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# Cryptology and Network Security

13th International Conference, CANS 2014  
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Proceedings



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## Volume Editors

Dimitris Gritzalis  
Athens University of Economics & Business  
Department of Informatics  
76, Patission Str., 10434 Athens, Greece  
E-mail: dgrit@aueb.gr

Aggelos Kiayias  
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens  
Department of Informatics and Telecommunications  
Panepistimiopolis, 15784 Athens, Greece  
E-mail: aggelos@di.uoa.gr

Ioannis Askoxylakis  
FORTH-ICS  
Vassilika Vouton  
P.O. Box 1385, 711 10 Heraklion, Crete, Greece  
E-mail: asko@ics.forth.gr

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# Preface

The 13th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security (CANS) took place on Heraklion, on the island of Crete, Greece, during October 20–22, 2014, and was organized by the Institute of Computer Science of the Foundation for Research and Technology - Hellas (FORTH-ICS).

The conference received 86 submissions, four of which were withdrawn. The Program Committee (PC) decided to accept 25 papers for presentation at the conference. Most submitted papers were reviewed by at least three PC members, while submissions co-authored by a PC member received at least one additional review. In addition to the PC members, a number of external reviewers joined the review process in their particular areas of expertise. The initial reviewing period was followed by a lively discussion phase that enabled the committee to converge on the final program. There were six papers that were conditionally accepted and shepherded by assigned PC members in a second round of reviewing. All conditionally accepted papers were included in the program. The paper submission, reviewing, discussion, and the preparation of proceedings were facilitated by the Web-based system EasyChair.

The objective of the CANS conference is to support excellent research in cryptography and network security and promote the interaction between researchers working in these areas. The PC strived to broaden the program and include papers covering diverse areas such as encryption, cryptanalysis, malware analysis, privacy and identification systems as well as various types of network protocol design and analysis work. The program also featured three keynote speakers, Sotiris Ioannidis from FORTH, Moni Naor from Weizmann Institute of Science, and Dawn Song from the University of California, Berkeley, who gave lectures on cutting-edge research on cryptography and network security. The titles and abstracts of their talks can be found in this proceedings volume.

Finally, we would like to thank all the authors who submitted their research work to the conference, the members of the Organizing Committee, who worked very hard for the success and smooth operation of the event, and the members of the Steering Committee and particularly Yvo Desmedt whose guidance during various stages of the PC work was invaluable. Last but not least, we thank all the attendees who participated and contributed to the stimulating discussions after the talks and during the breaks and social events that took place as part of the conference program.

October 2014

Dimitris Gritzalis  
Aggelos Kiayias  
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## **Invited Talks**

# Invited Talk 1: Primary-Secondary-Resolvers Membership Proof Systems and their Application to DNSSEC

Moni Naor

Weizmann Institute of Science  
Rehovot, Israel  
`moni.naor@weizmann.ac.il`

**Abstract.** We consider Primary-Secondary-Resolver Membership Proof Systems (PSR for short) that enable a secondary to convince a resolver whether or not a given element is in a set defined by the primary without revealing more information about the set.

The main motivation is studying the problem of zone enumeration in DNSSEC. DNSSEC is designed to prevent network attackers from tampering with domain name system (DNS) messages. The cryptographic machinery used in DNSSEC, however, also creates a new vulnerability - Zone Enumeration, where an adversary launches a small number of online DNSSEC queries and then uses offline dictionary attacks to learn which domain names are present or absent in a DNS zone.

We explain why current DNSSEC (NSEC3) suffers from the problem of zone enumeration: we use cryptographic lower bounds to prove that in a PSR system the secondary must perform non trivial online computation and in particular under certain circumstances signatures. This implies that the three design goals of DNSSEC — high performance, security against network attackers, and privacy against zone enumeration — cannot be satisfied simultaneously.

We provide PSR constructions matching our lower bound and in particular suggest NSEC5, a protocol that solves the problem of DNSSEC zone enumeration while remaining faithful to the operational realities of DNSSEC. The scheme can be seen as a variant of NSEC3, where the hash function is replaced with an RSA based hashing scheme. Other constructions we have are based on the BonehLynnShacham signature scheme, Verifiable Random and Unpredictable Functions and Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption.

The talk is based on the papers “NSEC5: Provably Preventing DNSSEC Zone Enumeration” by Sharon Goldberg, Moni Naor, Dimitrios Papadopoulos, Leonid Reyzin, Sachin Vasant and Asaf Ziv and “PSR Membership Proof Systems” by Moni Naor and Asaf Ziv.



# Invited Talk 2: Ask Us before you download: Lessons from Analyzing 3 Million Android Apps

Dawn Song

University of California, Berkeley  
Berkeley, CA, USA  
[dawnsong@cs.berkeley.edu](mailto:dawnsong@cs.berkeley.edu)

**Abstract.** Android is the most popular mobile platform currently, with over 1 billion devices activated. Millions of Android Apps have been downloaded billions of times. What are the security and privacy issues in these millions of apps? What lessons can we learn to ensure better app security and mobile security? In this talk, I will share our insights and lessons learned from analyzing over 3 million apps.

# Invited Talk 3: Security applications of GPUs

Sotiris Ioannidis

Institute of Computer Science  
Foundation for Research & Technology Hellas, Greece  
`sotiris@ics.forth.gr`

**Abstract.** Modern graphics processors have been traditionally used for gaming, but in the last few years they have been used more and more in the area of high performance computing. In this talk we will explore alternate uses of graphics processors, in the area of security. We will discuss how a defender can use graphics hardware to bolster system defenses, and how miscreants can exploit them to build better and stealthier malware.

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