The Takeover of Social Policy by Financialization

Lena Lavinas

The Takeover of Social Policy by Financialization

The Brazilian Paradox



Lena Lavinas Federal University of Rio de Janeiro Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

ISBN 978-1-137-49106-0 ISBN 978-1-137-49107-7 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-49107-7

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017932102

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover Illustration: © Artokoloro Quint Lox Limited / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Nature America Inc. The registered company address is: 1 New York Plaza, New York, NY 10004, U.S.A.

In memoriam de Ondina e Morais, que me mostraram o rumo. Para Joana e Manuela, que me mantêm no prumo.

In memory of Ondina and Morais, who showed me the way.

To Joana and Manuela, who keep me on track.

Foreword

The Takeover of Social Policy by Financialization explores three closely related issues, at distinct levels of analysis: first, neoliberalism and financialisation, both as defining features of contemporary capitalism and as drivers of social reproduction; second, financialisation in Brazil, focusing on the macroeconomic and financial policies implemented by the federal administrations led by the Workers' Party (PT, in power between 2003 and 2016); third, the unique, and uniquely significant, role of social policy in Brazilian financialisation. In doing this, The Takeover of Social Policy by Financialization offers a searing indictment of the 'social-' or 'neo-' developmentalist model associated with Presidents Luís Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff.

Neoliberalism is the current phase of global capitalism, and financialisation is the economic core of neoliberalism. In country after country, neoliberalism and financialisation have reorganised the processes of production, exchange, distribution and accumulation of value, and led to the emergence of distinctive modes of social reproduction including specific modes of governance, ideologies, and subjectivities. In this context, the financialisation of daily life has intensified the subjection of households to financial markets and processes almost everywhere.

These statements are generally correct but they lack historical content: even though neoliberalism and financialisation are analytically distinctive, they are not homogenising. Instead, they foster diversity and differentiation, with each country and region following an original route towards the new system of accumulation. While the USA, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada offer interesting but relatively familiar case stud-

ies, the transitions in other countries are often not widely known. The case of Australia is particularly relevant in this context. In Australia, governments and trade unions led by the Labor Party agreed to a set of neoliberal reforms in the mid-1980s, which culminated in a dramatic restructuring of Australia's economy and society, the disintegration of those governments, and the demolition of the organised left. The Brazilian case is similar; but it is peculiar in the way left-leaning administrations, trade unions, finance and industry coalesced around a neoliberal programme of economic and social restructuring that was veiled by a 'new' national project: the social-developmentalist model launched by the PT.

Social-developmentalism was validated by the argument that it combined the strengths of neoliberal macroeconomics, which should deliver economic efficiency and market credibility, with the advantages of progressive social and incomes policies that would promote social justice and boost the domestic market. This model of development provided, then, a 'covenant for growth with social inclusion': it would bring about a virtuous circle of economic growth and social equality, eventually turning Brazil into a happy, modern and prosperous Western social-democratic country. Lena Lavinas demonstrates that this was a terribly costly mirage. In particular, that 'covenant' was based upon a financialised and unsustainable pattern of mass consumption sustained by government transfers, subsidies, and permanently rising personal debt.

The Brazilian road to financialisation included two mutually reinforcing tracks. On the one hand, financialisation was parasitical upon, and helped to destroy, the previous system of accumulation based on import-substituting industrialisation. The process of financialisation intensified in the late 1980s, as Brazil embarked on a wholesale transition to neoliberalism. This process was heavily supported by government policy, especially during the administrations led by Presidents Fernando Collor (impeached for corruption in 1992) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002). This is uncontroversial. What is groundbreaking is Lavinas's detailed exposition of the growth of financialisation during the administrations led by the overtly left-wing PT. In this sense, Lavinas's argument is *not* that the PT 'failed' to reform Brazil's economic and social structures, or that it did not do 'enough' to build a cohesive society.

