

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND  
ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN CHINA

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# Intergovernmental Relations and Economic Management in China

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To my wife and my parents



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Finally, I shall claim that I am the only person responsible for any remaining errors of this book. The views expressed in the book are mine and should not be attributed to the World Bank.

# List of Abbreviations

ABC: Agricultural Bank of China  
BOC: Bank of China  
BOCOM: Bank of Communications  
CITIC: China International Trust and Investment Corporation  
COE: collectively owned enterprise  
COV: coefficient of variation  
FBIS: Federal Bureau of Information Service  
FERT: Foreign Economic Relations and Trade  
FTC: Foreign Trade Corporation  
GDP: gross domestic products  
GNP: gross national products  
ICBC: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China  
IMF: International Monetary Fund  
MOF: Ministry of Finance  
MOFERT: Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade  
NBFI: non-bank financial institutions  
NPC: National People's Congress  
OLS: ordinary least square  
PBC: People's Bank of China  
PCBC: Peoples Construction Bank of China  
PICC: Peoples Insurance Company of China  
SAIC: State Administration of Industry and Commerce  
SD: standard deviation  
SEZ: special economic zone  
SOE: state-owned enterprise  
SINOPEC: China Petrochemical Corporation  
VAT: value added tax