

## Appendix A.1 Summary of the 'Annan Plan'

Note that this is a summary of the main points of the Annan plan - however, the full plan was revised and updated four times before being submitted to the parties for agreement in April 2004. The plan was first presented on 11 November 2002. Revisions were subsequently issued on 10 December 2002, 26 February 2003 and 29 March 2004. The Secretary-General presented the final version of the plan to the parties on 31 March 2004, in Bürgenstock, Switzerland. Corrigena and clarifications were issued on 18 April and incorporated in the 31 March text, the corrected version of which was authenticated by the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Cyprus and submitted to the parties on 23 April 2004 (See [http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org/Annan\\_Plan\\_Text1.html](http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org/Annan_Plan_Text1.html), for full text of final plan).

- i. Affirming that Cyprus is our common home and recalling that we were co-founders of the Republic established in 1980.
- ii. Resolved that the tragic events of the past shall never be repeated and renouncing forever the threat or the use of force, or any domination by or of either side.
- iii. Acknowledging each other's distinct identity and integrity and that our relationship is not one of majority and minority but of political equality.
- iv. Deciding to renew our partnership on that basis and determined that this new partnership shall ensure a common future in friendship, peace, security and prosperity in an independent and united Cyprus.
- v. Underlining our commitment to international law and the principles and purposes of the United Nations.
- vi. Committed to respecting democratic principles, individual human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as each other's cultural, religious, political, social and linguistic identity.
- vii. Determined to maintain special ties of friendship with, and to respect the balance between, Greece and Turkey, within a peaceful environment in the Eastern Mediterranean.
- viii. Looking forward to joining the European Union, and to the day when Turkey does likewise.
- ix. Welcoming the Comprehensive Settlement freely reached by our democratically elected leaders on all aspects of the Cyprus Problem, and its endorsement by Greece and Turkey, along with the United Kingdom.

We, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, exercising our inherent constitutive power, by our free and democratic, separately expressed common will adopt this Foundation Agreement.

## **The new state of affairs**

1. This Agreement establishes a new state of affairs in Cyprus.
2. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the treaties listed in this Agreement shall be binding on Cyprus, and the attached «common state» legislation indispensable for the functioning of the «common state» shall be in force.
3. The Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance remain in force and shall apply mutatis mutandis to the new state of affairs. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, Cyprus shall sign a Treaty with Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus, along with additional protocols to the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance.
4. Cyprus shall sign and ratify the Treaty of Accession to the European Union.
5. Cyprus shall maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and Turkey, respecting the balance established by the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance and this Agreement, and as a European Union member state shall support the accession of Turkey to the Union.
6. Any unilateral change to the state of affairs established by this Agreement, in particular union of Cyprus in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession, shall be prohibited. Nothing in this Agreement shall in any way be construed as contravening this prohibition.

## **The State of Cyprus, its «common state» government, and its «component states»**

1. The status and relationship of the State of Cyprus, its «common state» government, and its «component states» is modeled on the status and relationship of Switzerland, its federal government, and its Cantons.  
Accordingly:
  - a. Cyprus is an independent state in the form of an indissoluble partnership, with a «common state» government and two equal «component states», one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot. Cyprus has a single international legal personality and sovereignty and is a member of the United Nations. Cyprus is organised under its Constitution in accordance with the basic principles of rule of law, democracy, representative republican government, political equality, bizonality, and the equal status of the «component states».
  - b. The «common state» government sovereignly exercises the powers specified in the Constitution, which shall ensure that Cyprus can speak and act with one voice internationally and in the European Union, fulfill its obligations as a European Union member state, and protect its integrity, borders and ancient heritage.
  - c. The «component states» are of equal status. Within the limits of the Constitution, they sovereignly exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the «common state» government, organising themselves freely under their own Constitutions.
2. The «component states» shall cooperate and coordinate with each other and with the «common state», including through Cooperation Agreements, as

well as through Constitutional Laws approved by the legislatures of the «common state» and the «component states». In particular, the «component states» shall participate in the formulation and implementation of policy in external and European Union relations on matters within their sphere of competence, in accordance with Cooperation Agreements modeled on the Belgian example. The «component states» may have commercial and cultural relations with the outside world in conformity with the Constitution.

3. The «common state» and the «component states» shall fully respect and not infringe upon the powers and functions of each other. There shall be no hierarchy between the laws of the «common state» and those of the «component states». Any act in contravention of the Constitution shall be null and void.
4. The Constitution of Cyprus may be amended by separate majority of the voters of each «component state».

## **Citizenship**

1. There is a single Cypriot citizenship. Special majority «common state» law shall regulate eligibility for Cypriot citizenship.
2. All Cypriot citizens shall also enjoy internal «component state» citizenship status. Like the citizenship status of the European Union, this status shall complement and not replace Cypriot citizenship. A «component state» may tie the exercise of political rights at its level to its internal «component state» citizenship status, and may limit the establishment of residence for persons not holding this status in accordance with this Agreement. Such limitations shall be permissible if the number of residents hailing from the other «component state» has reached one per cent of the population in the first year and 20 per cent in the twentieth year, rising by three per cent every three years in the intervening period.

Thereafter, any limitation shall be permissible only if one third of the population hails from the other «component state».

## **Fundamental rights and liberties**

1. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be enshrined in the Constitution. There shall be no discrimination against any person on the basis of his or her gender, ethnic or religious identity, or internal «component state» citizenship status. Freedom of movement and freedom of residence may be limited only where expressly provided for in this Agreement.
2. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots living in specified villages in the other «component state» shall enjoy cultural and educational rights and shall be represented in the «component state» legislature.
3. The rights of religious and other minorities, including the Maronite, the Latin and the Armenian, shall be safeguarded in accordance with international standards, and shall include cultural and educational rights as well as representation in «common state» and «component state» legislatures.

