

APPENDIX A: INTRODUCTION

1. Outline of Documents' names

关于省、市、自治区党政机关机构改革若干问题的通知 Guanyu sheng, shi, zizhiqu, dangzhengjiguan gaige ruogan wenti de tongzhi) in December 1982;

(关于地市州党政机关改革若干问题的通知 guanyu di shi zhou dangzhengjiguan gaige ruogan wenti de tongzhi) in February 1983;

(关于县级党政机关改革若干问题的通知 guanyu xianji dangzhengjiguan gaige ruogan wenti de tongzhi), in December 1983;

(中共中央、国务院关于地方政府机构改革的意见 zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu defang zhengfu jigou gaige de yijian) in January 1991;

(党政机构改革的方案 dangzheng jigou gaige de fangan) and

(关于党政机构改革方案的实施意见 guanyu dangzheng jigou gaige fangan de shishi yijian) in July 1993;

(中共中央关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定 . Zhonggongzhongyang guanyu wanshan shehuizhuyi shichangjingjitizhi ruogan wenti de jue ding) in 2003.

To the specific content of document in 2003:

(合理划分中央和地方经济社会事务的管理权责 heli huafen zhongyang he difang jingji shehui shiwu de guanli quanze), (属于全国性和跨省(自治区、直辖市)的事务, 由中央管理, 以保证国家法制统一、政令统一和市场统一。属于面向本行政区域的地方性事务, 由地方管理, 以提高工作效率、降低管理成本、增强行政活力,

shuyu quanguoxing he kuasheng zizhiqu zhixiashi de shiwu, you zhongyang guanli, yi baozheng guojia fazhi tongyi, zhengling tongyi he shichang tongyi, shuyu mianxiang benxingzheng quyue de difangxing shiwu, you defang guanli, yi tigao gongzuo xiaolv, jiangdi guanli chengben, zengqiang xingzheng, huoli).

2. There are six general questions asked to the interviewees during the interview:
 - What do you think about the current relationship between China and North Korea? Are there any changes in contrast to the past (according to your individual experience and media report)?
 - What role does your organisation play in the economic cooperation between China and North Korea?
 - What type of official support do you know/you have already received from the government to the Chinese companies in North Korea? Which level of government?
 - Are there any difficulties that you have met/as you know Chinese companies have met in implementing economic activities in North Korea? Is the official support helpful to resolve these problems?
 - What factors have motivated your company/Chinese enterprises to develop their business in North Korea? Is there any direct connection between these factors and official support? In other words, apart from the increase of tax to the country, is there any other contribution that your company or Chinese enterprises in North Korea have made so that your or these economic activities are encouraged with official support?
 - At the macro level, such as the Sino-DPRK general relationship and the North Korean nuclear problems, what types of potential and indirect impacts that Chinese economic activities in North Korea could or have already created?

APPENDIX B: CHINA'S ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTH KOREAN MINERAL RESOURCE SECTOR

1. This cross-Yalu River oil pipeline started from Jin-Shan bay Oil Store and arrived at North Korea Sinuiju Oil Store. Its length is 30.3 kilometres.
2. In 2006, Shandong province planned to integrate seven big local state-owned coal companies into one Shandong Energy Corporation. These seven companies are Yunzhou Mineral Corp, Zibo Mineral Corp, Zaozhuang Mineral Corp, Xinwen Mineral Corp, Feicheng Mineral Corp, Longkou Mineral Corp, and Linyi Mineral Corp. The Shandong Energy Corp is planned to be founded on 18 December 2010 as the third-largest coal company in China with an expected output of coal over 100 million tons. However, this integration plan was never agreed on by all the seven companies. Although two smaller companies, Feicheng Mineral Corp and Longkou Mineral Corp, agreed on the integration plan, Xinwen Mineral Corp, Zao Zhuang Mineral Corp, and Linyi Mineral Corp maintained neutrality. However, the most powerful one, Yunzhou Mineral Corp, refused to be a listed company in the stock market with complicated stock rights. Another powerful company, Zibo Mineral Corp, also rejected the plan of integration because it did not want to lose financial control and be balanced in the new Corp. Even after the foundation of Shandong Energy Corp was achieved on 23 March 2011 with the absence of Yunzhou Mineral Corp, it still required times to neaten domestic orders (Ding, 2011).

