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# International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism

 Springer

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## Preface

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, every continent except Antarctica witnessed at least one major assault from forces within or beyond their borders; in some areas, armed conflict was prolonged. All of these incursions have had enormous impact on ordinary people and civil society.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, regions that were not themselves subjected to direct assaults often sent troops to fight elsewhere in the world, and not necessarily for peacekeeping purposes. When state and nonstate political and military leaders initiate armed aggression to promote their agendas, the people in their communities may react in a variety of ways: for example, they may personally take up arms; they may provide political and verbal support to their leaders; they may protest actively—either violently or nonviolently—against their leaders’ military activities; and/or they may leave the area or declare their own neutrality.

From a psychological perspective, it is important to understand the kinds of reasoning that individuals bring to bear on the efforts of their leaders to engage them in armed conflict and/or other forms of aggression. In this book, we examine conceptions of war, torture, terrorism, and national security held by ordinary people from nine major regions of the world—Western Europe, Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East, the Gulf States (analyses of responses for this region are only available in the sections of this book for definitions and invasion), Africa, South and Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central and South America, and North America. We also provide an in-depth analysis of the socio-cognitive and emotional/motivational mechanisms that underlie the thinking of people from these regions concerning the potential right of governments to invade other countries or torture prisoners in times of war.

Because so much of the world has been carved up into nation states, with borders often created rather arbitrarily by the states with the most armed might, analyses of military conflict have often focused on individual countries and their involvement in global wars or more circumscribed violence. However, armed conflicts among groups are, with increasing frequency, not a matter of one country invading another to enhance economic or political power, or of a colony fighting for its independence, but a matter of regional issues with cultural and religious roots that sometimes extend beyond the emergence of nation

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<sup>1</sup> Civil society has been defined in many ways; it is used here to refer to individuals as well as voluntary groups, including NGOs, operating outside of the business and governmental spheres, to pursue common goals and values.

states. Thus, in this book, our focus is on the views of individuals in key regions of the world that vary in regard to the level of current and recent conflict, with less emphasis on the specific countries within each region.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the United Kingdom/Anglophone region, consisting of Canada and the United States, along with Australia, the United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland, has experienced the least amount of armed conflict on its own soil, despite suffering from some terrorist activities (Project Ploughshares 2010). On the other hand, the United States, to the dismay of many of its allies, has contributed to armed conflict in many other areas of the world, particularly the Middle East. These actions were fueled in part by military expenditures that amounted, in 2008, to 696.3 billion dollars—nearly half of all the military expenditures in the world (\$1,547.8 billion) that year (Project Ploughshares 2009). It is also noteworthy that the US monthly contribution of police, military experts, and troops to UN peacekeeping forces as of April 2011 was relatively small (\$110 billion), as compared, for example, to the United Kingdom (\$284 billion), Canada (\$213 billion), France (\$1,467 billion), and Italy (\$1,944 billion) (United Nations 2011).

The regions that were most highly subjected to domination by colonial and foreign powers throughout most of the twentieth century—that is, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa—are the regions still experiencing the most armed conflict on their own soil in the early twenty-first century. In Europe, particularly Eastern and Central Europe, armed conflict in the post-Cold War period has been characterized by intrastate violence reflective of nationalistic strivings—for example, in Chechnya, where efforts to separate from Russia had been squelched by 2009, although sporadic fighting continued into 2011. Overall, since WWII, the predominant form of armed conflict has consisted of “societal” warfare—that is, armed clashes related to civil, ethnic, and communal conflicts (Marshall and Cole 2009). In 2009, some of the best known of these societal wars were in the Sudan (particularly involving Darfur and South Sudan), Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as Israel (Gaza). The term “societal warfare” also applies to countries with serious armed conflict related to the production and sale of illegal drugs; in 2009, the major countries involved in that kind of societal warfare included Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and Myanmar (Marshall and Cole 2009).

Throughout the world, there still live some people whose collective memories are marked by World War II, the Cold War, and/or the colonial wars of liberation. In many regions, the younger generations have little direct experience with war; in others, dealing with armed conflict is a daily struggle leading to daily losses. In many regions, the leaders of some countries and groups have long been committed to peaceful coexistence, whereas the leaders of other countries and groups have long based their power on commitments to retaliation and conquest. An important task for psychologists is to understand better the kinds of thinking that allow ordinary citizens within these regions to tolerate, support, or resist the aggressive agenda of their leaders.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of some of the issues related to major armed conflicts, torture, and terrorism at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It then describes the international collaborative research project that produced the findings discussed in this volume; this section provides

information on research methodology, including the composition of the international collaborative known as the Group on International Perspectives on Government Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP), the nature of the international survey, and sample recruitment. The remainder of this chapter is devoted primarily to an overview of the coding systems developed for each of the four major sections of this volume, which are the following: (1) definitions of war, torture, and terrorism; (2) conceptions of national security; (3) judgments concerning the acceptability of invasion; and (4) judgments concerning the acceptability of torture. The analyses done for these last two sections build on and extend the work of Alfred Bandura (e.g., 1999) on moral disengagement and engagement. In particular, we consider the extent to which the sociocognitive mechanisms he identified as fundamental to moral disengagement can be identified in the responses of ordinary people making judgments about the extent to which governments have a right to invade other countries and torture prisoners during times of war.

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## **Invasion, Torture, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century**

### **Armed Conflicts**

The post-World War II decline in the frequency of armed conflicts has continued into the first decade of the twenty-first century. Depending upon the definition of armed conflict being used in different reports, estimates vary regarding the number of such conflicts occurring in any 1 year; nevertheless, there is general agreement that interstate violence in particular has declined. Defining armed conflict as “a political conflict in which armed combat involves the armed forces of at least one state (or one or more armed factions seeking to gain control of all or part of the state), and in which at least 1,000 people have been killed by the fighting during the course of the conflict” (Ploughshares 2010, p. 5), the Ploughshares Project indicates that there were 40 such armed conflicts in 2000 and only 28 such conflicts (in 24 different countries) in 2009—the latter figures being the lowest since Ploughshares began tracking armed conflict in 1985. According to the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) 2009 Annual Report, in which armed conflict is defined to include interstate and civil wars with a minimum threshold of 500 directly related deaths, “the global magnitude of warfare has decreased by over 60% since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2009 to its lowest level since 1960” (Center for Systemic Peace 2009, p. 4).

Although there were armed conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia throughout the early twenty-first century, these conflicts by no means directly involved all of the countries in each region. For example, in 2008, according to Project Ploughshares, 20% of the 50 countries in Africa experienced armed conflict—which accounted for over 39% of all the conflicts in the world that year. Similarly, in Asia, 19% of the 42 countries were subject to armed conflict—again just over 39% of all the world conflicts of the time. During the same year, in the much smaller region of the Middle

East (14 countries), armed conflict in only four countries (29% of the countries constituting that region) accounted for 14% of the world's armed conflicts. Less than 10% of the armed conflicts occurred in Europe (specifically, in part of Russia) and the Americas (44 countries), primarily in Central and South America, where there has been prolonged armed conflict in Colombia, South America. On the other hand, armed forces from the Americas and Europe were involved in some of the armed conflicts in the other regions—again, not necessarily as peacekeepers.

