

Commercializing Cosmopolitan Security

Andreas Krieg

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Safeguarding the Responsibility to Protect

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To my lovely wife Zohal

PREFACE

I commenced the research for this book amid the Arab Spring, when states and societies just outside Europe were plunging into chaos and anarchy. The resulting humanitarian crises—most notably those in Libya and Syria—received different responses from the international community: while in Libya the international community was ready to protect civilians at the 1,000-mark, five years into the conflict in Syria little has been done to alleviate the human suffering with hundreds of thousands killed and millions displaced. In my previous research I addressed the question of what motivates states to conduct humanitarian interventions, suggesting that, albeit a mix of altruistic and self-interested considerations, ultimately the decision of intervening or abstaining is a sober cost-benefit analysis.¹ The resulting inconsistency with which the international community commits to the responsibility to protect (R2P) begs the question of how to increase the states' political will to provide for human security overseas effectively and ethically.

This is where this book begins—with the realization that although states widely acknowledge the norm of the R2P they often lack the political will to act to protect, as Wheeler once put it, strangers in need.² States either completely abstain from preventing, reacting and rebuilding or act half-heartedly, generating questionable outcomes. The main reason, particularly for the liberal state, relates to the social contractarian nature of civil–military relations: the liberal state is asked to potentially put its soldier into harm's way to provide security for individuals who are not part of the fiduciary association bringing the state into existence. Hence, the will of liberal states to act on their responsibility to protect is constrained

by the political costs of potentially having to expose the soldier to the operational risks of military intervention for the mere benefit of strangers overseas.

It was this realization that inspired the idea of finding an alternative cosmopolitan security provider to the soldier—an alternative with a similar skill set but without any social contractarian bond to any particular society and state. The private contractor as a commercial provider of security appeared to tick the boxes. As a volunteer employed by a private military company to provide security primarily in exchange for financial remuneration, the contractor might offer the liberal state a means to protect civilians in need overseas at relatively low political costs.

Combining two timely topics, namely the future of the responsibility to protect and the commercialization of security, I arrived at an interesting normative question, which was to lie at the heart of this research: should the contractor become the liberal state's cosmopolitan agent to provide human security as a global good to strangers in need?

Inherently then, the ambition of this book is theoretical and normative in nature. Nonetheless, the conceptual understanding of the contractor's potential role as a liberal state's force multiplier in humanitarian intervention, has been based on extensive novel empirical research aiming at understanding how private military companies and private security companies employ the contractor in various security functions.

NOTES

1. Krieg, A. (2012). *Motivations for Humanitarian Intervention-Theoretical and Empirical Considerations*. New York: Springer.
2. Wheeler, N. (2002). *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Further, it is important to highlight here the military and academic colleagues as well as students at the UK Defence Academy who, through their insights, have enriched my understanding of strategic and operational decision-making within conventional militaries. I also want to say thank you to my family and friends who helped to maintain my sanity throughout the sometimes tiring work of both writing a doctoral dissertation and later transforming this dissertation into a book manuscript. In particular I extend thanks to my colleague and friend Dr David Roberts, whose constructive inputs and comments have helped me through the process of restructuring and rewriting my original thesis. Last but not least, I thank my amazing wife Zohal for pushing me to get my dissertation published.

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GLOSSARY

ADS	AeroSpace, Defence and Security Group
AECA	Arms Export Controls Act
AEGIS	London-based Private Security Company
ALI	Air Land Integration
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
API	Additional Protocol I 1977 to the Geneva Conventions
ASIS	American Society for Industrial Security
ATAC	US Alien Tort Claims Act
BAPSC	British Association of Private Security Companies
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BMP	<i>Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty</i> (Russian-made APC)
CAS	Close Air Support
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CMO	Company Management Officer
DMPI	Designated Mean Point of Impact for projectiles
DoD	US Defence Department
EO	Executive Outcomes
FAA	<i>Forças Armadas Angolanas</i> (Angolan Armed Forces)
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HLPR	UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
HN	Host Nation
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICoC	International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross

IGO	International Governmental Organization
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IPA	Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ISOA	International Stability Operations Association
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
JDAM	Joint Direct Attack Munitions
JSCSC	UK Joint Services Command and Staff College
JTAC	Joint Terminal Attack Controller
LN	Local National
LOAC	Laws of Armed Conflict
MCO	Major Combat Operation
MiG	Russian Aircraft Manufacturer
MPRI	Military Professionals Inc. (PMC/PSC)
MoD	UK Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PGM	Precision Guided Munitions
PMC	Private Military Company
PMSRG	King's College Private Military and Security Research Group
PSC	Private Security Company
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RoE	Rules of Engagement
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (rebel movement in Sierra Leone)
SIGIR	US Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction
SF	Special Forces
SMOF	State Monopoly on Force
TCN	Third Country National
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Unmanned Air Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission Sierra Leone
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNITA	<i>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</i>
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Croatia
USA	United States
USD	US Dollar

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