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INDEX

A

Abe, 122
Accountability, *see* European Central Bank (ECB); Accountability
Bank (ECB); Accountability
Aggregate demand, 22, 47, 57n2, 71, 73, 76n19, 76n21, 77n25, 96, 101, 102, 110n8, 119, 127, 130, 139–144, 152, 155
See also Effective demand
Alesina, 13n2, 27, 76n23
Amsterdam (Treaty), 4, 131
Austerity, 54, 65, 69–74, 76n18, 76n20, 76n22, 94, 96, 115, 118, 119, 140–143, 157n3, 159n19
Automatic stabilizers, 23

B

Baglioni, 130, 136n27, 160n38
Bail-in, 115, 116, 129
Bail-out
banks, 63, 64, 80, 83, 117, 129
states (sovereign debt), 60, 61
Balance of payments, 82, 90
See also Current account
Balassa, 5, 50
Balassa-Samuelson effect, 50

Baldwin, 42n17, 71, 111n20, 134n7, 142, 148, 150, 154
Banking union, 57n7, 127–130, 136n28, 142, 144, 154, 160n38
Barro, 28, 47
Beker, 109n2
Belke, 160n38
Bernanke, 49, 109n4
Blanchard, 76n20, 142
Bonds
German bund, 26, 46
See also Public Debt
Bretton Woods, 2, 16–18
Brexit, 3, 13n5, 115, 127, 137n36, 140, 153, 156, 158n11, 161n40
Budget
centralized, 22
See also EU, budget; Fiscal transfers
Buiters, 41n5, 147
Bundesbank, 45–56, 96, 111n28, 160n34
Business cycle
sensitivity, 34, 149
similarity, 27, 28, 31, 35, 41n18
synchronization, 25, 43n26
Buti, 25, 26, 43n24

C

Capital union, 127, 130, 144
 Central banks, 2, 14n8, 16–19, 45–56,
 60, 74n9, 87–89, 91, 114,
 120–124, 128, 136n22, 136n25
 balance sheets, 83, 88, 122, 124,
 126, 135n19
See also European Central Bank
 (ECB); Federal Reserve (FED)
 Cohesion Fund, 7, 19, 149
 Collateral, 51, 61, 120,
 121, 134n8
 Common agricultural policy (CAP),
 2, 17
 Common Market, 5
 Competition policy, 2, 4–6, 19
 Competitiveness, 7, 18, 22, 27, 28,
 41n7, 42n16, 50, 56, 74, 75n13,
 79, 90, 93, 96, 111n20, 131,
 140, 141, 143, 144, 148, 154
 Construction, 6, 24, 26, 27, 50, 83,
 93, 96, 127, 139, 140, 145, 147,
 148, 159n23
 Consumption, 50, 71, 81, 82, 84, 86,
 90, 96, 98, 110n8, 137n35,
 141, 143
 Contagion, 60, 61, 91–94, 111n21,
 114, 129, 150, 160n38
 Convergence
 beta, 28, 29, 30, 41n22
 extended, 29, 31
 institutional, 24–28, 41n12
 nominal, 20, 24–28, 41n5,
 41n12, 43n24
 real, 24–39, 40n12, 42n24, 138,
 148, 149
 sigma, 28
 Coordinated macroeconomic
 policies, 19, 48, 68, 142
 Corsetti, 160n33
 Credit crunch, 84, 123, 126, 127
 Crisis management, 73, 118–120, 149

Current account, 28, 41n17, 50,
 56, 93, 134n7, 141,
 142, 148, 157n6
See also Balance of payments
 Customs union, 2, 4–6, 17

D

Dabrowski, 136n31
 Decressin, 34
 Deepening, 1–4, 14n7, 25,
 154, 161n42
 Deflation, 20, 22, 49, 52, 53, 69, 71,
 86, 101, 122, 124–127,
 140–141, 157n4, 158n15
 De Grauwe, 13n5, 20, 23, 34, 40n5,
 48, 111n27, 135n15, 142, 148,
 149, 155, 156
 De Larosière group, 136n26
 Delors, 19, 119, 146, 148, 161n44
 report, 19
 Deregulation, 16, 81, 90, 141
 Draghi, 56, 57n2, 77n25, 114, 120,
 123, 127, 150

