

# Notes

## Introduction

1. Literature in the 1980s with themes of nuclear war was nearly double the number of that of the period from 1950 to 1959. See Paul Brians, "Nuclear Holocausts: Atomic War in Fiction," (Pullman, Washington: Washington State University, 2003; 2007) <http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/nukepop/chart.html> and <http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC8.pdf>.
2. J. L. Gaddis, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future," in *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace* (New York: Oxford, 1987).
3. Cold war battle deaths have been reported at twenty to twenty-five million. One estimate, which includes both "democide" and "genocide," is as high as seventy-six million from 1945–1987. R.J. Rummel, "20th Century Democide" (May, 1998) <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/POSTWWII.HTM>.
4. On what to do about landmines leftover from the cold war, see the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) Web site, [http://nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/peace/articles/williams/index.html](http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/articles/williams/index.html).
5. For development of the concept of "security community," see Karl Deutsch, *Political Community: North-Atlantic Area* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1957). See also Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Alex J. Bellamy, *Security Communities and their Neighbors* (New York: Palgrave, 2004). See also Chapter 10 this book.
6. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs America and the World 1990/91*; "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," *The National Interest* (Winter 2002/2003). [http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA\\_content/documents/Krauthammer.pdf](http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/Krauthammer.pdf).
7. Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, "America's Chaotic Road to War," *Washington Post* (January 27, 2002). After consultation with President Bush, vice-president Dick Cheney gave the orders to shoot down the hijacked airliner. Did it crash or was it shot down?
8. Senator Jim Webb (D-VA) mentioned in his response to President Bush's 2007 State of the Union Address the growing gap in CEO pay: "When I graduated from college, the average corporate CEO made 20 times what the average worker did; today, it's nearly 400 times. In other words, it takes the average worker more than a year to make the money that his or her boss makes in one day." <http://www.jameswebb.com/articles/wallstjrnl/classstruggle.htm>.

9. Samuel Huntington, "The Hispanic Challenge," *Foreign Policy* (March/April 2004). See critique of Huntington's position: Philippa Strum and Andrew Selee, *The Hispanic Challenge? What We Know about Latino Immigration*, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (March 29, 2004) <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/HispChall.pdf>.

## Chapter 1

1. See discussion of four forms of terrorism, Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the "War on Terrorism"* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005; 2007), chapter 3.
2. The National Intelligence Council's 2020 report argues that civilizational movements—that is, religious adherents that include Muslim militants, Christian evangelicals, Hindu nationalists, and Jewish fundamentalists, among others—will generally rise in numbers in the period from 2002 to 2025. National Intelligence Council (NIC), "Mapping the Global Future," Washington, DC: CIA, 2004. [http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC\\_globaltrend2020.html](http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html). This fact, along with increasing rivalry over natural gas, oil, and others sources of energy, opens a "danger zone" of both antistate and interstate conflict in that more individuals are becoming "activists" who tend to see the world in Manichaeic "good vs. evil" terms and "connect local conflicts to a larger struggle."
3. Human Security Report 2005/ 2006. <http://www.humansecurityreport.info/>.
4. See Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution: [http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/en\\_publications/annual\\_reports/vsbericht2005\\_eng/](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/en_publications/annual_reports/vsbericht2005_eng/).
5. Paul Wilkinson, "Why Modern Terrorism?" in *The New Global Terrorism*, ed. Charles W. Kegley, 120 (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003). On UK and European efforts to handle terrorism, see Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (London: Routledge, 2006). Xenophobic Russian nationalists are concerned with Russia's rapidly growing Islamic population, which now numbers roughly 25 million out of 143 million and which could represent one-fifth of the Russian population by 2020 in part because of declining fertility rates among ethnic Russians.
6. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0206/p06s01-woeu.html?s=itm>.
7. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0831/dailyUpdate.html?s=mesdu>; <http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/08/10/washington.terror.plot/index.html>.
8. Human Security Report 2005/ 2006, <http://www.humansecurityreport.info/>.
9. On spiraling arms races, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
10. For discussion of the security-insecurity "dilemma," see Anthony D. Lott, *Creating Insecurity* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate: 2004). The concept of "security dilemma" was articulated by John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2 (January 1950), but the issue appears more of a dialectical interrelationship and interaction of perceived insecurity countered by a quest for perceived security as opposed to a "dilemma."
11. "Letter May Detail Iraqi Insurgency's Concerns," CNN (February 10, 2004.) This is assuming the letter is authentic.
12. "Denmark's Muslims Welcome Cemetery Plan" *Agence France Presse* (April 8, 2006). In April 2006, the Danish government finally permitted the first Muslim cemetery after seven years of demands. The dead were either returned to their country of origin for burial or interred in the Muslim sections. Danes marrying

- non-Europeans can only marry at twenty-four years of age, in part to prevent arranged marriages.
13. Amitai Etzioni, "Leveraging Islam," *The National Interest* 83 (Spring 2006).
  14. Spero News. <http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=6361>. Archeologist Muazzez Ilmiye Cig was acquitted by a Turkish court for "inciting religious hatred" in regard to her theory as to the origin of the veil, which might have first been worn by priestesses in ancient Sumer who were initiating young people into sex rites but without being prostitutes.
  15. James P. Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Piscatori makes distinctions between "conformist" groups that accept the divisions of the global territorial state system and those "nonconformist" groups that seek to overturn the present state system in favor of a pan-Islamic Ummah. But even these categories can be further subdivided.
  16. Sayyid Qutb's theories on Islamic values have been regarded promulgating views that are the polar opposite of neoconservative idol Leo Strauss. See Anne Norton, *Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2005). Yet Strauss was an admirer of Andalusia in the fifteenth century when Muslims, Christians, and Jews lived in creative harmony before the Reconquista in 1492.
  17. Dafna Linzer and Thomas E. Ricks, "Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker," *Washington Post*, November 28, 2006.
  18. Arthur Bright, "Is Chechen Conflict 'Over'? Death of Basayev Seen as an Opening for Russian-Chechen Relations," [csmonitor.com](http://csmonitor.com) (July 12, 2006).
  19. On neocommunitarianism, see Amitai Etzioni, "A Neo-Communitarian Approach to International Relations," *Human Rights Review* 7, no. 1 (July–September 2006). On the potential for a deeper and wider conflict in the Philippines, see Simon Roughneen, "Philippine Escalation May Spark Wider War" *ISN Security Watch* (August 8, 2007).
  20. Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood" *Foreign Affairs* vol. 86, no. 2 (2007).
  21. For a critical analysis of the results of Bush administration efforts to "democratize" authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes, see Chris Toensing, "Regional Implications of the Iraq War" *Foreign Policy in Focus*. <http://www.fpif.org>.
  22. Terrorist Group Profiles, <http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/qjbr.htm>.
  23. Bright, "Is Chechen Conflict 'Over'?"
  24. Juan Cole, Informed Comment (March 26, 2006), <http://www.juancole.com/2006/03/at-least-35-killed-lebanon-shiite.html>.
  25. On a tactical level, the Iranians might have wanted to trade members of the MEK for al-Qaida cadres that were in Iraq. Although it was also on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations, the MEK might have proved useful if Washington was going to engage in "regime change." On a strategic level, the Iranians might have wanted a larger cooperation agreement. Council of Foreign Relations "Leverett: Bush Administration 'Not Serious' about Dealing with Iran" (March 31, 2006), <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10326/>.
  26. In the February 2005 elections, members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's largest and best-organized political force, won 88 seats (running as independents) despite efforts of the Mubarak government to repress the movement.
  27. Before the May 2007 elections, Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer stated that the country's secular system of government faced its gravest danger since the founding of the republic in 1923; yet Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan of the Islamic AKP party has continued to deny any hidden Islamist agenda. <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=70698>. In July 2007, the AKP did win the election, along with twenty-seven independent Kurdish candidates, former Islamist Abdullah

- Gull then won the presidency in August. See Ben Judah, "Erdogan's AKP wins new mandate" *ISN Security Watch* (July 23, 2007), <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17893>.
28. <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/milf.htm>.
  29. Lydia Khalil, "Iraqi President Claims Secret Talks with Insurgents," <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=15788>. As of August 2007, the Iraqi government had still failed to meet the demands of even moderate Sunni cabinet members. See Chapter 3.
  30. See, for example, Fred Weir, "Russia's Hamas Gambit" *Christian Science Monitor* (February 21, 2006).
  31. Tariq Ali, "Who Really Killed Daniel Pearl?" *The Guardian*, April 5, 2002. As Tariq Ali pointed out, "The group which claimed to have kidnapped and killed Pearl—The National Youth Movement for the Sovereignty of Pakistan—is a confection. One of its demands was unique: the resumption of F-16 sales to Pakistan. A terrorist, jihadi group which supposedly regards the current regime as treacherous, is putting forward a 20-year-old demand of the military and state bureaucracy." Yet if it is true that the third al-Qaida leader, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (as he purportedly confessed under torture) ordered the beheading of Daniel Pearl, then it implies a link between al-Qaida and Pakistan over the question of F-16s! French philosopher B. H. Levy believes Pearl was killed for investigating links between al-Qaida, the Pakistani ISI, and the Pakistani nuclear scientists. See B. H. Levy, *Who Killed Daniel Pearl?* (Hoboken, NJ: Melville House, 2003). In September 2007, the highly acclaimed Doha Debate in Qatar raised the question: "Is It Time to Talk to Al-Qaida?"
  32. See Mahan Abedin "The Essence of Al-Qaida: An Interview with Saad Al-Faqih," *Jamestown Foundation* 2, no. 2 (February 5, 2004), [http://www.jamestown.org/publications\\_details.php?volume\\_id=397&&issue\\_id=2907](http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=397&&issue_id=2907).
  33. *Ibid.*
  34. *New York Times*, April 24, 2006. By April 2006, bin Laden renewed his propaganda offensive by critiquing American and European policy with regard to the isolation of Hamas; the proposed Western-led peacekeeping force in Sudan; and the Danish cartoons that mocked the Prophet Mohammed. In 2007, al-Qaida warned Hamas not to compromise with Israel by joining the unity government. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/24/world/middleeast/24binladen.html?n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fOrganizations%2fH%2fHamas%20>
  35. Robert P. Hartwig, "The Cost of Terrorism: How Much Can We Afford?" National Association of Business Economics 46th Annual Meeting, October 4, 2004, Insurance Information Institute: <http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/sept11/> [http://server.iii.org/yy\\_obj\\_data/binary/736854\\_1\\_0/tria.pdf](http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/736854_1_0/tria.pdf) (Accessed April 15, 2006). Interestingly, bureaucratic infighting between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Bureau of Homeland Security over estimates of potential damage of attacks to chemical facilities makes insurance valuation very difficult.
  36. "All Indonesian Communities Vow to Fight Together Terrorism," [http://www.world-tourism.org/newsroom/Releases/2005/october/bali\\_tourism.htm](http://www.world-tourism.org/newsroom/Releases/2005/october/bali_tourism.htm).
  37. It has been argued that this figure leaves out the costs of American and Saudi backed training of mujaheddin and infrastructure assistance in Afghanistan during the war against the Soviet Union, but it is unclear that this training was totally relevant to the September 11 attacks. See <http://www.meforum.org/article/572>.
  38. Hartwig, "The Cost of Terrorism."
  39. Donald Rumsfeld "Memo: Global War on Terrorism," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/rumsfeld-d20031016sdmemo.htm>. While not all

- debt is caused by defense spending and the global war on terrorism, the U.S. national debt was \$5.6 trillion (57.4 percent of gross domestic product [GDP]) when George Bush Jr. came to office in January 2001; as of April 2007, it stood at roughly \$8.9 trillion (roughly 65.5 percent of GDP). By September 2007, the debt will probably reach the \$9 trillion limit that Congress had set in March 2006, potentially causing a government shutdown or crisis. The Bush administration has transformed previous U.S. government surpluses into major deficits.
40. See Tony Blankley, "An Islamist Threat Like the Nazis," *The Washington Times*, September 12, 2005. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20050912-122024-9420r.htm>.
  41. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/14/AR2007051402265.html>.
  42. Secretary Rumsfeld, "Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogation in the Global War on Terrorism," *Wall Street Journal On Line*, [http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/military\\_0604.pdf](http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/military_0604.pdf).
  43. The United States has been accused of killing Al-Jazeera journalists critical of U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. George Bush Jr. considered bombing Al-Jazeera in discussions with Tony Blair in April 2004 after the first siege of Fallujah. See "The War on Al- Jazeera," *The Nation*, December 19, 2005.
  44. *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies*, 65, no. 1 (January 2007): 71–84.
  45. Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower* (New York: Knopf, 2007), 52.
  46. For a critique of neoconservatives as a hybrid between Plato's "Timocrats" and Kant's "moralizing politicians," see Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the "War on Terrorism."* For a critique of Bush administration attempts to impose neoconservative "ideals" in Iraq and Afghanistan, see Amitai Etzioni, *Security First* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). On efforts of neoconservatives to distance themselves from the Bush administration's handling of the Iraq intervention, see David Rose, "Neo Culpa," *Vanity Fair* (November 3, 2006). Given the fact that Iraq had no militarily significant weapons of mass destruction (a fact probably known to the Pentagon), intervention there can be seen as preclusive, if not predatory, thus more characteristic of vultures than superhawks. (See Chapter 3.)
  47. Sen. John McCain, "Torture's Terrible Toll," *Newsweek* (November 21, 2005), <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10019179/site/newsweek/>.
  48. Military Commissions Act of 2006, <http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/documents/MilitaryCommissions.pdf#search='Military%20Commissions%20Act'>.
  49. Alfred W. McCoy, "Why the McCain Torture Ban Won't Work: The Bush Legacy of Legalized Torture," <http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=57336>.
  50. Commission on Human Rights, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Civil and Political Rights Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay Report of the Chairperson of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Leila Zerrougui. United Nations, February 15, 2006. The United States "considers itself bound by the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment only to the extent that it means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." p. 22, [http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/docs/62chr/E.CN.4.2006.120\\_.ppf](http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/docs/62chr/E.CN.4.2006.120_.ppf).
  51. Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, "New to Job, Gates Argued for Closing Guantánamo," *New York Times*, March 23, 2007. Robert Gates is best described as a traditional American "realist"; yet he has generally been more "hawkish" than former Secretary of State James Baker. When Baker had advocated working with Mikhail Gorbachev, Gates, as deputy National Security Council adviser, had been opposed.

- (Gates backed the tougher line of then secretary of defense Dick Cheney.) In 1990 President George H.W. Bush Sr. sent him as an envoy to head off a potential Indian-Pakistani nuclear confrontation. In 1991 Gates was appointed head of the CIA even though he was accused of distorting intelligence on the Soviet Union to match more hard-line views and despite being accused of knowing more about the Iran-Contra scandal than he had admitted. In 1994 Gates advocated a military strike against North Korea. In 2004 he and Zbigniew Brzezinski chaired a Council on Foreign Relations study, "Iran: Time for a New Approach" (July 2004), which proposed a selective U.S. engagement with Tehran, but not a "grand bargain."
52. In a September 12, 2006, letter signed by Senators John Warner (R-VA) and Carl Levin (D-MI), both retired military officials, denounced potential changes to the Geneva Convention in the Military Commissions Act of 2006: "As the U.S. has greater exposure militarily than any other nation, we have long emphasized the reciprocal nature of the Geneva Conventions. That is why we believe—and the U.S. has always asserted—that a broad interpretation of Common Article 3 is vital to the safety of U.S. personnel. But the Administration's bill would put us on the opposite side of that argument." <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/09/mil-060912-sasc01.htm>.
  53. In April 2006 the UN replaced the Commission on Human Rights, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, and established the Human Rights Council, now based in Geneva. [http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/A.RES.60.251\\_En.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/A.RES.60.251_En.pdf).
  54. Cal Thomas, "Donald Rumsfeld w/ Cal Thomas: Transcript," (December 11, 2006), [http://www.townhall.com/Columnists/CalThomas/2006/12/11/donald\\_rumfeld\\_w\\_cal\\_thomas\\_transcript](http://www.townhall.com/Columnists/CalThomas/2006/12/11/donald_rumfeld_w_cal_thomas_transcript).
  55. The term "global struggle against violent extremism" (G-SAVE) was to be put into usage in May 2005. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/26/politics/26strategy.html?ex=1280030400&en=22b94b0298c1ca6a&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss>.
  56. See Marcel Van Herpen, "Six Dimensions of the Growing Transatlantic Divide," in *NATO and the European Union: New World, New Europe, New Threats*, ed. Hall Gardner (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004).
  57. Thomas, "Donald Rumsfeld w/ Cal Thomas."

## Chapter 2

1. George Kennan, "NATO Expansion Would Be a Fateful Blunder," *International Herald Tribune*, February 6, 1997.
2. President Clinton said he would not submit the adapted CFE agreement to the U.S. Senate for advice or consent to ratification until Russian forces in the North Caucasus "have in fact been reduced to the flank levels set forth in the adapted treaty." <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/news/991119-cfe-usia1.htm>.
3. See Hall Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 135.
4. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2958381.stm>.
5. Dario Cristiani, "Russia's New Initiatives in the Persian Gulf," *Power and Interest News Report* (PIRN), March 1, 2007, <http://www.pinr.com>.
6. See Hall Gardner, "The Genesis of NATO Enlargement and the War 'over' Kosovo," in *Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition*, ed. Hall Gardner (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000).

7. Andrei S. Grachev, "La Russie à la recherche d'une politique étrangère," *Relations internationales: les Etudes de la Documentation Française La Russie 1995–1996* (Paris: la Documentation Française, 1996); Andrei S. Grachev, *Histoire Vraie de la Fin de l'URSS* (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 1992), 88–9 2. See also Susan Eisenhower in Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, eds., *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality* (Washington, DC.: Cato Institute, 1998).
8. Cited in Stephen Blank, "The NATO-Russia Partnership: A Marriage of Convenience Or a Troubled Partnership?," *Strategic Studies Institute*, 2005, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB734.pdf>.
9. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Kamynin warned the United States against basing BMD systems in Poland. "This could have a negative impact on strategic stability, regional security and the relations between states. . . . Such a new situation objectively requires corresponding measures from us." The Polish defense minister has tried to assure Moscow that the system would not be directed against Russia. Russia had announced earlier in 2006 that it was supplying Belarus with its S-300 anti-aircraft defense system. *Agence France Press*, October 3, 2006.
10. *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 11, No. 33, Part I, February 21, 2007.
11. *Ibid.* Polish deputy prime minister Alexander Vondra stated, "if we turn our back on this [U.S.] request, there is a threat that the [United States] will back away from Europe. If the Poles and the Czechs reject the [request], the Americans will [respond] accordingly."
12. On March 24, 2004, forty-nine retired generals and admirals called for missile defense postponement. See [http://www.mapw.org.au/missiledefence/USMilitary-letter-Bush\\_March2004.html](http://www.mapw.org.au/missiledefence/USMilitary-letter-Bush_March2004.html).
13. See comments by Robert Ranquet, cited in Brooks Tigner, "Rethinking NATO's role in Missile Defense," ISN Security Watch, March 20, 2007. See comments by Norman Ray, president for Europe of Raytheon, and NATO's former assistant secretary general for defense support, cited in Brooks Tigner, *ibid.*
14. *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 11, No. 45, Part I, March 9, 2007.
15. See *RFE/RL Newslines*, February 12, 22, and 23, 2007.
16. Thom Shanker, "U.S. Tries to Ease Concerns in Russia on Antimissile Plan," *New York Times*, February 22, 2007.
17. Richard Weitz, "Revitalizing US-Russian Security Cooperation," *RFE/RL Newslines* 11:33, Part I, February 21, 2007.
18. Jennifer Loven, "Bush Wins Polish Nod for Missile Defense," *The Guardian* (June 8, 2007) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/latest/story/0,,-6695301,00.html>; <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/06/9e494269-29d1-4e66-b950-ac846e7e9c2a.html>; "Intelligence Brief: Russia-Western Dialogue on B.M.D. Remains Difficult," *PINR*, <http://www.pinr.com>.
19. Paul T. Mitchell, "Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of U.S. Military Primacy," *Adelphi Paper No. 385* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006).
20. Richard Weitz, *Revitalizing US-Russian Security Cooperation* (London: Adelphi Papers, 2005).
21. *RFE/RL Newslines*, February 20, 2007, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/02/3A7C3F97-DBBF-44B7-B568-FEEC11414F37.html>. See also Simon Saradzhyan, *Radar Diplomacy*, ISN Security Watch (June 13, 2007).
22. *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 11, No. 33, Part I, February 21, 2007.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Blank, The NATO-Russia Partnership, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB734.pdf>.

