

## Author Biographies

**Stephen Gaukroger** is Professor of History of Philosophy and History of Science at the University of Sydney. His current research is centered on a long-term project on the emergence and consolidation of a scientific culture in the West in the modern era. Two volumes have already appeared: *The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1210–1685* (2006) and *The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1680–1760* (2010). Work on the third volume is underway: *The Naturalisation of the Human and the Humanisation of Nature: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1750–1825*.

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**Michael Hampe** holds a chair in philosophy at the ETH Zürich and has published widely on pragmatism, philosophy of science and early modern philosophy (especially Spinoza). His books *Gesetz und Distanz: Studien über die Prinzipien der Gesetzmäßigkeit in der theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie* (1996) and *Eine kleine Geschichte des Naturgesetzesbegriffs* (2007) analyze the relation between the concepts of nature and law in historical context.

**Martin Kusch** holds a chair in philosophy of science and epistemology at the University of Vienna. He moved to Vienna in 2009 from Cambridge where he held a chair in philosophy and sociology of science. His research focuses on social epistemology, philosophy of the social sciences, and the sociology of knowledge. He is currently completing a book on Wittgenstein and the sciences. His book publications include *Knowledge by Agreement* (2002) and *A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules* (2006).

**Martin Lenz** is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen. He studied in Bochum, Budapest and Hull (Ph.D. in 2001 in Bochum) and spent his postdoctoral period in Cambridge, Tübingen and Berlin (Habilitation in 2009). He is the author of *Mentale Sätze. Wilhelm von Ockhams Thesen zur Sprachlichkeit des Denkens* (2003) and *Lockes Sprachkonzeption* (2010) and various articles on medieval and early modern philosophy.

**Antonia LoLordo** is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia. She is the author of the books *Locke's Moral Man* (2012), *Pierre Gassendi and the Birth of Early Modern Philosophy* (2007) and various articles on Descartes, Gassendi, Hume, Locke, Malebranche, and others. She received her Ph.D. from Rutgers University.

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**Eric Schliesser** is BOF Research Professor of Philosophy at the University of Ghent. He has published articles on Newton, Spinoza, Berkeley, Hume, Smith, De Grouchy, Kant, and the philosophy of economics. He is the co-editor of *Interpreting Newton: Critical Essays* (2012).

**Lionel Shapiro** is Associate Professor at the University of Connecticut. He has published papers in the philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and the history of early modern and twentieth century philosophy. His research interests tend to focus on the proper roles of the concept of truth and of propositional-attribute ascriptions in theorizing about the intentionality of language and thought. Related interests include deflationary views of semantic notions and the semantic paradoxes.

**Anik Waldow** is Senior Lecturer in the Philosophy Department at the University of Sydney. She mainly works in early modern philosophy and has published articles on the moral and cognitive function of Humean sympathy, early modern theories of personal identity, skepticism and associationist theories of thought and language. She is the author of the book *David Hume and the Problem of Other Minds* (2009).

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