Although the number of armed conflicts in any one year has declined fairly steadily since the end of World War II, the establishment of the United Nations, and the establishment of other international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and NGOs, the percentage of deaths that are civilian rather than military personnel has increased. Among the contributors to noncombatant deaths are aerial bombings by foreign interventionary forces (particularly in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) and “high-casualty terrorist bombings” (HCTB) (defined by CSP as “bombings by nonstate actors resulting in 15 or more deaths”), which have increased dramatically since the 9/11 attacks in the United States.

### **Definitions of War**

In general in this book, we use the terms “war” and “armed conflict” interchangeably; indeed, “war” is often defined as “armed conflict.” A typical dictionary definition of war is “A state of open, armed, often prolonged conflict carried on between nations, states, or parties” (The Free Dictionary 2010). From a scientific point of view, such a definition is of limited usefulness because of its vagueness. What is meant by “open” conflict? How long is “prolonged?” Consequently, within the professional literature, “war” and the related term “armed conflict” are often operationally defined in more concrete terms—for example, as military actions involving 1,000 or more combat deaths (e.g., Leblang and Chan 2003). Moreover, within the academic community, there have been many efforts to differentiate between different types of war, as well as controversies concerning the best definitions of those different types. For example, global wars have been differentiated from small wars, for which there are many different synonyms, such as “brushfire wars,” “guerilla wars,” “internal wars,” “interventions,” “political wars,” and “revolutionary wars” (Beaumont 1995). Similarly, “classic wars” (between nations) have been differentiated from “post-national wars,” generally characterized by a lack of concern with national borders, an emphasis on protecting human rights wherever they may be violated, and a military effort to control what is seen as a global terror risk (Beck 2005).

Although authors vary in the extent to which they use precise terms to define these different types or levels of warfare, they often focus on quantitative criteria such as lives lost. For example, Collier et al. (2004) defined civil wars as violent conflicts, internal to a country, resulting in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths a year. They provide one additional criterion, intended to distinguish civil wars from massacres: that is, nongovernmental forces must be responsible for at least 5 % of the deaths. Sambanis (2004) provided an extensive analysis of problems regarding definitions of civil war that rely on

absolute thresholds for number of combat deaths and offered a much more articulated definition that includes such criteria as the following: (a) the warring parties having publicly stated political objectives; (b) the involvement of the government as one of the warring parties; (c) local representation and recruitment of insurgents; (d) the ability of the weaker party to sustain effective resistance; (e) at least 500–1,000 deaths; and (f) a peace that lasts at least 6 months following a treaty.

Some definitions of war and of particular types of war focus on the presumed motives of the leaders. In one classic definition, Oppenheim (1952) said that war is “a contention between two or more States through their armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases” (p. 54, cited in Dinstein 2001, p. 4). Cramer (2006) defined diversionary wars as “any use of force embarked upon to help solve domestic political problems” (p. 198). These are only two examples of how the definition of war varies with motive; the emphasis on these motives becomes particularly strong when the focus is on “just wars.”

Philosophers, theologians, political theorists, and others have argued for centuries over whether it is possible to differentiate between just and unjust wars. In a classic book on the issue, Walzer (1977) delineated what he viewed as necessary criteria for considering a war to be just; these criteria involved both the reasons for going to war (*jus ad bellum*) as well as the way the war is conducted (*jus in bello*). To meet the criteria for *jus ad bellum*, (1) there must be a just cause or purpose for declaring war (e.g., stopping a genocide); (2) the motivation and intent behind going to war must be morally right (e.g., it must not be aimed at increasing territory or control of natural resources); (3) it must be initiated and declared openly by a legitimate authority; (4) it must be a last resort, after all peaceful alternatives to force have been seriously tried and exhausted; (5) there must be a chance of success; and (6) the universal good that comes from war must outweigh the universal harm (Orend 2005).

The second set of criteria, *jus in bello*, which refer to the conduct of the war once it has been declared, involve both an internal *jus in bello* (concerned with the responsibility to do everything possible to maintain the rights of one’s citizens) and external *jus in bello*, which comprises six more rules: (1) respect and obey international laws concerning weapons; (2) carefully discriminate between civilians (who have noncombatant immunity) and legitimate targets who are harming individuals and their rights; (3) maintain proportionality in the use of force (i.e., use only the amount of force appropriate to and necessary for achieving their goal); (4) consistent with the Geneva Conventions, keep prisoners of war (POWs, who are no longer engaged in harm) away from battle zones until the war ends, and then exchange them for one’s own POWs; (5) use no weapons that are *mala in se* or “evil in themselves” (e.g., rape, genocide, ethnic cleansing); and (6) refrain from reprisals (Orend 2005).

In addition to the criteria for identifying a just war before and during the war, Orend (e.g., 2006) and others have stressed the importance of achieving justice in the postwar period, *jus post bellum*. The seven main principles of a just termination of war include the following: (1) the peace settlement, which should be publically declared, should be reasonable and not an act of revenge;

(2) the settlement should ensure the rights whose violation caused the war in the first place; (3) the settlement must discriminate among leaders, soldiers, and civilians; (4) punishment must be proportionate, and leaders who perpetrated war crimes should be brought to justice; (5) soldiers from all sides of the conflict who committed war crimes should also be held accountable; (6) there should be financial restitution without taxing civilians or usurping resources needed for reconstruction; and (7) rehabilitation and reform may be necessary (e.g., demilitarization and disarmament) (Orend 2005).

Despite the many efforts made to define a “just war,” there remains much controversy surrounding the issue of whether a war can ever truly be just or whether a nation ever absolutely has the right to invade another. In fact, many of the criteria in each of the two sets are highly controversial. For example, the rehabilitation criterion in the *jus post bellum* set is controversial because it may mandate a state’s transformation into a new regime (Orend 2005), which may conflict with the ideologies of that state, and thereby involve an imposition of the values and principles of one state on another. The aim of a just war, however, is to achieve peace, not to wipe out a nation or expand one nation’s military and territorial control and power. Beginning, maintaining, and ending a war appropriately, peacefully, and justly, however, is almost always—if not always—an arduous burden to surmount.

The concept of just war, particularly *jus ad bellum*, is also controversial because of the efforts of many perpetrators of war to present their aggression in sheep’s clothing, to cloak it in the language of moral principles. As is discussed in a later section of this chapter, Albert Bandura has devoted considerable attention to the processes of moral disengagement that allow individuals to perpetrate inhumane acts while trying to convince themselves and others of the morality of their undertakings. One of our interests in this study was to discover whether ordinary people around the world used the language of just war when defining war and considering whether they believed one country ever has the right to invade another country.

## The Persistence of Torture

There are no “just torture” principles comparable to the “just war” principles recognized by the United Nations. Indeed, in Article 5 of its Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) of December 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations declared unequivocally, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” This principle has been reiterated in countless human rights documents in the years since 1948. Nevertheless, although declared illegal by many national, regional, and international laws, torture continues to occur around the world. A study conducted by Amnesty International from early 1997 to mid-2000 revealed that state officials in more than 150 countries had been accused of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. In nearly half of these countries, such officially sanctioned torture was widespread or persistent, and in more than half of them, the torture in some cases led to death (Amnesty International n.d.). In its 2005 report, Amnesty International included such

Western industrialized countries as Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Sweden, and the United States in their list of 132 countries in which torture was being used by security forces, the military, and other authorities.