25. Blank, The NATO-Russian Partnership.
26. James A. Lewis, Center for Strategic and International Studies (June 15, 2007) [http://www.csis.org/component/option,com\\_csis\\_proj/task,view/id,968/](http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_proj/task,view/id,968/); <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6665195.stm>.
27. The Nuclear Information Project, <http://www.nukestrat.com/nukestatus.htm>.
28. *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 11, No. 42, Part I, March 6, 2007.
29. Daryl G. Kimball, "START Over," *Arms Control Today*, June 2007.
30. See Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads*, chapter 5.
31. See Chapter 6. GUUAM lost Uzbekistan in May 2005 as a member in part because of U.S. criticism of the Uzbek human rights record and consequent U.S. refusal to provide significant development assistance.
32. For analysis, see Jeronim Perovic and Robert Orttung, "Russia's Energy Policy: Should Europe Worry?," *Russian Analytical Digest* 18 (April 3, 2007).
33. See James Sherr, "Ukraine: The Pursuit of Defence Reform in an Unfavourable Context," *Conflict Studies Research Centre Central & Eastern Europe Series 04/08* (June 2004). On the domestic crisis in Ukraine, see James Sherr, "Ukraine: Prospects and Risks," *Conflict Studies Research Centre Central & Eastern Europe Series Research Centre 06/52* (October 2006).
34. NATO, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060914b.htm>.
35. Dick Cheney, "Vice President's Remarks at the 2006 Vilnius Conference Reval Hotel Lietuva," Vilnius, Lithuania, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/images/20060504-1\\_v050406db-0157jgg-515h.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/images/20060504-1_v050406db-0157jgg-515h.html).
36. Kurt Volker, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs, "The Road to NATO's Riga Summit," Testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Europe, Washington, DC., May 3, 2006, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/65874.htm>.
37. See Jacques Rupnick, "In Search of East-Central Europe," in *Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition*, ed. Hall Gardner (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000).
38. See Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads*, chapter 3.
39. Vladimir Socor, "Russia Cancels Border Treaty, Assails Estonia," [http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume\\_id=407&issue\\_id=3386&article\\_id=2369959](http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=407&issue_id=3386&article_id=2369959).
40. For background, see Alexey Ignatiev and Petr Shopin, "Kaliningrad in the Context of EU-Russia Relations," *Russian Analytical Digest* 15 (February 20, 2007).
41. "Swedish Security," *The Economist* (February 22, 2007). [http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story\\_id=8744532](http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8744532).
42. [http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc109/h5948\\_ih.xml](http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc109/h5948_ih.xml); [http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail&ContentRecord\\_id=312&ContentType=S&ContentRecordType=S&CFID=25753608&CFTOKEN=51551172](http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail&ContentRecord_id=312&ContentType=S&ContentRecordType=S&CFID=25753608&CFTOKEN=51551172).
43. <http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/11/news/belarus.php>.
44. "While Washington perceives Moscow as an opponent, if not a rival in the key issues of Black Sea democratization and reformation agenda, Berlin and Paris share the understanding of Russia's legitimate right to keep its own sphere of influence around its borders in order to balance the extension of the Atlantic Alliance to the east. Based on that presumption, the major European capitals maintain cautious attitude towards the Georgian efforts to transform its positions from a Russian satellite to a Western ally, from a backward dominion of Moscow, to a reformed partner of the West." Ognyan Minchev, "Major Interests and Strategies for the Black Sea Region," *Framework Analytical Review* (September 2006).



45. See Roman Kupchinsky, "Analysis: The Recurring Fear Of Russian Gas Dependency," *RFE/RL*, Prague, May 11, 2006.
46. Blank, *The NATO-Russian Partnership*.
47. Cornelius Ochmann, "Polish-Russian Relations in the Context of the EU's New Eastern Policy," *Russian Analytical Digest* 15 (February 20, 2007). <http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=C68F7FA1-F640-A2CF-DA36-42E321D7EF5A&lng=en>.
48. *Ibid.*
49. Minchev, "Major Interests and Strategies for the Black Sea Region."
50. In July 2006, Romania brought a case to the Hague against Ukraine concerning the maritime boundary between the two states on the Black Sea.
51. "Intelligence Brief: U.S. Military Bases in the Black Sea Region," *PINR*, November 19, 2005. [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=401](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=401). Romanian bases could function as useful NATO assets should the situation in Transnistria deteriorate and require more substantial Western intervention.
52. In June 2006, the American Hungarian Federation wrote President Bush and Hungarian prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány expressing its concern for greater "protection from discrimination and intolerance, as well as positive rights, cultural, territorial and/or personal autonomy" for Hungarian minorities in southern Slovakia, Transylvania, Romania, and Vojvodina, Serbia, [http://www.americanhungarianfederation.org/docs/Koszorus\\_Trianon\\_2006\\_06-04.pdf](http://www.americanhungarianfederation.org/docs/Koszorus_Trianon_2006_06-04.pdf).
53. "Economic fundamentals across eastern Europe . . . are increasingly shaky. Romania and Latvia . . . post trade and service deficits of more than 4% of GDP—a size that is tough for all but countries at the top of the credit-quality totem, like the US, to sustain. Slovakia and Croatia have big budget deficits that are getting worse. Several nations—notable Turkey and Hungary—have foreign-currency debt coming due that exceed their reserves of hard currency. Poland, the largest of the new EU members, is fast piling up foreign debt." Joellen Perry, "Troubling Signs in Hungary Woes," *Wall Street Journal*, September 21, 2006.
54. Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, "The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom," *Policy Review* 125 (June–July 2004).
55. EU members will not be able to reduce their dependence on Russia significantly any time soon. Alternatives are not easy to implement now that Russia's major energy companies (especially Gazprom) are moving to increase their control of Algeria's and Turkmenistan's resources (two of the possible alternative suppliers). "Intelligence Brief: Poland Fumes over Russian-German Projects; Meeting in Lithuania to Counter Russian Influence in F.S.U.," *PINR*, May 2, 2006, [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=483&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=483&language_id=1).
56. The Rioni, Kodori, Inguri Chorokh, Kyzyl-Irmak, Eshil-Irmak, Sakarya, Southern Bug, Dniester, the Danube, Dnieper, and the Don via the Sea of Azov are the main rivers that flow into the Black Sea. With ice-free ports, the Black Sea is the chief shipping outlet of the Ukraine and Russia; Odessa and Sevastopol in Ukraine and Novorossiysk in Russia are major ports. Others include Constanta, Romania; Varna and Burgas in Bulgaria; and Trabzon, Samsun, and Zonguldak in Turkey.
57. Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, "The Black Sea Region and Its Growing Influence," Athens, BSEC Day (July 18, 2006).
58. Marcel de Haas, "Current Geostategy in the South Caucasus," *PINR*, December 15, 2006, [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=595&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=595&language_id=1).
59. In terms of potential NATO overstretch, the 2004 addition of Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Bulgaria doubles "NATO's militarily 'free

- riders' under a U.S. security umbrella (given the minimal role of Iceland, Luxembourg, Denmark, Portugal, Greece, Hungary, and Czech republic). NATO must distribute military capabilities through specialized, modern, multilateral force planning, while consolidating links with the EU on counter-terrorism, [European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)], and peacemaking. A 26+ Alliance must also revise voting rules to improve decision-making, limiting consensus to Article V collective defense and new enlargements." See Marco Rimanelli, in Hall Gardner, ed., *NATO and the EU; New World, New Europe, New Threats* (Ashgate 2003).
60. See CFE Treaty: [http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/cfe/cfefin\\_act99e.htm](http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/cfe/cfefin_act99e.htm); <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/chron.htm>; [http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/final\\_act\\_of\\_cfe.htm](http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/final_act_of_cfe.htm).
  61. For background to the frozen conflicts, see Charles King in *Grasping the Nettle*, eds. Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005).
  62. The recognition of Montenegro's independence, discussions about Kosovo's final status, and President Putin's statements about the need to determine universal principles for self-determination have all increased Abkhaz optimism about their own prospects for recognition. For most of the 1990s, Abkhaz elites were willing to discuss "common state" options and federal arrangements with Georgia. Meanwhile Abkhaz and Russian observers charge that the United States, Turkey, and several European countries are arming and training Georgia for an offensive. Minchev, "Major Interests and Strategies for the Black Sea Region."
  63. In January 2005, Belgian foreign minister, and chairman in office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Karel de Gucht pledged to resolve the "frozen conflicts." He has stated he would not adopt a tougher stance vis-à-vis Russia while criticizing Moldovan authorities for asking for a unitary state. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov insisted that Russian troops must remain in Transdnister after a negotiated settlement to prevent munitions from falling into the wrong hands.
  64. Liz Fuller, "Georgia: Is Tbilisi Moving toward NATO Membership?" *RFE/RL*, Prague, June 2, 2006. In 2004 Georgia increased the size of the reserve force, "represent[ing] an increase of 25–30 percent on the figures enshrined in the original IPAP and "rais[ing] questions of affordability." Georgia asserts that it is committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, yet its military budget rose in 2005 at a rate higher than any other country in the world. For Georgia the unresolved conflict is an affront to its state-building project, impeding the consolidation of national security, democratic institutions, economic development, and regional integration. Crisis Group [http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/moldova/175\\_moldova\\_s\\_uncertain\\_future.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/moldova/175_moldova_s_uncertain_future.pdf).
  65. Mikhail Vignansky, "Caucasus Reels from Moscow-Tbilisi Fight," *IWPR*, September 6, 2006, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16760>.
  66. Federico Bordonaro, "Georgia: NATO by way of BMD" *ISN Security Watch* (29 May 2007) <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17669>.
  67. Eugene B. Rumer and Jeffrey Simon, "Toward a Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region," *Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 3*, Washington, DC.: National Defense University Press, April 2006, [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional\\_Papers/OCP3.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional_Papers/OCP3.pdf).
  68. The Black Sea Naval Task Force, or BlackSeaFor, was set up in 2001; the group comprises all six riparian states. Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) was created in late 2001 following the September 11 attacks. Turkey launched Black Sea Harmony in 2004 to patrol the southern segment of the Black Sea. Ankara extended an invitation

- to other littoral countries to join its security initiative. Igor Torbakov, "Turkey Sides with Moscow against Washington on Black Sea Force," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 43 (March 3, 2006).
69. See Minchev, "Major Interests and Strategies for the Black Sea Region." The Blue stream is said to be a consequence of Romanian and Bulgarian refusal to deal with the Gazprom monopoly. Gazprom is seen as playing a role in restoring central government control over Russia and of representing a major instrument of Russia's foreign policy.
  70. Asmus and Jackson, "The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom."
  71. Jeffrey Simon, *Black Sea Regional Security Cooperation: Building Bridges and Barriers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2006).
  72. Rumer and Simon, "The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom."
  73. Igor Torbakov, "Kremlin Wary of Emerging Kyiv-Tbilisi Axis," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* No. 72, no. 16 (January 24, 2005), JRL 9032—JRL Home Jamestown Foundation, <http://www.jamestown.org>.
  74. PINR, "Current Geostategy in the South Caucasus," December 15, 2006.
  75. <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=69246>. In response to the French law, the Turkish parliament threatened to pass a bill labeling the colonial killings of Algerians by French authorities as genocide and making it illegal to deny France's culpability!
  76. Nicholas Wood, "EU to Reduce Force in Bosnia," *International Herald Tribune*, February 28, 2007, <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2007/03/01/europe/web.0301bosnia.php>.
  77. <http://www.unmikonline.org/news.htm#0202>.
  78. *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 11, No. 45, Part II, March 9, 2007.
  79. Thomas Friedman, *International Herald Tribune*, February 15, 2007.
  80. See Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads*.
  81. See "An Open Letter to the Heads of State and Government Of the European Union and NATO," September 28, 2004. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/russia-20040928.htm>. The letter, signed by many neoconservatives, strongly criticizes Putin's steps toward an "authoritarian regime." A counterletter argues for concern, but against exaggeration; See "A Response to the Open Letter to Heads of State and Government of the European Union and NATO of Sept. 28, 2004," <http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20041013-055300-4000r.htm>; [www.npetro.net/openletter.html](http://www.npetro.net/openletter.html).
  82. In May 2005, Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, then the richest man in Russia, was sentenced to nine years for fraud, tax evasion, attempted murder, embezzlement, and money laundering. Putin's actions against a number of Russian "oligarchs" have frightened Russian and foreign businessmen. As Marshall Goldman put it: "What is tragic in all this is that now, this has given an excuse for the people around Putin to go after these oligarchs, and in the process, put themselves in a position where they can take over these assets and make themselves just as rich." <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8155/goldman.html>.
  83. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2056321,00.html>.
  84. The Kremlin has been accused of killing journalists critical of Russian actions in Chechnya including Anna Politkovskaya and former KGB agent Alexander V. Litvinenko (a friend of Boris Berezovsky). In regard to the latter (using Polonium 210 as poison in London in November 2006!), London has demanded the extradition of the alleged assassin, Andrei Lugovoi. Moscow has refused arguing that Russian law will not permit its citizens to be put on trial abroad, severely straining Anglo-Russian relations. In turn, Russia seeks the extradition from the United Kingdom of Boris Berezovsky (see ft. 86) who is also accused of plotting to overthrow the government by

- force, and Akhmed Zakayev, a Chechen separatist, who Russia sees as a terrorist. The United Kingdom has refused to extradite either. In the case of Berezovsky, London has been backed by the EU and United States, in effect, widening the dispute with dangerous ramifications. *Wall Street Journal Europe* (July 19, 2007).
85. Candidates include associates of Putin: Dmitri Medvedev (seen as pro-Western, pro-business); Sergei Ivanov (former member of the Federal Security Bureau, seen as tough on NATO enlargement); Vladimir Yakunin (also former member of the Federal Security Bureau, seen as benefiting from nomenklatura privatization); and Valentina Matvienko (governor of St. Petersburg, seen as ineffective). [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=3694](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3694).
  86. A possible, if not the most likely, successor to Putin, Sergei Ivanov, has stated that U.S. acceptance of Russia's BMD proposals "will quantitatively change Russian-U.S. relations. A new space for mutual trust will emerge. We may establish a real strategic partnership." Cited in Edward Lozansky, "Is George Bush Boosting the Russian Military-Industrial Complex?" *The Washington Times* (July 10, 2007).
  87. Blank, *The NATO-Russia Partnership*.
  88. Ukraine and Russia have declared their intention to join Blackseafor. Multilateralizing Black Sea Harmony not only could become a model for Blackseafor, but also might be subordinated to it after it completes its transformation. NATO's new allies, Bulgaria and Romania, though, remain unenthusiastic about these efforts, seeing them as forms of Turkish domination. Hence, Turkey's preferred approach appears to be to maintain its dominance by preventing NATO from extending Operation Active Endeavor into the Black Sea. Simon, "Black Sea Regional Security Cooperation."
  89. Rumer and Simon, "Toward a Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region."
  90. Ochmann, "Polish-Russian Relations in the Context of the EU's New Eastern Policy."
  91. Abrahm Lustgarten, "How Shell Lost Control of Sakhalin," *Fortune*, CNN (February 5, 2007), [http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune\\_archive/2007/02/05/8399125/index.htm](http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/02/05/8399125/index.htm).

### Chapter 3

1. January 17, 2007, CBS poll: "Looking back, do you think the United States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq, or should the U.S. have stayed out?" 39% Right thing; 56% Stayed out. Los Angeles Times Bloomberg Poll, released January 17, 2007, conducted January 13–16, 2007: "All in all, do you think the situation in Iraq was worth going to war over, or not?" 34% Worth It; 62% Not Worth It; Pew Research Center NPR poll, released January 16, 2007; conducted January 10–15, 2007. "Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force against Iraq?" 40% Right decision; 51% Wrong decision.
2. On the goals of "preemption," see Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the "War on Terrorism"* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). See also Chapter 1, endnote 46.
3. Peter Grier "Iraq's oil production falls short of goals," *Christian Science Monitor* (May 7, 2007). According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Iraq will still need to spend \$27 billion more for its electrical system and \$20 billion to \$30 billion for oil infrastructure. "Iraq Far from U.S. Goals for Energy," *Washington Post* (September 2, 2007). Prior to U.S. intervention, Washington threatened to cut countries that did support the war effort out of the Iraqi oil market. Although burgeoning Chinese influence in Iraq and throughout the world has

- been a major concern for U.S. policymakers (see Chapter 8), in mid-June 2007, Iraqi president Jalal Talabani went to Beijing to obtain a significant reduction in Iraq's \$8 billion debt to China (out of about \$60 billion foreign debt in total) and to expand Iraq-China economic cooperation, including renegotiating Saddam Hussein's 1997 deal for China's National Petroleum Corporation to develop the al-Ahdab oil field. The deal, which was the first for foreign oil investors, could go through if Iraq's parliament passes its controversial new oil law. Jamil Anderlini and Steve Negus, "Iraq revives Saddam deal with China," *Financial Times* (June 22 2007) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/c6c6f958-2108-11dc-8d50-000b5df10621.html>. Largely due to the extent of its energy dependency, China appears to be the first willing to take the risk of legal uncertainty and chaos in Iraq. Other oil deals appear to be in the making.
4. See Juan Cole, "Informed Comment," June 22, 2005, 12:00. <http://www.juancole.com/2005/06/kos-discussion-of-un-option-many.html>.
  5. Among the lowest opinion polls were Harry Truman during the Korean War; Richard Nixon before the latter's resignation after the Watergate scandal and during the Vietnam War; Jimmy Carter, ironically during the Iran-hostage crisis, a major issue that weakened Jimmy Carter and helped thrust Ronald Reagan into power. (Bush's approval rating run hit between 27 and 35 percent, with those opposed around 64–65 percent according to ABC).
  6. Democrats took a 233 to 202 advantage in the House of Representatives, and a 51 to 49 advantage in the Senate. The Senate figure includes two candidates who ran as independent candidates: Senator Joe Lieberman, for example, won as an "independent Democrat" after he lost the Democratic Party nomination in that he was generally regarded as a "cheerleader" for President Bush's foreign policy, but he then defeated Ned Lamont, an anti-Iraq War Democrat.
  7. Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International conducted the polling for The Associated Press.
  8. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Working Paper Number RWP06-011* (2006), <http://ksnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011>. This paper by two major neorealist theorists helped to open debate as to the nature of Israeli "influence peddling" in Congress. The question remains as to what extent U.S. policy would change even without such a powerful lobby. See Mitchell Plitnick and Chris Toensing, "'The Israeli Lobby' in Perspective" *Middle East Report* 243 (Summer 2007).
  9. *Wall Street Journal*, January 26, 2007.
  10. <http://iranuclearwatch.blogspot.com/2006/08/words-not-war-military-leaders-speak.html>.
  11. Robin Wright and Peter Baker, "White House, Joint Chiefs At Odds on Adding Troops," *Washington Post*, December 19, 2006.
  12. "The issue before us is not simply whether the United States should end the regime of Saddam Hussein, but whether we as a nation are prepared to physically occupy territory in the Middle East for the next 30 to 50 years. Those who are pushing for a unilateral war in Iraq know full well that there is no exit strategy if we invade and stay." James Webb, "Heading for Trouble," *Washington Post*, September 4, 2002, <http://www.jameswebb.com/articles/washpost/headingfortrouble.htm>. Even more important for the Democrats in regard to Middle East policy is the fact that Senator Webb is a former Republican who turned Democrat—largely in opposition to the Bush administration's decision to intervene in Iraq. With a son in Iraq, he is also a Vietnam era war hero and a former secretary of the navy under Ronald Reagan.

- Webb is thus symbolic of the former “Reaganites” who have been abandoning the Republican Party largely because of George Bush’s policies.
13. Jim Webb, <http://www.jameswebb.com/articles/wallstjrnl/ classstruggle.htm>. See Chuck Collins, *The Economic Context: Growing Disparities of Income and Wealth*, [http://www.mccormack.umb.edu/nejpp/articles/20\\_1/TheEconomicContext.pdf](http://www.mccormack.umb.edu/nejpp/articles/20_1/TheEconomicContext.pdf); Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “New IRS Data Show Income Inequality is Again on the Rise,” October 17, 2005, <http://www.cbpp.org/10-17-05inc.htm>.
  14. “This is the seventh time the president has mentioned energy independence in his State of the Union message, but for the first time, this exchange is taking place in a Congress led by the Democratic Party. We are looking for affirmative solutions that will strengthen our nation by freeing us from our dependence on foreign oil, and spurring a wave of entrepreneurial growth in the form of alternate energy programs.” Democratic response to President Bush’s State of the Union address, as delivered by Sen. Jim Webb (D-VA), <http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/01/23/sotu.webb.transcript/index.html>.
  15. A unitary presidency is a “theory under which, once war is declared, the president, as commander-in-chief, can ignore constitutional checks and balances, disregard the bill of rights, suspend accountability, and concentrate dictatorial power in his own hands.” Former Sen. Gary Hart, “A Surge of Constitutionalism,” *HuffingtonPost.com*, January 9, 2007. This characterization would appear true except that the role of the vice president, Dick Cheney, makes for a kind of imperial diarchy. On Cheney’s overpowering influence on President Bush, see Jack Lechelt, “The Loyal Foot Soldier” in Patrick Hayden, Tom Lansford, Robert P. Watson, (eds.), *America’s War on Terror* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
  16. The president’s “troop surge” appears to be based, at least in part, on the report by Frederick Kagan and Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.), “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq,” American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 2006., [http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic\\_semper\\_tyranis/files/200612141\\_choosingvictory6.pdf](http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyranis/files/200612141_choosingvictory6.pdf).
  17. James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, *Iraq Study Group Report*, <http://www.usip.org/isg/>. See also “Statement by Co-Chairs of the Iraq Study Group before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate,” January 30, 2007.
  18. Congressman Lee Hamilton: “The Congress is a co-equal branch of government. I frankly am not that impressed with what the Congress has been able to do. I think the Congress has been extraordinarily timid in its exercise of its Constitutional responsibilities on the question of war-making and conducting war. Now the answers here are not easy, but in a word, I think, very robust oversight is necessary. I think it has been lacking,” *ibid*.
  19. This position stems, in part, from James Baker, who has argued that creative diplomacy could woo Damascus away from its strategic alliance with Iran. “If you can flip the Syrians, you will cure Israel’s Hizb’allah problem.” Baker also indicated that Syria could persuade Hamas’ militant external wing to accept Olmert’s conditions for direct engagement with the Palestinians. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/08/world/middleeast/08diplo.html?ex=1323234000&en=a0514a2f3b7e4&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>.
  20. Further signs of congressional opposition to President Bush were indicated by Sen. Bill Nelson’s meeting with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad on December 13, 2006. The White House called Nelson’s meeting with the Syrian president “inappropriate” and “undermining democracy in the region.” Three other senators, including Republican senator Arlen Specter, likewise visited Damascus in defiance of President Bush, who has resisted talks with Syria, largely in opposition to Syrian actions in both Iraq and Lebanon. See Web site of Sen. Arlen Specter: <http://specter.senate.gov>.

