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Contracts of Adhesion Between Law and Economics

Rethinking the Unconscionability Doctrine

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ISSN 2192-855X ISSN 2192-8568 (electronic)
ISBN 978-3-319-13113-9 ISBN 978-3-319-13114-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-13114-6

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014954618

Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

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