Since 2005, the reports of torture taking place in various parts of the world continue to grow and to implicate the top leaders of many governments, including the United States. In his 2010 statement to the United Nations, Manfred Nowak, Special Rapporteur on Torture, reported:

Unfortunately, some of the Governments who had invited me, including China, Jordan, Indonesia ... put me under intense surveillance and made various attempts to obstruct my independent fact-finding by preparing places of detention or intimidating witnesses and detainees.... Quite a number of Governments did not respond to my requests or failed to issue invitations for me to conduct missions to their territories, including in Europe (Belarus); Asia and the Middle East (Afghanistan, Fiji, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Yemen); Africa (Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Liberia, Libya and Tunisia); and Latin America (Bolivia). Some Governments issued an invitation but did not agree to the terms of reference, including confidential interviews with detainees, and/or postponed or cancelled the mission at the last minute. These include the United States (with respect to our joint study on the situation of detainees at Guantanamo Bay), the Russian Federation ("postponed" indefinitely) and Equatorial Guinea.... My worst experience was in respect of *Zimbabwe*.

Citizens from many of the countries listed as lacking in cooperation with the investigation concerning use of torture (Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, the United States, and Russia) contributed to the research reported in this volume.

Clearly, many people believe that torture (generally by some other name) is an essential tool in the "war against terrorism"—an important enough tool to make them feel justified to dismiss the international prohibitions against it. For example, the 2010 Executive Report for Human Rights Watch noted that:

International efforts to combat terrorism since the 9/11 attacks in the United States have done incalculable damage to the absolute prohibition on torture. The global ban on torture is a cornerstone of international law, binding on all nations in peace and at war, and no exceptions or justifications are permitted. The attack on the torture prohibition by the US government under President George W. Bush has rightly received widespread international condemnation.... Far less attention has been paid to the other side of the Atlantic, where leading European governments continue to flout their obligations to prevent and eradicate torture worldwide—and betray their declared values—through intelligence cooperation with countries that torture. France, Germany and the United Kingdom—pillars of the European Union and important allies in the fight against terrorism—demonstrate, through policy statements and practice, a willingness (even eagerness) to cooperate with foreign intelligence services in countries like Uzbekistan and Pakistan—notorious for abusive practices.... (Human Rights Watch 2010)

Participants from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom also contributed to the findings reported in this volume regarding torture, terrorism, and war.

In 2010 and 2011, partly in connection with the Wikileaks revelations, considerable information became available regarding approval for "enhanced interrogation" techniques, identified by many sources as forms of torture, at the highest level of the US government. Moreover, a report from Physicians for Human Rights (2010) indicates that in addition to engaging in torture, medical personnel working for the CIA engaged in illegal experimentation on detainees as part of their post-9/11 "Enhanced Interrogation Program."

Based on his alleged role in the Wikileaks revelations, “Bradley Manning himself became a victim of policies approved at the highest levels of the US government, which have been condemned as forms of torture.” Immediately after World War II, there was tremendous support for the complete ban of torture. Is that support diminishing? How do ordinary citizens around the world define torture, and what do they think about granting governments a right to impose torture on prisoners? These are among the questions we address in this volume.

## **What Is Terrorism?**

The terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” appear in the international news media every day. Terrorist alert systems, as well as antiterrorism and counterterrorism programs, are now operative in many countries and international organizations. For example, in December 1996, the General Assembly passed resolution 51/210, establishing an Ad Hoc Committee “to elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and...to address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism” (United Nations 2011). In 2001, the United Nations established a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), and in resolution 1566, which passed unanimously in October, 2004, the UN Security Council explicitly condemned any acts of terrorism:

Criminal acts, including (those) against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or international organizations to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.

Although this statement provides a somewhat vague and indirect definition of terrorism, defining it primarily in terms of its intents and purposes, subsequent working groups have been unable to establish a more precise definition of terrorism satisfactory to all group members. As of April 15, 2011, the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee Negotiating Comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Convention reported that “specific sticking points” slowing the work of the committee included “a definition of terrorism and extradition procedures.”

There appear to be several major stumbling blocks to the achievement of consensus concerning an acceptable meaning of “terrorism.” One issue mentioned during the 15th session of the UN Ad Hoc Committee in April 2011 is as follows: “Some delegations emphasized that terrorism should not be equated with the legitimate struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for national liberation and self-determination” (United Nations Ad Hoc Committee 2011). Another issue involves the debate over whether the concept of “state terrorism” should be included in an official UN definition of terrorism: “Some delegations also reiterated their view that the

convention should address terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including State terrorism, and that activities undertaken by the armed forces of States not regulated by international humanitarian law should also fall within its scope” (United Nations Ad Hoc Committee 2011).

Despite ongoing debate within the United Nations and its relevant committees over an acceptable definition of terrorism, other groups and nations have felt compelled to formulate their own definition. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the European Union, like the UN, saw an increasingly urgent need to cooperate more closely with the United States in developing international counterterrorism initiatives (Congressional Research Service 2011). In 2002, the EU extracted some parts of the UN statement on terrorism, defining terrorist acts as being executed with the aim of “seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization” (Quaker Council for European Affairs 2007). Part of the EU’s “Framework for Combating Terrorism,” this definition provides examples of terrorism, including, but not limited to, attacks on a person’s life or physical integrity, kidnapping, and the release of dangerous substances (Quaker Council for European Affairs 2007). The EU also identifies threats to commit any of the listed acts as terrorism (Quaker Council for European Affairs 2007). NATO, also in agreement with the UN, has deemed terrorism “a universal scourge that knows no border, nationality or religion... a challenge that the international community must tackle together” (NATO 2011).

Even within the United States, official definitions vary, with the Department of Defense, the FBI, and the State Department each having their own definitions. The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” (Burgess 2003). The FBI’s official definition is similar but not identical: “Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Quaker Council for European Affairs 2007). The State Department offers yet another definition of terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (Center for Defense Information 2003). All three definitions identify terrorism with politically motivated violence, yet such a general component retains a great deal of ambiguity and specifically avoids dealing with the concerns being expressed in the UN over rebellion against misuse of authority and the possibility of terrorism being committed by states.

It is interesting to look at the difference between the definitions for “war” and for “terrorism.” The aforementioned American definitions of terrorism do not stray greatly from Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s seminal definition of war as “the continuation of political intercourse with the addition

of other means” (Center for Defense Information 2003). Given the debates surrounding the issue of war, such as whether a war is ever just, it is not surprising that defining terrorism is also a struggle.

Thus, there remains considerable scholarly and diplomatic skepticism as to whether terrorism can ever be defined. To this end, terrorism expert Walter Laqueur says: “Even if there were an objective, value-free definition of terrorism, covering all its important aspects and features, it would still be rejected by some for ideological reasons” (Center for Defense Information 2003). Acquiring a working definition, however, serves more purposes than just the obvious one of establishing a standard agreement among all nations about what constitutes terrorism. “By defining terrorism one can also define the preferred means of countering it. Defining terrorism also allows terrorists to be defined (or not), justifying (or not) any action that is being taken against them” (Center for Defense Information 2003). By defining terrorism, counterterrorism has the potential to exist.