## **The «common state» government**

1. The «common state» Parliament composed of two chambers, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, shall exercise the legislative power:
  - a. Each Chamber shall have 48 members. The Senate shall be composed of an equal number of Senators from each «component state». The Chamber of Deputies shall be composed in proportion to population, provided that each «component state» shall be attributed no less than one quarter of seats.
  - b. Decisions of Parliament shall require the approval of both Chambers by simple majority, including one quarter of voting Senators from each «component state». For specified matters, a special majority of two-fifths of sitting Senators from each «component state» shall be required.
2. The Office of Head of State is vested in the Presidential Council, which shall exercise the executive power:
  - a. The Presidential Council shall comprise six members elected on a single list by special majority in the Senate and approved by majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The composition of the Presidential Council shall be proportional to the population of the two «component states», though no less than one-third of the members of the Council must come from each «component state».
  - b. The Presidential Council shall strive to reach decisions by consensus. Where it fails to reach consensus, it shall, unless otherwise specified, take decisions by simple majority of members voting, provided this comprises at least one member from each «component state».
  - c. The members of the Council shall be equal and each member shall head a department. The heads of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and European Union Affairs shall not come from the same «component state».
  - d. The offices of President and Vice-President of the Council shall rotate every ten calendar months among members of the Council. No more than two consecutive Presidents may come from the same «component state». The President, and in his absence or temporary incapacity, the Vice-President, shall represent the Council as Head of State and Head of Government. The President and Vice-President shall not enjoy a casting vote or otherwise increased powers within the Council.
  - e. The [executive heads] (Observation: Terminology to be adjusted when the governmental structures of the «component states» are decided) of the «component states» shall be invited to participate without a vote in all meetings of the Council in the first ten years after entry into force of the Agreement, and thereafter on a periodical basis.
3. The Central Bank of Cyprus, the Office of the Attorney-General and the Office of the Accountant-General shall be independent.

## **The Supreme Court**

1. The Supreme Court shall uphold the Constitution and ensure its full respect.
2. It shall be composed of nine judges, three from each «component state» and three non-Cypriots.

3. The Supreme Court shall, inter alia, resolve disputes between the «component states» or between one or both of them and the «common state», and resolve on an interim basis deadlocks within the institutions of the «common state» if this be indispensable to the proper functioning of the «common state».

## Transitional common state institutions

1. The «common state» institutions shall evolve during transitional periods, after which these institutions shall operate as described above.
2. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the leaders of the two sides shall become Co-Presidents of Cyprus for three years. The Co-Presidents shall exercise the executive power during the first year, assisted by a Council of Ministers they shall appoint. For the following two years, the executive power shall be exercised by a Council of Ministers elected by Parliament, and the Co-Presidents shall together hold the office of Head of State.
3. «Component state» legislatures to be elected within 40 days of entry into force of this Agreement shall each nominate 24 delegates (reflecting the political composition of their legislature) to a transitional «common state» Parliament to operate for one year.
4. A transitional Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Co-President for one year.

## Demilitarisation

1. Bearing in mind that:
  - a. The Treaty of Guarantee, in applying mutatis mutandis to the new state of affairs established in this Agreement and the Constitution of Cyprus, shall cover, in addition to the independence, territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of Cyprus, the territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of the «component states»;
  - b. The Treaty of Alliance shall permit Greek and Turkish contingents, each not exceeding [insert 4-digit figure] all ranks, to be stationed under the Treaty of Alliance in the Greek Cypriot «component state» and the Turkish Cypriot «component state» respectively;
  - c. Greek and Turkish forces and armaments shall be redeployed to agreed locations and adjusted to agreed levels, and any forces and armaments in excess of agreed levels shall be withdrawn;
  - d. There shall be a United Nations peacekeeping operation to monitor the implementation of this Agreement and use its best efforts to promote compliance with it and contribute to the maintenance of a secure environment, to remain as long as the government of the «common state», with the concurrence of both «component states», does not decide otherwise;
  - e. The supply of arms to Cyprus shall be prohibited in a manner that is legally binding on both importers and exporters; and
  - f. A Monitoring Committee composed of the guarantor powers, the «common state», and the «component states», and chaired by the United Nations, shall monitor the implementation of this Agreement, Cyprus

shall be demilitarised, and all Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces, including reserve units, shall be dissolved, and their arms removed from the island, in phases synchronised with the redeployment and adjustment of Greek and Turkish forces.

2. There shall be no paramilitary or reserve forces or military or paramilitary training of citizens. All weapons except licensed sporting guns shall be prohibited.
3. Neither «component state» shall tolerate violence or incitement of violence against the «common state», the «component states», or the guarantor powers.
4. Cyprus shall not put its territory at the disposal of international military operations other than with the consent of Greece and Turkey.

### **«Component state» boundaries and territorial adjustment**

1. The territorial boundaries of the «component states» shall be as depicted in the map which forms part of this Agreement.
2. Areas subject to territorial adjustment which are legally part of the Greek Cypriot «component state» upon entry into force of this Agreement, shall be administered during an interim period no longer than three years by the Turkish Cypriot «component state». Administration shall be transferred under the supervision of the United Nations to the Greek Cypriot «component state» in agreed phases, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Agreement with the transfer of administration of largely uninhabited areas contiguous with the remainder of the Greek Cypriot «component state».
3. Special arrangements shall safeguard the rights and interests of current inhabitants of areas subject to territorial adjustment, and provide for orderly relocation to adequate alternative accommodation in appropriate locations where adequate livelihoods may be earned.