21. The term comes from the early nineteenth-century Spanish and Portuguese pirates, “filibusteros,” who held ships hostage for ransom. It also means an irregular military adventurer; specifically an American engaged in fomenting insurrections in Latin America in the mid-nineteenth century.
22. On January 17, 2007, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-DE), Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-NE), and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Carl Levin (D-MI) introduced a bipartisan, yet nonbinding, Senate resolution expressing their opposition to the deepening U.S. military commitment in Iraq. This is significant in that Chuck Hagel became the first Republican to publicly break with President Bush.
23. For “surge estimates in May 2007, see Paul Rogers, “U.S., Iran: The Fire Next Time” <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17665> For Congressional Budget Office estimates of costs of troop surge, see <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7778/TroopIncrease.pdf>.
24. Republican senator Mark Warner’s (R-VA) proposal was a compromise between his own former proposal and that of Democratic senator Biden’s. The new and revised Warner-Levin resolution expressed the Senate’s opposition to the surge but promised to sustain funding for the troops. The resolution did not include the language stating the Bush plan is against the national interest (as did the Democratic statement), but it also dropped an earlier provision by Warner suggesting that Senate support the deployment of additional troops, if necessary.
25. Carl Hulse and Jeff Zeleny, “G.O.P. Senators Block Debate on Iraq Policy,” *New York Times*, February 6, 2007.
26. “Any resolution that could be construed by American forces that Congress has lost faith in their ability to be successful in Iraq should be rejected because it rings of defeatism at a time when we should be focused on Victory. . . . I believe General Petraeus’s new strategy of sending more troops and more economic aid, and improving the political climate in Iraq is our best chance for success, and I support his new effort. To my colleagues who believe Iraq is a lost cause, I urge you to have the courage of your convictions and vote to stop sending more troops into Iraq by cutting off funding. . . . A resolution declaring the new strategy a failure before it is implemented is the worst of all worlds. It is a vote of no confidence in General Petraeus, will empower our enemies, and be demoralizing to our own troops.” *Washington Post*, Jan. 31, 2007.
27. *Ibid.*
28. “The President addressed a range of issues, but none is more important than the struggle against Islamic extremism. This is the central issue of our time. And the primary front in this struggle is Iraq. I understand that the American people are frustrated with the lack of progress in the war, and the many mistakes that have been made. However, there is now a new plan in place with a new commander. While there is no guarantee of success, it is guaranteed that it would be disastrous to our national security if we fail in Iraq. That is why Congress should not impede this new effort to defend the struggling democracy in Iraq.”
29. Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME), who is an opponent of Bush’s escalation plan, has stated that she has been “getting a lot of pressure” to go along with Bush from her conservative Republican colleagues. She stated that she was “really offended when people say that those of us who are in favor of the resolution are somehow betraying the troops. . . . I don’t believe that at all. . . . I think all Americans support our troops.” (Interview MSNBC). Other Republicans who opposed President Bush’s policies include Maine’s Olympia Snowe and Oregon’s Gordon Smith.

30. [http://www.clw.org/policy/iraq/resources/clippings/new\\_warner\\_resolution\\_vs\\_old\\_warner\\_resolution/\(CNN on Jan. 17\).](http://www.clw.org/policy/iraq/resources/clippings/new_warner_resolution_vs_old_warner_resolution/(CNN on Jan. 17).)
31. William Branigin, "House OKs Timetable for Troops in Iraq," March 23, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/23/AR2007032300531.html?sub=new>.
32. In late January 2007, Congressman Kucinich declared: "The degree to which this President continues to take steps to go to war against Iran without consulting with the full Congress is the degree to which he is increasingly putting himself in jeopardy of an impeachment proceeding."
33. [http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ny15\\_rangel/CBRStatementDraft05262005.html](http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ny15_rangel/CBRStatementDraft05262005.html). Presidential campaign links between the pro-Iraq war Fox News and the Congressional Black Caucus may be seen as ways to divide the democratic opposition, in part to support the war effort in Iraq. On July 3, 2002, President Bush proclaimed that all immigrants (which can include illegals) who have served honorably on active duty in the armed forces after September 11, 2001, shall be eligible to apply for expedited U.S. citizenship. On the need for immigrant skills, such as translators, in the war on terrorism, see Margaret D. Stock, *Immigration Policy in Focus*, Vol. 5, No. 9, November 2006. [http://www.aifl.org/ipc/infocus/infocus\\_11206.pdf](http://www.aifl.org/ipc/infocus/infocus_11206.pdf)
34. <http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jan07.aspx>.
35. As Senator Levin put it: The president's most recent plan, like previous ones, includes no mechanism to hold the Iraqis to their commitments. Deepening our involvement in Iraq would be a mistake. Deepening our involvement in Iraq on the assumption that the Iraqis will meet future benchmarks and commitments given their track record would compound the mistake. Opening Statement of Sen. Carl Levin at the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Iraq. <http://www.senate.gov/-levin/newsroom/release.cfm?id=267518>.
36. Tom Lasseter, "Mahdi Army Gains Strength through Unwitting Aid of U.S.," *McClatchy Newspapers*, February 1, 2007.
37. International Office of Migration, "Bleak Prognosis on Iraqi Displacement in 2007," <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pbnAF/cache/offonce?entryId=13117>.
38. Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Things Fall Apart. What Do We Do If Iraq Implodes?" *Washington Post*, August 20, 2006.
39. <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/>.
40. <http://www.senate.gov/-levin/newsroom/release.cfm?id=267518>.
41. *New York Times*, July 20, 2007. By August 2007, Senator Levin urged the Iraqi parliament to vote the government of Prime Minister al-Maliki out of office. This, of course, should be an Iraqi decision. *New York Times*, August 21, 2007. Senator Hillary Clinton also called for al-Maliki to step down, as did French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, who previously stated that he had come to Iraq to "listen," not advise, and to reestablish French relations with Iraq in order to strengthen the UN role. Former prime minister Ayad Allawi stated that his alliance "had lost faith" in the present Iraqi government and that Iraq was not closer to reconciliation and was capable of developing policies that would check Iranian influence. *New York Times*, August 27, 2007. On the withdrawal of al-Sadr's six cabinet members, plus those of the Sunni Accordance Front and the Iraqiya bloc led by Ayad Allawi from the Iraqi cabinet, see the *New York Times*, April 16, 2007; August 1, 2007; August 27, 2007.
42. Congressman Murtha, "Testimony before Senate Foreign Affairs Committee," (January 23, 2007) [http://www.house.gov/list/press/pa12\\_murtha/PRtestimony.html](http://www.house.gov/list/press/pa12_murtha/PRtestimony.html).



43. On the debate over defense transformation, see Ronald O'Rourke, "Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress," Washington, D.C.: CRS Reports, November 9, 2006.
44. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/10/world/middleeast/10cnd-mtext.html?pagewanted=2>; [http://graphics.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/Text\\_of\\_joint\\_statement.pdf](http://graphics.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/Text_of_joint_statement.pdf).
45. As in the Michael Jackson "moonwalk": it was argued that the Pentagon was engaging in a strategy of moving forward while actually sliding backward. Thomas E. Ricks, "Pentagon May Suggest Short-Term Buildup Leading to Iraq Exit," *Washington Post* (November 20, 2006). For a critical perspective, see Juan Cole, <http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/salon059.html>.
46. <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3974> [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/03/washington/03assess.html?\\_r=1&th=&adxn1=1&oref=slogin&emc=th&adxnlx=1180888214-N/7COWxrWTTpKTobH/Z0/w](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/03/washington/03assess.html?_r=1&th=&adxn1=1&oref=slogin&emc=th&adxnlx=1180888214-N/7COWxrWTTpKTobH/Z0/w). Considerable spending on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and bases (including Al Asad in Anbar Province, Balad Air Base about fifty miles north of Baghdad, and Tallil Air Base in the south) throughout the country suggests a long term presence.
47. Ali al-Fadhily, "Iraq: U.S. Losing Ground Through Tribal Allies (IPS) Jun 15, 2007 <http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38190>.

## Chapter 4

1. *Agence France Press*, January 21, 2007.
2. P. R. Kumaraswamy, "China, Russia on Road to Abandoning Iran," *ISN Security Watch*, January 10, 2007.
3. UN Resolution 1747 focuses on constraining Iranian arms exports, the state-owned Bank Sepah—already under Treasury Department sanctions—and the Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is an elite military organization separate from the nation's conventional armed forces. Thom Schanker, "Security Council Votes to Tighten Iran Sanctions," *New York Times*, March 25, 2007.
4. <http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2007/02/apiran070201/>.
5. <http://www.webb.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=270138>.
6. [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/world/middleeast/15sunnis.html?pagewanted=3&\\_r=1&th&emc=th](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/world/middleeast/15sunnis.html?pagewanted=3&_r=1&th&emc=th).
7. U.S. Department of Energy, "The Hydrogen Posture Plan," February 2004, [http://www.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells/pdfs/hydrogen\\_posture\\_plan .pdf](http://www.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells/pdfs/hydrogen_posture_plan.pdf). On multilateral development of "fourth generation" nuclear plants, see U.S. Department of Energy: <http://www.ne.doe.gov/genIV/neGenIV4.html>.
8. Ariana Eunjung Cha, "China Embraces Nuclear Future," *Washington Post*, May 29, 2007, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/05/28/AR2007052801051\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/05/28/AR2007052801051_pf.html); Benjamin K. Sovacool, "Think Again: Nuclear Energy," *Foreign Policy* (September 2005). [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?Story\\_id=3250&print=1](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?Story_id=3250&print=1).
9. "Economic Brief: Fallout from Energy Trends," *PINR*, <http://www.pinr.com>.
10. Kamal Nazer Yasin, "Iran: The Geostrategy of Oil," *ISN Security Watch* (July 18, 2007).
11. The National Geoscience Database of Iran states on its Web page for geothermal energy: "Installed capacity of power plants which is now 29000MW should be increased into 90000MW in 2020 regarding to population and industrial growth

- rate. But since in next few years reducing Iran's reliance on oil and 'petrodollars' must be done seriously so renewable energy productivity will not only help to decrease pollution, but will also help Iran diversify its economy." <http://www.njdir.ir/?PID=15&index=0>.
12. Richard Betts, "The Osirak Fallacy," *The National Interest* (Spring 2006). In a report allegedly leaked to embarrass Germany, revealing major German, U.S., UK, and Chinese firms purportedly involved in Saddam's nuclear program, see *The Guardian* (December 18, 2002).
  13. It should be noted that in February 1975, the shah stated that Iran had "no intention of acquiring nuclear weaponry but if small states began building them, then Iran might have to reconsider its policy."
  14. Richard Perle, cited by *The New American Century*, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-20030224.htm>.
  15. Even though the Soviet-era Temelín nuclear power plant (Soviet VVER-1000/320 reactors) in the Czech Republic, for example, has been upgraded and refitted with Westinghouse technology, it is continuing to cause concern.
  16. <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070219/60947595.html>. "Russia, Iran and the Bottom Line," *New York Times*, March 21, 2007.
  17. The fact that six out of twelve nuclear research reactors in Moscow had to be shut down in December 2006 should represent a warning in that Russian ecologists have repeatedly called for the removal of all nuclear research reactors from the city to prevent radiation and health risks. *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 10, No. 233, Part I (December 19, 2006).
  18. See, "Iranian President: No 'Nuclear Apartheid,'" *CNN Access* (September 17, 2005), <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/09/17/ahmadinejad/index.html>.
  19. *Ibid.*
  20. Nazila Fathi, David E. Sanger, and William J. Broad, "Iran Says It Is Making Nuclear Fuel, Defying U.N.," *New York Times*, April 12, 2006.
  21. David E. Sanger, William J. Broad, "Iran Expanding Nuclear Effort, Agency Reports," *New York Times*, February 22, 2007.
  22. William O. Beeman, "After Ahmadinejad: the Prospects for US-Iranian Relations," in *Iranian Challenges*, ed. Walter Posch, Chaillot paper, 89 (May 2006).
  23. Bernard Gwertzman, interview of Ray Takeyh, "Takeyh: Iranian Middle Class Growing Disillusioned with Ahmadinejad," December 19, 2006.
  24. Algiers Accord, [http://www.parstimes.com/history/algiers\\_accords.pdf](http://www.parstimes.com/history/algiers_accords.pdf).
  25. [http://www.parstimes.com/history/albright\\_speech.html](http://www.parstimes.com/history/albright_speech.html).
  26. Bernard Gwertzman, "Leverett: Bush Administration 'Not Serious' about Dealing with Iran," Council on Foreign Relations, March 31, 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10326>; Kamal Nazer Yasin, "Bush Administration's 'Strategic Malpractice' on Iran," interview with Flynt Leverett, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16933>. For political background, see Shahram Chubin, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006; Shahram Chubin and Robert S. Litwak, "Debating Iran's Nuclear Aspirations," *Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2003). Supreme Jurisprudent Ali Khamenei has argued that atomic weapons are immoral. Informed Comment, April 12, 2006, <http://www.juancole.com/2006/04/iran-can-now-make-glowing-mickeymouse.html>.
  27. Conn Hallinan, "The Democrats & Iran," (December 9, 2006) *Foreign Policy in Focus*, <http://www.fpiif.org/fpifxt/3771>.
  28. Lisa Bryant, "France Defends Talk with Iran on Nuclear Fuel," *Reuters*, February 4, 2005.

29. See "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005." <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf>. Russia has declared that it does not want Iran to possess nuclear arms, but it argued for greater diplomatic efforts before turning Iran over to the UN Security Council.
30. M. K. Bhadrakumar, "China, Russia, Welcome Iran into the Fold," *Asia Times On Line* (April 18, 2006), <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HD18Ad02.html>; Jephraim P. Gundzik, "The Ties That Bind China, Russia, and Iran," June 4, 2005, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GF04Ad07.html>; [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\\_East/FK06Ak01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FK06Ak01.html).
31. Hassan M. Fattah, "Arab States, Wary of Iran, Add to Their Arsenals but Still Lean on the U.S.," *New York Times*, February 23, 2007.
32. Meghan Clyne, "Congress Outbids Bush on Iran Democracy Aid," *New York Sun*, March 3, 2006.
33. Amitai Etzioni, "Iran: A Faustian Bargain Communitarian," Letter #10, <http://hermes.circ.gwu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A3=ind0604&L=comnet&P=25208&E=1&B=254161802c984fb9&T=text/html>.
34. Seymour M. Hersh, "The Iran Plans: Would President Bush Go to War to Stop Tehran from Getting the Bomb?" *New Yorker*, April 17, 2006 (Posted April 8, 2006).
35. "Iraq's neighbors influence, and are influenced by, events within Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq's internal sectarian dynamics. Nonetheless, Iranian lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants clearly intensifies the conflict in Iraq. Syria continues to provide safe haven for expatriate Iraqi Bathists and to take less than adequate measures to stop the flow of foreign jihadists into Iraq." National Intelligence Estimate, [http://dni.gov/press\\_releases/20070202\\_release.pdf](http://dni.gov/press_releases/20070202_release.pdf).
36. Mark Mazzetti and Michael R. Gordon, "Fissures Emerge on Iran's Role in Iraq Attacks," *International Herald Tribune*, February 14, 2007.
37. AFP, Jan 21, 2007.
38. Heather Stewart, "Iran Crisis 'Could Drive Oil over \$90,'" *The Guardian*, January 29, 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/oil/story/0,,1697137,00.html>.
39. Gareth Porter, "Israeli Realism on Iran Belies Threat Rhetoric," January 30, 2007, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36369>.
40. Jacques Chirac, January 20, 2006, <http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/standpoint/stand157.asp>.
41. Porter "Israeli Realism on Iran Belies Threat Rhetoric."
42. AIPAC Memo "Proceed with Caution If Engaging Iran and Syria" Dec. 6, 2006 <http://www.aipac.org/PDFDocs/AIPAC%20Memo%20-%20ProceedWithCaution.pdf>.
43. "Hillary Clinton Calls Iran a Threat to U.S., Israel," *International Herald Tribune*, February 1, 2007.
44. ISN Security Watch staff, "OpEd: The Iran Endgame," January 31, 2007.
45. Ibid.
46. "President Ahmadinejad: The transcript," <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14912050/>.
47. "President Ahmadinejad Should Visit the US Holocaust Museum if He Speaks to the UN," <http://www.usmmm.org/wlc/en/index.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005143>.
48. David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (July/August 1994), [http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art\\_ofn=ja94albright](http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ja94albright).
49. See my argument, Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the "War on Terrorism,"* p. 103.

50. Hassan M. Fattah, "Arab States, Wary of Iran, Add to Their Arsenals but Still Lean on the U.S.," *New York Times*, February 23, 2007.
51. Mohammed Abdullah Al Roken, "Dimensions of the UAE-Iran Dispute over Three Islands," [http://www.uaeinteract.com/uaeint\\_misc/pdf/perspectives/09.pdf](http://www.uaeinteract.com/uaeint_misc/pdf/perspectives/09.pdf). The islands might have some value in disrupting shipping at the beginning of a conflict, but following the U.S. "revolution in military affairs," any defenses would be instantly wiped out in the case of an outbreak of serious hostilities.
52. <http://www.nato-qatar.com/security/speech2.html>.
53. <http://bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/BakerHamiltonTestimony070130.pdf>.
54. [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\\_East/HD26Ak02.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HD26Ak02.html). The Iranian Revolutionary Guards might have stuffed the ballots for Ahmadinejad, even though the ruling Ayatollahs control the Supreme National Security Council, the Guardians Council, the foundations, the army, and the media.
55. Informed Comment, April 12, 2006, <http://www.juancole.com/2006/04/iran-can-now-make-glowing-mickey-mouse.html>.
56. Hassan Rowhani, *Time Magazine*, May 11, 2006, cited at Global Security.org <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2006/iran-060511-irna01.htm>; [http://www.parstimes.com/history/un\\_598.html](http://www.parstimes.com/history/un_598.html); <http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-17/0704106338191059.htm>.
57. See Ray Takeyh, "A Nuclear Iran: Challenges and Responses Author: Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies," March 2, 2006, [http://www.cfr.org/publication/10008/nuclear\\_iran.html?breadcrumb=default](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10008/nuclear_iran.html?breadcrumb=default).
58. "Director General Briefs Press on Iran's Nuclear Programme" IAEA (14 June 2007) <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2007/pressbrief140707.html>. IAEA Director General Dr. El-Baradei told reporters that the Board had not adopted the IAEA's 2 percent budget increase for 2008–2009. He said that there was a "gradual erosion" of the IAEA's ability to perform critical functions that directly relate to decisions on war and peace. Without sufficient resources, he cautioned, "I will not be able to certify that we are able to do the critical functions we are expected to perform." Washington toned down its strong opposition to El-Baradei's bid for a third term as Director General, but stated that he needed to get tougher on Iran. *Washington Post* (June 8, 2005) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/07/AR2005060701542.html>.
59. Here, it should be pointed out that one of the key differences between Iran and North Korea is that Iran has a highly active civil society that does not always support government policy. It is not necessarily certain that nuclear power can continue to serve as a rallying point for the Iranian leadership.
60. Helene Cooper and David E. Sanger, "Iran Strategy Stirs Debate at White House," *Washington Post*, June 16, 2007. In addition, General Wesley Clark rebuked Senator Lieberman's public call to pursue Iranian forces across Iraq's border: "What we need now is full-fledged engagement with Iran. . . . All options are on the table, but we should be striving to bridge the gulf of almost 30 years of hostility before, and only when all else fails should there be any consideration of other options. . . . Only someone who never wore the uniform or thought seriously about national security would make threats at this point. . . . What our soldiers need is responsible strategy, not a further escalation of tensions in the region." Gen. Wesley Clark Slams Senator Lieberman on Iran Newsmax (June 13, 2007) <http://www.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2007/6/13/203112.shtml?s=ic>.
61. Sam Gardiner, a retired air force colonel and strategy teacher at the National War College, the Naval War College, and the Air Force War College, says President Bush "talks about the Middle East in messianic terms, and is said to have told those close

to him that he has got to attack Iran because even if a Republican succeeds him . . . he will not have the same freedom of action that Bush enjoys.” According to Seymour Hersh, Cheney said that the November 7, 2007, midterm congressional elections “would not stop the administration from pursuing a military option with Iran.” Hallinan, “The Democrats & Iran.”

