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BUSINESS ECONOMICS

The Application of Economic Theory

Paul R. Ferguson, Glenys J. Ferguson
and R. Rothschild

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*To our parents
(Paul and Glenys Ferguson)*

*To my father and the memory of my mother
(R. Rothschild)*

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