### **Property**

1. Claims by property owners dispossessed by events prior to entry into force of this Agreement shall be resolved in a comprehensive manner in accordance with international law, respect for the individual rights of dispossessed owners and current users, and the principle of bizonality.
2. In areas subject to territorial adjustment, properties shall be reinstated to dispossessed owners.
3. In areas not subject to territorial adjustment, the arrangements for the exercise of property rights, by way of reinstatement or compensation, shall have the following basic features:
  - a. Dispossessed owners who opt for compensation or whose properties are not reinstated under the property arrangements shall receive full and effective compensation on the basis of value at the time of dispossession plus inflation;
  - b. Current users, being persons who have possession of properties of dispossessed owners as a result of an administrative decision, may apply for and

- shall receive title if they agree in exchange to renounce their title to a property, of similar value and in the other «component state», of which they were dispossessed;
- c. Current users may also apply for and shall receive title to properties which have been significantly improved provided they pay for value in original condition;
  - d. There shall be incentives for owners to sell, lease or exchange properties to current users or other persons from the «component state» in which a property is located;
  - e. Properties not covered by the above shall be reinstated five years after entry into force of this Agreement (three years for vacant properties), provided that no more than X per cent of the area and residences in either «component state» and Y per cent (Observation: The figures X and Y shall depend on the agreed map) in any given municipality or village (other than villages specifically designated in this Agreement) shall be reinstated to owners from the other «component state»; and
  - f. Current users who are Cypriot citizens and are required to vacate property to be reinstated shall not be required to do so until adequate alternative accommodation has been made available.
4. Property claims shall be received and administered by an independent, impartial Property Board, composed of an equal number of members from each «component state», as well as non-Cypriot members. No direct dealings between individuals shall be necessary.

## Reconciliation Commission

1. An independent, impartial Reconciliation Commission shall promote understanding, tolerance and mutual respect between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.
2. The Commission shall be composed of men and women, comprising an equal number of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, as well as at least one non-Cypriot member, which the Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to appoint in consultation with the two sides.

## Past acts

1. Any act, whether of a legislative, executive or judicial nature, by any authority [...] whatsoever, prior to entry into force of this Agreement, is recognised as valid and, provided it is not inconsistent with or repugnant to any other provision of this Agreement, its effect shall continue following entry into force of this Agreement. No-one shall be able to contest the validity of such acts by reason of what occurred prior to entry into force of this Agreement.
2. Any claims for liability or compensation arising from acts prior to this Agreement shall, insofar as they are not otherwise regulated by the provisions of this Agreement, be dealt with by the «component state» from which the claimant hails.

## **Entry into force and implementation**

1. This Agreement shall come into being at 00:00 hours on the day following confirmed approval by each side at separate simultaneous referenda conducted in accordance with the Agreement.
2. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, there shall be ceremonies throughout the island at which all flags other than those prescribed in the Constitution are lowered, the flags of Cyprus and of the «component states» raised in accordance with the Constitution and relevant legislation, and the anthems of Cyprus and of the «component states» played.
3. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the Co-Presidents shall inform the United Nations that henceforth the membership rights and obligations of Cyprus in the United Nations shall be exercised in accordance with the new state of affairs. The agreed flag of Cyprus shall be raised at United Nations Headquarters.
4. This Agreement shall be implemented in accordance with the binding time-frames laid down in the various parts of the Agreement and reflected in the calendar of implementation.



## Appendix A.2 Call for Deepening of the Reconciliation Process

For the first time since 1974, the dividing line in Cyprus the so called 'Green Line' was opened with the decision of the regime in the northern part of Cyprus on 23 April 2003, enabling Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to move around the island on a daily basis. This happened one week after the Republic of Cyprus signed the accession agreement to European Union (EU) in Athens. The partial opening of the dividing line was a historical moment since after the war of 1974, this was the first time ever that people on both sides of the island were allowed to move in big numbers to 'the other side' that was banned to them for the last 29 years. Every day thousands of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have been crossing the 'line' and visiting towns, villages, homes and friends that they left 29 years ago.

The 'banned' part of their land is now starting to have a human face; every day thousands of people go in search of the homes they left, in search of their memories; remembering how the 'distant' past was like, and seeing for the first time, what it looks like today. There has been many emotional moments when a friend from the distant past knocked one's door or when one went to the Kyrenia harbour for a cup of coffee or visited Paphos to watch the sea. When the old inhabitant came to the door and the current inhabitants of the house opened the door saying 'Kopiaste' or 'Hosgeldin' (Welcome in Greek and Turkish) these two words also opened channels to the hearts and minds of our people.

This process is showing many things to us and to the world: what is described as the 'Cyprus problem' between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots is not something that cannot be solved. The important issue is not the problem but how you deal with it: the reconciliation process, if continued, will have an effect that will last for long years to come in the hearts of the people.

Despite media campaigns painting hostile images of 'the other', despite repression and persecution against those defending peace in the northern part of the island, despite 'state policies' against any solution, the two communities very clearly and strongly have shown their wish to live together in a common country in this short period of time. Our communities clearly showed their wish to embrace each other, putting what is called 'the Cyprus conflict' aside and creating their own means of communication, taking bolder steps than the politicians of this country ever could. Therefore any provocation to set back this process of reconciliation will not come from within our two communities but will come from outside.