62. These include Elliott Abrams, who is deputy assistant to President Bush and deputy national security adviser for global democracy strategy in the second-term Bush administration; David Addington, Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff in the second term; John Bolton, the former UN ambassador; Vice President Richard Cheney, who played a prominent part as a member of the joint congressional Iran-Contra inquiry of 1986; Robert M. Gates, successor to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who was accused of knowing more than he admitted once the Iran-Contra scandal broke. See “The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On,” The National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/index.htm>. Saudi Prince Bandar was also involved in funding Iran-Contra. For a differing perspective, Seymour M. Hersh, “The Redirection,” *New Yorker*, February 25, 2007. Hersh argues correctly that fear of Iran is bringing Saudis, the United States, and Israel closer together; and that, like the Iran-Contra affairs, U.S.-Saudi activities in Iraq and Iran possess no accountability. But his perspective does not entirely take into account opening of discussions between Saudi Arabia with Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Hersh quotes a former official as saying, “The C.I.A. is asking, ‘What’s going on?’ They’re concerned, because they think it’s amateur hour.” Conversely, those who were in charge of Iran-Contra at least have had some experience in dealing with Iranian hard-liners. Whether that will prove helpful is another question.

## Chapter 5

1. On September 10, 2006, Riah Abu El-Assal, bishop of the Episcopal Church of Jerusalem and the Middle East, was one of six invited to meet with Prime Minister Tony Blair at the British consulate in Jerusalem. “Riah Abu El-Assal’s Latest Report from the Middle East, Friday, 22 September 2006,” [http://www.morayrossandcaithness.co.uk/artman/publish/article\\_111.shtml](http://www.morayrossandcaithness.co.uk/artman/publish/article_111.shtml).
2. U.S. State Department, “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm>.
3. [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000\\_2009/2001/1/Israeli-Palestinian%20Joint%20Statement%20-%2027-Jan-2001](http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2001/1/Israeli-Palestinian%20Joint%20Statement%20-%2027-Jan-2001).
4. [http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2007/03/27/arab\\_summit\\_considers\\_military\\_plan/](http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2007/03/27/arab_summit_considers_military_plan/).
5. “The Geneva Accord,” Haaretz.com, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?ItemNo=351461>. Annex X, unpublished, was to propose multinational peacekeeping.
6. Amitai Etzioni, “On Giving Your Cake—and Enjoying It Too, Update #69,” A Communitarian Letter, <http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/>.
7. Reuven Paz, “ Hamas and Islamic Jihad,” cited in Council of Foreign Relations, <http://cfrterrorism.org/groups/hamas.html>.
8. Yossi Melman, “Egypt Recommends Hamas Put an End to Terror,” April 5, 2006, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/702512.html>.
9. Marwan Bishara, “The Risk of a Third Intifada,” *The Guardian*, August 18, 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1551402,00.html>.

10. Here, the wall around the major Israeli settlement in Ma'ale Adumim reaches from the 1949 cease-fire line into the West Bank for up to 25 kilometers and effectively blocks access from north to south for Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Ramallah. Israeli hard-liners see construction as a way to cement Jewish control over East Jerusalem and prevent expanding Palestinian villages from encroaching on the nearly five-kilometer-long finger of land linking Ma'ale Adumim to Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. "Israel Begins Building in West Bank Zone," *ISN Security Watch*, August 25, 2005.
11. BBC Monitoring Middle East, " Hamas PM-designate Comments on Israeli Poll Results, Readiness for Talks," March 29, 2006.
12. In the spring of 1994, apparently accepting the green line, Sheikh Yassin had offered a cease-fire if Israeli forces withdrew from occupied territories, settlements were dismantled and prisoners were released. See, Ami Isseroff, "A History of the Hamas Movement," <http://www.mideastweb.org/hamashistory.htm>. For citations of Hamas legislators in regard to recognition of Israeli boundaries, see [http://www.memri.org/bin/opener\\_latest.cgi?ID=SD107906](http://www.memri.org/bin/opener_latest.cgi?ID=SD107906).
13. The Palestinian Authority's annual operating budget is roughly US\$1.6 billion, roughly two-thirds of which comes from Europe, international donor agencies, the United States, and Asian governments. The US\$1.3 billion in foreign aid in 2006 accounted for 32 percent of Palestinian gross domestic product, making Palestinians the biggest recipients of foreign per capita aid in the world.
14. In the 2000–2004 period, the Intifada cost the Israeli economy about \$12 billion, or approximately 10 percent of Israel's \$121 billion GDP. Israel's potential growth per capita over this period was reduced by 11 percent, with a 30 percent fall in stock prices. Per capita income in Israel would likely have been \$18,500 (up from its present \$16,700) without the conflict. On the other side, the costs to the Palestinian economy has been \$4.5 billion in the same period, or nearly 300 percent of the West Bank's GDP of \$1.7 billion. Economic growth was -22 percent, with a loss of GDP per capita of \$1,200. (Up to \$700 million in the past decade or so has been stolen.) "Journal: Costs of the Intifada," November 19, 2004, [http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/11/journal\\_the\\_cos.html](http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/11/journal_the_cos.html). See also "Deep Palestinian Poverty in the Midst of Economic Crisis," World Bank, October 2004, [http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/Poverty+Report/\\$File/Poverty+Eng+final.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/Poverty+Report/$File/Poverty+Eng+final.pdf).
15. "Israel Breaks Off Direct Contacts with Palestinian Government," *New York Times*, April 10, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/10/world/middleeast/10mideast.html?th&emc=th>.
16. Mitch Potter, "Jimmy Carter's Secret Mission," *The Toronto Star*, January 27, 2006.
17. Dominic Moran, *ISN Security Watch*, September 16, 2006.
18. Hamas won seventy-six seats; Fatah won forty-three seats; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) won three seats; The Third Way block won two seats; Badil won two seats; and Independent Palestine won two seats and a list of other independents won the remaining four seats. Hamas: Change and Reform (434,817 votes, 43 percent of the total vote, seventy-six seats); Fatah Movement (403,458 votes, 39.9 percent of the total vote, forty-three seats); Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa (41,671 votes, 4.1 percent of the total vote, three seats); The Third Way (23,513 votes, 2.3 percent of the total vote, two seats); The Alternative (28,779 votes, 2.8 percent of the total vote, two seats). Others (53,200 votes, 5.3 percent of the total vote, four seats). Yet, secular parties won 57 percent of the popular vote altogether.
19. Sharmila Devi, "World Bank May Sever Contacts with the PA," *Financial Times*, April 13, 2006.

20. Dina Kraft and Christine Hauser, "Suicide Attack Kills at Least 8 in Tel Aviv," *New York Times*, April 17, 2006.
21. BBC Monitoring Middle East, " Hamas PM-designate Comments on Israeli Poll Results, Readiness for Talks." March 29, 2006.
22. Under the Mecca agreement, Hamas was to hold nine ministries in the cabinet, including the prime minister's post. Fatah was to hold six, and other factions were to hold four positions. Fatah was expected to name independents as foreign minister and two state ministers without portfolio. For its part, Hamas would name independents as interior minister and planning minister and would appoint a state minister without portfolio.
23. Steven Erlanger, " Hamas and Fatah Agree on Unity Government," *New York Times*, March 15, 2007.
24. David Aaron, " Outside View: How to Deal with Hamas," UPI, March 15, 2006.
25. See *ibid.*
26. Yotam Feldner and Yigal Carmon, " Jordanian Policies on the Palestinian Problem. Part II" *The Middle East Media Research Institute* No. 15 (March 16, 1999).
27. " Terror Leader Admits for First Time That He Ordered 9/11 Attacks," CAIRO, Egypt, CBS News, October 29, 2004.
28. Mark Mackinnon, Reuters; Trish McAlaster, *The Globe and Mail*, January 17, 2007.
29. Jim Lobe, Inter Press Service, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3340750,00.html>.
30. Patrick Seale, " Who Killed Rafik Hariri?" *The Guardian*, February 23, 2005. Unlike others in Lebanon, al-Hariri was not an avowed " enemy" of Syria; although he was forced to resign from his post as prime minister by Syrian military intelligence, he was also thought to be negotiating for Syrian withdrawal as an intermediary between Damascus and the opposition at the time of the assassination. Not all Lebanese have taken an anti-Syrian stance: Michael Aoun, who opposed Syrian intervention in 1989 as Prime Minister, and who is now leader of the Free Patriot Movement, has forged a tactical alliance with Sh'ite parties Hizb'allah and Amal- against Prime Minister Siniora's government, in effect dividing the Christian Maronites. Failure to forge a national unity government could provoke renewed civil war.
31. [http://www.cfr.org/publication/13391/fatah\\_alislam.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/13391/fatah_alislam.html).
32. Yoav Stern, " Assad: Peace Talks with Israel Could Be Completed in 6 Months," *Haaretz* (The Associated Press), February 10, 2006.
33. Jerome M. Segal, " Final Status in a New Era," *Haaretz*, February 17, 2007.
34. Robert E. Hunter and Seth G. Jones, *Building a Successful Palestinian State* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand: 2006); Thomas L. Friedman, " Go Slow-Mo, NATO," *New York Times*, December 12, 2002; " The Hard Truth," *New York Times*, April 3, 2002. I publicly proposed a NATO-Partnership for Peace approach to Middle East peace-keeping in October 2001 at the Atlantic Council conference in Slovenia.
35. Israeli Raid on Palestinian Prison Ignites Crisis in Occupied Territories. See interview with Naseer Aruri, " Dishonest Broker: America's Role in Israel and Palestine," *Democracy Now*, March 16, 2006, <http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/03/16/158202>.

## Chapter 6

1. Gal Luft and Anne Korin, " Terror's Next Target," *Journal of International Security Affairs* (December 2003).
2. Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars* (London: Zed, 2001), chapter 7.

3. "Current Geostrategy in the South Caucasus," Power and Interest Research Group (PINR), December 15, 2006).
4. As Moscow makes a near 150 percent profit on gas it buys from Kazakhstan and then distributes to Europe, the EU hoped to cut Russia out of the equation so as to reduce its dependency. Melissa Hahn, "Moscow Achieves Success with Kazakh Oil Deal," PINR (May 29, 2007). "Current Geostrategy in the South Caucasus," PINR (December 15, 2006). <http://www.pinr.com>.
5. See Igor Tomberg, "Geopolitics of Pipeline Communication Systems in Eurasia," *World Affairs* Vol 10, No 1 (2006).
6. Paul Rogers "US, Iran: The fire next time" (May 29, 2007) <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17665>.
7. On naval strategy and the war on terrorism (seen as a two front war, with psychological and physical fronts), see Randall G. Bowdich, "Global Terrorism, Strategy, and Naval Forces," chapter 5 in Sam J. Tangredi, ed., *Globalization and Maritime Power*, National Defense University, 2002. [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/Books\\_2002/Globalization\\_and\\_Maritime\\_Power\\_Dec\\_02/01\\_toc.htm](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/01_toc.htm).
8. On the roots of U.S. policy toward South Africa, see Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1980–81).
9. In the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the United States "did not push the Soviets to intervene [in Afghanistan], but purposely augmented the chances that they would." See Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the "War on Terrorism."*
10. Edward Jay Epstein, "Who Killed Zia?" *Vanity Fair* (September 1989). <http://edwardjayepstein.com/archived/zia.htm>.
11. Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
12. In 2006, Afghan opium exports were estimated at \$3.1 billion, one-third of Afghanistan's GDP. The area under poppy cultivation has risen from 8,000 hectares in 2001 to 165,000 hectares in 2006. Despite U.S. and NATO efforts, in 2006, 60 percent more cultivable land was planted with opium compared to 2005; the poppy harvest reached 6,100 tons. Roughly 12 percent of the Afghan population is involved in drug production at some level. Anuj Chopra, ISN Security Watch "Addicted in Afghanistan" (July 17 2007).
13. Michael Weinstein, "Uzbekistan and the Great Powers: Courting Instability," PINR (January 3, 2005). [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=251&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=251&language_id=1); Erich Marquardt and Yevgeny Bendersky, "Uzbekistan's New Foreign Policy Strategy," PINR, November 23, 2005 [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=404&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=404&language_id=1).
14. Amin Tarzi, "Pakistan Hails North Waziristan Peace Deal," *RFE/RL*, October 24, 2006. See Crisis Group critique of "appeasement" in "Pakistan's Tribal Areas." [http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south\\_asia/125\\_pakistans\\_tribal\\_areas\\_\\_\\_appeasing\\_the\\_militants.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/125_pakistans_tribal_areas___appeasing_the_militants.pdf). Yet, is democratization necessarily the salvation?
15. Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis* (Santa Monica, RAND: 2002). [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1450/](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450/). For background on Kashmir, see Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer in *Grasping the Nettle*, eds. Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005).
16. Robert O. Freedman, "Russia—A Partner for the US in the Post-Saddam era?" *Strategic Insights* 3, no. 4 (April 5, 2004).



17. At the CIS summit in September 2004, Kyrgyz president Askar Akaev stated, "I am a decisive supporter of a strategy of preemptive strikes." Uzbek president Karimov suggested the creation of a CIS-wide list of terrorist organizations and individuals.
18. *Washington Post*, July 30, 2005.
19. Weinstein, "Uzbekistan and the Great Powers: Courting Instability"; Erich Marquardt and Yevgeny Bendersky, "Uzbekistan's New Foreign Policy Strategy."
20. Peter Zeihan, "Post-Turkmenbashi: Gaming the Five 'Stans," *Geopolitical Intelligence Report* (December 26, 2006).
21. On the social and domestic side, notable are the importance of Black American lobbying groups such as TransAfrica, among others, which helped lead the domestic U.S. opposition to apartheid in South Africa and that seeks to link Africa with Black Americans. Congressman Rangel (see Chapter 3) sought to include in the Internal Revenue Code denial of tax credits for taxes paid to South Africa as an antiapartheid measure. <http://www.house.gov/rangel/bio.shtml>.
22. United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), "Human Security in Africa," December 2005. [http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001972/Human-security\\_OSAA\\_Dec2005.pdf](http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001972/Human-security_OSAA_Dec2005.pdf).
23. <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2071764&C=mideast>.
24. *Boston Globe*, December 21, 2006. [http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2006/12/21/pentagon\\_plans\\_new\\_command\\_to\\_cover\\_africa/](http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2006/12/21/pentagon_plans_new_command_to_cover_africa/).
25. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/acri.htm>.
26. PINR [www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_printable&report\\_id=617&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=617&language_id=1).
27. Douglas A. Yates, "Chinese Oil Interests in Africa," in *China in Africa*, p. 224, ed. Garth le Pere (Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2007).
28. John Prendergast, "So How Come We Haven't Stopped It?" *Washington Post*, November 19, 2006. "The deepening intelligence-sharing relationship between Washington and Khartoum blunted any U.S. response to the state-sponsored violence that exploded in Darfur in 2003 and 2004. . . . And since 2001, the administration had been pursuing a peace deal between southern Sudanese rebels and the regime in Khartoum—a deal aimed at placating U.S. Christian groups that had long demanded action on behalf of Christian minorities in southern Sudan. The administration didn't want to undermine that process by hammering Khartoum over Darfur." For background on Sudan, see J. Stephen Morrison and Alex de Waal in *Grasping the Nettle*, eds. Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005).
29. South Africa ranks third of states with a high degree of criminal violence after Brazil (first), then Russia (second); Canada ranks fourth; France, fifth; the United States sixth. The Human Security Report 2005.
30. [http://www.crs.org/get\\_involved/advocacy/policy\\_and\\_strategic\\_issues/oil\\_report\\_full.pdf](http://www.crs.org/get_involved/advocacy/policy_and_strategic_issues/oil_report_full.pdf).
31. Eboe Hutchful and Kwesi Aning, in *West Africa's Security Challenges*, ed. Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid, p. 211 (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2004).
32. *Wall Street Journal Europe*, April 11, 2007.
33. Jean-Christophe Servant, "Africa: External Interest and Internal Insecurity: The New Gulf Oil States," <http://mondediplo.com/2003/01/08oil>.
34. National Intelligence Council (NIC) Project 2020. [http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC\\_2020\\_project.html](http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_project.html).
35. John Page, "Are the Millennium Development Goals Bad for Growth?" World Economic Forum on Africa 2006 (January 6, 2006).
36. NIC Project 2020.
37. Page, "Are the Millennium Development Goals Bad for Growth?"

38. Michael Deibert, "Following Oil Boom, Biofuel Eyed In Africa" (IPS) July 13 2007
39. UN Press Conference, Jean Marie Guéhenno. [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/articles/pr\\_JMG.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/articles/pr_JMG.pdf).
40. NIC Project 2020. See also the Report on the Panel of UN Peacekeeping. [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/).
41. "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," September 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>.
42. Adekeye Adebajo, in Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid, *West Africa's Security Challenges*, chapter 13 (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2004).
43. Manuel Correia de Barros, "Can the Gulf of Guinea Develop a Common Regional Oil Policy?" in *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea*, eds. Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, Publisher; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/02115/barros.pdf>.
44. Ibid.

## Chapter 7

1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on the North Korea Nuclear Test," October 16, 2006, February 27, 2007. <http://odni.gov/announcements/announcements.htm>.
2. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm>.
3. PINR, "Intelligence Brief: North Korea Deal Welcomed by China," February 21, 2007, <http://www.pinr.com>.
4. Audra Ang, "North Korean Nuclear Talks Break Down," *Associated Press*, March 23, 2007. The Russians blamed the Americans for not assuring the Chinese banks that it would not be illegal to deal with the bank transfer. The Americans blamed technical problems.
5. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "U.S. Concedes Uncertainty on North Korean Uranium Effort," March 1, 2007.
6. David E. Sanger and Norimitsu Onishi, "U.S. to Hold Direct Talks in North Korea on Arms," *New York Times*, June 21, 2007.
7. Ralph C. Hassig and Kongdan Oh, "North Korea: A Rogue State Outside the NPT Fold," *Foreign Policy Agenda*, March 2005. <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0305/ijpe/kongdan.htm>.
8. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm>.
9. Nicholas Eberstadt, "North Korea Triumphs Again in Diplomacy," American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, October 2005. [http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.23277/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.23277/pub_detail.asp).
10. David E. Sanger, "In North Korea and Pakistan: Deep Roots of Nuclear Barter," *New York Times*, November 24, 2002. [http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/pt2\\_wright.htm](http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/pt2_wright.htm).
11. Yoel Sano, "Talks Aside, North Korea Won't Give Up Nukes," *Asian Times On Line*, March 2, 2004. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/FC02Dg04.html>.
12. Scott Snyder, "South Korea's Squeeze Play," *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 4 (Autumn 2005).
13. Bruce Klingner, "China Shock for South Korea," *Asian Times On line*, September 11, 2004, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/korea/FI11Dg03.html> (accessed on March 30, 2006).
14. John S. Park, "Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks," *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 4 (Autumn 2005).