3. China's rare earth export quota had a significant reduction in 2010. The export quota of rare earth in 2009 was 50,145.1 tons. In 2010, the quota reduced almost 40 per cent and dropped to 30,259 tons. Since then, China's rare earth export quota always stayed at around 30,000 tons until formal cancellation in 2015.
4. China meets the serious challenge of rare earth loss through smuggling. Smuggling rare earth from China to the foreign countries started from 2006 and rapidly increased every year. From 2008 to 2011, the captured amount of smuggled rare earth reached 16,000 tons. In 2009, the smuggled rare earth reached 20,000 tons, as many as 40 per cent of the 50,000 normal export rare earth. It had a 10 per cent increase of smuggling amount in contrast to the amount of 2008. In 2012, the amount of smuggled rare earth in the largest historical case reached 12,000 tons (China Rare-Earth Association, 2013: 5–6). Although China reduced the rare earth quota from 50,000 tons in 2009 to 30,000 tons in 2010, the smuggled amount of rare earth still supplied the gap of quota (China Rare-Earth Association, 2012).
5. Australia and Brazil are the two major suppliers of iron ore to China and comprise over 80 per cent of China's import of iron ore. From 2003 to 2015, China's import of iron ore increased from 148 million tons to 952 million tons. The corresponding import amount from Australia increased from 21 million tons to 560 million tons (China Custom House, 2015: 25–30).
6. China has been the country with largest vehicle production in the world since 2009 by producing 13.79 million in 2009, 18.26 million in 2010, 18.41 million in 2011, 19.27 million in 2012, 22.11 million in 2013, 23.72 million in 2014, and 24.59 million in 2015 (China Vehicle Association, 2015).
7. These twenty-five programmes are the Jilin parts of the Haerbin-Dalian High-Speed Railway, Jilin-Tumen-Hunchun Custom Railway, Changchun-Tonghua Railway, Helong-Nanping Railway, Tonghua-Guanshui Railway, Songyuan-Taolaizhao Railway, Baicheng-Wulanhaote Railway, Changchun-Baicheng High-Speed Railway, Hunchun-Dongning Railway, Changchun-Changling-Baiyinshuo Energy transport line, Baihe-Dunhua-Dongjingcheng Railway, Songjianghe-Changbai Railway, Baishan Town-Quanyang Railway, Helong-Nanping Railway, Jingyu-Songjianghe Railway, Liaoyuan-Changchun Railway, Zhengjiatun-Manhanying Railway, Changshuangyan Railway, Baicheng-Jieji Second Railway, Baihe-Helong Railway, Baicheng-Zhenxi Railway, Tongliao-Siping Railway, Changchun-Xibayanhua Railway, and Jilin Railway West Round Line.

APPENDIX C: CHINA'S ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTH KOREAN FISHING INDUSTRY

1. North Korean coastal commercial firms are mainly controlled by the North Korean army. Thus, their fishing boats are usually adapted simply from small naval boats. The single-ship trawling skill is a historical, undeveloped fishing method where the fishing boats work alone with nets on one side of the boat. In contrast, the double-ship trawling technology is more advanced with higher requirement for facilities and human control of the fishing boats. It needs two fishing boats to cooperate together by using stronger facilities to attract fish (such as high-powered lights for attracting squid at night), keeping the same (or higher) speed to follow and catch up with fish groups, and finally holding larger nets to catch fish. The fishing catch from double-ship trawling could reach four to five times that of single-ship trawling.
2. The technology transfer, as well as the assistance in helping North Korean local partners to fish, was usually an extra and temporary option in the previous investment in fishing in North Korea in exchange for larger fishing areas. A similar option could also be catching some of the fish for North Korean fishing companies to fulfil their production quotas set by the central government in Pyongyang.
3. The ocean border between China and North Korea near the access to Yalu River is not always very clear. From the late 2000s, in the name of anti-illegal cross-border fishing activities, North Korean local military units were reported to attack and rob Chinese fishing

boats who had already bought fishing licences from the central government, or who, according to GPS facilities, have not actually crossed the ocean border.