We call on many bi-communal groups of the past and the present to be aware of such provocations and to 'take sides' in order to prevent these. We call on thousands of people who had been and who are involved in the conflict resolution and peace activities to consider themselves as important players in this process and be alert to any provocation, not to stay silent but to speak out, to encourage and help reconciliation. We call on the international community, the United Nations (UN) and the EU to help the solution of the problems that

exist in the current crossings in order to expand this process. We suggest that a few practical measures can be taken to improve the situation:

- Currently thousands of people are in long queues waiting for hours to cross. There are only three 'check-points' where they can cross from. We demand the opening of new crossing points. We support the existing initiatives to improve this problem.
- While Greek Cypriots are free to take their vehicles to the northern part of the island, Turkish Cypriots are not allowed to go to the southern part with their own vehicles. A formula must be developed for the flow of Turkish Cypriots with their own vehicles addressing the humanitarian issue at hand as well as the car-safety related issues. We welcome the ongoing efforts by Republic of Cyprus to this direction.
- The crossings between north and south can only take place between 09.00 and 24.00 hours. This restriction must be lifted and people should be allowed to stay as long as they like in both parts of the island.
- The local authorities and municipalities on both sides of the island must be encouraged to take practical measures to help to ease the free flow of the people: practical information guides about how to get around in towns and villages, where to eat, where to find hospitals or police in case of emergencies etc must be provided.
- The crossings should become less formal. There should not be visas, stamps or long queues. This should become as close as possible to a crossing within one's own country.
- The international community, especially the EU must encourage the 'reunification' of the communication systems. Currently people can call each other by using the telephone lines controlled by the UN, these lines are far from sufficient. The GSM (mobile) systems must be 'united' since it is not possible to use the GSM of one side on the other. Local telecommunications authorities are capable of re-opening the existing infrastructure.
- 'Reconciliation centres' must be encouraged to be opened on both parts of the island, where those people, including many women and young people, who have been working voluntarily in mediation and conflict resolution for many years, can use their skills for the benefit of our communities. Such centres will be valuable resources within civil society for dealing with any problems that may come up during the process of change.

On longer term, keeping in mind that we consider this as one step in a series of steps for a final lasting solution of the Cyprus issue, we demand that the process be further extended, for example, to the teaching of Turkish and Greek languages must be in the school curriculums on both sides in order to encourage communication among the two communities. Common elements of anti-chauvinist and anti-sexist education for shared citizenship should be devised and introduced to schools, so that our children can grow up in equality and mutual respect.

Cypriots should be able to exercise their basic rights for organisation and registration of joint organisations should be encouraged. The international community, especially the EU must encourage joint business ventures on both sides of the island and people must have the right to be able to work on both parts

on the island, with social security and other labour rights, including employment equality for women, regardless of where they reside.

Negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus problem have been going on for decades. Despite the efforts of the UN, EU and the international community especially for the last two years, reaching a solution based on the Annan plan has not been possible due to the intransigence of Rauf Denktaş, leader of the regime in the north. Many international resolutions, as well as numerous decisions of the EU summits and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) have pointed out Turkey's responsibility over the northern part of the island. Therefore we call on the international community, the UN and EU to remind Turkey of its responsibility for a solution. Fresh efforts must be made for the signing of an agreement before May 2004 when Cyprus will become a full EU member. Until then, we will continue our struggle for peace and reconciliation in a free and united Cyprus.

## **Cypriots for a Common Country**

Supported by: Hands Across the Divide, Cyprus Action Network (<http://www.cypriusaction.org>, [www.peace-cyprus.org](http://www.peace-cyprus.org)), German-Cypriot Forum.

## **Platform of Peace Organisations**

Bicommunal Citizens Movement  
Bicommunal Coordinating Committee  
Bicommunal Dialogue Forum  
Bicommunal Choir  
Bicommunal Conflict Resolution Trainers Group  
Brussels Group  
Business Womens Group  
Citizen's Movement for Re-unification and Co-existence  
Co-Villagers Project  
Cyprus Neuroscience and Technology Institute  
Dali Municipality Bicommunal Committee  
Hands Across the Divide  
HasNa (CYPRUS)  
Interactive Management Facilitators Group  
International Eco.peace Village  
International World Affairs (Cyprus and Middle East)  
Internet Group  
Leaders I Group  
Leaders II Group  
Management Center  
New Cyprus Association  
NGO Resource Center  
Peace Center  
Platform Solution, Re-unification Now  
Reconciliation Now Initiative  
Steps For Peace

Teachers Group  
Technology For Peace  
The Association of Management Studies  
The bicomunal citizens action group for peace in Cyprus  
The Brussels Womens group  
The FOSBO Group  
The Language Group  
The Olso group  
The Peace Center  
The SIT2002CY group  
University Students  
Westminster Foundation Cyprus  
Women for the Prevention of Domestic Violence  
Youth Encounters for Peace (15 sub groups)  
Youth Promoting Peace  
ZEYTIN DALI Foundation  
28.4.2003