15. Yoshinori Takeda, "Putin's Foreign Policy toward North Korea," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (March 3, 2006): 1411. <http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/lci141v1>.
16. Sieff Martin, "Putin's China Visit Shifts Power," March 23, 2006. <http://www.americarussia.net/eng/geopolitics/113619502>.
17. Alexander Vorontsov, "FOCUS: Economic Engagement with N. Korea Becoming Reality: Expert," *Japan Economic Newswire*, March 14, 2006. <http://asia.news.yahoo.com/060314/kyodo/d8gb1p7o0.html>.
18. Darryl Howlen, "A Concert of the Willing: A New Means for Denuclearising the Korean Peninsula," in *Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Transatlantic Debate*, ed. Ettore Greco, Giovanni Gasparni, and Riccardo Alcaro IAI Quaderni (February 2006).
19. Bruce B. Auster and Kevin Whitelaw, "Upping the Ante for Kim Jong Il: Pentagon Plan 5030, a New Blueprint for Facing Down North Korea," *US News and World Report* (July 21, 2003). <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/030721/21korea.htm>.
20. R. James Woolsey and Thomas McInerney in the *Wall Street Journal* (August 4, 2003). <http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/498>.
21. John S. Park, "Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks," *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 4 (Autumn 2005).
22. Erich Marquardt, "U.S. Struggles to Place Pressure on North Korea," PINR, March, 23 2005). [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=281&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=281&language_id=1).
23. "U.S. Reveals New Tactics to Pressure N Korea," ISN Security Watch (February 14, 2005). <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=10763>.
24. "Senator Murkowski Addresses World Trade Center Alaska," *US Fed News* (February 23, 2006).
25. Todd Walters, "The Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks." PINR, September 5, 2005. [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=360&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=360&language_id=1).
26. Howlen, "A Concert of the Willing."
27. Moon Ihlwan, "Bridging the Korean Economic Divide," *Business Week* (March 7, 2006). [http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2006/gb20060307\\_843108.htm](http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2006/gb20060307_843108.htm).
28. North Korea's trade with Japan totaled \$190 million in 2005, the lowest since 1977. During the same period, China's trade with North Korea totaled \$1.58 billion, up 14.8 percent. China remains North Korea's top trade partner, with two-way trade between the two rising by an average 30 percent per year since 2000. Alexander Vorontsov, cited in *Japan Economic Newswire*, "FOCUS: Economic Engagement with N. Korea Becoming Reality: Expert," (March 14, 2006). <http://asia.news.yahoo.com/060314/kyodo/d8gb1p7o0.html>.
29. Troy Stangarone, PacNet #6 (February 22, 2007).
30. "South Korea has requested duty-free treatment for products produced in the Kaesong Industrial Complex in prior FTA negotiations with other trade partners. The issues are twofold. The first is substantive: North Korea does not meet internationally recognized core labor standards; rights to associate, organize, and bargain collectively are absent entirely. . . . The real problem is that while conditions in Kaesong may be exploitative, they probably are considerably better than those existing elsewhere in North Korea, and there may be no shortage of North Koreans willing to work on these terms. The second issue is procedural: While the FTA will presumably include a labor standards chapter, South Korea has no way to enforce such commitments in Kaesong, where North Korea is sovereign. One possible solution would be to involve

- a third party such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) to monitor conditions in the zone . . . but even this solution would require the cooperation of the North Korean government, which is not a member of the ILO, [and which] has a track record of non-cooperation in other spheres of international engagement, and to date has restricted access to the zone by third-party observers.” Marcus Noland, “How North Korea Funds Its Regime,” *Congressional Quarterly*, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Congressional Testimony (April 25, 2006).
31. Choe Sang-Hun, “Roh Warns U.S. over N. Korea: Blunt Speech Shows Rift between allies,” *International Herald Tribune*, January 26, 2006.
  32. U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea, Alexander Vershbow, argued that the United States “did not place ‘sanctions’ on North Korea, as is commonly misrepresented in the press; we took law enforcement action against a bank in Macau to protect our financial system from abuse. . . . Like South Korea, the United States is ready to return to the talks. It’s in everyone’s best interest, including North Korea’s, to see the commitments contained in the September 19 Joint Statement implemented. Those commitments include not only denuclearization, but negotiation of a permanent peace regime, normalization of diplomatic relations, and economic integration.” “U.S. Ambassador Vershbow Delivers Remarks to the Korea Freedom League,” as released by the State Department, *Congressional Quarterly* (April 18, 2006). North Korea countered by saying, in general, that U.S. sanctions apply to North Korean trade, science and technology, investment, real estate, insurance, transportation, communication and immigration, and to prevent their exchanges overseas.
  33. Cameron Stewart, “Dirty Secrets of the Soprano State,” *The Australian*, March 11, 2006. The Sopranos is an American TV show about a mafia family.
  34. Selig Harrison, “North Korea: A Nuclear Threat,” *Newsweek*. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15175633/site/newsweek/page/2/>. See also comments of Selig S. Harrison in Joseph Kahn, “North Korea to Challenge U.S. on Nuclear Fuel,” *New York Times*, September 25, 2006; Donald Gregg and Don Oberdorfer, “Wrong Path on North Korea,” *Washington Post*, September 6, 2006.
  35. Jong-Heon Lee, “Analysis: N. Korea’s Reliance on China,” UPI. <http://www.upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/view.php?StoryID=20060213-062742-1321r>.
  36. Donald Kirk, “Back from China, Kim Jong Il Eyes Ally’s Success—and Largess,” *Christian Science Monitor*, January 19, 2006. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0119/p04s01-woap.html?s=widdep>.
  37. Rep. James A. Leach (R-IA), “Hearing of the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee. Subject: East Asia in Transition: Opportunities and Challenges for the United States.”
  38. “US Expert Pessimistic about Six-Nation Nuclear Talks’ Future,” *Yonhap News Agency* (April 7, 2006). Interview with Peter Beck, the Northeast Asia project director of the International Crisis Group, April 6, 2007.
  39. Walters, “The Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks.”
  40. “Sandwiched between the intransigence of the two chief negotiators, China would also like to see a more flexible and practical U.S. policy toward North Korea instead of a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. If not, Beijing will not be able to exercise the leadership that Washington hopes will roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.” Anne Wu, “What China Whispers to North Korea,” *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005).
  41. “Libya Profile,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). [http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/profiles/Libya/3939.html#fn6](http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/3939.html#fn6).

42. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on the North Korea Nuclear Test," October 16, 2006, February 27, 2007. <http://odni.gov/announcements/announcements.htm>.
43. For details on South Korean military reforms, see B. B. Bell, commander, United Nations Command, "Fiscal 2007 Budget: Department of Defense, Committee on Senate Armed Services," *Congressional Quarterly* (March 7, 2006).
44. Michael E. O'Hanlon, "A 'Master Plan' to Deal with North Korea," *Brookings Policy Brief*, No. 114 (January 2003). <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb114.htm>.
45. <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3997>.
46. Rather than put human rights issues before a UN human rights commission or council governed by states, the UN should sponsor an independent advisory counsel made of world-renowned human rights activists who could critique the human rights policies of all states more fairly and objectively. See Chapter 1.
47. Bruce Klingner "China Shock for South Korea," *Asian Times On line*, September 11, 2004. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/korea/FI11Dg03.html>.
48. *Ibid.*
49. See Dingli Shen, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Test China's Wisdom," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006). While sharing U.S. concerns about the dangers of the Iranian nuclear program, neither China (nor Japan) can afford higher oil prices as a result of tensions with Iran. Here, it appears that the United States might need to find a way to engage more directly with both Iran and North Korea, with the concerted backing of China, Russia, Japan, and the Europeans.
50. Ted Galen Carpenter, "Options for Dealing with North Korea," *Foreign Policy Briefing* No. 73, January 6, 2006. <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefts/fpb73.pdf>.
51. On rising tensions in Asia, see *ibid.*, chapter 6. See also Colin Robinson and Rear Adm. (Ret.) Stephen H. Baker, "Stand-off with North Korea: War Scenarios and Consequences," *Center for Defense Information*, June 26, 2003. For a theoretical discussion of major power war in Asia, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations; Is Conflict Inevitable?" *International Security* (Fall 2005).
52. Professor Shi Yinling of Beijing's Renmin University put it this way: "A North Korea alienated from China would allow the U.S. military to ignore the Korean peninsula in any conflict with China over Taiwan. . . . If there is a confrontation with Taiwan and the (U.S. Navy's) 7th Fleet, what value then can North Korea have? Minimal value if it collapses. . . . So it is not denuclearization that is China's number one goal. Number one is peace on the Korean peninsula." See Jim Landers, "China in a Delicate Position Regarding Future of Long-Time Ally North Korea," *Dallas Morning News*, January 6, 2006. <http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/13555490.htm>.
53. "Korea's and Japan's Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute Escalates toward Confrontation," PINR. <http://www.pirn.org>.
54. In January 2003, then minister of state for defense Shigeru Ishiba, in his testimony before the Japanese House of Representatives Budget Committee, made an unprecedented explicit reference to Tokyo's use of preemptive force: "We will consider the start [of a military attack] if [Pyongyang] expresses an intention to demolish Tokyo and starts fuelling its missiles to realize that." Park, "Inside Multilateralism".
55. "Intelligence Brief: North Korea's Missile Tests," PINR, July 5, 2006. <http://www.pirn.com>.

## Chapter 8

1. The film's coauthor, Su Xiaokang, was forced into exile after the Tiananmen Square crackdown.
2. Howard W. French, "Letter from China: Is the U.S. Plunging into 'Historical Error'?" *International Herald Tribune*, June 1, 2006.
3. Willy Lam, "China Brief," *Jamestown Foundation* 7, no. 1 (January 10, 2007).
4. Willy Lam, "China Brief," *Jamestown Foundation* 7, no. 5 (March 8, 2007).
5. Human Rights Watch, "China: Curbs on Lawyers Could Intensify Social Unrest" (December 12, 2006). <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/12/china14791.txt.htm>. In effect, the more China takes the "capitalist road," the more it is confronted with internal dissent, particularly directed at local and provincial authorities. See Andrew Wedeman in Sujian Guo, ed., *China's "Peaceful Rise" in the 21st Century* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006).
6. Human Rights Watch, op.cit. See also Andrew Wedeman, *ibid.*
7. Anita Chan, "Made in China: Wal-Mart Union," *Yale Global*, October 12, 2006. On multinational corporate investments in China and related loss of 2.8 to 3 million manufacturing jobs, see Walden Bello, *Dilemmas of Domination* (London: Zed Books, 2005), 93–97.
8. Matt Benjamin and Julianna Goldman, "Paulson Is Attacked for Softer Stance on Yuan Policy," Update1, Bloomberg (December 20, 2006).
9. *Ibid.* Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke branded China's undervalued currency an "effective subsidy" for its exporters that was distorting patterns of production and trade. Although Bernanke dropped the phrase in a speech in Beijing, using instead the less inflammatory term "distortion," the Fed was standing by the language of the original text.
10. As of January 2007, Japan held \$627 billion; China held \$400 billion, oil exporters \$112 billion, the United Kingdom \$103 billion, South Korea \$62 billion, Taiwan, \$59 billion, and Hong Kong \$54 billion. <http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt>.
11. On ethanol, see Antoaneta Bezlova, "China: Food First, Not Fuel" (IPS) Jun 15, 2007. Toshiba of Japan spent \$5.4 billion in 2006 to acquire the U.S. Westinghouse Electric in part in expectation of the huge China nuclear market. Ariana Eunjung Cha, "China Embraces Nuclear Future," *Washington Post*, May 29, 2007. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/28/AR2007052801051\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/28/AR2007052801051_pf.html). On problems in the nuclear industry in southeast Asia, see: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17896>.
12. Richard Spencer, "Tension Rises as China Scours the Globe for Energy," November 19, 2004. <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1892>.
13. Lam, "China Brief" 7, no. 1. It is rumored that China was able to reverse engineer cruise missile technology sold to Beijing by bin Laden from an unexploded missile fired by Bill Clinton in August 1998 at al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan, thus providing some additional profit for al-Qaida.
14. <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/40554110-295C-4760-9635-BCC86A121F45.html>.
15. PINR, "The Emerging Cold War on Asia's High Seas." [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=439&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=439&language_id=1).
16. Li Qingsi in Sujian Guo, ed., *China's "Peaceful Rise" in the 21st Century*, p. 149.
17. Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa, "Not Going Nuclear: Japan's Response to North Korea's Nuclear Test," *Arms Control Today* (June 2007).
18. Mohan Malik, "China's Strategy of Containing India," PINR. [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=434](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=434); PINR, "The Modernization of the Chinese Navy/" [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=364](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=364);

- PINR, "India's Project Seabird and the Indian Ocean's Balance of Power." [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=330](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=330).
19. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,352465,00.html>.
  20. Chietigj Bajpae, "Strategic Interests Pull Japan and India Together," February 16, 2007, <http://www.pinr.com>.
  21. Ibid.
  22. Stephen Blank, "China's Energy Crossroads" Perspective (Volume 16, Number 3 May 2006), <http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol16/blank2.html>.
  23. Spencer, "Tension Rises as China Scours the Globe for Energy." *Daily Telegraph* (November 19, 2004).
  24. [http://www.jamestown.org/print\\_friendly.php?volume\\_id=415&issue\\_id=3821&article\\_id=2371339](http://www.jamestown.org/print_friendly.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3821&article_id=2371339).
  25. Spencer, "Tension Rises as China Scours the Globe for Energy."
  26. Joseph Kahn, "China Shows Assertiveness in Weapons Test," *New York Times*, January 20, 2006. See also Xuetang Guo, in Sujian Guo, ed., *China's "Peaceful Rise" in the 21st Century*, p. 161.
  27. Xuetang Guo, in *ibid*, p. 163.
  28. Kahn, "China Shows Assertiveness in Weapons Test."
  29. [http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story\\_id=27642](http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=27642); Xuetang Guo, in Sujian Guo, ed., *China's "Peaceful Rise" in the 21st Century*, p. 174. See also press conference by Robert Gates in support of a strong American military presence in Asia. <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3974>
  30. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/01/29/200334675>.
  31. Kurt M. Campbell; Jeremiah Gertler, *The Paths Ahead: Missile Defense in Asia CSIS* (March 2006) [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0603\\_pathsahead.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0603_pathsahead.pdf).
  32. Chen also pledged to continue his drive for a new independent constitution and to join international bodies like the UN and World Health Organization (WHO)—goals that are strongly opposed by Beijing. Yet here, there should be some diplomatic formula (as a form of confederation) to enhance Taiwanese participation in international regimes. Taiwan's nonmembership in WHO, for example, hurt international efforts to stop the spread of Asian bird flu. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/01/29/200334675>.
  33. Former secretary of defense William S. Cohen, now chairman of the U.S.-Taiwan Council, warned an audience in Taiwan in November 2003 that "You cannot expect the American people to burden ourselves the way we are to carry out responsibilities for other countries if there is no corresponding effort being made for self-defense."
  34. David DeVoss, "Deal or No Deal: The Complicated Business of Defending Taiwan," *Weekly Standard*, November 28, 2006.
  35. <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/Roy-TawainArms.pdf>. This is a perfect description of differing perceptions of threat that characterizes the insecurity-security dialectic. The underlying American assumption is that balance of power causes peace by deterring China, while an imbalance favoring China would encourage Beijing to opt for a military solution. The prevailing view in China is the opposite: a balance increases the chances of war because it emboldens Taipei to move toward independence, which would eventually leave China no recourse but military action.
  36. Douglas E. Streusand, "Geopolitics versus Globalization," in Sam J. Tangredi, ed., *Globalization and Maritime Power*, National Defense University, 2002. [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/Books\\_2002/Globalization\\_and\\_Maritime\\_Power\\_Dec\\_02/01\\_toc.htm](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/01_toc.htm).

## Chapter 9

1. *Gulf Daily News* (Bahrain), December 19, 2006. <http://www.gulfdailynews.com/Story.asp?Article=164956&Sn=BUSI&IssueID=29274>.
2. “Global systemic crisis in 2007—Financial sector: ‘Another bubble’ Close to Bursting.” [http://www.leap2020.eu/Global-systemic-crisis-in-2007-Financial-sector-Another-bubble-close-to-bursting\\_a317.html](http://www.leap2020.eu/Global-systemic-crisis-in-2007-Financial-sector-Another-bubble-close-to-bursting_a317.html).
3. Agnes Lovasz and Daniel Kruger, “Energy in 2007: A Chaotic Way Out of the ‘Dollar Era’ Venezuela, Oil Producers Buy Euro as Dollar, Oil Fall,” (Update1) (Bloomberg). “Dec. 18, 2006. Banco Central de Venezuela slashed the percentage of its \$35.9 billion worth of reserves invested in dollars and gold to 80 percent from 95 percent in 2005. The country, the world’s fifth-largest oil supplier, has boosted its euro holdings to 15 percent, from less than 5 percent in the same period.” <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aCVBzWdStPk&refer=news>.
4. On April 12, 2002, in an initial State Department statement, the United States blamed the Chávez government itself for precipitating the coup, stating that “undemocratic actions committed or encouraged by the Chávez administration provoked” the crisis. But the next day, as the illegal actions of the de facto government continued, the United States voted in favor of the OAS resolution condemning the coup attempt. In September, amid further coup rumors, the U.S. embassy in Venezuela issued a declaration unequivocally stating its opposition to any illegal disruption of constitutional rule in Venezuela. Human Rights Watch. <http://hrw.org/wr2k3/amicas10.html>.
5. According to a survey of 1,300 people by pollster Datanalysis. The poll, taken October 18–25, 2005, has a margin of error of 2.71 percent. Bloomberg.com. [http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&sid=abx10oH0HBc0&refer=latin\\_america](http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&sid=abx10oH0HBc0&refer=latin_america).
6. Opposition leaders are concerned about voter confidentiality because they say the government has discriminated against Venezuelans who signed a petition in 2004 seeking a recall vote to remove Chavez from office. The list became public information after Luis Tascon, a congressman from Chavez’s own Fifth Republic Movement Party, acquired a copy and disseminated it. [http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&sid=abx10oH0HBc0&refer=latin\\_america](http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&sid=abx10oH0HBc0&refer=latin_america).
7. “[Chávez] has destroyed the Venezuelan economy, and he’s going to make that a launching pad for communist infiltration and Muslim extremism all over the continent. You know, I don’t know about this doctrine of assassination, but if he thinks we’re trying to assassinate him, I think that we really ought to go ahead and do it. It’s a whole lot cheaper than starting a war. . . . We have the Monroe Doctrine, we have other doctrines that we have announced. And without question, this is a dangerous enemy to our south, controlling a huge pool of oil, that could hurt us very badly. We have the ability to take him out, and I think the time has come that we exercise that ability. We don’t need another \$200 billion war to get rid of one, you know, strong-arm dictator. It’s a whole lot easier to have some of the covert operatives do the job and then get it over with.” Pat Robertson, *The 700 Club*, August 22, 2005. <http://mediamatters.org/items/200508220006>.
8. ISN Security Watch, Wednesday, November 23, 2005: 18:11 CET.
9. With more than a two-thirds majority in parliament, Chávez could possibly remove the current constitutional limit of two presidential terms in office and thus consolidate his Bolivarian Revolution.
10. Simon Romero, “Chávez Moves to Nationalize Two Industries,” *New York Times*, January 9, 2007.



11. Ibid.
12. Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, "Venezuela's Hugo Chavez Makes His Bid for a Bolivarian Revolution." [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=285](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=285). In October 2004, Chavez raised the royalty tax on companies working in the Orinoco region from 1 percent to 16.6 percent. Under a law passed in 2001, new projects will have a royalty rate of 30 percent, which does not seem to have discouraged investors in the short term. (For example, on March 31, 2004 Chevron-Texaco announced plans to pursue joint development in the Orinoco belt with Venezuelan state company PDVSA.) But this could be changing in 2007.
13. *BBC News Chinese*, May 12, 2006.
14. Quoted in Gal Luft, "In Search of Crude China goes to the Americas," Institute for the Analysis of Global Security: Energy Security, January 18, 2005. <http://www.iags.org/n0118041.htm>.
15. Ibid.
16. <http://www.latin-focus.com/latinfocus/countries/venezuela/vengdpsector.htm>.
17. "Despite a five-fold expansion in oil prices, Venezuela is currently running a fiscal deficit projected at 2.3 percent for 2006. A decline in oil prices, or perhaps even something less dramatic, will make this house of cards come tumbling down. When it does, it will be the Venezuelan poor who will pay the heaviest price." Francisco Rodríguez, "Why Chávez Wins," *Foreign Policy*. [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=3685](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3685).
18. For details, see Weinstein, "Venezuela's Hugo Chavez Makes His Bid for a Bolivarian Revolution."
19. Jim Rutenberg and Larry Rohter, "Bush and Chávez Spar at Distance over Latin Visit," *New York Times*, March 10, 2007.
20. <http://www.ethanolrfa.org/media/press/rfa/2006/view.php?id=683>.
21. Edmund L. Aandrews and Larry Rohter, "U.S. and Brazil Seek to Promote Ethanol in West," *New York Times*, March 2, 2007.
22. Lester R. Brown, "Plan B 2.0," Earth Policy Institute, 2006. <http://www.earth-policy.org/Books/PB2/Contents.htm>.
23. Ironically, Oliver North's statements in Nicaragua in late October 2006 just before the election might have taken votes away from the candidate preferred by the Bush administration and thus helped Ortega at the polls. National Security Archive. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB113/>.
24. Der Spiegel, August 28, 2006. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,434272,00.html>.
25. Adam Wolfe, "Economic Brief: The Doha Round." [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=409&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=409&language_id=1). On Latin American opposition to the the FTAA and WTO Agreement on Agriculture largely due to northern subsidies, see Walden Bello, *Dilemmas of Domination*, chapters 5–7.
26. As Pascal Lamy put it: "Today the Doha Round is at a crossroad: the path towards success or the slow move towards a deep freeze." If the Doha Round is to succeed, progress must soon be made in agriculture subsidies and tariffs on agriculture and industrial tariffs, as elections in the United States will be held in 2008, to be followed by changes in the European Parliament and in the European Commission in 2009. [http://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/sppl\\_e/sppl64\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl64_e.htm).
27. Civic groups of at least four of the nine eastern regions (Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, and Tarija) have demonstrated in town meetings (cabildos) in support of greater regional autonomy—an option opposed by the central government, which, it is feared, might attempt to break the country into 40 smaller regions. International

- Crisis Group, "Bolivia's Reforms: The Danger of New Conflicts," *Latin America Briefing* 13 (January 8, 2007).
28. *BBC World News*, "Garcia proposes thaw with Chavez" (June 6, 2006) Peruvian president Alan Garcia has opposed Chávez's "militaristic and backwards expansion project he intends to impose over South America" but seeks good relations and does not intend to lead "a continental anti-Chavez movement."
  29. [http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2006/12/venezuelas\\_military\\_buildup\\_wh.php](http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2006/12/venezuelas_military_buildup_wh.php).
  30. Juan Forero, "Colombia's Coca Survives U.S. Plan to Uproot It," *New York Times*, August 19, 2006. <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/08/19/america/web.0819coca.php>; <http://www.cmu.edu/clips/v212.html> - link. In 2004 John Walters, the head of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, stated that the \$3.3 billion Plan Colombia begun in 2000 had failed to make a significant dent in the amount of cocaine flowing out of that country. Ted Galen Carpenter, "Yet Another Drug War Failure," August 13, 2004. [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=2783](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2783). In 2000, U.S. consumers spent an estimated \$36.1 billion on cocaine. For background, see Cynthia J. Arnson and Teresa Whitfield in *Grasping the Nettle*, eds. Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005).
  31. Ricardo Palmera, leader of FARC, was captured in Ecuador in 2004. The Brazilian drug lord Fernandinho Beira Mar had been arrested inside Colombia in 2001 after trying to sell drugs to the FARC in exchange for weapons, which might be attempting to establish Brazilian wing.
  32. National Security Archive, "War in Colombia Background." <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/background.html>.
  33. At the time of September 11, 2001, the majority of "terrorist" attacks did not occur in the Middle East, but in Colombia, according to U.S. State Department figures, which tended to confound acts of "terrorism" with acts of "sabotage" largely directed against the Cano Limón oil pipeline.
  34. *Ibid.*
  35. Assuming it is not an "urban legend," genetically modified varieties of marijuana and other drugs have purportedly become available that are less susceptible to pesticides and that need less space to grow, making eradication even more difficult.
  36. "Interview with Milton Friedman on the Drug War." <http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Misc/friedm1.htm>. As Friedman put it, "[Drug use] does harm a great many other people, but primarily because it's prohibited. There are an enormous number of innocent victims now. You've got the people whose purses are stolen, who are bashed over the head by people trying to get enough money for their next fix. You've got the people killed in the random drug wars. You've got the corruption of the legal establishment. You've got the innocent victims who are taxpayers who have to pay for more and more prisons, and more and more prisoners, and more and more police. You've got the rest of us who don't get decent law enforcement because all the law enforcement officials are busy trying to do the impossible. . . . And, last, but not least, you've got the people of Colombia and Peru and so on. What business do we have destroying and leading to the killing of thousands of people in Colombia because we cannot enforce our own laws? If we could enforce our laws against drugs, there would be no market for these drugs. You wouldn't have Colombia in the state it's in." If the United States can not stop drug use altogether, it will need to modify that usage and demand in such a way as to limit damage both domestically and globally.
  37. Bureau of Justice Statistics, <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm#jail>.
  38. Georges Estievenart, "Opium in and from Afghanistan," *World Political Forum*, (October 27, 2006). See "U.S. Fails to Reduce Opium Crop," *International Herald Tribune* (August 26, 2007).