4. Recorded by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (2009), the inter-Korea cooperation in the fishery sector started very early. As early as the 1970s there was inter-government discussion between Pyongyang and Seoul about fishery cooperation. In 1998, in order to resolve the problem of coastal seafood resource decline, the South Korean government planned to develop the marine territory of North Korea as an alternative fishing area; the South Korea Ocean Seafood Department and Research Institution cooperated with North Korea on seafood aquaculture, and research into Yellow Sea seafood resources and environmental research of the East Sea began. South Korea used technology transfer in exchange for the rights of shellfish aquaculture in Hwanghae and Pyongan, and salmon aquaculture in Namdaecheon. Following the summit of the Joint Declaration on the North and South, the discussion and negotiation of inter-Korea economic cooperation began. In 2000, except for the opening of the Kaesong Industrial Zone, North Korea decided to allow South Korean fishermen to enter 2 square kilometres of its east marine territory. South Korea also agreed to negotiate with North Korea on the issue of allowing North Korean fishing boats to enter the disputed sea area between North and South Korea. In 2005, the inter-Korea mutual fishing area in the west sea of the Korean Peninsula was decided in the first meeting of the Inter-Korea Fishery Co-operation Working Conference and an agreement was reached on the further discussion as to specific details, such as the fishing period and number of fishing boats and equipment allowed. In 2007, an inter-Korea agreement was signed allowing South Korean boats to enter North Korean designated marine territory, payment in kind, and the potential construction of mutual fishing areas in the East Sea of the Korean Peninsula.
5. Red tide is a natural disaster occurring with a rapid increase of algae in the river and ocean. It is usually caused by water eutrophication as a direct result of the increase in human pollution. Red tide could cause the mass mortality of fish and other small living creatures in the water.

6. The eleven major types of seafood production in Bohai Sea are prawns, small yellow fish, big yellow fish, jellyfish, crab, shrimp, megrim, mackerel, squid, codfish, and ribbon fish. Five types which have maintained original output are prawns, megrims, crabs, jellyfish, and squid.
7. North Korea is an underdeveloped country in terms of fishery technology. According to Li (2004: 23–35), due to the lack of advanced fishing technology, in the early 2000s, North Korea only effectively developed half of its ocean territory, which included almost 10 per cent sea area under the DPRK-Japanese agreement for Japanese fishing and Inter-Korea agreement for South Korean fishing in North Korea. Jin (2009: 9–10) states that compared to the Bohai Sea and parts of the Yellow Sea near China, the ocean near North Korea is very clean, compared to the general level of 3.5 (heavily polluted) of the Bohai Sea environment, and level 3 (medium polluted) of the Yellow Sea environment near China, most of the North Korean sea environment achieves level 1 of the international standard for a clean natural environment.

APPENDIX D: CHINESE CROSS-BORDER ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN NORTH KOREA

1. This agreement is the predecessor to the mutual management agreement. The framework formally constructs bilateral cooperation and establishes communication: bilateral meetings are to be held every half year for the exchange of ideas in solving problems; the two sides will create interaction between offices and departments, form corresponding working groups of cooperative areas, and hold relevant meetings of working groups to conduct research on effective strategies for pushing forward bilateral cooperation in order to promote mutual development (Hunchun.gov.cn, 2010; Xinhuanet, 2010).
2. The major Chinese representatives were Chen Weigen, vice-head of Jilin province and a member of the standing committee of the Jilin Chinese Communist Party; Zhang An-shun, secretary of the Yanbian Chinese Communist Party and a member of the standing committee of the Jilin Chinese Communist Party; Zhao Zhenghao, chairman of the North Korea Rason People's Committee; Choi Kuang-nam, vice-chairman of the North Korea Rason People's Committee; and a few other important local officials from Yanbian.
3. 'Road-Harbor-District Integration Project' has three major parts: road, harbour, and district.

