11</i>	164
6.5	<i>Humanitarian Disasters</i>	168
6.6	<i>Conclusion</i>	172
	<i>Notes</i>	173
<b>7</b>	<b>Conclusion: A Theory of Alliance Persistence and the Future of the AASR</b>	<b>177</b>
7.1	<i>A Theory of Alliance Persistence</i>	178
7.2	<i>The Persistence of the Four-Dimensional AASR After the Cold War</i>	180
7.2.1	<i>Mutual Reciprocity</i>	180
7.2.2	<i>Congenial Partnership</i>	183
7.2.3	<i>Embedded Habits of Cooperation</i>	185
7.2.4	<i>Recurrent Common Threats</i>	187
7.3	<i>Challenges Facing the AASR and Implication for Its Persistence in the Future</i>	190
7.3.1	<i>The US's Pivot to the Asia-Pacific Region</i>	190
7.3.2	<i>The UK's Shrinking Military Capability</i>	192
7.3.3	<i>Decline of Anglo-Saxon Population in the US</i>	193
7.3.4	<i>EU Referendum</i>	194
	<i>Notes</i>	195
	<b>Appendix 1: List of Interviewees</b>	<b>197</b>
	<b>Appendix 2: The US's Special Relationships and the Dates When They Were Publicly Acknowledged by American Presidents</b>	<b>199</b>
	<b>Appendix 3: The JIC Estimates on Iraq's WMD, 1990–2002</b>	<b>203</b>

<b>Appendix 4: The American Intelligence Community's Estimates on Iraq's WMD, 1996–2002</b>	<b>205</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>207</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>247</b>

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AASR	Anglo-American Special Relationship
AFISRA	Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency
AFRICOM	Africa Command
ALF	Arab Liberation Front
ANO	Abu Nidal Organization
AQAP	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQI	Al Qaeda in Iraq
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb
ARG	Accident Response Group
ARRC	Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
AWE	Atomic Weapons Establishment
BAFDC	British-American Forces Dinning Club
BOI	Balance of Interest
BOP	Balance of Power
BOT	Balance of Threat
BRNC	Britannia Royal Naval College
BSA	Basic Standardisation Agreement
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive
CENTCOM	Central Command
CGI	Coast Guard Intelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
CYBERCOM	Cyber Command
DGC	Defence Geographic Centre
DGIFC	Defence Geospatial Intelligence Fusion Centre

DHO	Defence HUMINT Organisation
DI	Defence Intelligence
DIA	Defence Intelligence Agency
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
DSACT	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
DSD	Defence Signals Directorate
EIVR	Exchange of Information by Visit and Report
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FTX	Field Training Exercise
GC&CS	Government Code and Cypher School
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSCB	Government Communications Security Bureau
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IASR	Israeli-American Special Relationship
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IIS	Iraqi Intelligence Service
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
INR	Intelligence and Research
INSCOM	Intelligence and Security Command
IOSWG	International Open Source Working Group
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IS	Islamic State
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISC	Intelligence and Security Committee
JAGO	Joint Aeronautic and Geospatial Organisation
JARIC	Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre
JFIG	Joint Forces Intelligence Group
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JOWOG	Joint Working Groups
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
JSSO	Joint Services Signals Organisation
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MASINT	Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
MCIA	Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
MDA	Mutual Defence Agreement
MEK	Mujahidin e-Khalq
MI5	Secret Service

MI6	Security Intelligence Service
MNF-I	Multinational Force-Iraq
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NMD	National Missile Defence
NORTHCOM	Northern Command
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIA	Office of Intelligence and Analysis
OICI	Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
ONSI	Office of National Security Intelligence
OSC	Open Source Centre
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
OUP	Operation Unified Protector
PACOM	Pacific Command
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLF	Palestinian Liberation Front
PSA	Polaris Sales Agreement
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RAF	Royal Air Force
SAS	Special Air Service
SBS	Special Boat Service
SFSG	Special Forces Support Group
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SNF	Short-range Nuclear Force
SNP	Scottish National Party
SRR	Special Reconnaissance Regiment
STOA	Science and Technology Options Assessment
STRATCOM	Strategic Command
TFI	Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
TWPG	Trident Warhead Program Group
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSS	United Nations Security Council
USAF	United States Air Force
UTN	Ummah Tameer-e-Nau
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

## LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 2.1	Four schools in Anglo-American relations	24
Fig. 2.2	Framework of a theory of alliance persistence	36
Fig. 2.3	The four-dimensional AASR	46
Fig. 3.1	Military Expenditure in the UK and the US, 1951–1991 (Million in 2011 U.S. Dollars)	51
Fig. 3.2	Military Expenditure in the UK and the US, 1991–2014 (Million in 2011 U.S. Dollars)	52
Fig. 3.3	GDP in the UK and the US, 1951–1991 (10 billion in 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars)	53
Fig. 3.4	GDP in the UK and the US, 1991–2011 (10 billion in current U.S. dollars)	54
Fig. 3.5	Incongruence of Voting Behaviour between the US and Other UNSC Permanent Members, 1994–2012	65
Fig. 4.1	Percentages of the US's favourable feelings towards its four allies, 1990–2014	93
Fig. 4.2	Percentages of American people's very/mostly favourable foreign countries, 2005–2015	94
Fig. 4.3	Percentages of Americans' view on countries as its close ally, 1997–2007	96
Fig. 4.4	Percentages of the Three European Countries' Favourable Feelings towards the US, 2003–2015	97
Fig. 5.1	Numbers of the JOWOGs Meetings under the auspices of the 1958 MDA, 2001–2011	129
Fig. 5.2	Numbers of the visits under the auspices of the 1958 MDA, 2003–2008	130
Fig. 6.1	American Public Opinion on Saddam's Iraq (%), 1991–2003	158

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1	Top five countries in the IfG-Monocle soft power index	55
Table 3.2	Top five countries in the Anholt-GfK Roper nation brands index	56
Table 3.3	Troop contributions of the top three leading states in NATO-led ISAF, 2007–2014	75
Table 3.4	The US and the UK Troops in Iraq War, 2003–2009	79
Table 4.1	Words used by Presidents and Prime Ministers to describe the AASR	100
Table 4.2	Contributors to the AASR from the perspective of Presidents and Prime Ministers	101
Table 4.3	The importance of the AASR in the eyes of Presidents and Prime Ministers	102
Table 5.1	Intelligence agencies of the UK and the US on the five “INTs”	117
Table 5.2	Institutionalisation of the Anglo-American nuclear relationship	126
Table 5.3	JOWOGs under the auspices of the 1958 MDA	127
Table 6.1	Comparison of the British Dossier, American NIE and Duelfer report	152
Table 6.2	Documented Iraqi use of chemical weapons	160
Table 6.3	Terrorist groups supported by Saddam’s Iraq	160