Many international organizations exist in which sovereign states around the world have come together to develop counterterrorism strategies. These include the following: the Counterterrorism Task Force (CTTF) of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF), the European Union, the G-8, the G-20, and NATO. NATO “has developed a consistent policy with respect to terrorism, which combines forceful condemnation of terrorism in all its forms, a commitment to unity and solidarity in the face of this threat, and a determination to combat it for as long as is necessary. Terrorism is now a standing item on the agendas of both the North Atlantic Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council” (U.S. Department of State, Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs n.d.). The alliance has also established many counterterrorism initiatives, such as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). The distribution of membership illustrates as well that counterterrorism and antiterrorism are more often than not international efforts, further emphasizing the need for an international definition of terrorism and counterterrorism.

The US also has its own antiterrorism programs that deal with terrorist attacks on its citizens, whether domestic or abroad. The Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) provides funding for programs such as the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program, Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), Counterterrorism Engagement with Allies, and Counterterrorism Financing. The United States is also involved in some smaller counterterrorism partnerships. For example, in May 2011, President Obama of the United States and President Medvedev of the Russian Federation released a joint statement on their counterterrorism cooperation. In light of the January 2011 bombing at Domodedovo Airport and the attempt to bomb planes headed for the US in October 2010, the presidents stated that the protection of the traveling public was a main focus of their counterterrorism efforts, intending “to enhance [their] cooperation by putting in place measures to strengthen security in airports serving [their] two countries and enhance cooperation on other modes of transportation” (Whitehouse.gov 2011). This alliance is an example of an international counterterrorism initiative with a slightly narrower focus than initiatives like the G-8 or the G-20.

In the context of all this furor over terrorism and how it should be defined and handled, some important questions arise: given debates about an appropriate definition of terrorism at top levels of government and international organizations, how do ordinary people define terrorism? More importantly: who benefits from fears of terrorists? Do terror warning levels and terrorist alerts always keep people safer? Are there groups who profit from public anxiety over the possibility of a terrorist attack? Do fears of terrorists increase the likelihood that ordinary people will support acts of aggression that violate international law, such as torture? Questions such as these underlie much of the work reported in this book.

### **War, Torture, and Terrorism: Perspectives from Ordinary People in Civil Society**

How do ordinary people from different regions around the world respond to the persistence of war and torture? How do they define terrorism, and how serious do they think the threat of terrorism is? What kinds of thinking allow some people to support their governments or other leaders in the undertaking of various forms of aggression? Why would citizens support leaders who desire to break up their families and send them off to kill and/or be killed? What kinds of reasoning allow some people to judge the infliction of pain, injury, and/or death on another human being as acceptable behavior? What kinds of reasoning characterize people who do not condone such aggressive behaviors on the part of their leaders? Do arguments for and against state aggression vary by region? In comparison to people living in relatively peaceful regions, do people who live in parts of the world that have been suffering directly from armed conflict in recent years differ in the ways they reason about governmental aggression? These are the kinds of questions that have been pursued for the last several years by an international collaborative of researchers—the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP).

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### **The GIPGAP Research Program**

#### **GIPGAP: The Core Group**

The core members of the GIPGAP are located at Boston University, and consist primarily of psychology faculty and students, but also include some members of the International Relations Department. This research team evolved following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, particularly in response to the United States government's invasion of Iraq. In the next few years after 9/11, international representation in GIPGAP grew; a pilot survey was developed, tested, and modified, and the current project was launched. The Core GIPGAP team (otherwise known as the Core Group) consists of a faculty advisor (Malley-Morrison), several postdocs, and international graduate and undergraduate students concerned with issues of violence. Although

membership varies somewhat from year to year as some students graduate and move ahead with their careers, and other students from various regions join, international students and colleagues participating in the Core Group have come from countries as diverse as Portugal, Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Russia, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, China, Colombia, and Peru. Thus, we had a broad range of perspectives on which to draw in developing both the survey and the coding manuals.

## **GIPGAP: International Contributors**

The International GIPGAP team (known as the International Group) consists of faculty and graduate students from a range of academic departments, including psychology, sociology, and international relations, in more than 40 countries. These international contributors were recruited through a number of different approaches: networking by Core Group members, notices in *Announcements from the APA Division of International Psychology*, notices in *International Psychology Bulletin*, and invitations during presentations at international psychology conferences. With approval from the appropriate institutional authorities, these contributors administered the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) to ordinary people from multiple countries in every major region of the world: Western Europe (Iceland, France, Portugal, Spain, Germany, and Sweden); Russia and the Balkan Peninsula states (Greece, Slovenia, Serbia); the Middle East (Turkey, Afghanistan, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia); the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar); Africa (Egypt, Nigeria, Angola, Ghana, Botswana, Zambia, and South Africa); Central and South America (Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Argentina); South and Southeast Asia (Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, and the Philippines); the Far East (China, Japan, and Korea); and a region we identified as a UK/Anglo “cultural region,” which included Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the United States, Australia, and Canada.

Although today Great Britain and Northern Ireland are both legally parts of the United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), we, for the most part, treat them separately in this book because Northern Ireland, for much of its history, was a subject of British rule, as were Australia, Canada, and the United States. It was the Great Britain part of the current United Kingdom that colonized what is now the United States, Australia, and Canada (and many other regions); it was not Northern Ireland that engaged in imperialistic expansion. Thus, in this and other chapters in this book, we report on findings from separate Great Britain and Northern Ireland samples.

## **The PAIRTAPS**

The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) has six sections: (1) judgments concerning the extent to which

governments have the right to perform such acts of aggression as invading another country, killing innocent civilians in times of war, and torturing prisoners during times of war; (2) judgments concerning the rights of individuals to grow up and live in a world of peace, and the right to demonstrate against war and in favor of peace; (3) views concerning patriotism and the United States' involvement in the Iraq war; (4) projected emotional responses that might be experienced following direct or indirect exposure to acts of governmental violence; (5) definitions of war, torture, terrorism, peace, reconciliation, and rights; and (6) views on the achievability of peace and the relationship of national security to individual and family security.

Several of the items in Sections 1 and 2 are direct expressions of human rights guarantees (e.g., freedom from torture, right to assembly) established in United Nations agreements. For Sections 1–3, and 6, respondents indicated on a scale from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement) the extent to which they agreed with each item (e.g., “Sometimes a country has the right to ignore international treaties or international human rights agreements.”). Then, in their own words, they provided an explanation of the reasoning behind their rating on the item. Sections 4 and 5 call only for open-ended qualitative responses—for example, examples of emotions that would be felt in the face of governmental aggression, and definitions of terms. For the purposes of this volume, chapter authors were asked to focus only on qualitative responses to the following selected items: (a) definitions of war, torture, and terrorism (from Section 5 of the PAIRTAPS); (b) sometimes one country has the right to invade another country (from Section 1); (c) the government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war (from Section 1); (d) national security is essential for individual and family security (from Section 6); and (e) the best way to achieve national security is... (from Section 6).