E

Economic and monetary union
 (EMU), 4, 14n7, 15–39, 39n4,
 40n11, 45, 57n10, 60, 61, 69,
 92, 128, 139–156
 A “genuine” EMU, 128, 153,
 154, 156
 Economic growth, 2, 4, 5, 20, 21,
 25–27, 27, 47–50, 54, 56, 62, 66,
 68–71, 73, 75n12, 80, 119, 123,
 126, 127, 130, 131, 132,
 136n30, 139–143, 157n8
 Economic union, 15–39, 153–156
 Effective demand, 94–103, 110n8
See also Aggregate demand

- Eichengreen, 21, 109n1, 110n9, 159n27, 160n37
- Employment, 4, 7, 22, 26, 49, 86, 102, 104–109, 119, 131–133, 136n34, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 160n36
 employment rates, 26, 106, 107, 132, 136n34, 140
- Euro
 exchange rate, 16–22, 25–26, 28, 40n2, 42n20, 46, 50, 56, 126
 introduction, 39, 56, 61, 62, 92, 129
 survival, 70, 142, 149, 150, 159n27
- Euro area, 20, 24, 28, 29, 31, 39, 42n22, 51, 52, 54, 57n7, 65, 66, 111n20, 117, 118, 124, 126, 130, 134n4, 141, 142, 144, 149, 150, 152, 154, 161n40
See also Eurozone
- Eurobonds
 project bonds, 119
 stability bonds, 155
- Eurogroup, 14n8, 152, 153
- Europe 2020, 4, 14n6, 26, 70, 106, 130–134, 149
- European Central Bank (ECB)
 accountability, 48
 conservatism, 46–49
 executive board, 45, 46
 governance, 45–46
 Governing Council, 46, 47, 52
 independence, 46–48
 instruments, 46, 51–53, 55, 57n7, 122, 125
 Main Refinancing Operations (MROs), 51–52, 120
 objectives, 47–49, 51, 52, 53, 129
 strategies, 51–52
 unconventional measures, 55, 89, 120–124
- European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 2
- European Deposit Insurance Scheme, 130, 144
- European Economic Area (EEA), 13n3
- European Economic Community (EEC), 2, 6, 24
- European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), 14n8, 114, 116, 119, 134n5, 149
- European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), 146
- European Investment Bank (EIB), 14n8, 121, 125, 146, 147
- European Monetary System
 crisis (1992–93), 19
 European currency unit (ECU), 40n2
 floating interval, 18, 19
 realignments, 17, 18
- European Monetary Union, 15–39, 41n4, 41n11, 45, 57n10, 60, 61, 69, 92, 127, 140, 148–150, 154–156
- European Parliament, 4, 48, 152, 153
- European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), 7
- European Semester, 69, 132
- European Social Fund (ESF), 7
- European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 114, 116, 117, 119, 123, 125, 128, 149, 152, 155, 158n14
- European Supervision Authorities (ESAs), 128
- European System of Central Banks (ESCB), 45, 46, 49
- European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), 128
- European unemployment insurance system (proposal), xv

