NEW STUDIES IN ETHICS

Volume One Classical Theories

The monographs reproduced in this collection
have been published separately in booklet
form as part of the paperback series 'New
Studies in Ethics'

New Studies in Ethics

Volume One

CLASSICAL THEORIES

MACMILLAN

© Pamela Huby 1967, 1974; D. J. O'Connor 1967, 1974;
J. Kemp 1970, 1974; W. D. Hudson 1967, 1974;
H. B. Acton 1970, 1974; W. H. Walsh 1969, 1974

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1974 978-0-333-17355-8

All rights reserved. No part of this publication
may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form
or by any means, without permission.

First collected edition published in 1974 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke
Associated companies in New York Dublin
Melbourne Johannesburg and Madras

SBN 333 17355 4

ISBN 978-1-349-02398-1 ISBN 978-1-349-02396-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-02396-7

CONTENTS

	Editor's Foreword to Volume One	vii
1	GREEK ETHICS <i>Pamela Huby</i>	1
	I. Introduction	3
	II. The Beginnings	5
	III. Socrates	17
	IV. Plato	28
	V. Aristotle	43
	VI. After Aristotle	66
	<i>Notes</i>	72
	<i>Bibliography</i>	76
2	AQUINAS AND NATURAL LAW <i>D. J. O'Connor</i>	79
	I. Introduction	81
	II. Some Features of Aquinas' Philosophy	84
	III. Philosophical Presuppositions	90
	IV. Happiness and the End for Man	102
	V. Reason, Action and Morality	112
	VI. The Freedom of the Will	126
	VII. Natural Law	137
	VIII. Conclusion	160
	<i>Notes</i>	165
	<i>Note on Reading</i>	170
	<i>Bibliography</i>	172
3	ETHICAL NATURALISM <i>J. Kemp</i>	173
	<i>Note on References</i>	174
	I. Introduction	175
	II. Hobbes	177
	III. Hume	203
	<i>Notes</i>	227
	<i>Bibliography</i>	228
4	ETHICAL INTUITIONISM <i>W. D. Hudson</i>	229
	I. Introduction	231
	II. Man Benevolent and Moral	236
	III. Moral Discourse <i>Sui Generis</i>	242
	IV. Moral Sense	248
	V. Rational Intuitionism	253
	VI. Butler's View of Conscience	259
	VII. The Debate	264

VIII. What Constitutes Virtue?	272
IX. Some Outstanding Questions	281
X. Critique of Intuitionism	287
XI. Conclusion	291
<i>Notes</i>	297
<i>Bibliography</i>	302
5 KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY <i>H. B. Acton</i>	305
I. Introduction: Kant and the Enlightenment	307
II. Some Ethical Bearings of Kant's <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>	311
III. Kant's Discussion of the Ordinary Moral Consciousness	315
IV. Hypothetical Imperatives and the Categorical Imperative	322
V. The Supreme Principle of Morality: Universal Law	327
VI. The Moral Motive	336
VII. The Principle of 'Autonomy and Other Formulations of the Categorical Imperative	341
VIII. Freedom of the Will and Morality	351
IX. God and Immortality	359
X. Conclusion	366
<i>Notes</i>	372
<i>Bibliography</i>	376
6 HEGELIAN ETHICS <i>W. H. Walsh</i>	379
<i>Preface</i>	380
I. Introduction	381
II. The Tasks of Ethics	386
III. The Scope of Ethics	392
IV. Ethical Formalism	401
V. The Contradictions of Kantian Morality	408
VI. Value, Fact and the Morality of Love	415
VII. Value, Fact and Concrete Ethics	420
VIII. Critique of Concrete Ethics	429
IX. Hegel's Moral Psychology	439
X. The British Hegelians	449
XI. Conclusion	457
<i>Notes</i>	460
<i>Bibliography</i>	463
<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	465

EDITOR'S FOREWORD

The studies presented here were all published originally as separate booklets in a series entitled 'New Studies in Ethics'. The aim of that series was to provide a comprehensive survey of the main types of theory which have arisen in the history of moral philosophy. Each monograph was written by a professional philosopher, who had been invited to contribute a clear exposition and critical assessment of a type of ethical theory on which he was an expert. The series was well-received and the suggestion frequently made that the monographs should be bound up together and published in a composite work. This suggestion has now been implemented, in the form of the present two-volume edition. The text of each study remains as in the original publication, but errata have been corrected and, where appropriate, new material has been added to the bibliographies.

Systematic moral philosophy began when Greek thinkers turned their attention from cosmology to the study of man. First Socrates and the Sophists, then Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans, took up the question: What is virtue? Their answers provided an astonishing richness and variety of opinion, and most of the subjects which have occupied ethical thinkers down to the present day were first considered by them. Is virtue to be conceived as the possession of a certain kind of knowledge; or as living in accordance with nature; or as obeying some sort of inner law; or as the attainment of happiness and well-being? Pamela Huby shows how these questions were introduced and discussed in the first classical flourishing of ethical thought.

Intellectually, the middle ages were dominated by Thomas Aquinas. In his ethical theorising morality was closely related to religion. He conceived of virtue as conformity to natural law, i.e. to the way things are because God so wills them to be. This conception takes natural law to be both descriptive and prescriptive and raises the question as to whether a law can be both at the same time. D. J. O'Connor, in discussing this and other issues, indicates how Aquinas's ethical theory, on the one hand, rests on Aristotelian and Stoic ideas of virtue, and, on the other, adumbrates recent discussions about how what *is* the case must be related to what *ought* to be the case.

This is the question which, in their different ways, British ethical thinkers in the great debates of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries attempted to answer. Philosophers such as Hutcheson and Richard Price believed that there is an objective moral law known to us by intuition but they differed about whether such intuition should be conceived as an exercise of reason or of a special moral sense. In my own contribution to this volume I try to show why this distinction seemed to them to be important and to assess the assumptions on which ethical intuitionism in any form is based.

Thinkers such as Hobbes and Hume, on the other hand, evidently believed that the way to an understanding of morality lay through a psychological analysis of human nature. They thought that only when we are clear about the non-moral facts concerning the nature of man can we answer questions concerning what men ought to be or to do. J. Kemp in his discussion of ethical naturalism brings out what there is to be said for this approach.

Kant is famous for his attempt to effect a rapprochement between the rationalism and empiricism which had for long divided philosophers; and in his moral philosophy he endeavours to harmonise many of the lines of thought developed by his predecessors. In this field he is best known perhaps for his theory of the categorical imperative and for his contention that our moral experience constitutes a sort of proof of the existence of God, freedom and immortality. What precisely Kant meant by these views is explained and criticised in H. B. Acton's contribution.

Hegel's moral philosophy to some extent inspired the most repugnant forms of political totalitarianism which our age has seen and for this reason, as well as for the obscurity of his style of writing, he fell into disfavour with many students of ethics. However, his ethical theory constitutes a penetrating criticism of Kant, and W. H. Walsh makes this clear. In his contribution he also extricates Hegel's leading ideas from the verbiage in which they are entangled, and shows the abiding importance of the latter's insistence that morality must be conceived in social, and not purely individual, terms.

The second volume of this work contains studies of Utilitarianism, Axiological Ethics, Evolutionary Ethics, Marxism and Ethics, Existentialist Ethics and Contemporary Moral Philosophy.

University of Exeter

W. D. HUDSON