Also analyzed were participants' responses to three of the emotional response scenarios from Section 4. The instructions for all three scenarios were the following: (1) “Assume that you have *very direct and dramatic exposure* to each of the situations below—that is, either you witness them directly or you see them happening live on a TV show or documentary that exposes you to the event in the *most immediate and dramatic* way. Please indicate first how you would *feel* in the situation and then what you would *want* to do.” The first item stated that “Another country is indiscriminately bombing a major city in your country, and women, children, the elderly, and civilian men are running around bloody and screaming. *What would you feel? What would you want to do?*” The second, related, item stated: “Your country is indiscriminately bombing a major city in another country, and women, children, the elderly, and civilian men are running around bloody and screaming. *What would you feel? What would you want to do?*” The third item was as follows: “Military officials are torturing somebody suspected of having information about terrorists. *What would you feel? What would you want to do?*”

All researchers contributing to this project adhered to human subjects ethical guidelines. The anonymous survey responses were collected between 2005 and 2008. In some cases (e.g., Nigeria), shortened versions of the survey were administered because the respondents were unfamiliar with taking

surveys. The survey could be completed either online on a secure website or as a paper-and-pencil measure. Individual chapter authors made the decision as to which procedure best protected their participants' rights and safety. In many of the Western countries, both procedures were used, although the bulk of the responses were submitted over the Internet.

Although most chapter authors analyzed responses to most, if not all, of these items, some items had been omitted from some surveys, and most of the chapter authors analyzed and reported on results from only one of the two bombing scenarios. Despite such relatively minor differences in coverage of survey items, each section of this volume ends with an integrative chapter summarizing similarities and differences found across regions in the themes that emerged.

In addition to responding to the PAIRTAPS items, participants completed a background information form asking for basic demographic information such as age, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and religion, as well as whether they or any family member had been in the military, and whether they had participated in any protest activities. Participants typically responded to the survey in their native language, although in several of the countries, particularly the African countries (e.g., South Africa, Nigeria), the participants had been educated in English and responded in English. Translations of survey items from English to another language were either done independently by at least two native speakers of the other language who then compared translations and resolved differences in translations, often in consultation with members of the Core Group, or they were translated from English to the other language and then back-translated to identify problems in the translation. A similar process was followed for the translations of responses in other languages into English.

## **Sections A and B: Grounded Theory Coding of Definitions and National Security Items**

The qualitative responses to the definitions of war, torture, and terrorism and to the two national security items were coded according to a grounded theory approach. That is, we did not start out with a particular theoretical framework and then strive to fit the responses into that framework. Instead, we followed the procedures recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1998), proceeding from open coding to axial coding, using a process of constant comparison. During the open-coding phase, we divided the qualitative responses to the definitions and national security items into units of meaning ("codeable units") that varied in length from one word (e.g., "Disgusting") to phrases (e.g., "Only in defense of one's own citizens") and entire sentences (e.g., "Torture is never ever acceptable").

At the axial level of coding, the relationships among the more fragmented, seldom-used categories initially identified were reviewed, and, where appropriate, these categories were organized into more inclusive categories. For example, in regard to qualitative responses to the item, "National security is essential to individual and family security," preliminary thematic categories

for threats to security (e.g., “Yes. If there is a chance for someone to take advantage of a breach of security, then someone will take it”), defense (e.g., “It’s essential for defense”), and governmental responsibility (e.g., “This is the government’s duty”) were ultimately integrated into a more inclusive category that we named “*Need to protect*.” This *need to protect* category became a subcategory of an even more inclusive category, “reasons why *national security is essential* for family and individual security.” Moreover, further reviews of the evolving category system allowed us to identify specific subcategories of “need to protect,” including “to *protect values*” (e.g., “Yes we need to protect ourselves, our culture which terrorists lack ...or else we will go back to medieval times”), *feel safe* (e.g., “I feel safer knowing that there are people working to remove the threat of terrorism”), and *protect from evil* (e.g., “As long as bad people exist, people will need someone to protect them. We need to protect ourselves from the evil of the world”). In a grounded theory analysis, data collection, coding, conceptualizing, and theorizing take place simultaneously, and analyses of new responses are compared both with analyses of previous responses and with the concepts emerging from those analyses. A more detailed summary of the procedures followed, and the categories derived for Section A (“Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism”) and Section B (“Perspectives on National Security”) can be found in the introductory chapters to each of those sections.

## Sections C and D: Judgments on Invasion and Torture

In the final two sections of this volume, our focus is on understanding the forms of social cognition that individuals bring to their judgments concerning invasion (Section C) and torture (Section D). The coding systems for the invasion and torture items were developed using a modified form of *deductive qualitative analysis* (Gilgun 1999), informed by the work of Albert Bandura on moral disengagement and personal agency.

Bandura (e.g., 1999, 2002) has identified several types of reasoning—which he calls mechanisms of moral disengagement—that provided a useful framework for the analysis of arguments concerning the extent to which governments have the right to order invasions of other lands and torture prisoners during times of war. Based on his description of these forms of reasoning, the Core Group has identified a complementary series of mechanisms, which we loosely call mechanisms of moral engagement. Although we present a brief overview of Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement and engagement here, our focus in our analyses was on the mechanisms rather than on the value-laden constructs of moral disengagement and engagement per se.

According to Bandura (1999), moral disengagement processes mediate between moral standards and actual behaviors; they allow individuals to behave immorally or tolerate immorality by others, even when these behaviors violate their own moral standards. Thus, moral disengagement theory shares assumptions with theories of cognitive dissonance and dissonance resolution (cf. Festinger 1957; Matz and Wood 2005), as well as with theories of escalation and self-justification (cf. O’Leary and Wolinsky 2009; Wolff and Moser

2008), all of which suggest that humans will go through a variety of psychological machinations to allow themselves to feel good about themselves and avoid feelings of guilt, despite various forms of misbehavior. In Bandura's view, these mechanisms of moral disengagement allow individuals to violate moral standards while continuing to maintain their self-image as caring human beings. More specifically, he suggests that when individuals commit injurious acts, they generally try to legitimize and excuse their behavior in order to avoid feeling guilt, regret, negative emotions, and/or other self-sanctions.

Although Bandura's (1999) theory was developed primarily to explain how individuals could excuse themselves for behaving in ways that violate universal moral codes, it is also applicable at group and state levels of behavior. For example, Bandura and his colleagues have applied the construct of moral disengagement to prisoner-guard relationships (Osofsky et al. 2005), weapons manufacturers (Bandura 1990), the tobacco industry (White et al. 2009), group massacres (Bandura 1999), and capital punishment (Osofsky et al. 2005), as well as to everyday, nonviolent moral lapses in behavior, including in the corporate world (Bandura et al. 2000).

In addressing the problems of inhumane behavior, Bandura (1999) identified eight overlapping and interrelated mechanisms of moral disengagement, which he classified into four major groups: (1) mechanisms involving the cognitive reconstruction of harmful behavior; this group includes moral justifications, euphemistic labeling, and advantageous comparisons, all of which serve to psychologically reconstruct harmful behavior into something more benign; (2) mechanisms that misrepresent, minimize, and/or disregard the negative consequences of injurious behavior; (3) mechanisms that serve to remove or obscure personal accountability for harmful behavior (e.g., through displacing or diffusing responsibility for the misconduct); and (4) mechanisms that devalue the recipient of the harm through dehumanizing and/or blaming the victim or situation. Overall, these mechanisms of moral disengagement can operate independently and/or simultaneously in ways that allow individuals to be complicit in the perpetration of acts that are harmful toward others without feeling guilty or subjecting themselves to self-sanctions.