39. Jon Gettman, "Marijuana Production in the United States" (2006). <http://www.drugscience.org/Archive/bcr2/exec.html>. New studies indicate that marijuana risks inducing schizophrenia in those susceptible. See also the problems facing the commercial hemp industry as a result of its unfortunate association with marijuana: [http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/ncnu\\_02/v5-284.html](http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/ncnu_02/v5-284.html).
40. Venezuela had already attempted to nationalize the oil sector under Carlos Andrés Pérez in the 1970s. The economy, however, collapsed after oil prices crashed in the 1980s, leading subsequent administrations to privatize state companies and open the oil industry to foreign investment.
41. Samuel Huntington, "The Hispanic Challenge," *Foreign Policy* (March/April 2004). See also critique of Huntington's position: Philippa Strum and Andrew Selee, "The Hispanic Challenge? What We Know About Latino Immigration" Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (March 29, 2004) <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/HispChall.pdf>.
42. In an editorial headlined "Uncle Scrooge's Paltry Package," the conservative Brazilian daily newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo* noted that Bush's offering amounted to "the equivalent of five days' cost of the war in Iraq, and a drop of water compared with the ocean of petrodollars in which Chávezism is navigating at full speed, from Argentina to Nicaragua." See Rutenberg and Rohter "Visit by Bush Fires Up Latins' Debate over Socialism," *New York Times*, March 9, 2007. While the United States has promised roughly \$7.5 billion in grants and loans through the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, plus \$3 billion in direct aid since 2005, Chavez has promised at least \$8.8 billion in 2007 alone, plus undisclosed investments, far more than any single country in the region. Natalie Obiko Pearson and Ian James, "Chavez offers Billions in Latin America," *Other News* (August 28, 2007).
43. On growing income disparities in the United States, see Chuck Collins, "The Economic Context: Growing Disparities of Income and Wealth." [http://www.mccormack.umb.edu/nejpp/articles/20\\_1/TheEconomicContext.pdf](http://www.mccormack.umb.edu/nejpp/articles/20_1/TheEconomicContext.pdf); Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, "New IRS Data Show Income Inequality Is Again on the Rise," October 17, 2005. <http://www.cbpp.org/10-17-05inc.htm>.
44. On March 10, 1999, President Bill Clinton apologized for the past U.S. support of repressive regimes in Guatemala. "For the United States, it is important that I state clearly that support for military forces and intelligence units which engaged in violence and widespread repression was wrong, and the United States must not repeat that mistake." On the "dirty war" in Mexico, see <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB89/>. On Chile, Edward C. Snyder "The Dirty Legal War: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Chile 1973-1995," *Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law*, 1995. <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/evidence99/pinochet/HistoryGeneralArticle.htm>. For details, see Human Rights Watch, "Chile: Government Discloses Torture Was State Policy," November 29, 2004.
45. For an overview of immigration from Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala during the 1980s, see Ruth Ellen Wasem "Central American Asylum Seekers: Impact of 1996 Immigration Law," Congressional Research Center (Updated November 21, 1997). [http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/1997/upl-meta-crs-463/97-810epw\\_1997Nov21.pdf?PHPSESSID=e6fec1d875a24eed7972ff3cdb30541a](http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/1997/upl-meta-crs-463/97-810epw_1997Nov21.pdf?PHPSESSID=e6fec1d875a24eed7972ff3cdb30541a).
46. Teresa Castellanos, "Context for Salvadoran Immigration," [Immigrant.info.org](http://www.immigrantinfo.org/KIN/elsalvador.htm). <http://www.immigrantinfo.org/KIN/elsalvador.htm>.
47. "El Salvador, Foreign Relations, Relations with the United States," p. 3. <http://www.country-date.com/cgi-bin/query/r-4295.html>.

48. For details, see Wasem “Central American Asylum Seekers: Impact of 1996 Immigration Law.”
49. <http://www.uscis.gov/lpBin/lpext.dll/inserts/publaw/publaw-11120?f=templates&fn=document-frame.htm#publaw-pl104208>.
50. *Ibid.*
51. Pew Hispanic Center Fact Sheet, May 22, 2006.
52. Matthew Continetti, *The Weekly Standard*, June 5, 2006.
53. Steven Camarota of The Center for Immigration Studies, argues that amnesty will let in 14.4 million “illegals,” including 7.4 million illegals who would be made legal, 2.6 million legalized fraudulently, using false documentation, plus 4.5 million family members living abroad. Of the 14.4 million illegals and their family members who will receive amnesty, 13.5 million would eventually become permanent residents. Camarota argues that his figures are based on the 1986 amnesty. See Steven Camarota, “Amnesty under Hagel-Martinez.” <http://www.cis.org/articles/2006/back606.html>.
54. For background on Congressional positions (June 14, 2007) see “Key Issues in the Immigration Reform Debate,” [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/immigration\\_primer\\_060807.html?hpid=topnews#overview](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/immigration_primer_060807.html?hpid=topnews#overview). Darryl Fears, “Guest-Worker Program Part of Government’s Immigration Plan,” *Washington Post* (March 30, 2007, A08).
55. In September 2006, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) awarded initial contracts — worth upwards of \$2 billion — for the high-tech surveillance technology along border region to weapons giant Boeing. Secure Border Strategic Plan of the DHS estimated the total costs for equipment, logistics, and manpower at \$7.6 billion though FY 2011, but still was not certain. See Frida Berrigan, “Militarizing the Border” *Foreign Policy in Focus* (April 12, 2007) <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4146>.
56. See comments of the governor of Arizona, Janet Napolitano, “Don’t Forget the Border,” *New York Times*, June 1, 2007.
57. For details, see Gordon H. Hanson, “Why Does Immigration Divide America? Public Finance and Political Opposition to Open Borders,” *The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper 129*, December 2005, pp. 5–6.
58. Kristin F. Butcher Anne Morrison Piehl, “Why are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation” *Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago November 2005* [http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/wp2005\\_19.pdf](http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/wp2005_19.pdf).
59. Siobhan Gorman, “New Border Security System Raises Cost-Benefit Concerns,” *National Journal* (May 30, 2003). <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0503/053003nj1.htm>. As Gorman observes: “A recent Justice Department inspector general’s report found that the INS was able to kick out just 13 percent of foreigners who had not been detained after being issued final deportation orders. The INS successfully deported just 6 percent of those undetained foreigners who came from countries declared to be state sponsors of terrorism.”
60. *El Diario/La Prensa*, March 6, 2006, cited by Saurav Sarkar, “The False Debate over ‘Broken Borders,’” *FAIR* (May/June 2006). <http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2896>.
61. Stuart Anderson, “The Impact of Agricultural Guest Worker Programs on Illegal Immigration,” *The National Foundation for American Policy*, November 2003. [http://www.nfap.com/researchactivities/studies/Nov\\_study1.pdf](http://www.nfap.com/researchactivities/studies/Nov_study1.pdf).

62. Ted Robbins, "San Diego Fence Provides Lessons in Border Control," National Public Radio, April 6, 2006. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5323928>.
63. Trac Immigration, Immigration Enforcement: The Rhetoric, The Reality <http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/178/>. For all but one individual charged under the terrorist label, the section under which they were charged suggested that these individuals had all initially entered the United States legally—they were not individuals who had attempted to slip across our borders. They also were from diverse nationalities: three from Jordan, two from Pakistan, one each from Cambodia, Cameroon, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Germany, Haiti and Liberia. (Language referring to "illegal entrants" has undergone numerous changes over the years. In the 1955 INS Annual Report, the term "wetbacks" was used for those illegally crossing the Mexican border. For many years "deportable aliens" was the phrase of choice. Since 9/11 "terrorists" appears in official documents to refer to all "illegal entrants" whatever their purpose—those seeking work, engaging in cross-border smuggling or other forms of criminal behavior, in addition to terrorists per se.) <http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/141/>.
64. See Jerry Seper, "Al-Qaida Seeks Tie to Local Gangs," *Washington Times*, September 28, 2004. <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040928-123346-3928r.htm>.
65. See Mandalit del Barco, "International Reach of the Mara Salvatrucha," National Public Radio, *All Things Considered*, March 17, 2005. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4539688>.
66. For congressional testimony by the FBI on Los Zetas drug cartel (November 17, 2005) see: <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/swecker111705.htm>.
67. David Leonhardt, "Immigrants and Prison," *New York Times* (May 30, 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/30/business/30leonside.html>. See also Kristin F. Butcher Anne Morrison Piehl, op.cit.
68. The White House, "Comprehensive Immigration Reform." <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/immigration/>.
69. PEW Hispanic Center, "America's Immigration Quandry," March 30, 2006, pp. 1–2.
70. Public Agenda, "Immigration: Bills and Proposals," *NBC/Wall Street Journal*, September 2006.
71. For details, see Hanson, "Why Does Immigration Divide America."
72. PEW Hispanic Center, "America's Immigration Quandry."
73. Ibid.
74. For details, see Hanson, "Why Does Immigration Divide America." Inter-American Development Bank "Remittances" (March 13, 2006) <http://www.iadb.org/news/articledetail.cfm?artid=2881&arttype=BP&language=En>.
75. Inter-American Development Bank "Remittances" (March 13, 2006) <http://www.iadb.org/news/articledetail.cfm?artid=2881&arttype=BP&language=En>.
76. World Bank, Global Development Finance Report, 2006. [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGDF2006/Resources/GDF06\\_complete.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGDF2006/Resources/GDF06_complete.pdf).
77. Ibid.
78. As Pascal Lamy of the WTO argued, "Aid for Trade aims at improving the capacity of developing countries to reap the benefits of more open trade. For some developing members this will mean setting up testing facilities and reliable institutions to help to ensure that exported products meet the technical, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and standards of export markets. For some others it would mean larger-scale projects such as improving transport infrastructure and trade logistics," [http://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/sppl\\_e/sppl64\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl64_e.htm).

## Chapter 10

1. M. K. Bhadrakumar, "Turkey not done with the Kurds," *Asia Times Online* (June 12, 2007) [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\\_East/IF12Ak05.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IF12Ak05.html).
2. Richard L. Russell, "Insurgency in Waiting," *Foreign Policy* (November 2005). [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=3309](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3309).
3. Gal Luft and Anne Korin, "Terror's next target," *Journal of International Security Affairs* (December 2003).
4. William Arkin, "Not Just A Last Resort? A Global Strike Plan, With a Nuclear Option," *Washington Post* (May 15, 2005). [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/14/AR2005051400071\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/14/AR2005051400071_pf.html).
5. Larry M. Wortzel, "China's Nuclear Forces," *Strategic Studies Institute* (May 2007) <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=776>.
6. Nuclear Posture Review (Excerpts) Global Security (January 8, 2002) <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>.
7. Federico Bordonaro, "US, Russia, Belarus: Politics of Democracy." <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=15914-28k>. "Since Washington and its NATO allies appear determined to include Kiev in their security and economic community, the whole area connecting the Baltic regions to the Caucasus—via Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia—is set to remain a contested zone by competing U.S. and Russian influences. NATO's insistence on penetrating the Russian-dominated Eurasian landmass could therefore prove strategically short-sighted as it will likely undermine a better and more useful partnership between Washington and Moscow."
8. Gal Luft and Anne Korin, "Terror's next target." In January 2000 al-Qaida attempted to ram a boat loaded with explosives into the USS The Sullivans in Yemen. In October 2000 al-Qaida succeeded in ramming a boat packed with explosives into the USS Cole. In June 2002 al-Qaida operatives suspected of plotting raids on British and American tankers passing through the Strait of Gibraltar were arrested by the Moroccan government; in October of 2002, al-Qaida hit a French supertanker off the coast of Yemen.
9. Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis* (Santa Monica, RAND: 2002). [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1450/](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450/); [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1450/](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450/).
10. Herman Kahn, *Thinking About the Unthinkable* (Horizon Press, 1962); Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1957). Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard University Press, 1960; 1980).
11. Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," In *The New Global Terrorism*, ed. Charles W. Kegley, p. 158 (Prentice Hall, 2003). On cyber warfare, see also John Arquilla and Don Ronfeldt, *In Athena's Camp* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND: 1997).
12. One variety of neoconservatives, who had been dubbed "superhawks" during the cold war, called themselves "vulcans." Superhawks, which appear to have metamorphosed into vultures with their eyes awash in visions of black gold in the case of Iraq, have also been dubbed by their critics as "chicken hawks" in that a number managed to escape military service during the Vietnam War or have had no military expertise whatsoever despite their advocacy of the use of unilateral force. On vulcans and chickenhawks, see James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans* (Viking, 2004). For the development of an owl strategy during the cold war, see Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985). See also Chapter 1, endnote 46 in this book.

13. For “selective intervention,” see Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). What Art calls “selective engagement”—in which the United States would dominate “only” Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf—is hardly “selective” and can still draw the United States into numerous quagmires. For a critique, see Earl Ravenal, “‘Isolationism’ as the Denial of Interventionism,” *Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing* No. 57, April 27, 2000. <http://www.cato.org/pubs/ fpbriefs/fpb57.pdf>.
14. For a critique of neo-realist views and nuclear weaponry, see Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the “War on Terrorism,”* Chapter 4.
15. According to neoconservatives Kaplan and Kristol, “One of the virtues of preemptive action . . . is that it is often less costly than the alternative.” See Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, *The War Over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003). This dogmatic (and ahistorical) perspective has certainly not applied to the case of Iraq and would be very dubious for either Iran or North Korea!
16. Germany and Ukraine could both rapidly develop independent nuclear weapons if they so decided, as could Japan—yet such weapons would prove highly provocative.
17. “President Bush Attends Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention, Discusses War on Terror” (August 22, 2007), <http://www.whitehouse.gov>. In criticizing U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, as permitting the Communist repression of South Vietnam (as if the war itself dating from the United States, backed French intervention did not already cost between one and five million Vietnamese lives) and as ostensibly permitting the Khmer Rouge to come to power in Cambodia, President Bush attempted to justify U.S. intervention in Iraq by reference to U.S. military interventions against Japan, North Korea, and North Vietnam, as a means to promote democracy “to help make America safer” as opposed to helping make the world “safe for democracy” in Wilsonian terms, thus ostensibly attempting to emphasize U.S. national interest as opposed to altruism.
18. Michael Hirsh, “Iran Has a Message. Are We Listening?” *Washington Post* (July 1, 2007), B01.
19. For a neo-communitarian approach to the Iraq crisis involving “high devolution” (which should be tempered by the deployment of limited numbers of international peacekeepers as a buffer between conflicting communities), see Amitai Etzioni, “Plan Z” <http://www.gwu.edu/%257Eccps/documents/1035PlanZ.doc>. See also Amitai Etzioni, *Security First*. In addition, see National Intelligence Estimate, “Prospects for Iraq’s Stability” (August 2007). The latter argues “that the emergence of ‘bottom-up’ security initiatives, principally among Sunni Arabs and focused on combating al-Qaida in Iraq, represent the best prospect for improved security over the next six to 12 months” but that “these initiatives will only translate into widespread political accommodation and enduring stability if the Iraqi Government accepts and supports them.” Such “bottom-up initiatives” if not fully exploited by the Iraqi Government, “could over time also shift greater power to the regions, undermine efforts to impose central authority, and reinvigorate armed opposition to the Baghdad government.” The main problem then is to find a way to balance regional and communal interests with those of the national government, while concurrently providing security against extremists, such as al-Qaida in Iraq and Jaysh al-Mahdi, among others. This would require a buildup of Iraqi national capabilities, which may or may not be strengthened as the United States threatens to withdraw. The problem is that the United States will not be able to wait forever as new and resurgent threats, coupled with more traditional geopolitical pressures from Russia, China, and other states, appear on the horizon.

# Bibliography

## Books

- Adebajo, Adekeye, and Ismail Rashid. *West Africa's Security Challenges*. Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2004.
- Adler, Emmanuel, and Michael Barnett, eds. *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Alex J. Bellamy, *Security Communities and their Neighbors* (New York: Palgrave, 2004).
- Alexander, Yonah, and Michel S. Swetnam, *Usama bin Laden's al Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network*. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2001.
- Allison, Graham T., Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1985.
- Arquilla, John, and Don Ronfeldt. *In Athena's Camp*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997.
- Art, Robert J. *A Grand Strategy for America*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.
- Bellamy, Alex J. *Security Communities and their Neighbors*. New York: Palgrave, 2004.
- Bello, Walden. *Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire*. London: ZED Books, 2005.
- Blank, Stephen. *The NATO-Russia Partnership: A Marriage of Convenience or a Troubled Partnership?* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005.
- Brians, Paul. *Nuclear Holocausts: Atomic War in Fiction*. Pullman, Washington: Washington State University, 2003; 2007.
- Bull, Hedley. *The Anarchical Society*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
- Carpenter, Ted Galen, and Barbara Conry, eds. *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality*. Washington, DC.: Cato Institute, 1998.
- Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. *Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004.
- . *Grasping The Nettle*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005.
- Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
- Deutsch, Karl. *Political Community: North-Atlantic Area*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1957.
- Duffield, Mark. *Global Governance and the New Wars*. London: Zed Books, 2001.
- Etzioni, Amitai. *Security First*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Long Peace*. New York: Oxford, 1987.
- Gardner, Hall. *American Global Strategy and the "War on Terrorism"*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005; revised 2007.



- . *Dangerous Crossroads*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.
- . *NATO and the EU: New World, New Europe, New Threats*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004.
- Grachev, Andrei S. *Histoire Vraie de la Fin de l'URSS*. Paris: Editions du Rocher, 1992.
- Guo, Sujian, ed. *China's "Peaceful Rise" in the 21st Century*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006.
- Hayden, Patrick, Tom Lansford, and Robert P. Watson, eds. *America's War on Terror*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.
- Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
- Hogan, M. J., ed. *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Howard, Lawrence, ed. *Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992.
- Howard, Russell D., and Reid L. Sawyer, eds. *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism*. Gilford: McGraw Hill, 2003.
- Hunter, Robert E., and Seth G. Jones. *Building a Successful Palestinian State*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006.
- Huntington, Samuel. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Touchstone, 1997.
- Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Johnson, Chalmers. *Blowback*. London: Little Brown, 2000.
- . *The Sorrows of Empire*. New York: Henry Holt, 2004.
- Kahn, Herman. *Thinking About the Unthinkable*. Kahn: Horizon Press, 1962.
- Kegley, Charles W., ed. *The New Global Terrorism*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003.
- Kissinger, Henry. *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. New York: Harper, 1957.
- Lott, Anthony. *Creating Insecurity: Realism, Constructivism and US Security Policy*. Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004.
- Mann, James. *Rise of the Vulcans*. New York: Viking, 2004.
- Mitchell, Paul T. *Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of U.S. Military Primacy*. Adelphi Paper No. 385. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006.
- Norton, Anne. *Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2005.
- Piscatori, James P. *Islam in a World of Nation-States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Schelling, Thomas C. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960; 1980.
- Simon, Jeffrey. *Black Sea Regional Security Cooperation: Building Bridges and Barriers*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Black Sea Security Program Publications, 2006.
- Suskind, Ron. *The One Percent Solution: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.
- Tangredi, Sam J. *Globalization and Maritime Power*. National Defense University, 2002.
- Tellis, Ashley J., C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby. *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2002.
- Thompson, William R. *On Global War*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988.
- Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

- Weitz, Richard. *Revitalizing US-Russian Security Cooperation* London: Adelphi Papers, 2005.
- Wilkinson, Paul. *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Wright, Lawrence. *The Looming Tower*. New York: Knopf, 2007.