It is far worse: Lavinas shows that the PT's policies were neither simply misguided nor merely unfortunate. They were *perverse*, since they helped to entrench neoliberalism and accelerate the financialisation of the Brazilian economy and society. This happened through several channels;

key among them was the explosive growth of consumer credit and the (closely related) expansion of transfers, which were at the core of the PT's flagship social policies. Those transfers were meant not only to alleviate extreme poverty, but also to provide collateral for personal loans, credit cards, insurance and the sale of other financial services and assets to virgin markets populated by tens of millions of workers that were misleadingly called 'the new middle class'. The capture of those social groups into financial structures and processes during the PT administrations was intensified by 'consigned' bank loans, paid through deductions coming directly from the wage packets, pensions and benefit payments. This type of loan was promoted by an unholy alliance including the federal government, PT-led trade unions, industry, private health and education providers and, of course, banks and insurance companies. Consigned loans drastically reduced bank costs; credit became cheaper, safer and widely available, and borrowing was normalised formillions of people. The financialisation of daily life proceeded apace under the PT.

Lavinas shows in precise detail how and why this model of growth was flawed. For example, while the global winds were favourable, the Brazilian road to financialisation was funded by the country's booming primary exports. However, the government's neoliberal macroeconomic policies also fuelled perverse international flows of capital, the overvaluation of the currency and a process of premature deindustrialisation that drastically reduced the scope for generating incomes to support jobs, transfers, the repayment of loans and the wider distribution of income. This was worse than ignorance, and more perverse than neglect: Lavinas shows that the PT governments maintained course despite the glaring insufficiencies of social developmentalism, the alarm expressed even by the party's supporters and the economy's rapid loss of dynamism since 2011. As the world became bogged down in the longest crisis since the Great Depression, the model of growth associated with the PT increasingly had to rely on public sector subsidies, tax rebates and transfers, which eroded the fiscal balance, and on personal loans, that turbo-charged the financialisation of daily life. This way, the government drilled into its own foundations. The Brazilian economy entered the longest and deepest depression in its recorded history; the opposition turned feral, and the Rousseff administration was impeached on trumped-up charges. The PT suffered an unprecedented but not wholly unpredictable—cataclysm.

There is nothing to suggest that the putschist administration will address the previous policy shortcomings constructively, rebalance the economy, distribute income more efficiently or reverse financialisation. Quite the contrary. The Brazilian paradox identified by Lena Lavinas remains firmly in place, now with new layers of complexity and even greater iniquities. This book is essential to appreciate them, and to find out how Brazil came into its current predicament. Those painful realities cannot be challenged without appropriate understanding. This book is, then, not only brilliant; it is also essential reading for our bleak times.

Alfredo Saad-Filho London, September 2016

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

People very dear to me were essential to the making of this book, and I have much to thank them for. Not only were they utterly present, but they also generously shared in the journey that this has been. They brought levity to the somewhat tiresome, often unruly task of making ideas fit into a book, and they nourished me with critiques, numbers, differences of opinion, enthusiasm, and affection.

In the process of honing the ideas presented here and fine-tuning the slightest details, my colleagues at the UFRJ Institute of Economics, Denise Gentil and Jennifer Hermann, were enviably skilled interlocutors, keeping up a warm, constant dialogue like the friends they are. Alfredo Saad-Filho's contributions came in the form of the discovery of a vast bibliography, which has been amply used over the course of the pages of this book, as well as astute recommendations as to the structure of the work. Eliane de Araújo, for her part, showed great generosity helping out with the regression model that, though simple, needed adjustments. Miguel Bruno lent a hand with eloquent clarifications of the ongoing process of financialization in Brazil. Ana Carolina Cordilha, my PhD student, research assistant, and now co-author, was at the helm of data collection and systematization, and worked unflaggingly to draw up graphs and tables. Norberto Montani Martins and André Simões were swift to respond to requests for data or elucidation, as were the undergraduate interns, Victor Bridi and Beatriz Ferrari, who assisted throughout. Eduardo Pinto and Alexis Saludjian kindly shared databases.

Other colleagues from the "Financialization and Social Policy" research group, which I coordinate—among them Lígia Bahia, José Antonio

Sestelo, and Guilherme Leite Gonçalves-debated issues during our sessions which are to be found throughout this book, providing important insights. Special thanks to my colleague Ricardo Bielschowsky, alongside whom I teach (and liven up) graduate courses at UFRJ. Our differences, as laid out in the classroom, were of the utmost importance in the maturing of the arguments presented here regarding the feats and missteps of recent developmentalist strategy.