# Notes

## Chapter 1 Understanding the European Union as a Global Actor

1. See Rummel (2003) for latest developments in EU foreign policy.
2. Also see Hill (2002) for an assessment of European foreign policy and its strengths and weaknesses in the light of the events of 11 September 2001.
3. For literature on enlargement as foreign policy see Munuera (1994), Friis and Murphy (1999), Hill 2001, Sjursen & Smith (2001), Sjursen (2002, 1998), Smith K.E. (1998, 2000, 2003), Diez (2000), Christou (2002, 2003).
4. A term borrowed from Munuera (1994), in his discussion of how potential membership of the EU could help in conflict prevention.
5. For a thorough analysis and definition of what might constitute 'strategy' and 'strategic behaviour' on the part of the EU see Gomez (2003, pp. 1–24).
6. See Hill (2001, p. 330) for differentiation between the three.
7. For example *conflict management* – which is directed towards preventing escalation once conflict has begun.
8. The relevant articles established the procedures for establishing customs unions with the associates. They included provisions on Community investment, rights of establishment and the mutual protection of workers' rights.
9. See Gomez (2003) and Gomez and Christou (forthcoming 2004) for analysis of the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership.
10. Defined by Smith as 'The addition or accretion of political meanings, understandings and consequences to particular areas and instruments of policy' (Smith M., 1998, p. 83).
11. The principle of consistency is referred to in Art. A, Art. C, and Title V, Art.J.8 (2) and is described by Krenzler and Schneider as having two elements: Vertical consistency – which is between the Union and its member states and horizontal consistency between the European Community's external relations and CFSP. See Krenzler and Schneider (1997, Ch 8).
12. For Brusselisation see Allen (1998, p. 77). For Europeanisation see Hill and Wallace (in Hill, 1996) and Michael E. Smith (2000).
13. The Petersburg Declaration in 1992 stipulated that 'The CFSP will cover 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking' and that 'the WEU may call upon NATO resources where the US decides not to act'.
14. The EU launched 'Operation Concordia' the first ESDP military mission in Macedonia in March 2003, marking the start of a new strategic partnership between the EU and NATO – and complementing other existing EU activity in the area. However, in terms of its military capability it is too early to judge the difference that this might make to the EU's 'actorness' in more controversial areas of conflict; particularly given the primacy of 'unanimity' in the agreement process.

15. Several proposals have been put forward at the European Convention for the reform of the EU's foreign and security policy for the purpose of enhancing its role on the world stage. See Rummel R., (2003). Also see Preliminary draft Constitutional Treaty, CONV 369/02.
16. See Holland (1991), Carlsnaes and Smith (1994), and Ginsberg (1997, 2001), for an excellent review of the utility of such theories for EFP.
17. For a critique of EU policy on Cyprus see Stavridis (1999, pp. 95–112). See also Melakopides (1992).
18. Sjursen and Smith (2001) outline three analytically distinct ways in which foreign policy can achieve legitimacy (applied to the EU enlargement process) that are grounded in three logics of action or justification for an individual actor: a logic of consequences; a logic of appropriateness; and a logic of moral justification. Furthermore, they present three different criteria that identify these logics: utility, values and rights. They suggest that the importance of each of these logics and the criteria that underpin them is relative to the type of foreign policy examined. Their findings, in relation to enlargement as foreign policy, suggest that whilst traces of all three logics can be found in the EU's conditions for membership, the *logic of moral justification* appeared to be dominant in justifying the EU's enlargement policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. In terms of the Mediterranean applicants however, this conclusion was not tenable, and they suggest instead that a mixture of the *logic of consequences* and *logic of values* might be identified in the EU's enlargement policy. With regard to values in particular, they suggest that the treatment of Turkey is influenced by value-based assumptions about who is European and who is not. See also Sjursen (2002) for an extended discussion of these logics and justification for the EU's enlargement policy.
19. See Hill (2001, pp. 323–329) and Munuera (1994, p. 96). See also Ginsberg (2001) on the instruments of EU foreign policy.
20. See Emerson and Tocci (2002a and 2002b) for comprehensive coverage of how the EU could accommodate a 'common state' of Cyprus – institutionally and legally. For a critique of Emmerson and Tocci see Carras (2002). See also Diez (2002) on other ways in which the EU might provide a framework for a solution of the Cyprus conflict.
21. Other important actors include the Greece, the US, and the UK.

## Chapter 2 The Complexity of the Cyprus Case: The Historical Context

1. AKEL had the solid support of around 40 per cent of the 'Cypriot' population.
2. It is estimated that 79 Turkish Cypriots were killed in 1963 and 136 in 1964.
3. See [http://www.hri.org/Cyprus/Cyprus\\_Problem/UNdocs](http://www.hri.org/Cyprus/Cyprus_Problem/UNdocs).
4. Dr Kurt Waldheim brought out his 'Evaluation' paper at the end of 1981; Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar produced three major documents between January 1985 and March 1986, and his 'Food for Thought' in the summer of 1989; Dr Boutros Ghali presented his 'Set of Ideas' (including a map indicating territorial adjustments) in August 1992; and Mr Kofi Annan revived part of the

'Set of Ideas' and presented it through his Special Representative Mr Diego Cordobez to President Clerides and Mr Denktash in Troutbeck, New York State and Glion, Switzerland in the summer of 1997 <http://website.lineone.net/~acgta/Stavrinides.doc>. Kofi Annan also presented a comprehensive plan for settlement of the Cyprus issue in November 2002 to the leaders of the two communities and the guarantor states, which has come to be known as the 'Annan plan'.

5. Both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots had criticisms of the 'Set of Ideas' and disagreed with certain elements contained within the ideas, and the associated map presented by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali to the two sides in August 1992. The Greek Cypriots in particular saw certain elements as divisive and negative, elements which they put down 'to the pernicious influence of the United States, Great Britain and certain other Western countries' <http://website.lineone.net/~acgta/Stavrinides.doc>

