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# Index

## A

Allocative efficiency, 18, 29, 61, 65,  
91, 92, 113, 150

Anticipatory breach, 124, 139–141

## B

Binary quantity choice, 46, 47, 49,  
91, 101–103, 113, 114, 132,  
133, 140

Bounded rationality, 28

Breach set, 69, 186, 195

## C

Civil Law, 4, 9, 10, 72, 141, 151, 192,  
193

Common Law, 4, 9, 10, 81, 134, 141,  
151, 177, 192, 193

Compensatory interest, 148, 175, 176

Continuous quantity choice, 46, 49,  
91, 102, 112–114, 122, 132,  
133, 197

## E

Expectation damage, ix, 10, 13, 18,  
63, 65, 68, 72, 76–78, 80,  
81, 85, 86, 91, 100–103,  
111–113, 123–125, 127, 130,  
132–135, 138, 139, 141–144,  
148, 151, 153, 162, 167, 168,  
170, 172, 175–178, 183, 195,  
196

Expectation interest, ix, 18, 76, 111,  
141, 151, 152, 156, 167, 172,  
196, 197

Expected expectation damage, 152,  
172, 173, 176, 183, 196

**F**

First best, 37, 44, 60, 65, 70, 80, 94,  
96–99, 101, 102, 112, 113,  
135, 140, 144, 150, 152, 158,  
163, 165, 166, 169, 171, 174,  
179, 194, 196

**G**

Gap filling, 5, 6, 14, 26, 28, 53  
Groves-Clarke, 113, 123, 136, 140,  
149, 150

**H**

Hidden action, 8, 17, 21, 27, 28, 39,  
64, 73, 123, 126, 132, 136,  
140  
Hidden information, 8, 17, 27, 60,  
123, 124, 126, 141, 143, 167  
Hold up, viii, 7, 8, 18, 24, 27, 30, 41,  
42, 44, 45, 52, 53, 59–65,  
70, 74, 92, 97, 98, 150, 164,  
191, 195

**I**

Incentive Compatible  
Incentive Constraint, 61, 105, 127,  
129, 131, 132, 136, 140, 141,  
149, 182  
Incomplete contract, viii, 2, 5  
Increasing Difference, 118, 145  
Individual Rationality Constraint  
Participation Constraint, 82, 83,  
105, 107, 127, 128, 149–151,  
182

Information disclosure, 153

Insurance motive

Precautionary Motive, 164, 171,  
175, 193, 194

Intermediate quantity, 46, 49, 112,  
195

**L**

Liquidated damage, 11, 17, 62, 63, 65,  
66, 81, 82, 84–86, 103, 104,  
107, 109, 113, 136, 152, 172,  
178–180, 182, 183, 196

**M**

Moral hazard, 8, 9, 17, 27, 59, 61,  
148, 162

**O**

Objective method  
Objective damage measure, ix,  
144, 151, 152, 173, 175  
Opportunistic behaviour, 8, 14,  
30, 113, 148, 151, 162,  
191, 196

**P**

Precautionary motive, 164, 166, 175,  
194

**Q**

Quasi-linear utility, 150

**R**

Reliance damage, 11, 73, 75, 76, 80,  
92, 93, 95, 99, 141, 143, 144,  
151, 152, 162, 165, 166, 175,  
194  
Rent seeking, 9, 61  
Repudiate, 24, 93, 114, 155  
Restitution damage, 11, 73, 80, 92,  
95, 96, 162–164, 166, 194,  
195

**S**

Second Best, 148  
Second price auction, 149  
Secrecy interest, 8, 147, 148, 175, 176  
Separation prevention motive, 166,  
171, 175, 193, 194  
Single crossing property  
SCP, 117–119, 130  
Social cost of breach, 74, 98, 164  
Social welfare, 2, 12, 18, 65, 78, 152,  
172, 176

**Specific investment**

Relation specific investment, 7, 26  
Transaction specific investment,  
26, 30, 35–37, 39, 42, 45,  
62, 68, 95, 152, 156, 164,  
176, 192

**Specific performance remedy,**

112, 171, 172, 192, 193,  
195, 196

**Subjective method**

Subjective damage measure, ix,  
151, 152, 168, 176

**T**

Transaction costs, 6, 7, 26  
Transfer schedule, 126–128, 130, 132,  
141–143

**V**

Valuable breach option, 8