I must also acknowledge the valuable contributions of these young professionals—yesterday's graduate students, now heading up several wings of IBGE: Barbara Cobo, João Hallak, André Cavalcanti, and Leonardo Oliveira. At the Brazilian Central Bank, meanwhile, I received invaluable support from José Aloísio Costa Filho, José Albuquerque Jr., and Cristiano Duarte.

Filipe Nogueira da Gama and André Fernandes, at the Receita Federal do Brasil; Carlos Ocké-Reis, at IPEA; Eduardo Fagnani, at the UNICAMP Institute of Economics; Pedro Nascimento Silva, professor at IBGE's Escola Nacional de Ciência Estatística; and Miguel Ribeiro de Oliveira at ANEFAC, all did their bit to help. Thanks are due to Banco Itaú's management for all of the information and explanations they provided regarding the dynamics of the credit and insurance market in Brazil from 2003 on.

To the Directors of the UFRJ Institute of Economics, Professor Carlos Frederico Leão, and his successor, Professor David Kupfer, my thanks for the encouragement to carry on with this academic project. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from CNPQ (the Brazilian National Research Council) in the form of a long-term senior scholarship. James Green at Brown University was a diligent supporter since the beginning of this journey.

I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers who patiently read the entire manuscript and to Ben Fine, Barbara Fritz, and Rubén Lo Vuolo for their helpful comments and suggestions. Needless to say they are not responsible for any errors I may have made.

Finally, I must register my deep gratitude to Flora Thomson-DeVeaux, who has once again brought me the joy of reading myself in an English where the zest of the prose brings out the fluidity of the ideas; to Denise Uderman, who kindly joined the team so as to enhance the quality of the final product; and to Eudes Lopes, a young academic at Cornell, who brought his background to bear on a constant dialogue with the objectives of this book. Last but hardly least, to Maria Gaudêncio das Neves, for the fresh mint teas and all of the everyday comfort with which she surrounds me—which, over this long undertaking, made all the difference.

I revised the final version of this manuscript while at the Wissenschaftskolleg (Institute for Advance Study) in Berlin as a Fellow in the fall of 2016. I could not have asked for a better combination of excellence, academic enthusiasm, constant assistance, and remarkable working conditions. For all this, I am extremely appreciative.

> Berlin, October 2016 Contents

Contents

1	Introduction	J
2	Social Developmentalism as a Growth Model in Times of Financialization	17
3	Financial Inclusion in the New Covenant for Growth	75
4	Connections Between the Social Protection System, Taxation, and Financialization	109
5	Lingering Brazilian Paradoxes	171
Re	References	
Index		201

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1	Brazil, trends for unemployment (persons aged 10–65 classified as employed or unemployed during the week of the survey), interest rates, inflation, and primary fiscal surplus, 2001–2015 [Source: for interest rates, Bacen interest rate (base interest rate, annual average of daily rates for 252 days); for unemployment, monthly employment research—IBGE (annual average of monthly rates for six metropolitan regions; 2015 data from January to October); for inflation—IBGE (annual growth rate of IBCA prime in days) for positive processes agent appears of the processes and processes agent appears of the processes agent	200
E:~ 2.2	IPCA price index); for primary fiscal surplus—Bacen]	20
Fig. 2.2	Brazil, return on net equity of financial and non-financial companies, 1997–2014 (%) [Source: Pinto et al. (2016). Data from "Exame" magazine ("Maiores e Melhores" 2015) for non-	
	financial companies and Bacen for banking-financial sector	21
Eig 2 2	Brazil, Gini index, 1960–2014 [Source: Neri (2012) for	21
Fig. 2.3	1960–1990 and PNAD (IBGE) for 2003–2014; for 2003–2014,	
	Gini index of the distribution of average monthly income for	
	workers over 15 years of age; excludes rural areas of Rondônia,	22
E: 2.4	Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará and Amapá]	22
Fig. 2.4	Brazil, growth index of minimum wage, average earnings and formal employment (amount of employers, army, statutory civil	
	servants and registered employees, except for domestic workers,	
	in total occupied population ages 10–65), 1995–2014 (1995 = 100)	
	[Source: for minimum wage, IBGE (constant values as of October	
	2014, adjusted by national consumer price index—INPC); for	
	average earnings, national household sample survey—PNAD/IBGE	
	(real values as of October 2014, calculated by IPEA); for formal	
	employment—PNAD/IBGE]	25