### Chapter 3 The European Union and Cyprus

1. Which was concluded on the basis of Article 238 of the EEC (containing only trade provisions) rather than on the basis of Article 113 concerning the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements (Association between the Republic of Cyprus and the EEC, Cyprus Press and Information Office, 1982). This may suggest that in comparing the Cyprus Agreement to others of its type at the time, the EEC-Cyprus trade agreement was approached much more moderately in terms of long-term association.
2. The European Commission did however present proposals for enhancement of the Association Agreement in 1976 although member states were reluctant to adopt these proposals given the fragility of the situation in Cyprus at the time (Redmond, 1993: 68).
3. Within the period 1976-1985 the following protocols were signed: On the 15 September 1977 an Additional Protocol Agreement was signed in Brussels which provided for the extension of the first stage until 31 December 1979. At about the same time Cyprus signed the First Financial Protocol worth ECU 30 million. On the 11 May 1978, Cyprus and the EEC, also entered into two new protocols: a special supplementary protocol which settled some additional agricultural issues in line with Mediterranean policy of the Community and another laying down certain provisions relating to the trade in agricultural products. A new transitional protocol was again signed on 7 February 1980 extending this Agreement and in July 1983 yet another special Protocol was signed which made additional concessions on customs duties and quotas on a number of agricultural products and lifted quotas on certain industrial categories. In addition, in December 1983, Cyprus and the EEC signed the Second Financial Protocol, which totalled ECU 44 million. See Cyprus-EEC Customs Union (1986); Cyprus-EC Relations (1989); The Cyprus Problem: Cyprus Towards the European Union, [http://hri.org/Cyprus\\_Problem/europeanunion.html](http://hri.org/Cyprus_Problem/europeanunion.html) For a more detailed analysis of the economic measures see Tsardanidis (1984).
4. All UN resolutions on Cyprus can be found on: [http://www.hri.org/Cyprus/Cyprus\\_Problem/Undocs.html](http://www.hri.org/Cyprus/Cyprus_Problem/Undocs.html)

5. In reality this precedent had been set much earlier in as far back as Greece's application to the EEC in the 1970s. Turkey had previously submitted its application for membership to the EC in 1987 and the Commission in December 1989 issued an opinion. The opinion gave as one of its reasons for not granting Turkey early EC membership the various disputes with Greece, in particular over Cyprus, as obstacles. See Survey of Turkey (7) (1992).
6. These substantive talks started on the 26 November 1993 and involved close coordination between the Commission and the government of Cyprus who, for the purposes of the talks established twenty-three working groups (and many sub-groups) composed of civil servants, delegates of semi-government agencies and the private sector (Joseph, 1999, p. 8).
7. See for instance Stephanou and Tsardanides, (1991, p. 207).
8. See <http://www.kypros.org/Embassy/Jan98/text.htm>
9. See for details: [http://www.pio.gov.cy/update/english/news/1996/96\\_09/960926](http://www.pio.gov.cy/update/english/news/1996/96_09/960926))
10. For the Greek-Cypriot position see Michaelides (1996). For the Greek position see <http://www.MFA.GR/foreign/>
11. For assesement on adoption of the *acquis communautaire* in Cyprus up to November 2003 see Commission Monitoring Report on Cyprus (Nov, 2003): [http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report\\_2003/pdf/cmr\\_cy\\_final.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/cmr_cy_final.pdf)
12. A reference was also made to Cyprus in the meeting through a joint position, which also acknowledged that lack of progress in solving the Cyprus problem would be to the detriment of Turkey, the EU and EU-Turkish relations. See: <http://www.kypros.org/PIO/english/update/news/1997/9705/970502.htm>
13. See <http://www.kypros.org/PIO/english/update/news/1997/9707/070716.html>)
14. For the reactions of both the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot leadership see *Cyprus Weekly*, 22–28 August (1997) p. 1.
15. Britain's special envoy for Cyprus (who has now stepped down), Sir David Hannay however, voiced the following opinion with regard to the EU's handling of the Turkish relationship, 'I think that the handling of the Turkish candidacy has been a-bit clumsy frankly and I feel it has not been ...the EU has shown a tendency to try to answer questions that weren't being posed...nobody is asking the question at the moment ...can Turkey join the European Union now...The Turks aren't asking it...no-one is asking it ...and yet we seem to spend half the time try to answer that question when it is not being posed....its not being posed because the Turks accept that they do not fulfill the criteria' (Interview, Hannay, 1999)
16. See <http://www.cynews.com/March/31/news033113.htm>, 31 March 1998 for details. It is important to note here that the three leading opposition leaders in the north of Cyprus have all attacked Denktash for this intransigent stance towards the EU and the UN sponsored talks. This view was also confirmed when I interviewed Mehmet Ali Talat on a visit to London. He said that there was much support on the part of the Turkish Cypriot Community for accession to the EU. He also said that he believed in accession of Cyprus to the EU but only after a federal solution had been agreed



upon. He would have preferred Cyprus to apply after a solution so as to include the whole island from the outset. The main problem in the North was that although they did not like what was happening, 'they were not being given any choice', because of the support enjoyed by Denktash from Turkey and the Turkish settlers. See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the views of the opposition parties and leaders in the North.

17. I was informed in an interview with a Council official that this statement made by Commissioner van den Broek was an independent statement that was not coordinated with the other EU institutions e.g. the CFSP Secretariat, Council etc. This illustrated one of the great difficulties for the EU in terms of trying to establish a 'coherent' line or policy on issues such as Cyprus given the diversity of people and positions involved within the EU structure.
18. See <http://www.pio.gov.cy/news/1998/980615.html>
19. As were the more positive relations between Greece and Turkey after the earthquakes of 1999.
20. Even more so given the fact that certain quarters in Turkey do not believe Cyprus is of great strategic relevance for Turkey any longer (Kiyat, 30 Dec 2002, Translated interview, in Cyprus Press and Information Office, 10.01.02–17.01.02).
21. The Council adopted on 17 December 2001 a regulation concerning pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey. The regulation reiterated the Commission's objective to establish pre-accession financial assistance, on average, at an annual level of €177 million. See <http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/english/e-mali-view-new.html>
22. The support for actions aiming at bringing the Turkish Cypriot community closer to the Union is based on the idea that this community should be informed on the implications of joining the EU. The legal basis for the expenditure will be the existing regulation on pre-accession support to Cyprus and Malta (Council Regulation (EC) No.555/2000), applicable until 31 December 2003. In the event of no comprehensive settlement before 2004, the Commission will ensure further specific and targeted actions.
23. If we take strategy to mean purposive, goal directed behaviour to pursue more or less specified objectives, themselves as a result of the identification, prioritisation and articulation of interests. See Allen (1998, p. 46), Gomez (2003, pp. 1–24).