- European Union (EU)
 budget, 2, 6–9, 13n3, 60, 133, 134, 148, 152
 commission (EC), 21, 25, 27, 65, 68, 73, 75n13, 76n24, 102, 112n32, 133, 144, 150, 153, 154
 council, 14n8, 17, 18, 46, 69, 114, 124, 136n26
 governance, 5, 59–74, 148–153
 parliament, 4, 48, 128, 152–154
 treaty, 2, 14n7, 116
- Eurozone (or euro area)
 budget (proposal), 152
 core, 41n13, 43n26, 71, 115
 periphery, 68, 115
- Exports, 6, 11, 21, 22, 26, 35, 82, 86, 90, 97, 97, 141, 143
- F**
- Fatàs, 34
- Federal Reserve (FED), 45, 71, 83, 120
- Finance Minister of Eurozone (proposal), 151, 152
- Financial crisis, 52, 55, 56, 61, 63, 71, 80, 82–84, 86, 90, 92, 102, 109n1, 116, 119, 120, 128, 148, 155
- Financial liberalizations, 79–84, 109n1
- Fiscal Compact, 14n6, 23, 27, 68–70, 111n30, 118, 119, 148, 151
- Fiscal policy
 fiscal capacity, 152
 fiscal consolidation, 70, 76n20
 fiscal multipliers, 72, 73, 76n20
 fiscal rules, 119
 fiscal stimuli packages, 64
 fiscal transfers, 148
 fiscal union (proposal), 154, 155
- Fitoussi, 81
- Five Presidents' Report, 154
- Forward guidance, 123
- Founding fathers, 156
- France, 2, 10, 12, 41n13, 43n26, 43n33, 46, 62–65, 68, 88, 89, 96, 106, 110n16, 116, 117, 143, 160n34
- Frankel, 22, 160n33
- Friedman, 17, 46, 47, 136n23, 147
- G**
- G-20, 80, 90, 110n17
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 2, 16
- Germany, 2, 10, 12, 18, 19, 25, 28, 40n3, 41n4, 41n13, 42n17, 43n26, 43n28, 43n33, 46, 48, 63, 65–67, 71, 74n2, 76n17, 82, 86, 88–89, 96, 104, 106, 110n16, 114, 116, 117, 135n16, 136n32, 137n38, 141–143, 146, 151, 159n24, 159n28, 160n32
- Giavazzi, 13n2, 42n17, 71, 111n20, 134n7, 142, 148, 150, 154
- Global imbalances, 79–84, 90
- Globalization, 5, 9–10, 16
- Goodhart, 136n28, 159n26
- Government budget, 75n14
 cyclically adjusted, 75n14
- Government debt
 service, 74, 94, 146
See also Bail-out
- Government deficit, 60, 66, 90, 91, 141
- Government expenditures, 64, 75n12
- Government revenues, 6, 75n12, 155
- Great Moderation, 80–82
- Great Recession, 24, 26, 31, 39, 54, 57n9, 63–65, 71, 72, 84–86, 90–92, 94, 104, 122, 125

- Greece, 2, 7, 20, 26, 27, 31, 35, 40n6, 41n20, 43n33, 50, 65, 67, 68, 70, 76n18, 86, 91, 92, 96, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110n19, 111n24, 111n28, 112n32, 114–116, 118, 123, 143, 150
- Gros, D., 150, 160n38
- H**
- Housing bubble, 26, 83, 88
- I**
- Inflation
- core, 19, 53, 126
 - dispersion, 50
 - harmonized consumer price index (HCPI), 49
 - inflation target, 49–50, 51, 53, 124, 125
 - perceived, 50
- Innovation, 4, 7, 14n6, 69, 81, 109n8, 131, 132, 141, 143, 144, 146, 152, 158n16
- Integration, 1–4, 5, 7, 9, 13n1, 13n2, 19, 24–26, 28, 35, 39, 41n9, 44n33, 80, 93, 96, 127–129, 139–161
- Interest expenditure, 42n19, 66, 94, 151
- Interest rates
- nominal, 20, 26, 41n11, 49, 50, 72, 75n10, 158n15
 - nominal negative rates, 158n15
 - official (*see also* European Central Bank) real, 26, 47, 50, 91, 111n23
 - zero-lower bound, 122
- Internal devaluations, 74, 96, 142, 143
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2, 16, 72, 80, 90, 141
- Investments
- plan (proposed for Europe), 119, 147, 150
 - private, 71, 117, 123, 144, 145, 147
 - public, 7, 63, 73–74, 96, 101, 115, 143–147, 155–156, 158n17, 159n19
- See also* Juncker plan
- Ireland, 2, 26, 35, 43n27, 43n30, 50, 65–68, 70, 83, 86, 88, 93, 94, 96, 102, 106, 111n21, 111n28, 114, 116, 118, 123, 134n5, 143
- Italy, 2, 7, 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, 31, 40n3, 43n33, 46, 61, 66–68, 74n1, 74n2, 86, 88, 89, 93, 94, 96, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110n15, 110n16, 111n21, 114, 117, 122, 123, 126, 135n16, 143, 159n28
- J**
- Japan, 13, 66, 74n7, 74n9, 86, 89, 110n16, 120, 122
- Juncker plan, 74, 75n16, 115, 143–147
- K**
- Kenen, 21, 27
- Keynesian theories, 48, 51
- Krugman, 16, 21, 25, 41n10, 111n27
- L**
- Labour, 22, 25, 27, 28, 42n14, 42n15, 42n18, 47, 56, 59, 74, 76n23, 80, 86, 102, 104, 106, 109, 112n33, 130–133, 136n33, 137n38, 140–141, 143, 148, 153
- Lehman Brothers, 84, 120
- Lisbon Agenda, 4, 26, 106, 130–134, 149
- Lisbon Treaty, 4, 14n8