Considerable empirical support has been found for the role of moral disengagement in tolerance for governmental aggression. For example, McAlister (2001), an internationally prominent moral disengagement scholar, found that moral disengagement was related to individual support for military bombings of the former Yugoslavia and Iraq. Examining attitudes from over 21 nations, Grussendorf et al. (2002) found that moral disengagement was employed in accepting the use of deadly force in response to a threat. In addition to support for war, Aquino et al. (2007) found that moral disengagement was linked to support for lethal punitive actions against perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks as well as detainee abuse in Iraq. Thus, Bandura's (1999) theory is particularly valuable for understanding individual agreement with and rationalizations for various forms of state aggression, including invading countries and torturing individuals who are seen as some sort of threat.

Bandura (1999) and others (e.g., Grussendorf et al. 2002; McAlister et al. 2000) recognize that not everyone acts in ways that violate their own and more general moral codes. In contrast to moral disengagement, moral engagement entails a conscious commitment to behave in ways that conform to one's

moral standards, regardless of circumstances. Personalizing the victim, accepting responsibility, exercising personal agency, being sympathetic and empathetic, and recognizing the negative effects of inhumane behavior, all contribute to moral engagement. Bandura further emphasizes the power of humanization, social obligation to helping others, and recognition of everyone's common humanity across differing political, ethnic, religious, and social groups. In his view, moral engagement and treating others with humanity are reflective primarily of empathy, but also of perceived similarity and social or moral obligation.

Arguably, these characteristics of moral engagement may also be associated with support for humanitarian interventions, which Walzer (1977) argues are a justifiable response (in the context of "reasonable expectations of success") to acts that "shock the moral conscience of mankind" (p. 107). Moreover, Walzer indicates that he is referring specifically to "the moral convictions of ordinary men and women" (p. 107)—the same reference group of interest to our research group. In his view, "clear examples of what is called 'humanitarian intervention' are very rare" (p. 101). "Indeed," he says, "I have not found any, but only mixed cases where the humanitarian motive is one among many" (p. 101). Whether the rarity of cases of pure humanitarian intervention is linked to a lack of moral engagement in ordinary citizens concerning the well-being of people in other countries, the disinterest of states in committing resources for humanitarian purposes, some combination of these forces, and/or other factors, is not clear; however, Bandura's (1999) argument that humanitarian justifications for inhumane behavior constitute forms of moral disengagement is consistent with Walzer's arguments concerning the rarity of true humanitarian intervention.

Exercising moral agency has dual aspects—inhibitive and proactive. According to Bandura (2002), the inhibitive form of moral agency is the process that allows individuals to refrain from behaving inhumanely, whereas the proactive form expresses itself in the power to behave humanely. Bandura noted that individuals guided by proactive moral agency base "their sense of self-worth so strongly on human convictions and social obligations that they act against what they regard as unjust or immoral even though their actions may incur heavy personal costs" (p. 194). He also argued that when exercising proactive morality, people act in the name of humane principles even when experiencing pressure to engage in expedient and harmful behavior. When morally engaged people "disavow use of valued social ends to justify destructive means. They sacrifice their well-being for their convictions. They take personal responsibility for the consequences of their actions. They remain sensitive to the suffering of others" (Bandura 1999, p. 203). Thorkildsen (2007) added that moral engagement "controls the regulation of humane behavior and the inhibition of inhumane behavior because it represents a vision of how the world ought to function" (p. 115). Although there has been less research on moral engagement than moral disengagement, McAlister (2001) found that students' attitudes regarding war changed in the direction of increased moral engagement when the students were exposed to information that countered the tendency towards moral disengagement; his findings indicate that not only do different social messages influence reasoning about moral issues, but that moral engagement can indeed be promoted.

Informed by Bandura's theory, we developed a coding manual with guidelines for coding two items related to invasion: (1) the right to invade item ("Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country") and (2) the scenario items (e.g., "Your country is indiscriminately bombing a major city in another country, and women, children, the elderly, and civilian men are running around bloody and screaming. What would you *want* to do?"). Responses to the right to invade item were organized first into two major types: invasion-tolerant and invasion-intolerant. The invasion-intolerant responses were then coded for themes reflective of Bandura's mechanisms of moral disengagement. Specifically, we identified four main invasion-tolerant coding categories reflective of the mechanisms he identified: (1) *displacement of responsibility* (with subcategories for *deferral to the government* and *deferral to the international community/UN*), (2) *advantageous comparison/positive consequences* (including responses approving of war if done as a *last resort*), (3) *attribution of blame*, and (4) *pseudo-moral justification* (with subcategories for *self-defense/preemptive strike* and *pseudo-assistance*); in addition, we had a category for *general pro-invasion* for responses that had no specific codeable argument in support of a state right to invasion.

The invasion-intolerant responses fell into three categories based on the parallel set of moral engagement mechanisms that we identified in our extension of Bandura's work. These categories included the following: (a) *accepting responsibility* (which included subcategories for *respect for government/sovereignty* and *honor international mandates*), (b) *appreciating consequences* (with two subcategories, recognizing *negative consequences* and recognizing *better alternatives/violence as unnecessary*), and (c) *principled moral justification* (including *nonviolence/concern with peace* and, *human rights/concern for others*, which in turn included subcategories for *human rights/concern for others* and *equality and freedom*); there was also a category for *general invasion intolerance* or *anti-invasion*.

The coding categories for responses to the bombing scenarios were designed to address as much as possible Bandura's emphasis on the role of agency in moral conduct, while also reflecting the fact that some of the responses to the scenarios seemed to show agency in the service of moral disengagement. We first identified two types of responses: (a) those suggesting agency on behalf of moral disengagement (which we labeled "personal disengagement") and (b) those indicating agency on behalf of moral engagement (which we labeled "personal engagement"). The *personal disengagement* category included the following subcategories: (a) *denial of responsibility* (which included a subcategory for responses showing *reliance on the government/military*) and (b) *antisocial agency* (which included subcategories for *vengeful agency* and *harming emotions*); some responses could be coded only for *general personal disengagement*. The *personal engagement* category included subcategories for: (a) *general responsibility* (with *appeal to the international community* as a subcategory), (b) *pro-social agency* (with two subcategories, *self-referenced agency* and *helping emotions*), and (c) *humanizing agency* (with a subcategory for *genuine assistance*). A much more extensive discussion, with examples, of all coding categories and subcategories for the invasion and bombing items can be found in the introductory chapter in the section on perspectives on invasion.

We also used concepts from Bandura's moral disengagement and engagement theory in developing a coding manual for the state right to torture item and the scenario asking participants what they would want to do if directly and dramatically exposed to the torture of a prisoner during times of war. Not surprisingly, there were a number of similarities between the torture coding manual and the invasion/bombing coding manual.

The major torture-tolerant coding categories were the following: (a) *pseudo-moral justification* (with subcategories for *advantageous comparison* and *last resort*); (b) *euphemistic labeling*; (c) *denial of responsibility* (with subcategories for *diffusion of responsibility*, *displacement of responsibility*, and *indifference*); (d) *misrepresenting, minimizing, or disregarding the consequences of torture*; (e) *dehumanization*; and (f) *attribution of blame* (including a subcategory for *revenge*). The major torture-intolerant coding categories were the following: (a) *principled reasoning* (including *personal moral principles*, *honor international mandates*, *humanization*, and *respect human rights*), (b) *descriptive language*, (c) *principled comparison* (including endorsing *better alternatives* and noting that torture is *ineffective/not useful*), (d) *awareness of negative consequences of torture*, and (e) *exonerating the prisoner*. There were also coding categories for *unspecified torture tolerance* and *unspecified torture intolerance* for responses that provided no argument in support for their vague agreement or disagreement with a state right to torture.