## Chapter 4 The Power of Attraction: Greek and Turkish Cypriot Perceptions

1. Cyprus at this time was in the midst of much internal strife and crisis, which meant that the policy of European orientation had to be temporarily put on hold (see Chapter 2).
2. By this time, the joint administration had effectively collapsed, and was being run by the Greek Cypriots.
3. See [http://hri.org/Cyprus\\_Problem/europeanunion.html](http://hri.org/Cyprus_Problem/europeanunion.html).
4. See Joseph (1999) for the argument that the EU can provide a rational and conducive framework through the *acquis communautaire* in the search for a political settlement on Cyprus.

5. The internationally recognised Greek Cypriot government which controls southern Cyprus
6. See also previous documentation – EP Task Force Enlargement, 29 October 1998 – PE 167.238/ rev.3: 4 and Recommendation 1197 (1992) on the demographic structure of the Cypriot communities.
7. According to Cyprus Government figures 1,521 passports were issued in 2002, and 1,192 in 2001 (Cyprus News, 2003). Of course, this might also have a negative consequence if Turkish Cypriots get passports and migrate to Europe this will impact on the Turkish Cypriot community in the North (and the maintenance of). This in turn might prove detrimental to finding a solution.
8. Although the Cypriot government does accept the Annan plan in principle, it does have certain reservations about the details, and thus, for the Greek Cypriots, changes must be made to certain elements of the plan in order for it to be viable; the nature of these changes, however, remain undisclosed at the time of writing. The important point here is that the Greek Cypriots accepted the Annan plan – at least as a basis for negotiating a settlement (see Chapter 6) – in order to demonstrate that they were showing the necessary ‘political will’ to find a solution.
9. See Stravridis (2002) for details and analysis of the *Vouli* and its role in Cypriot politics.
10. See <http://www.akel.org.cy/English/eu.html> for an explanation of AKEL’s position on the EEC/EU. See also speech by Dimitris Christofias at a panel discussion on Copenhagen and Beyond: building a Common Future, 07.12.02, Pyla, Cyprus <http://www.akel.org.cy/Archive/English/arch-om-071202.html>
11. See <http://www.disy.org.cy> for more details (Greek and English) on the history, formation and development of the party.
12. See: <http://www.papandreou.gr/papandreou/content/articlepage.aspx?articleid=1082&language=0>
13. See also Eurobarometer Report (2002) on ‘Attitudes with Regard to the prospect of Membership in the applicant countries’, p. 143. It must also be noted here that Cyprus was the only one of the ten accession countries that did not hold a referendum on accession.
14. Governmental elites, who served in the TRNC (e.g. Talat, Akinci, Ozgur).
15. See Brewin (2000, pp. 172–207)
16. The Turkish government commissioned a legal ‘opinion’ on this issue that was drawn up by a London QC, Maurice Mendelson (Prof. of Law, University College London), and circulated at the UN in October 2001. Prof. James Crawford of Cambridge University, Professor Gerhard Hafner of Vienna University and Prof. Alain Pellet of Paris-X University, however, have categorically rejected Turkey’s contention that Cyprus’ accession to the EU would be illegal in a unanimous further legal opinion. This opinion was published on 8 January 2002 and forwarded to the UN by the government of Cyprus (Cyprus News, Jan 2002, p. 2).
17. Of course in 1960 neither Greece nor Turkey were members of the EEC.
18. According to the post-accession financial aid for new EU members in 2004–2006 (published by the Commission, 30 January 2002) the total amounts foreseen in commitments to the north of Cyprus are €39 million

- in 2004, €67 million in 2005 and €100 million in 2006 (Cyprus News, January 2002, p. 2).
19. For details of the demonstrations against the Denktash regime and for membership of the EU and a solution of the Cyprus issue on the basis of the Annan plan, see Cyprus Press and Information Office, Feb–Sep 2003.
  20. See for example also *Report*, Friends of Cyprus, No. 45, Autumn 2002, pp. 12–14, for concessions on security arrangements by the two sides.
  21. See European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer, Spring 2002.
  22. Diez (2002) has argued that although Turkish Cypriot non-governmental organisations have criticised Denktash, their criteria for a settlement included a number of aspects, such as component states on the basis of political equality, which are not different from the position of Denktash. However, this is not entirely accurate, as one of the central provisions of the Annan plan, accepted by both the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (not the ruling elite), is the existence of a common state of Cyprus consisting of two equal component states, each with its own administration and legislature. Furthermore, opinion polls in the North have indicated that there is widespread support amongst Turkish Cypriot civil society and opposition parties for the ‘Annan plan’ as a starting point for negotiations at least (as is the position of the Greek Cypriots) – a position that is completely at odds with the view of Rauf Denktash who has on many occasions stated that the Plan is completely unacceptable and that nothing could be achieved with this Plan. Indeed more recently Denktash has attempted to formulate his own plan for the resolution of the Cyprus issue (Cyprus Press and Information Office, 04.09.03–12.09.03).
  23. Other parties include (at the time of writing): the Cyprus Justice Party (Oguz Kalelioglu); the Patriotic Unity Movement (Alpay Durduran); the United Cyprus Party (Izzet Izzcan) and the Nationalist Peace Party (Ertugrul Hasipoglu).
  24. See also CPIO, Cyprus elections, Special edition, 2003.
  25. See Guven- Lisanviler and Rodriguez (2002, pp. 181–202).