Long Term Refinancing Operations
(LTROs), 123–124
See also Targeted Long Term
Refinancing Operations (T-LTROs)

M

Maastricht Treaty, 3, 4, 7,
18–20, 24, 25, 27, 45,
48, 49, 52, 60, 61, 74n5,
114, 118, 142, 147
Convergence criteria, 18–20
Maddison, 9–11
Marelli, 24, 41n12, 42n19,
77n26, 106, 112n33,
158n16
Masera, 135n12, 158n17
McKinnon, 21, 61
Merchandize exports and imports, 11
Micossi, 52, 73,
148, 159n21
Migration policies, 153
Monetarism, 47
Monetary policy
activism, 55
of ECB (*see* European Central Bank)
helicopter money, 147
Monetary unions
adjustment mechanisms, 22, 59
asymmetric shocks, 59–60
benefits, 59–60
costs, 21
incomplete, 127, 139, 148
insurance mechanisms, 59
See also OCA theories
Moral hazard, 93, 114, 134n8,
150, 155
Moro, 42n17, 109n2,
111n24, 157n10
Mundell, 18, 21, 22
Mutualization, 119, 129, 130,
135n18, 150–151

N

National Reform Plans (NRP), 70
NEET, 108, 132
See also Unemployment
New Classical Macroeconomics, 17
New Member States (NMS), 50
Nice (Treaty of), 4
Non-performing loans, 130, 144
Non-tariff barriers, 5

O

Obama, 64, 89, 122
Optimal Currency Area (OCA)
theories, 20–24
endogeneity hypothesis, 25, 31
See also Monetary unions
Opting-out, 41n6
O'Rourke, 110n9, 142, 159n29
Output gap, 101, 102, 111n30,
112n31, 112n32, 147
See also Potential output
Outright monetary transactions
(OMTs), 123

P

Paulson Plan, 64
Perotti, 71
Phillips curve, 17
PIIGS, 42n13, 93, 96, 110n19,
111n24, 123, 126, 143
Pissarides, 159n28
Political union, 153–156, 160n37
Populist movements, 153
Portugal, 3, 7, 27, 35, 43n29, 65, 67,
68, 70, 93, 94, 96, 102, 104,
106, 111n24, 114, 116, 123, 143
Potential output, 101, 102, 140, 143,
144, 157n3
potential growth, 101
Primary balance, 66, 68