Fig. 2.5	Latin American countries, statutory minimum wages in 2016 (constant US\$ as of March 13, 2016) [Source: For minimum	
	wages, national public agencies; for exchange rate, Bloomberg]	27
Fig. 2.6	Brazil, real GDP growth rate, annual and average per period (%)	
Ü	[Source: Bacen]	29
Fig. 2.7	Brazil, growth indexes of exchange rate, imports and exports, 2001–2014 (2001 = 100) [Source: for exchange rate—BACEN; for exports and imports—Brazilian national accounts (IBGE); exchange rates as averages of monthly data adjusted for	
	inflation as calculated by the Central Bank, aggregated per year;	
	exports and imports as annual variation of trade in goods and	
TI	services over GDP]	32
Fig. 2.8	Brazil, growth indexes of total wages, total credit, personal credit and consumer credit (2002 = 100) [Source: IBGE (national accounts) and Bacen; constant values of December 2014	
	adjusted by consumer price index (IPCA); cumulative values as	
	of December, with changes in accounting methodology by the	
	Central Bank since 2007]	35
Fig. 2.9	Brazil, public securities debt, 2003–2015 [Source: Brazilian	
U	Central Bank (BACEN) and IPEADATA. Amount of securities	
	from federal, state, and local governments on the market at the	
	end of the year. Constant prices as of December 2015, indexed	
	by the consumer prices national index (IPCA)]	44
Fig. 2.10	Brazil, public debt interest payments (as a % of GDP), 2001–2015	
	[Source: Bacen. Nominal interest rates paid by central	
	government, regional governments and state companies]	45
Fig. 2.11	Brazil, financialization rate and accumulation rate, 1970–2015	
	[Source: calculated by Bruno and Caffe, Figure 2 (2015: 51), and	
	updated by Bruno (2016), using data from the Brazilian Central	
	Bank (Bacen). Accumulation rate: growth of productive fixed	
	capital stock. Financialization rate: ratio of total financial assets to	
E. 21	productive fixed capital stock]	46
Fig. 3.1	Brazil, access to adequate sanitation (running water + sewage +	
	adequate garbage collection), cell phones, color TV sets, per income decile, 2003–2013 (% households) [Source: PNAD 2003	
	and 2013	86
Fig. 3.2	Brazil, interest rates of consigned credit by type of borrower,	80
11g. 3.2	2004–2016 (% per year) [Source: Bacen, Nominal rates]	92
Fig. 4.1	Brazil, net assets of private pension funds and balance of national	12
115. 1.1	savings account, 2002–2015 (millions of Reais as of 2015) [Source	:
	ANBIMA (2016) and BACEN. Constant December 2015 values	
	adjusted by Consumer Price Index (IPCA). 1 US\$ = R\$ 3.87	
	, ,	126

38
42
49
50
52

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1	Brazil, components of aggregate demand, 2003–2014	31
Table 2.2	Estimates for regression 1 (complete sample 2004–2015)	37
Table 2.3	Subperiod 1 (2004–2007)	38
Table 2.4	Subperiod 2 (2007–2012)	38
Table 2.5	Subperiod 3 (2012–2015)	39
Table 2.6	Including default as a variable (2012–2015)	40
Table 4.1	Brazil, social security budget, 2005-2015 (billions of Reais,	
	constant values of 2015)	112
Table 4.2	Brazil, social security budget, 2005–2015 (as % of GDP)	117
Table 4.3	Brazil, general social insurance regime (RGPS) and the special	
	social insurance regime for civil servants (RPPS), 2014	
	(constant 2015 Reais)	122
Table 4.4	Brazil, average value of retirement benefits in the general	
	social insurance regime (RGPS) and special social insurance	
	regime (RPPS), 2015 (current Reais)	123
Table 4.5	Brazil, characteristics of the Brazilian population enrolled	
	in private healthcare plans and in SUS (2013)	133
Table 4.6	Brazil, tax credits from personal income tax, by tax rate	
	brackets, and nature of expenditure, 2014	135
Table 4.7	Regression 2: LOGPRIVATESERVICES	141
Table 4.8	Brazil, tax burden—composition of tax revenues by	
	categories—2005–2014	154