## Chapter 5 The Power of Attraction: Perceptions from Turkey

1. Indeed Turkey preferred to leave the Cyprus issue to interminable inter-communal talks, or to discuss it as one of many issues with regard to Greek-Turkish differences – which was not acceptable to Greece and the Greek Cypriots.
2. For example, in reaction to the terms of its Accession Partnership with the EU Turkey stated that it ‘has never accepted any linkage between the efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus issue and its candidacy to the EU’ (cited by Biscop, 2002, p. 28). See also McLaren (2000). In her work on Turkish elite perspectives on the EU, she finds that many do not consider the Cyprus issue to be a major stumbling block to Turkish membership.
3. Although it could be argued that in terms of the ‘democratic’ element Atatürk’s attempts to allow opposition parties were hindered by his own reluctant attitude and backtracking.

4. See Müftüler-Bac (1997, p. 65), for historical context of Turkish-Greek relations
5. For a comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of Turkey–EU trade relations see Ugur (1999, Ch 5).
6. In order to resolve this fear the EC came up with a formula whereby Turkey would be informed of any issues discussed within EPC that affected its interests.
7. However, Turkey did have supporters in Europe who argued that Turkey as the only secular and semi-democratic Muslim state deserved to be given a special position in the European system (see Chapter 3).
8. For a greater insight and understanding of why see Buzan and Diez (1999).
9. A major reason for Greece's perceived 'awkward' attitude was the Greek Prime Minister, Papandreou, (1981–89 and 1993–1995), who was less than cooperative due to his own personal anti-western agenda.
10. In 1984 the Greeks also blocked funds in the amount of 400 million ECU's to Turkey. See Wood and Yesilada (1996, p. 208). In 1988 the Turkish government was 'displeased' with the fact that both a declaration by ministers and a European Parliament resolution had stated that the Cyprus issue 'affects the relations of Turkey with the EC', see Meinardus (1991, p. 162).
11. The EP in actual fact was not very happy with the link made between the acceptance or continuation of the CU with Turkey (by Greece) and the commitment made to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the IGC of 1996. They would have preferred to keep these two issues separate – but not for the first time it was national interest and national positions that determined the policy on Cyprus (Interview, MEP, 1998).
12. See EU/Turkey: Ankara rejects offer from European Council of Luxembourg and breaks political dialogue with the EU, *Europe*, Vol. 45, 1997, 7122. p. 6–7.
13. See Tanlak (2002) for details of amendments that Turkey made to its constitution in order to comply with the EU *acquis* (EU harmonisation Laws adopted by the Turkish National Assembly in 2002).
14. See [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report\\_2003/](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/)
15. This is a generalisation and perhaps an oversimplification, as there are those, such as the Chief of the General Staff, General Ozkok, that are known to be pro-Western and moderate in their orientation. However, as pointed out by a senior EU Commission official, it is difficult to gauge the attitude and policy of the Turkish military, as views change on a day-to-day basis according to political opportunity (anonymous, 2002). In addition, the Turkish military have often been perceived as the major constraint on reform in Turkey with regard to EU conditionality, not least in relation to the Cyprus issue (see Spiteri, 2003)
16. See <http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/english/e-mali-overview.html> for details of planned and implemented financial assistance to Turkey.
17. See also *The Economist* (14 April 2002, p. 44) on the renewed cooperation between Greece and Turkey.
18. This has been mutually reinforcing – the resumption of the Cyprus talks in 2002 led to more positive climate for resolving Greek-Turkish disputes. Indeed the 'new' positive relationship is something that has been asserted repeatedly by the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, who were said to have developed good personal working relation-

- ships. It must also be said however, that despite this there have been question marks as to how far this has led to any substantive results in terms of settling the disputes between Greece and Turkey, including Cyprus.
19. See McDonald (2000) for more detail on these disputes.
  20. For a more complex analysis and exploration of explanations for these incidents see, Turkey: Growing Danger of Military Incident with Greece in the Aegean, *Civilitas Research*, 24 June 2004.
  21. For full details of the Accession Partnership document, see <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/docs.htm>
  22. Although it must be noted that no evidence of this was found in the Commission's Progress Report (2003) on Turkey. See [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report\\_2003/index.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/index.htm)
  23. A survey by McLaren (although attitudes have changed since 2000 when it was conducted it still remains valid and reflective of current positions) is illustrative and confirms the view amongst important elites in the Turkish establishment that the Cyprus problem was not a factor keeping Turkey out of the EU. Turkish elites held the belief that there were more fundamental problems with Turkey's application than the opposition of Greece and the solution of the Cyprus issue.

## Chapter 6 The Power of Attraction and the United Nations Context

1. See Savvides (2003, p. 19–24). See also Emerson and Tocci (2002).
2. This is not to argue that other external factors have not been important, but that the decision taken at Helsinki was an equally, if not more important contributory factor in creating a more positive climate for negotiation and reconciliation.
3. Alvaro de Soto did, however, state that the June 2002 target date for the conclusion of the intercommunal talks envisaged by the UN Security Council was a 'desirable goal' accepted by both leaders, but not a deadline.
4. Conducted for an Athenian newspaper by the polling company Evresis Call Centre. The telephone survey used a multistage, stratified and random method on a Cyprus-wide scale amongst men and women over 18 years old who live in urban and rural areas. An opinion conducted by the Greek Cypriot daily newspaper in November 2002 revealed that opposition stood at 64 per cent (Reported in *The Cyprus Weekly*, 'Greek opposition to UN plan grows', 29 Nov 2002).
5. This was, however, prior to the election of Tassos Papadopoulos as President in February 2003.
6. See <http://www.ctpkibris.org/English/271202.htm>

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