- Prodi, 63
- Productivity, 5, 25, 28, 42n16, 43n22, 56, 74, 77n26, 93, 102, 131, 132, 140, 141, 143, 144
- Public account balance, 66
See also Government budget
- Public debt, 18, 19, 26, 60, 64, 68, 69, 73, 74n9, 75n10, 75n11, 88, 93, 94, 110n14, 110n15, 111n25, 116, 120, 134n7, 150, 151
sustainability, 60, 68, 74n9, 75n10, 75n11, 116, 150
See also Government debt
- Public sector purchase programme, 125
- Q**
- Quantitative Easing (QE), 89, 122, 124–127, 147
- R**
- Rating agencies, 91, 128
- R&D, 7, 74, 132, 136n34, 137n35, 144, 145, 149, 159n19
- Recession
double-dip, 70, 89, 111n27, 130
See also Great Recession
- Recovery, 65, 71, 72, 86, 89, 91, 94, 96, 110n10, 114, 118, 120, 122, 124–127, 130, 139, 143, 144, 156, 157n8, 158n11, 159n23
- Reinhart, 71, 109n1, 110n18
- Ricardian equivalence, 71
- Risk
default, 26, 60, 61, 70, 92, 93, 116, 119, 136n29
exchange-rate, 21, 22, 25
redenomination, 93
risk-reduction, 115, 151, 152, 155
risk-sharing, 27, 155
systemic risk, 90, 123, 128, 136n29
- Rogoff, 47, 71, 110n18
- Rome (Treaty of), 2, 3, 5, 6
- Rose, 22, 50, 71, 90, 132, 153
- Roubini, 89, 158n13
- S**
- Salvatore, 79
- Sapir, 25, 152
- Save-States funds, 115, 116–118, 122
See also EFSE; ESM
- Scarpetta, 106
- Schengen agreements, 153
- Securities Market Programme (SMP), 114
- Self-defeating (austerity), 72, 76n22, 118, 141
- Signorelli, 3, 24, 41n12, 42n19, 75n10, 77n26, 114n33
- Single Act, 3, 5
- Single Market, 3, 4–6, 19, 127
- Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), 129, 144
- Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), 129, 144
- SixPack, 68
- Social cohesion, 4–5, 49, 119, 131, 156
- Solidarity, 115, 129, 150
- Sovereign debt, 14n8, 24, 27, 39, 41n13, 42n17, 54, 56, 65, 66, 68, 70, 71, 74n7, 81, 86, 88, 91–94, 98, 104, 110n20, 114–115, 119, 120, 122, 123, 127, 128–129, 134n8, 142, 149, 150, 151, 155, 158n14
crisis, 14n8, 24, 27, 39, 40n13, 54, 56, 65, 66, 68, 70, 71, 74n7, 86, 90, 93–96, 102, 106, 110n20, 114–115, 119, 120, 122, 123, 128, 149, 150, 151, 155
See also Public debt

- Spain, 3, 7, 26, 27–28, 42n17, 46, 50, 61, 65, 66, 68, 74n1, 83, 86, 88, 89, 93, 94, 96, 104, 106, 111n24, 111n29, 114, 115, 118, 123, 126, 135n16, 143
- Spillover effects, 60
- Spread, 16, 26, 48, 61, 70, 74n1, 84, 91, 93, 94, 111n21, 111n26, 118, 126, 134n5, 137n36, 140
- Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
debt condition, 69
deficit condition, 115
flexibilities, 62, 145
golden rule, 145
macroeconomic imbalance
 procedure, 142
medium-term objective, 68, 111n30
new SGP, 68–69
stability plans, 70
- Stabilization, 48, 51, 116
- Stagnation, 24, 70, 75n12, 79, 86, 114, 124, 130, 139, 142, 143, 146, 153
- Stiglitz, 16, 80, 81
- Stress test, 136n30
- Structural deficit, 68, 101, 157n3
- Structural funds, 5, 7, 131, 145, 149, 155
- Structural policies, 11, 19, 45, 47, 48, 101, 102, 130–134, 149
 structural reforms, 101
- Sub-prime crisis, 79–84, 135n10
- Subsidiarity principle, 152, 155, 160n35
- Systemic risk, 90
- T**
- Tabellini, 76n19, 117, 152, 155
- Tapering, 122
- Targeted Long Term Refinancing Operations (T-LTRO), 124
- Tariffs, 2, 5, 16
- Taylor, 76n20, 142, 159n29
- Tobin tax, 91
- Trade integration, 28, 39, 44n33
- Troika, 111n25, 116–118
- Two-Pack, 150
- U**
- Unemployment
 long-term, 104, 109
 structural, 86, 101, 111n29, 131, 155
 youth, 106, 112n33, 118, 132
- United Kingdom (UK), 2, 3, 10, 12, 34, 41n6, 43n33
- United States (US), 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 22, 26, 27, 42n15, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 154, 156, 161n44
 US dollar, 56
- United States of Europe, 154, 156, 161n44
- V**
- Van Rompuy, 128, 153
- W**
- Washington consensus, 16
- Werner plan, 19
- Widening, 1–4, 25, 61, 131
- World Bank, 2, 10, 16, 80
- World Trade Organization (WTO), 80
- Wyplosz, 70, 160n37
- Y**
- Yellen, 49