Finally, in regard to the scenario concerning the torture of someone suspected of knowing a terrorist, most responses could be coded for level of personal involvement. The personal engagement coding category was *positive action* (with subcategories for *unspecified positive action*, *political/institutional activism*, *promote moral awareness*, and *agentic alternative solutions*). The other levels of personal involvement included the following: (a) *passivity regarding torture*, (b) *compliance with torture*, and (c) *helplessness*. A much more extensive discussion, with examples, of all coding categories and subcategories for the torture items can be found in the introductory chapter in the section on perspectives on torture.

## The Final Coding Process

As the Core Group developed these coding manuals on an ever-expanding international coding manual sample, it made the coding manuals available to the International Group. The International Group was invited to conduct their own deductive qualitative analysis (i.e., an analysis informed by Bandura's theory) or to use the Core Group's manuals for coding the data. We did not want to be restrictive in regard to any group member's coding, but rather to encourage them to use consistent category labels when discussing the same or similar types of arguments. The Core Group also offered to do the coding of the responses from any country, as long as they had been translated into English or could be translated by a member of the Core Group.

As previously noted, coding manuals were developed and refined by the local group and shared with the international team members. Each of the four sections of this book focuses on the responses to a particular set of items (definitions, national security, invasion, or torture); coding of the responses

for each section was conducted by a team assigned to that section under the supervision of the team leader for that section. All coding was done by at least one team member and then reviewed by the team leader; in the case of the four countries for which responses to one set of questions were coded by an investigator from that country, a random sample of the coded responses was coded independently by the team leader for that section, and feedback was provided until the international team member was completely reliable.

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## This Volume

The first chapter in each of the four sections of this volume (definitions of war, torture, and terrorism; perspectives on national security; perspectives on invasion; and perspectives on torture) describes the coding system and variable formation process for all the chapters in that section. Each introductory methods chapter is followed by eight or nine regional chapters and then a final integrative chapter for the section. The sections of the book for definitions and invasion include nine regional chapters: Western Europe, the UK/Anglo countries (Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the United States, Canada, and Australia), Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East, the Gulf States, Africa, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, and East Asia. The other two sections (national security and torture) have only eight regional chapters, as there is no chapter for the Gulf States in either of those sections. In each regional chapter, the lead author provides a historical and political context for the survey findings presented in that chapter. The findings typically take the form of first a description of the distribution of responses across the major coding categories and then the results of some simple exploratory analyses (mostly nonparametric) designed to identify possible differences in response patterns based on demographic variables such as gender, participation in the military, religion, and nationality. Because we cannot assume that our samples are representative of the population in the regions studied for this book, it should not be assumed that our exploratory findings can be generalized to those populations. Our emphasis is always on the qualitative responses, as they provide the most direct access to the thoughts and feelings, the arguments and motivations, and the fears and goals of our diverse sample of men and women from around the world.

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# Contents

<b>Preface</b> .....	v
<b>Section I Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism</b>	
<b>1 Coding and Variable Formation for Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism</b> .....	3
Elizabeth Planje and Tristyn Campbell	
<b>2 Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism in Western Europe</b> .....	15
Mathilde Salmberg, Carla Machado, Silja Bara Ómarsdottir, Milena Doerfer, Ashley Brown, Laura Marcucci, Michael Corgan, Mariana Barbosa, Julia Koenig, Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg, and Christine Roland-Levy	
<b>3 Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Australia, Canada, and the United States</b> .....	27
John M. Davis, Elizabeth Planje, Carol J. Davis, James Page, Michael Whitely, Shane O’Neil, and Doe West	
<b>4 Definitions of War, Terrorism, and Torture in the Balkan Peninsula and Russia</b> .....	49
Sherri McCarthy, Vlado Miheljak, Nebojsa Petrović, Marko Polič, Charikleia Tsatsaroni, Nadide Pinar Kulakoglu, Anna Medvedeva, Alev Yalcinkaya, Shane O’Neil, and Elizabeth Stern	
<b>5 Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism in the Middle East</b> .....	63
Majed Ashy, Elizabeth Planje, Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi, Lane Smith, Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz, Helena Syna Desivilya, Kamala Smith, Linda Jeffrey, William Tastle, Feryal Turan, Alev Yalcinkaya, and Rouba Youssef	

<b>6</b>	<b>Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism in the Gulf States</b> .....	81
	Heyam Mohammed, Raja Tayeh, Elizabeth Planje, and Gregory Malley	
<b>7</b>	<b>Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism in Africa</b> .....	95
	Mahlon Dalley, Jacqui Akhurst, Adeniyi Famose, Natoschia Scruggs, Laura Marcucci, Abdelali Abdelkader, Shane O’Neil, Helena Castanheira, Eduardo Correia, and William Tastle	
<b>8</b>	<b>Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism in Latin America</b> .....	113
	Eros DeSouza, Michael Stevens, Amanda Clinton, Laura Marcucci, Madison Mellish, Rodrigo Barahona, Eddy Carillo, Ricardo Angelino, Luciana Karine de Souza, and Sherri McCarthy	
<b>9</b>	<b>Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia</b> .....	133
	Janice Jones, Ma. Regina E. Estuar, Evan E. Diehnelt, Sherri McCarthy, Ellora Puri, Megan Reif, Leslie Flores, Nisha Raj, Dylan Rose, Darshini Shah, Haslina Muhamad, and Jas Jafaar	
<b>10</b>	<b>East Asian Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism</b> .....	145
	David Oh, Alice Murata, Hillary Mi-Sung Kim, Michelle Murata, and Andrea Jones-Rooy	
<b>11</b>	<b>Integrative Summary for Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism</b> .....	163
	Abram Trosky, Mathilde Salmberg, Laura Marcucci, and Shane O’Neil	
 <b>Section II National Security</b>		
<b>12</b>	<b>Introduction to National Security Coding System</b> .....	183
	Lauren Groves and Andrea Mercurio	
<b>13</b>	<b>Views on National Security in Western Europe</b> .....	189
	Michael Corgan, Helena Castanheira, Albertina Aros, Sandra Carina Fulquez, Matt Pita, Mariana Barbosa, Julia Koenig, Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg, Carla Machado, Silja Bara Ómarsdottir, Christine Roland-Levy, and Mathilde Salmberg	
<b>14</b>	<b>Views on National Security: the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, Australia, Canada, and the United States of America</b> .....	205
	Lauren Groves, John M. Davis, James Page, Michael Whitely, Dylan Rose, and Doe West	

**15 Views of National Security in Balkan and Russia** ..... 223  
 Marko Polič, Vlado Miheljak, Nebojsa Petrović,  
 Sherri McCarthy, Charikleia Tsatsaroni,  
 and Anna Medvedeva

**16 Views on National Security in the Middle East** ..... 239  
 Lane Smith, Mohammad Bahramzadeh, Sherri McCarthy,  
 Tristyn Campbell, Majed Ashy, Helena Syna Desivilya,  
 Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi, Kamala Smith, Alev Yalcinkaya,  
 William Tastle, Feryal Turan, Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz,  
 and Rouba Youssef