### Selected Articles

- Abedin, Mahan. "The Essence of Al Qaeda: An Interview with Saad al-Faqih." *Jamestown Foundation* 2, no. 2 (February 5, 2004).
- Asmus, Ronald D., and Bruce P. Jackson. "The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom." *Policy Review* 125 (June/July 2004).
- Betts, Richard. "The Osirak Fallacy." *The National Interest* (Spring 2006).
- Blank, Stephen. "The NATO-Russia Partnership: A Marriage of Convenience Or a Troubled Partnership?," Strategic Studies Institute, 2005. [http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB73\\_4.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB73_4.pdf).
- Baker, James A. III, and Lee H. Hamilton. *Iraq Study Group Report*. <http://www.usip.org/isg/>. See also updated "Statement by Co-Chairs of the Iraq Study Group before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate," January 30, 2007.
- Bordonaro, Federico. "US, Russia, Belarus: Politics of Democracy." <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=15914—28k>.
- Carpenter, Ted Galen. "Options for Dealing with North Korea." *Foreign Policy Briefing* 73. January 6, 2006. <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb73.pdf>.
- . "Yet Another Drug War Failure." August 13, 2004. [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=2783](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2783).
- Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. "New IRS Data Show Income Inequality is Again on the Rise." October 17, 2005. <http://www.cbpp.org/10-17-05inc.htm>.
- De Haas, Marcel. "Current Geostrategy in the South Caucasus." PINR (December 15, 2006).
- Estievenart, Georges. "Opium in and from Afghanistan," World Political Forum, October 27, 2006.
- Etzioni, Amitai. "Leveraging Islam." *The National Interest* 83 (Spring 2006).
- . "A Neo-Communitarian Approach to International Relations." *Human Rights Review* 7, no. 1 (July–September 2006).
- Freedman, Robert O. "Russia—A Partner for the US in the Post-Saddam era?" *Strategic Insights* 3, no. 4 (April 5, 2004).
- Friedberg, Aaron L. "The Future of U.S.-China Relations; Is Conflict Inevitable?" *International Security* (Fall 2005).
- "The Geneva Accord." Haaretz.com. <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?ItemNo=351461>.
- Friedman, Milton. "Interview with Milton Friedman on the Drug War." <http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Misc/friedm1.htm>.
- Grachev, Andrei S. "La Russie à la recherche d'une politique étrangère," *Relations internationales: les Etudes de la Documentation Française La Russie 1995–1996* (Paris: la Documentation Française, 1996)
- Hanson, Gordon H. "Why Does Immigration Divide America? Public Finance and Political Opposition to Open Borders." The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, Working Paper No. 129 (December 2005).
- Hartwig, Robert P. "The Cost of Terrorism: How Much Can We Afford?" [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=3700&page=2](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3700&page=2).
- Herz, John H. "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 2 (January 1950).

- Huntington, Samuel. "The Hispanic Challenge," *Foreign Policy* (March/April 2004).
- Kagan, Frederick, and Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.). "Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq." American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 2006. [http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic\\_semper\\_tyrannis/files/200612141\\_choosingvictory6.pdf](http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/files/200612141_choosingvictory6.pdf).
- Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Moment." *Foreign Affairs: America and the World* (1990/91).
- . "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," *The National Interest* (Winter 2002/2003).
- Leiken Robert S., and Steven Brooke. "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood." *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 2, (2007).
- Luft, Gal, and Anne Korin. "Terror's Next Target." *Journal of International Security Affairs* (December 2003).
- Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen Walt. "The Israeli Lobby and US Foreign Policy." Working Paper Number RWP06-011 (2006). <http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011>.
- Minchev, Ognyan. "Major Interests and Strategies for the Black Sea Region." *Framework Analytical Review* (September 2006).
- Mitchell, Paul T. "Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of U.S. Military Primacy." *Adelphi Paper* No. 385. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006.
- National Intelligence Council (NIC) Project 2020. [http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC\\_2020\\_project.html](http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_project.html).
- Ochmann, Cornelius. "Polish-Russian Relations in the Context of the EU's New Eastern Policy." *Russian Analytical Digest* 15 (February 20, 2007). <http://se2.isn.ch/service/engine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=C68F7FA1-F640-A2CF-DA36-42E321D7EF5A&lng=en>.
- O'Hanlon, Michael E. "A 'Master Plan' to Deal with North Korea." Brookings Policy Brief No. 114 (January 2003). <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb114.htm>.
- Page, John. "Are the Millennium Development Goals Bad for Growth?" World Economic Forum on Africa 2006 (January 6, 2006).
- Robinson, Colin, and Rear Adm. (Ret.) Stephen H. Baker. "Stand-off with North Korea: War Scenarios and Consequences." Center for Defense Information (June 26, 2003).
- Rodríguez, Francisco. "Why Chávez Wins," *Foreign Policy*. [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=3685](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3685).
- Rummel, R.J. "20th Century Democide" (May, 1998). <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/POSTWWII.HTM>.
- Rumer, Eugene B., and Jeffrey Simon. "Toward a Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region." Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 3. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, April 2006. [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional\\_Papers/OCP3.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional_Papers/OCP3.pdf).
- Shen, Dingli. "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Test China's Wisdom." *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006).
- Sherr, James. "Ukraine: The Pursuit of Defence Reform in an Unfavourable Context." Conflict Studies Research Centre Central & Eastern Europe Series 04/08 (June 2004).
- . "Ukraine: Prospects and Risks." Conflict Studies Research Centre Central & Eastern Europe Series Research Centre O6/52 (October 2006).
- Stock, Margaret D. Immigration Policy in Focus 5, No. 9, November 2006. [http://www.aifl.org/ipc/infocus/infocus\\_11206.pdf](http://www.aifl.org/ipc/infocus/infocus_11206.pdf).
- Strum, Philippa and Andrew Selee. "The Hispanic Challenge? What We Know About Latino Immigration." Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (March 29, 2004). <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/HispChall.pdf>.

- Takeda, Yoshinori. "Putin's Foreign Policy toward North Korea." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (March 3, 2006).
- Tomberg, Igor. "Geopolitics of Pipeline Communication Systems in Eurasia." *World Affairs* 10, no. 1 (2006).
- Wasem, Ruth Ellen. "Central American Asylum Seekers: Impact of 1996 Immigration Law," Congressional Research Center (Updated November 21, 1997).
- Wortzel, Larry M. "China's Nuclear Forces." Strategic Studies Institute (May 2007)
- Zeihan, Peter. "Post-Turkmenbashi: Gaming the Five 'Stans,'" Geopolitical Intelligence Report (December 26, 2006).

### Web Sites

- American Enterprise Institute: <http://www.aei.org/>.
- American-Israel Public Affairs Committee: <http://www.aipac.org/>.
- America-Russia.net: <http://www.americarussia.net/>.
- Arms Control Today: <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/>.
- Asian Times: <http://www.atimes.com/>.
- Bloomberg: <http://www.bloomberg.com/>.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies: <http://www.csis.org/>.
- CIAO: Colombia International Affairs Online: <http://www.ciao.org/>.
- Cicero Foundation: <http://www.cicerofoundation.org/>.
- Communitarian Network: <http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/index.html>.
- Congressional Research Service Reports and Issue Briefs: <http://fpc.state.gov/c4763.htm>.
- Connections PfP consortium: [http://www.pfpconsortium.org/info-pages/pubs\\_en.htm](http://www.pfpconsortium.org/info-pages/pubs_en.htm).
- Council on Foreign Relations: <http://www.cfr.org/>.
- Crisis Group: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/>.
- Democracy Now: <http://www.democracynow.org/>.
- Defense Link: <http://www.defenselink.mil/>.
- Der Spiegel: <http://www.spiegel.de/>.
- Economist: <http://www.economist.com/>.
- Earth Policy Institute: <http://www.earth-policy.org/>.
- European Union Institute for Security Studies: <http://www.iss-eu.org/>.
- Federation of American Scientists: <http://www.fas.org/>.
- Financial Times: <http://www.ft.com/>.
- Foreign Affairs*: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/>.
- Foreign Policy*: <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/>.
- Foreign Policy in Focus: <http://www.fpif.org/>.
- Global Security: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/>.
- Guardian*: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/>.
- Haaretz: <http://www.haaretz.com/>.
- Heritage Foundation: <http://www.heritage.org/>.
- Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/>.
- Human Security Report: <http://www.humansecurityreport.info/>.
- Inter-American Development Bank: <http://www.iadb.org/>.
- International Atomic Energy Agency: <http://www.iaea.org/>.
- International Herald Tribune*: <http://www.iht.com/>.
- International Security Network: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/>.
- Jamestown Foundation: <http://www.jamestown.org/>.
- Juan Cole, Informed Comment: <http://www.juancole.com/>.
- Jubilee Iraq News*: <http://www.jubileeraq.org/>.

- Middle East Research Information Project (MERIP): <http://www.merip.org/>.  
Middle East Media Research Institute: <http://www.memri.org/>.  
MidEastWeb: <http://www.mideastweb.org/>.  
*Moscow Times*: <http://www.moscowtimes.ru/>.  
National Intelligence Council: [http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC\\_2020\\_project.html](http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_2020_project.html).  
National Interest: <http://www.nationalinterest.org/>.  
Newsmax: <http://www.newsmax.com/>.  
Nthposition Online: <http://www.nthposition.com/>.  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: <http://www.nato.int/>.  
NATO Parliamentary Assembly: <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?TAB=595>.  
Nuclear Information Project: <http://www.nukestrat.com/>.  
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI): <http://www.nti.org/>.  
Other News: <http://other-news.info/index.php>.  
*Power and Interest News Report*: <http://www.pinr.com/>.  
Project for a New American Century: <http://www.newamericancentury.org/>.  
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL): <http://www.rferl.org/>.  
Sens Public: <http://www.sens-public.org/>.  
Stratfor: <http://www.stratfor.com/>.  
Tomdispatch: <http://www.tomdispatch.com/>.  
Townhall: <http://www.townhall.com/>.  
Turkish Daily: <http://www.turkishdailynews.com/>.  
The National Security Archive: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/>.  
United Nations. <http://www.un.org/>.  
Untimely Thoughts: <http://www.untimely-thoughts.com/>.  
U.S. House of Representatives: <http://www.house.gov/>.  
U.S. Senate: <http://www.senate.gov/>.  
U.S. State Department: <http://www.state.gov/>.  
Wall Street Journal On Line: <http://online.wsj.com/>.  
Washington Post: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/>.  
Washington Times: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/>.  
White House: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/>.  
World Bank: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/>.  
World Trade Organization: <http://www.wto.org/>.  
World Watch Institute: <http://www.worldwatch.org/features/security/briefs>.

# Index

- Abbas, Mahmoud, 103–9  
Abdullah, Saudi Crown Prince, 103  
Abdullah II, King of Jordan, 110  
Abkhazia, 55–56, 58–60  
Adonis, 111  
Afghanistan, 117–19, 122–27, 129, 131, 134; NATO role in, 123–26  
Africa, regional organizations. *See* African Union (AU)  
African National Congress, 27–28, 121–23  
African Union (AU), 134, 138, 221  
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 17, 76, 85, 86, 90, 93, 96, 189  
Aid for Trade initiative, 206  
AIDS, 49, 131, 137  
Al-Aqsa Mosque, 102, 108, 113  
al-Assad, Bashar, 113, 244  
Albania(ns), 39, 53, 58, 60  
Albright, Madeline, 88  
Algeria, 24, 28, 87, 119–20, 132–33, 137–38  
al-Hakim, Abdul Aziz, 24  
*Al-Jazeera*, 33, 182, 235  
Allawi, Ayad, 32, 246  
Allende, Salvatore, 180  
Alliot-Marie, Michele, 89  
al-Mahdi, Jayish, 24, 73, 75  
al-Majid, Ali Hassan, 26  
al-Maliki, Nuri Kamal, 25, 75, 76, 77, 246  
al-Muslimeen, Jamaat, 14  
al-Qaida, 4, 9, 14, 15, 19–20, 22–24, 26, 28–32, 66, 70, 73, 77, 88, 99, 105, 113, 115, 123, 124–28, 132–34, 148, 202, 211–12, 216, 220, 222, 228, 233–34, 260, 267–69  
al-Sadr, Moqtada, 24, 75  
al-Sama, Jund, 25  
al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 24, 33, 105, 133  
American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), 91–93  
Ansar al-Islam, 26, 131  
ANZUS pact, 174  
appeasement, 19, 92, 112, 142, 218, 254  
Arafat, Yasser, 102–5, 107, 109–10, 114, 123, 130  
Arbenz, Jacobo, 180  
Arctic claims, 213  
Argentina, 183–84, 186–89, 194, 202, 213, 222  
Armenia, 51, 55–56, 59, 127, 129, 225  
arms control treaties: collapse of arms control treaties, 45–46; Conventional Force in Europe treaty (CFE), 37, 42, 43, 46, 55, 224, 236, 240; INF Treaty, 42, 45, 46; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 46, 144, 146, 149–150, 155; Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), 37, 43, 45, 46  
arms sales, 4, 38, 87, 88, 168, 173, 174  
Azerbaijan, 51–59, 129, 225  
Bachelet, Alberto, 186  
Bachelet, Michelle, 186  
Baker, James, 39, 68, 74, 76, 80, 92, 95, 110, 112, 144–45, 244  
ballistic missile defense (BMD), 4, 8–11, 57, 59, 62, 80, 90, 99, 119, 151, 159, 161, 169, 175, 212, 220. *See also* national missile defense (NMD); theater missile defense (TMD)

- ballistic missiles, 40, 43, 45, 145, 148, 175–76, 212
- Balkans, 2, 6, 38, 54, 59, 224
- Baltic states, 4, 39; Baltic Nord Stream pipeline, 50–62, 150, 213; Russian red line, 44, 49
- Basayev, Shamil, 23, 233
- Basque Fatherland and Liberty *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)*, 15
- Bayh, Evan, 93
- Belarus, 2, 47–48, 50–52, 55, 59, 127, 129, 150, 151, 184, 213, 219, 237
- Berezovsky, Boris, 62, 241–42
- Biden, Joseph, 75, 81, 245
- bin Laden, Osama, 21, 29, 30, 88, 105, 117, 123, 124, 128, 234, 260
- black market activities, 2, 59, 90, 124, 125; link to terrorism, 142–43, 155, 158, 161, 189, 190
- Black Sea, 47–61, 64, 130, 213; Baltic-Black Sea alliance, 46, 62, 213; Black Sea regional security community, 63, 222
- Blair, Tony, 33, 101, 170, 235
- Bolivarian vision, 7, 8, 11, 180, 184–87, 191–92, 222
- Bolivia, 184–92, 222
- Bosch, Hieronymous, 12, 36
- Brazil, 136, 167, 172, 181, 183, 185–94, 219, 222, 255
- brinkmanship, post-cold war, 1, 56, 77, 79, 95
- Brownback, Sam, 67
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 38, 69, 77, 87, 236, 254
- Bulgaria, 38–62, 119, 224
- Bush, George W., 5, 14, 20, 32, 38, 65–71, 79, 81, 102, 117, 124, 148–49, 166, 177, 198–99, 200, 203, 210
- Calderón, Filipe, 186
- capital flight, 86, 135
- Carter, Jimmy, 87, 102, 107, 121, 123, 146, 163, 181, 243
- Caspian Sea, 54–59, 63–64, 89, 118–20, 128, 130, 171
- Castro, Fidel, 179
- Castro, Raúl, 186, 189, 205
- Caucasus, 9, 41–42, 52–59, 117–19, 127–28, 210–13, 224, 226, 268; frozen conflicts, 6, 46, 55, 57, 63, 213
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 31, 109, 123, 148, 180, 192, 236
- Chávez, Hugo, 7, 179–94, 207
- Chen Shui-bian, 160, 175, 176
- Cheney, Dick, 9, 34, 68, 88, 144, 154, 231, 236, 244
- Chevron-Texaco, 134, 136, 183, 263
- Chiang Kai-Chek, 163
- Chile, 180, 186–87, 189
- China, 4, 7, 80, 83, 89, 94, 98, 99, 107, 118–22, 126–30, 133–34, 136, 183–87, 195, 211–14, 226; BMD, 175; currency, 166–68; energy demand, 164–72; North Korea, 144–46, 154–58; People's Liberation Army, 165, 168; Russia, 167–70; Socialist Spiritual Civilization, 2, 164–65; Taiwan, 160–62, 174–77; Tiananmen, 2, 145, 163–64, 167; Taiwanese independence, 173; Tiananmen Square, 2, 10, 145, 163–67, 260; Wal-Mart unionization, 166; White Paper, 165
- Chirac, Jacques, 16, 92
- clash of civilizations, critique, 165
- Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 93, 246
- Clinton, William Jefferson, 2, 38, 59–61, 88, 102, 132, 142–45, 148, 170, 174, 210, 216, 236, 260, 265
- CNN, 32, 182
- Collective Security Treaty Organization, 59, 127, 129, 224
- Colombia, 7, 30, 186–87, 189–92, 194, 202, 222
- Commonwealth of Independent States, 44, 46, 47
- Communitarian(ism), 23, 138
- Community of Democracies, 47
- Community of Democratic Choice, 47
- confederation (confederal), 7, 10–12, 60, 78, 104, 110–11, 114–16, 138, 143, 153, 159, 161, 180, 221, 224, 225, 228
- Congo, 121, 133, 134, 135, 137, 199, 223
- Correa, Rafael, 186, 191
- cost-benefit analysis, 31, 185; peace and security-oriented, 218
- Crocker, Ryan, 75
- Cuba, 31, 151, 179, 181–95, 205, 222
- Dagestan, 55, 128
- DeLay, Tom, 66
- democratization, 48, 102–3, 180
- Denmark, 21, 232

- Department of Homeland Security, 200–11, 266
- Deutsche Volksunion*, 16
- development (socioeconomic), 11, 14, 51, 63, 66, 106, 124, 132–39, 145, 164, 166, 184, 192–94, 205–6, 218, 223
- Die Deutsche Volksunion, 16
- Die Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, 16
- Die Republikaner*, 16
- Dole, Bob, 67
- drugs, legalization, 125–27, 202, 218; marijuana, 192, 264; opium, 124–25, 191, 222, 254; war on, 189–93, 222
- Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 124, 190
- Ecuador, 120, 186–91, 202, 264
- Edwards, John, 93
- Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), 190
- el-Assal, Riah Abu, 111
- El-Baradei, Mohamed, 97, 250
- El Salvador, 196, 205, 265
- energy, alternatives 83; biofuel, 118, 136–37, 185; energy efficient technologies, 210, 219; ethanol, 137, 167, 185–86, 194; geothermal, 84, 219; hybrid, 215; hydrogen, 82, 219; natural gas, 44, 47, 52–57, 89, 118–20, 128, 172, 187–88, 214, 223; nuclear enrichment/uranium, 80, 82–86, 89, 92, 94–97, 142, 151, 171, 180–82, 211; nuclear plants, fourth generation, 82, 85, 88–89, 167, 216; nuclear power, 51, 82–84, 90, 126, 155, 169, 176, 183–84, 214, 219, 248, 250; petroleum, 181–83, 210; solar, 84, 170, 219
- Estonia, 38, 44, 48–50, 213, 215
- European Union (EU), 3, 10, 16, 20, 36, 64; Central Asia, 129; China, 167–70; energy demand, 119; “enlargement fatigue,” 64; European Security and Defense, 40, 52, 60; Iran, 89–99; Israel-Palestine, 102–16; NATO “double enlargement,” 48–54; North Korea, 155; Russia, 51–54; Sudan, 133; troika, 96, 99; WTO, 188
- EU-NATO-Russia and Euro-Mediterranean Security Communities, 225–26
- Fatah, 20, 27, 102–14, 123, 130–31, 220, 225, 252–53
- Fox, Vicente, 186
- France, 2, 16, 21, 28, 46, 51, 59, 77, 81, 89, 92, 94, 98, 107, 132, 168
- Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 187, 188, 192, 222
- Friedman, Milton, 191, 264
- Friedman, Thomas, 61
- Gandhi, Mahatma, 20
- Gandhi, Rajiv, 19
- Gates, Robert M., 34, 40, 70, 72, 79, 144, 216, 235
- genetic genocide, 85
- Geneva Convention, 32, 34, 236
- Georgia, 3, 4, 9, 39, 41, 46–48, 51, 54–60, 118, 119, 127–28, 150, 168, 213, 224
- Georgia-Ukraine-(Uzbekistan)-Azerbaijan-Moldova alliance, 46
- Germany, 15, 16, 30, 34, 38, 41, 48–55, 77, 81, 89, 92, 94, 98, 147, 159, 223, 269
- gerrymandering (ethnic), 25–26
- Global Struggle Against Extremism (G-SAVE), 36
- Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 36
- global war scenario, 210–15
- Gorbachev, Mikhail, 39, 101, 121, 144–46, 219
- Gore, Al, 67
- Graham, Lindsey, 70
- Great Game of Go, 130, 171
- Greece, 48, 59, 240
- Gregg, Judd, 70
- Guatemala, 180, 194, 265
- Guinea, Gulf of, 120, 132–35, 223
- Gulf Cooperation Council, 81, 96, 221, 227
- Hagel, Chuck, 71, 197, 245
- Hamas, 10, 20, 23, 27, 28, 31, 92, 97–98, 102–15, 123, 130–31, 220, 225, 227
- Hamilton, Lee, 68, 74, 76, 95, 244
- Hariri, Rafik, 20, 93, 112–13, 253
- Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin, 27, 123–24
- Hill, Christopher, 154
- Hizb’allah, 20, 23, 27, 76, 77, 80, 88, 92, 97, 98, 111, 114, 227, 244
- Holocaust, 81, 92, 93
- Homeland Security Organization, 5, 215
- Hu Jintao, 167, 172
- Hussein, King of Jordan, 110
- Hussein, Saddam, 20, 25–26, 33, 65, 74, 87–88, 96, 101, 112, 117, 122, 130–31, 144, 180, 189, 210, 243