The 'Road' includes two parts: railway and highway. The highway means the 48.75 kilometres' road from North Korea Yuanting to Rajin port. The railways are the perspective 218.80 kilometres'

railway lay in the eastern part of Northeast China from Dongning of Heilongjiang province to Hunchun in Jilin, and the 50 kilometres' special railway from Rajin Harbor to Hunchun Quanhe port which targets to unblock the Rajin Harbor by fast removal of products.

The 'Harbor' comprises three parts: firstly, the existing No. 1–No. 3 port in the Rajin Harbor will be reconstructed; secondly, several new ports will be constructed under the current foundation; thirdly, the custom and products transportation line will be opened from Rajin port to southeast China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia.

The 'District' means the construction of two big economic zones in Rason area. The first one is the Rajin China Investment and Cooperation District. This district, which is located at Kuan-Gu-dong between Rajin and Xianfeng, with 1.3 square kilometres, will develop the export processing and business service in the future. The other one is the investment, construction, and management of the Harbor neighbouring bonded logistic area. This district is located close to Rajin Harbor with 3.7 square kilometres. As early as March 2006, the local national development and reform commission of Jilin province has formally permitted the project of enlarging the highway between Rajin and Yuanting under the standard of China secondary road.

The project started after the licences of opening and operation of a few projects, which include 'the construction and operation of Rajin Harbor', 'the construction and operation of the railway from Rajin Harbor to Hunchun', and 'Developing mineral mountains have been formally permitted and added into the Sino-North Korea 'Road-Harbor-District Integration project' by the top decision-maker of North Korea. The Rason China Investment and Cooperation District has been put into the plan of Overseas China economic and trade cooperation region by the Department of Commerce.

4. In stage I China invested 3 billion RMB in order to form the transport channel of the Tumen River to significantly improve bilateral trade between China and North Korea. The major cost of China's investment will be used in three parts: 0.3 billion RMB for the enlargement of the road from Rajin Harbor to Yuanting port; 1.2 billion RMB for the construction of a railway from Dongning, in Heilongjiang, to Hunchun, in Jilin; 1.13 billion RMB for the

reconstruction of a third port and construction of a new fourth port in Rajin Harbor.

5. It is expected that fifty-one sunshine greenhouses will be built in Rason. In the first three months, seven greenhouses have been built with an investment of 650,000 RMB.
6. One modern chicken farm with 20,000 layers was first built in 2011; this has now increased to a total of 80,000 chickens (30,000 layers and 50,000 broilers).
7. The pig farm was constructed but failed to continue due to environmental problems and difficulties in the selection of a new location.
8. The change of relationship between Cameron's UK government and Beijing can be seen as a suitable case. Cameron's government had a very beneficial beginning for Sino-British relationships in trade and business: in 2010, Cameron visited China and returned with a 3 billion GBP cooperation programme and twelve signed agreements (Xinhuanet, 2010). However, the relationship between China and the UK declined heavily because of Cameron's meeting with the Dalai Lama in May 2012. China punished the UK by stopping the dialogue at the ministerial level with the UK for almost one year. However, after the announcement by Cameron recognising Tibet as a part of China, the relationship between China and the UK in late 2013 normalised with the second official visit of Cameron, which gained 4.5 billion GBP in cooperation programmes and ten signed agreements (Xinhuanet, 2013).
9. The case is the foundation of a new UNHRC (United Nation Human Rights Council) in 2006 to replace the previous UNHRC (United Nation Human Rights Committee). Since 2006, China has successfully been elected three times as a member country of the UNHRC: the first term of office is 2007–2009, the second one is 2010–2012, and the third one is 2014 to 2016 (UNHRC, 2013). The only reason for China's absence in 2013 is that UNHRC rules state that countries can only have one reappointment to UNHRC membership and the new term of office as member must start one year after the end of two previous terms of office. Thus, at the international level, in contrast to the huge leverage of economic power, the human rights issue is no longer an effective tool for increasing pressure on Beijing.
10. Shenyang Consulate Incident.