**17 Views on National Security in Africa** ..... 257  
 Mahlon Dalley, Jacqueline Akhurst, Davies Banda,  
 Abdelali Abdelkader, Alexandra Dick, Helena Castanheira,  
 and Eduardo Correia

**18 Views on National Security in Latin America** ..... 273  
 Eros DeSouza, Michael Stevens, Jorge Luna-Torres,  
 Ricardo Angelino, Rodrigo Barahona, Eddy Carillo,  
 Amanda Clinton, Luciana Karine de Souza,  
 and Sherri McCarthy

**19 Views on National Security in South  
 and Southeast Asia** ..... 283  
 Kalyani Raj, Nisha Raj, Sherri McCarthy,  
 Ma. Regina E. Estuar, Ariel Stone, Tristyn Campbell,  
 Telma Almeida, Darshini Shah, Ellora Puri, Megan Reif,  
 Haslina Muhammad, and Jas Jafaar

**20 Views on National Security in East Asia** ..... 301  
 Hillary Mi-Sung Kim, Hwan Ho Lee, Nari Yoo,  
 Dong Youn Cho, Bryan Bonseok Koo, Alice Murata,  
 Andrea Jones-Rooy, and Michelle Murata

**21 National Security: An Integration** ..... 315  
 Andrea Mercurio and Madeleine Logan

**Section III Invasion**

**22 Methods for Coding Perspectives on a State Right  
 to Invasion and Bombing Scenarios** ..... 325  
 Tristyn Campbell

**23 Perspectives on Invasion in Western Europe** ..... 335  
 Carla Machado, Julia Koenig, Mariana Barbosa,  
 Mathilde Salmberg, Jaime Lam, Ariel Stone,  
 Sophie Cox, Tristyn Campbell, Telma Almieda,  
 Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg, Michael Corgan,  
 Silja Bara Ómarsdóttir, and Christine Roland-Lévy

<b>24</b>	<b>Perspectives on Invasion: Great Britain, Northern Ireland, United States, Canada, and Australia</b> .....	359
	James Page, John M. Davis, Michael Whitely, Ariel Stone, Tessa Schaaf, and Doe West	
<b>25</b>	<b>Perspectives on Invasion in Russia and the Balkans</b> .....	381
	Sherri McCarthy, Anna Medvedeva, Tristyn Campbell, Nebojsa Petrović, Vlado Miheljak, Marko Polič, and Charikleia Tsatsaroni	
<b>26</b>	<b>Perspectives on Invasion in the Middle East</b> .....	401
	Majed Ashy, Rouba Youssef, Tristyn Campbell, Alev Yalcinkaya, Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi, Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz, Helena Syna Desivilya, Feryal Turan, Kamala Smith, Lane Smith, Atherine Steiner, and William Tastle	
<b>27</b>	<b>Gulf States' Perspectives on Invasion</b> .....	413
	Raja Tayeh, Heyam Mohammed, Tristyn Campbell, and Gregory Malley	
<b>28</b>	<b>African Perspectives on Invasion</b> .....	421
	Laura Johnson, Grace Kibanja, Abdelali Abdelkader, Mahlon Dalley, Ting Wu, Jacqui Akhurst, Davies Banda, Natoschia Scruggs, Eduardo Correia, and Helena Castanheira	
<b>29</b>	<b>Latin American Perspectives on the Right to Invasion</b> .....	443
	Amanda Clinton, José Anazagasty, Michael Stevens, Eros DeSouza, Bailey Pescatore, Laura Marcucci, Ricardo Angelino, Rodrigo Barahona, Luciana Karine de Souza, Eddy Carillo, and Sherri McCarthy	
<b>30</b>	<b>Perspectives on Invasion in South and Southeast Asia</b> .....	467
	Ma. Regina E. Estuar, Nico A. Canoy, Sherri McCarthy, Ariel Stone, Tristyn Campbell, Megan Reif, Emily Mulloy, Ellora Puri, Haslina Muhamad, and Jas Jaafar	
<b>31</b>	<b>Perspectives on Invasion in East Asia</b> .....	487
	Etsuko Hoshino-Browne, Alba N. Villamil, Ting Wu, Hillary Mi-Sung Kim, Ariel Stone, Alice Murata, Michelle Murata, and Andrea Jones-Rooy	
<b>32</b>	<b>Patterns in the Justification of Invasion and Responses to Attack</b> .....	507
	Alfred McAlister, Tristyn Campbell, and Erin Murtagh	

## Section IV Perspectives on Torture

- 33 Methods of Assessing Perspectives on Torture** ..... 521  
Charikleia Tsatsaroni
- 34 Perspectives on Torture in Western Europe** ..... 531  
Julia Koenig, Eric Fischer, Mathilde Salmberg,  
Mariana Barbosa, Silja Bara Ómarsdóttir,  
Michael Corgan, Alex Stankiewicz,  
Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg, Carla Machado,  
Scott Borrelli, and Christine Roland-Levy
- 35 Perspectives on Torture in Great Britain,  
Northern Ireland, the United States, Canada,  
and Australia** ..... 551  
John M. Davis, Jenet Cory, Carol J. Davis,  
Tristyn Campbell, and Michael Whitely
- 36 Perspectives on Torture in Russia  
and the Balkan Peninsula** ..... 565  
Charikleia Tsatsaroni, Sherri McCarthy,  
Natalia Parnyuk, Nebojsa Petrović, Marko Polič,  
Anna Medvedeva, Mimi Maritz, and Vlado Miheljak
- 37 Perspectives on Torture in the Middle East** ..... 583  
Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi, Stephen Gailliot,  
Charikleia Tsatsaroni, Melike Eger,  
Helena Syna Desivilya, Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz,  
Lane Smith, Kamala Smith, Rouba Youssef,  
and Alev Yalcinkaya
- 38 Perspectives on Torture in Africa** ..... 599  
Mahlon Dalley, Savreen Hundal, Davies Banda,  
Jacqui Akhurst, Abdelali Abdelkader, Adeniyi Famose,  
Natoschia Scruggs, and Eduardo Correia
- 39 Perspectives on Torture in Latin America** ..... 617  
Amanda Clinton, José Anazagasty, Javier Fortín,  
Luciana Karine de Souza, Sherri McCarthy,  
Tristyn Campbell, Alex Stankiewicz, Ricardo Angelino,  
Rodrigo Barahona, Eddy Carillo, Eros DeSouza,  
and Michael Stevens
- 40 Perspectives on Torture in South and Southeast Asia** ..... 631  
Savreen Hundal, Sherri McCarthy, Ma. Regina E. Estuar,  
Darshini Shah, Ellora Puri, Megan Reif, Haslina Muhamad,  
and Jas Jafaar
- 41 Perspectives on Torture in East Asia** ..... 645  
Etsuko Hoshino-Browne, Ting Wu, Alba N. Villamil,  
Hillary Mi-Sung Kim, Alice Murata, Michelle Murata,  
and Andrea Jones-Rooy

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<b>42 Torture: Integrative Chapter</b> .....	663
Kimberly Rapoza and Megan Clapp	
<b>43 Conclusions</b> .....	677
Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Andrea Mercurio, and Andrew Potter	
<b>Index</b> .....	691

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