- hypertrophy. *See* overextension
- immigration. *See* migration
- Inácio, Luiz, 186
- income. *See* salary gap
- India, 2–3, 5–6, 83, 84, 89, 92, 120, 126–28, 142, 164, 168–73, 183–84, 188, 213–14, 219, 225
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 85, 96–98, 142, 145, 155, 161
- International Court of Justice, 53, 60
- International Criminal Court (ICC), 34
- Internet, 32, 44, 166; cyber-sabotage/warfare, 214–15
- Intifada, 23, 102, 113, 130, 252
- Iran: ballistic missiles, 212; holocaust polemics, 92–93; hostage crisis, 86–88; nuclear enrichment, 84–86; nuclear power, 82–84; revolutionary guards, 79, 80, 86, 91, 247
- Iran-Contra affair, 87, 99
- Iraq Study Group Report, 68, 71, 80, 91, 92, 112, 216
- Iraq War: Congressional benchmarks, 74–75; de-*Ba'athification*, 34, 74; Iraq Petroleum Law, 75; Kurds, 25–26, 57–59, 74; regime recognition and reform, 97, 237; Sunni-Shi'a conflict, 24–25; troop surge, 69–76, 79; Vietnam War analogy, 226–27
- Irgun, 27
- Irish Republican Army (IRA), 15, 27, 28
- irredentism, 4, 5, 15, 26, 44, 48, 49, 53, 59, 111, 125–26, 158–59, 165, 212
- Islam, 3, 9, 10, 14, 15–33, 89, 102–10, 117–37, 164, 171, 225
- Islam, Deobandi, 20, 22–32, 73–77, 79–98, 101, 117–31, 211, 220, 227
- Islamic Jihad, 23, 92, 104–5, 108
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 128
- Islamic Resistance (*Al-Mowqawama al-Islamiyya*), 27
- Islamic Salvation Front, 28
- Islamic *waqf*, 106, 113
- island disputes, 47, 53, 63, 95, 161, 168, 176, 213
- isolation, 9, 96, 97, 143, 147, 160, 220, 234
- isolationism, 7, 8, 11, 16, 31, 46, 78, 168, 180–81, 194, 201, 207, 215, 216, 218, 228–29
- Israel, 2, 10, 17, 35, 42–43, 66, 69, 76, 80–98, 123, 140; Golan, 41, 111–16; holocaust polemics, 92–93; Jerusalem, 101–15, 251; peacekeeping, 114–16, 218–27; separation wall/barrier, 105–6
- Jaafari, Ibrahim, 25
- Japan, 76, 81, 120, 129, 163, 165–68, 170–77; China, 172; Kurile Islands, 146, 169; NATO, 172; North Korea, 141, 155, 161, 212; BMD, 151, 161, 178; Self-Defense Force, 157, 169; Taiwan, 164. *See also* ballistic missile defense (BMD)
- Jewish Defense League, 15
- Jordan, 10, 23, 24, 39, 74, 82, 102, 110–16, 225
- Jospin, Lionel, 16
- Joz, Wadi, 113
- Jürgen Haider, 16
- Justice and Development Party (Turkey), 27
- Kaczynski, Jaroslaw, 52
- Kahane, Rabbi Meir, 15
- Kaliningrad, 42, 49, 214
- Karadzic, Radovan, 16
- Karzai, Hamid, 124–25
- Kasparov, Garry, 62
- Kasyanov, Mikhail, 62
- Kazakhstan, 2, 46, 58–59, 63, 89, 118–19, 127–31, 171–72, 213, 254
- Kennan, George, 37, 180, 226
- Khalilzad, Zalmay, 28
- Khamenei, Ayatollah, 86, 88, 248
- Khan, A. Q., 29, 171
- Khatami, Mohammad, 86, 88, 93
- Khomeini, Ayatollah, 86, 87, 94
- Kim, Il-Sung, 145
- Kim, Jung-Il, 143
- Kirchner, Néstor, 186, 188
- Kissinger, Henry, 99, 215
- Koppel, Ted, 86
- Korea, North: averting war, 160–62; February 2007 accords, 143, 157; Kaesong complex, 152–53, 257; Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism, 141, 143, 157; nuclear weapons program, 141–62; sanctions, 141–43, 149, 151–56; Ukrainian model for UN security guarantees, 156–57

- Korea, South, 10, 142–61, 170–76, 219;  
 Korean reunification, 156–58; Korea-  
 U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 153
- Kosovo, 3, 39, 52, 53, 60, 213, 224
- Kosovo Liberation Army, 27, 28
- Kucinich, Dennis J., 72, 246
- Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), 26, 74, 211
- Kurdistan Democratic Party, 26
- Kurdistan (Iraqi), 57, 211
- Kyl, Jon, 70
- Lebanon, 20, 23, 24, 29, 77, 80, 88, 97,  
 103, 110–14, 131, 137. *See also* Israel
- Le Pen, Jean Marie, 16
- Levant, 11, 63, 225
- Levin, Carl, 69–70, 74, 236, 245, 246
- Libya, 29, 34, 84, 118, 133, 145, 156, 171
- Lieberman, Joe, 68, 70, 71, 72, 243, 250
- Litvinenko, Alexander V., 241
- Los Zetas, 202
- Lukashenko, Alexander, 50–51
- Macedonia, 39, 53, 56, 58
- Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), 15, 202
- Massoud, General Ahmad Shah, 19
- Mazuz, Menachem, 113
- McCain, John, 34, 70, 72
- Mercusor, 187, 22
- Merkel, Angela, 41, 52
- Mexico, 6, 30, 118, 131, 179–206, 220, 222
- migration, 8–11, 15, 49, 63, 126, 132, 136,  
 166, 222, 225, 228; deportation, 200;  
 Earnings Suspense File, 195–96, 204;  
 Hispanic, 7, 193–207; Muslim, 21–22,  
 106, 133, 232; Secure Border  
 Initiative, 201, 266; U.S. VISIT, 200
- Moldova, 46–60, 127, 224
- Mongolia, 144, 147, 159, 168, 174, 213
- Montreux Convention, 57–58
- Morales, Evo, 186–89, 191
- Morocco, 24, 120, 133, 211
- Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 23, 28
- Moro National Liberation Front, 23, 28
- Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), 26, 130
- multilateralism, 89, 96, 141, 143, 152, 155,  
 157, 218, 222, 228; multilateral  
 dissuasion and persuasion, 2, 7, 9, 14,  
 27, 108, 116, 214
- multinational oil companies: Amerada Hess,  
 136; British Petroleum, 63, 119, 183;  
 Citgo, 181–82; Exxon, 183; Shell, 135
- Murtha, James, 75, 76
- Musharraf, Pervez, 125, 126
- Muslim Brotherhood, 21, 23, 24, 105, 110,  
 123, 131, 233
- Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), 27, 131
- Nasrallah, Sayyed Hassan, 20
- National Endowment for Democracy, 192
- National Intelligence Council, 135
- national missile defense (NMD), 37, 39–46,  
 173. *See also* ballistic missile defense  
 (BMD); theater missile defense (TMD)
- NATO, 3–10, 23, 27–28, 37–64, 66,  
 90–99, 113, 115–16, 118–25, 139,  
 147, 159, 168, 169, 174, 209–25
- Nelson, Bill, 69
- neoconservatives, 3, 5, 9, 32–34, 54, 65, 68,  
 71, 73, 86, 87, 88, 92, 112, 117, 149,  
 154, 189, 210, 216, 235, 241, 268–69
- Netanyahu, Benjamin, 104
- Nevzlin, Leonid, 61
- New Union Treaty, 51
- New Zealand, 172
- Nidal, Abu, 26, 130
- Nigeria, 5, 65, 83, 118, 120, 133–38, 172,  
 219
- Nitze, Paul, 37, 38, 45
- Nixon, Richard, 99, 163, 190, 243
- Niyazov, Saparmurat, 127
- Northern Ireland, 15, 219
- nuclear weaponry, 30, 54, 75, 80, 82,  
 84–97, 116, 125, 128, 139–142,  
 145–55, 165, 176, 212–15, 221, 223;  
 no first use of, 98; tactical, 44–46, 69,  
 145, 175, 214–15, 224
- Obama, Barack, 81
- Obrador, Andrés Manuel López, 186
- oil prices, 5, 39, 65, 83, 85, 89, 155, 172,  
 179–83, 185, 191
- Olmert, Ehud, 232, 235
- Omar, Mohammed, 109, 112
- Operation Active Endeavor (OAE), 57, 240
- Organization for Security and Cooperation  
 in Europe (OSCE), 63, 126, 221
- Organization of the Islamic Conference, 35
- Ossetia, 5, 60
- Ortega, Daniel, 186, 195
- overextension, 4, 11, 31, 38, 58, 66, 226
- overreaction, 3, 9, 29–31, 34, 35, 216

- Pakistan, 2, 20, 23, 26–29; North Korea-Pakistan nuclear-missile connection, 170–72, 211, 219, 229; nuclear weapons, 83, 84, 98–99, 118–30, 142, 145; Red Mosque, 126
- Palestine, 92, 116, 211, 226–27; Al-Aqsa, 113–14; Gaza, 10, 27, 88, 98, 102–15, 130, 225; Intifada, 23, 102, 113, 130; “land for peace” 103, 106, 110, 225; Mecca Accords, 108–9; West Bank, 102–15, 225, 252
- Patriotic Union of Turkey, 26
- peacekeeping, 38, 52, 56, 59, 63, 73, 89, 105, 114, 115, 116, 123, 127, 133–37, 218, 224–27, 234
- Pearl, Daniel, 29, 234
- Perle, Richard, 84
- Peru, 184, 187, 189–90, 222
- Petraeus, David, 70, 245
- pipelines (oil or gas), 30–32, 42–63, 118–20, 128–34, 147–50, 170–72, 187, 210–13, 264
- piracy, 120, 167
- Poland, 2, 38, 50–54, 91, 122, 164, 213, 237
- Politkovskaya, Anna, 241
- preclusion, 3, 19, 30, 38, 66, 84, 133, 159, 160, 176
- preemption, 2, 4, 9, 17, 19, 34, 43, 66, 83, 84, 91, 98, 128, 145, 149, 151, 157, 160, 161, 176, 209, 210–12, 215, 222, 227, 242, 255, 259, 269
- Proliferation Security Initiative, 151, 160
- Prophet Mohammed cartoons, 21
- Pushtuns, 23, 125
- Putin, Vladimir, 39, 41, 43, 50, 61, 82, 144, 147, 154, 169
- Qatar, 29, 35, 39, 80, 82, 90, 95, 107, 119, 182; Doha Debate, 234
- Quartet, 109–10
- Qutb, Sayyub, 23–24, 33, 233
- Rabin, Yitzak, 104
- Rangel, Charles, 72–73, 255
- Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, 21
- Reagan, Ronald, 51, 86, 87, 101, 121, 123, 216, 243–44
- regime change, 17, 46, 65, 88, 90, 91, 94, 97, 98, 142, 149, 154, 156, 158, 161, 213, 215–16, 218, 222, 233
- regime reform, 10, 97, 98, 142, 218, 227
- regional security communities, 2–6, 8–11, 46, 63, 81, 102, 114, 116, 136, 138–39, 143–56, 163, 207, 221–25; exclusive, 7, 169, 186, 218–19; inclusive, 7, 218, 219
- religion, 16, 25, 55; Christian (Catholic), 102, 121, 122, 184; Christian (Protestant), 15, 19, 20, 28, 31, 34, 35, 86, 92, 101, 106, 113, 122, 133, 216, 228, 232, 233, 253, 255; Christian conservative, 66–68, 86, 92, 216; Hindu, 232; Judaism, 15, 93, 101, 105, 232. *See also* Islam
- Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 189–91, 264
- Revolution in Military Affairs, 124, 157, 175, 215
- Rice, Condoleezza, 22, 34, 41, 68, 80, 81, 90, 98, 106, 109, 132, 152
- Road Map for Peace, 102–9
- Robertson, Pat, 182, 262
- Roh, Moo-hyun, 149, 153
- Roh, Tae Woo, 145
- Romania, 38–62, 119, 224, 239
- Rowhani, Hassan, 96
- Rumsfeld, Donald, 31, 34–36, 70, 87–88, 154, 174, 216, 251
- Russia, 2, 16, 42–45, 118–31; Balkans, 59–60; Baltic-Black Sea, 46–48, 54–55; Belarus-Poland-Russia, 50, 51; Chechnya, 61; China, 167–70; Eurasian alliance, 7, 53, 169; frozen conflicts, 55–57; German-Russian relations, 51–52; Iran, 95–98; Israel-Palestine, 102–16; Kurile Islands, 146, 169; North Korea, 146–51; oligarchs, 62. *See also* United States
- Rwanda, 31, 121, 132, 134, 138
- Saadat, Ahmed, 115
- Sadat, Anwar, 24, 123
- Salafist Group for Call and Combat, 132
- Salah, Sheikh Raed, 113
- Salah ad-Din, 73
- salary gap, 7, 67, 107, 120, 136, 170, 194, 231
- Saudi Arabia, 24, 28–30, 39, 66, 74, 76, 77, 80–95, 102–16, 117, 131, 145, 172, 180, 212–13, 220, 227, 251
- Saygun, Ergin, 74

- Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), 119  
 security dilemma, 232  
 security-insecurity dialectic, 9–10, 17–18,  
 45, 93, 143, 160, 173, 176, 212, 232
- Serbia, 39, 53–60
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 89,  
 126
- Shari'a law, 23, 28, 132
- Sharon, Ariel, 102, 104, 109
- Simões, Antonio, 186
- South Africa, 28, 80, 94; nuclear program,  
 121, 136–38, 185, 219
- Soviet Union, 2, 23, 31, 94, 121–22, 144,  
 147, 176, 179, 209
- Specter, Arlen, 69, 112, 198
- strategic leveraging, 18, 49, 118
- Strauss, Leo, 233
- subsidies: agricultural, 136, 177, 187, 188,  
 193, 194, 206, 221, 263; currency,  
 164–65, 263; drugs, 191; ethanol, 185;  
 gas and oil, 47, 51, 83, 85, 90, 144,  
 185; industry, 263
- Sudan, Darfur, 133–36, 190, 234, 255  
 swarming, 80, 91, 213
- Syria, 20, 26, 41, 61, 76, 80, 93, 103–16,  
 145, 211–12, 227–28, 244
- Taiwan: arms sales, 174–76; confederation,  
 143, 159, 160–62, 177; independence,  
 156, 214; unification by force, 2, 4, 6,  
 146, 214. *See also* Ballistic Missile  
 Defense (BMD)
- Tajikistan, 59, 63, 89, 119, 127–30, 172
- Talabani, Jalal, 28, 243
- Taliban, 4, 6, 19, 23, 88, 96, 123–31,  
 222–27
- Tamil Tigers, 15, 20, 128
- terrorism, 13, 18, 21–27, 29, 36;  
 assassination, 19, 20, 22, 30, 93, 104,  
 105, 123, 211, 253; counter-terrorism,  
 14–17, 31, 33, 98, 132, 240;  
 Manchurian incident and Japan, 31;  
 political-economic impact, 30–32;  
 state-supported, 15, 19, 20, 28, 31,  
 34–35; Reichstag and Nazi Germany,  
 31
- theater missile defense (TMD), 40–42, 46,  
 161, 169, 173–76, 220. *See also*  
 ballistic missile defense (BMD);  
 national missile defense (NMD)
- torture, 13, 31–36, 227; Guantánamo Bay,  
 31
- Transdnier, 55, 63
- Trinidad and Tobago, 14
- Turkey, 21, 26, 28, 41, 47–63, 74, 77, 79,  
 82, 94, 102, 107, 113, 125, 128, 171,  
 211, 214, 224–25, 227; Ottoman  
 Empire, 2, 23, 118, 122
- Turkmenistan, 63, 119, 126, 130, 172
- Ukraine, 2–4, 127, 150, 156, 168, 213–14,  
 219, 223, 242, 268; Black Sea, 54–55;  
 NATO, 39–44; Sea of Azov dispute,  
 47; UN security guarantees, 46–48
- ul-Haq, Muhammed Zia, 123
- United Kingdom, 2, 27, 28, 35, 39, 41, 46,  
 51, 54, 66, 76, 81, 89, 94, 98, 99, 101,  
 157, 211, 220, 223, 241–42
- United Nations (UN) Security Council, 2,  
 46–47, 60, 76, 80, 81, 86–97, 103,  
 128, 133–34, 149–52, 161, 217, 223,  
 245–46; UN Millennium Goals, 16,  
 136, 194
- United Self Defense Forces of Colombia  
 (AUC), 190
- United States: Africa Command,  
 AFRICOM, 131, 135; Central Asia,  
 relations with, 129; China, 11, 23,  
 164, 170–77, 218–19; double  
 standards, 3, 13, 32, 33, 61; energy  
 demand, 118; flip-flop policy, 56, 60,  
 229; honest broker, 34, 137, 217; Iran,  
 hostage crisis, 86–88; Israel-Palestine,  
 102–4; military bases (worldwide),  
 119–21; monocontainment, 5; NATO  
 enlargement, 42–45; North Korea,  
 148–58; regime change, 88, 90–92;  
 Russia, 2, 3, 7, 14, 16, 37–43, 45–46,  
 62–64; Senate, 66, 70–77; South  
 Korea, 151–56; strategic options  
 (terrorism), 26–30; Sudan, 133;  
 Taiwan, 161–75; war on drugs,  
 188–92, 222. *See also* Ballistic Missile  
 Defense (BMD); immigration; NATO;  
 Venezuela
- U.S.-European-Russian-Japanese  
 “diplomatic revolution,” 11, 177, 218
- U.S. global strategic options, 215–29
- U.S.-NATO-Japanese alliance, 7
- Uzbekistan, 4, 46, 47, 89, 119–29, 172, 238

- Van Gogh, Theo, 22  
 Vatican, 114, 121  
 Venezuela, 5–11, 30, 83, 118, 131, 172, 180, 207, 219, 222  
 Vieira de Mello, Sergio, 19  
 Virtual Negotiations, 29
- walls (barriers), 1, 10, 101–6, 199, 200, 203, 219–21
- Warner, John W., 69, 70, 71, 75
- war scenarios: Afghanistan, 123–27; Africa, 131–35; Black Sea/Caucasus/frozen conflicts, 57–58; Central Asia, 123–27; China-Taiwan-Japan-U.S.-ANZUS, 172–77; global terrorism, 17–20; India-Pakistan, 123–26; Iraq-Iran-U.S.-Gulf countries, 77, 79–82, 90–92; Latin America, 190–92; major power war, 210–17; North Korea, 147–48, 158–60
- Webb, Jim, 67–69, 82, 112, 231, 243  
 World Trade Center, 3, 30, 117, 129  
 World Trade Organization (WTO), 63, 166, 169, 206
- xenophobia, 15, 28, 123, 164
- Yassin, Sheikh Ahmed, 20, 105  
 Yeltsin, Boris, 60–62, 144
- Zahar, Mahmoud, 107  
 Zhirinovskiy, Vladimir, 16
- zones, of conflict, 2, 8, 10, 117, 130, 210; Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 152–53, 219, 219; exclusive economic (EEZ), 169, 146; Green Zone, 73, 76; nuclear free weapons zone, 98; widening zone of conflict, 19, 136