On 8 May 2002, five North escapees attempted to seek political asylum in the Japanese Consulate in Shenyang. They tried to rush into the Consulate. Three of them were blocked by Chinese Security Guards violently but the other two still successfully entered the Consulate. After negotiating with Japanese staff, Chinese policemen took all the five North escapees away from the Consulate. All these five North escapees were sent to Philippines first and then they arrived in Seoul on 22 May 2002.

11. Law of PRC on punishments in public order and security administration: 治安管理处罚法, Zhian Guanli Chufa Fa

Criminal Law 刑法

刑法第13条规定, 情节显著轻微, 危害不大的, 不认为是犯罪。如果符合以上规定, 就可以不采用刑罚, 而给予治安管理处罚即可.....Xingfa di 13 tiao guiding, qingjie xianzhu qingwei, weihai buda de, burenwei shifanzui ruguo fuhe yishang guiding, jiukeyi bu caiyong xingfa, er geiyu zhian guanli chufa jike.

(第三章:违反治安管理行为和处罚 Di san zhang: Weifan Zhian Guanli Xingwei he Chufa; Chap. 3: Weifan Zhian Guanli Xingwei he Chufa)

第十九条有下列扰乱公共秩序行为之一, 尚不够刑事处罚的, 处十五日以下拘留、二百元以下罚款或者警告:

(一)扰乱机关、团体、企业、事业单位的秩序, 致使工作、生产、营业、医疗、教学、科研不能正常进行, 尚未造成严重损失的;

Di 19 Tiao, you xialie raoluan gonggong zhixu xingwei zhiyi, shang bugou xingshi chufa de, chu 15ri yixia julu, 200yuan yixia fakuan huo jinggao:

Raoluan jiguan, tuanti, shiye danwei de zhixu, zhishi gongzuo, shengchan、yingye、yiliao、jiaoxue、keyan buneng zhengchang jinxing, shangwei zaocheng yanzhong sunshi de;

第二十二 条, 有下列侵犯他人人身权利行为之一, 尚不够刑事处罚的, 处十五日以下拘留、二百元以下罚款或者警告:

(一)殴打他人, 造成轻微伤害的;

(二)非法限制他人人身自由或者非法侵入他人住宅的;

Di 22 Tiao, you xialie raoluan gonggong zhixu xingwei zhiyi, shang bugou xingshi chufa de, chu 15ri yixia julu, 200yuan yixia fakuan huo jinggao:

(一)Ouda taren, zaocheng qingwei shanghai de;

(二) Feifa xianzhi taren rensheng ziyou huozhe feifa qinru taren zhuzhai;

第二十三条, 有下列侵犯公私财物行为之一, 尚不够刑事处罚的, 处十五日以下拘留或者警告, 可以单处或者并处二百元以下罚款:

(一)偷窃、骗取、抢夺少量公私财物的;

Di 23 Tiao, you xialie qingfan gongsi caiwu xingwei zhiyi, shang bugou xingshi chufa de, chu 15 ri yixia juliu huozhe jinggao, keyi danchu huo bingchu 200 yuan yixia fakuan:

(1) Touqie、pianqu、qiangduo shaoliang gongsi caiwu de;

12. Beijing's reply to Chang-Ji-Tu Initiative

(原则同意《中国图们江区域合作开发规划纲要—以长吉图为开发开放先区》(以下简称纲要), 请认真组织实施 吉林省长春市、吉林市部分区域和延边州(以下简称长吉图)是图们江区域的核心地区)

(Yuanze tongyi <<Zhongguo Tumenjiang quyu hezuo kaifa gui-hua gangyao—yi Chang-Ji-Tu wei kaifang kaifa xianqu>> (yixia jiancheng gangyao), qing renzhen shishi Jilin

sheng Changchun shi, Jilin shi bufen quyu he Yanbian zhou (yixia jiancheng Chang-Ji-Tu) shi Tumenjiang quyu de hexin diqu).

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