

APPENDIX A

EXCERPT FROM “ADDRESS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE COMMUNIST LEAGUE”

KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS

LONDON, MARCH 1850¹

BROTHERS!

In the two revolutionary years of 1848–49 the League proved itself in two ways. First, its members everywhere involved themselves energetically in the movement and stood in the front ranks of the only decisively revolutionary class, the proletariat, in the press, on the barricades and on the battlefields. The League further proved itself in that its understanding of the movement, as expressed in the circulars issued by the Congresses and the Central Committee of 1847 and in the Manifesto of the Communist Party,² has been shown to be the only correct one, and the expectations expressed in these documents have been completely fulfilled. This previously only propagated by the League in secret, is now on everyone’s lips and is preached openly in the market place. At the same time, however, the formerly strong organization of the League has been considerably weakened. A large number of members who were directly involved in the movement thought that the time for secret societies was over and that public action alone was sufficient. The individual districts and communes allowed their connections with the Central Committee to weaken and gradually become dormant. So, while the democratic party, the party of the petty bourgeoisie, has become more and more organized in Germany, the workers’ party has lost its only firm foothold, remaining organized at best in individual localities for local purposes; within the general movement it has consequently come under the complete

domination and leadership of the petty-bourgeois democrats. This situation cannot be allowed to continue; the independence of the workers must be restored . . .

2. To be able forcefully and threateningly to oppose this party, whose betrayal of the workers will begin with the very first hour of victory, the workers must be armed and organized. The whole proletariat must be armed at once with muskets, rifles, cannon and ammunition, and the revival of the old-style citizens' militia, directed against the workers, must be opposed. Where the formation of this militia cannot be prevented, the workers must try to organize themselves independently as a proletarian guard, with elected leaders and with their own elected general staff; they must try to place themselves not under the orders of the state authority but of the revolutionary local councils set up by the workers. Where the workers are employed by the state, they must arm and organize themselves into special corps with elected leaders, or as a part of the proletarian guard. Under no pretext should arms and ammunition be surrendered; any attempt to disarm the workers must be frustrated, by force if necessary. The destruction of the bourgeois democrats' influence over the workers, and the enforcement of conditions which will compromise the rule of bourgeois democracy, which is for the moment inevitable, and make it as difficult as possible—these are the main points which the proletariat and therefore the League must keep in mind during and after the approaching uprising.

3. As soon as the new governments have established themselves, their struggle against the workers will begin. If the workers are to be able to forcibly oppose the democratic petty bourgeois it is essential above all for them to be independently organized and centralized in clubs. At the soonest possible moment after the overthrow of the present governments, the Central Committee will come to Germany and will immediately convene a Congress, submitting to it the necessary proposals for the centralization of the workers' clubs under a directorate established at the movement's center of operations. The speedy organization of at least provincial connections between the workers' clubs is one of the prime requirements for the strengthening and development of the workers' party; the immediate result of the overthrow of the existing governments will be the election of a national representative body. Here the proletariat must take care:

- 1) that by sharp practices local authorities and government commissioners do not, under any pretext whatsoever, exclude any section of workers;

- 2) that workers' candidates are nominated everywhere in opposition to bourgeois-democratic candidates. As far as possible they should be League members and their election should be pursued by all possible means. Even where there is no prospect of achieving their election the workers must put up their own candidates to preserve their independence, to gauge their own strength and to bring their revolutionary position and party standpoint to public attention. They must not be led astray by the empty phrases of the democrats, who will maintain that the workers' candidates will split the democratic party and offer the forces of reaction the chance of victory. All such talk means, in the final analysis, that the proletariat is to be swindled. The progress which the proletarian party will make by operating independently in this way is infinitely more important than the disadvantages resulting from the presence of a few reactionaries in the representative body. If the forces of democracy take decisive, terroristic action against the reaction from the very beginning, the reactionary influence in the election will already have been destroyed . . .

Although the German workers cannot come to power and achieve the realization of their class interests without passing through a protracted revolutionary development, this time they can at least be certain that the first act of the approaching revolutionary drama will coincide with the direct victory of their own class in France and will thereby be accelerated. But they themselves must contribute most to their final victory, by informing themselves of their own class interests, by taking up their independent political position as soon as possible, by not allowing themselves to be misled by the hypocritical phrases of the democratic petty bourgeoisie into doubting for one minute the necessity of an independently organized party of the proletariat. Their battle-cry must be: *The Permanent Revolution.*

APPENDIX B

“SKETCH OF A PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT”

SETTING: TSARISM IN ST. PETERSBURG STRUCK DOWN, the autocratic government overthrown—struck down but not utterly destroyed, not killed, *not annihilated*, not extirpated.¹

The provisional revolutionary government appeals to the people. Workers and peasants *take the initiative*. Complete freedom. The people organise their own lives. The *government programme* = full republican liberties, peasant committees for the *complete* reform of agrarian relations. The Programme of the Social-Democratic Party *is a thing standing by itself*. Social-Democrats in the provisional government = people delegated, *commissioneed* by the Social-Democratic Party.

Next—the Constituent Assembly. *If* the people have risen, they . . .² *may* (even though not immediately) find themselves in the majority (peasants and workers). *Ergo*, the revolutionary *dictatorship* of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Frantic resistance of evil forces. Civil war *in full sweep*—*annihilation* of tsarism.

Organisation of the proletariat grows, propaganda and agitation of the Social-Democrats increases ten thousandfold—all the government printing-presses, etc., etc. “*Mit der Gründlichkeit der geschichtlichen Aktion wird auch der Umfang der Masse zunehmen, deren Aktion sie ist.*”³

The peasantry takes *all* agrarian relations, *all* the land, into its own hands. *The nationalisation* becomes a fact.

Tremendous growth of productive forces—the entire rural intelligentsia, all technical knowledge, is brought into action to increase agricultural production, to get rid of fettering influences (uplifters, Narodniks, etc., etc.) . . . Gigantic development of **capitalist** progress . . .

War: the *fort* keeps changing hands. Either the bourgeoisie overthrows the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, or this dictatorship sets Europe aflame, and then . . . ?

If we are to consider the question of revolutionary dictatorship from the standpoint of Marxism, we shall have to reduce it to an analysis of the *struggle of the classes*.

Ergo, what major social forces should be taken into account? *Ordre de bataille*?

(α) The bureaucratic, military, and Court elements stand *for* absolutism *plus* the unenlightened elements among the people (a rapidly disintegrating conglomerate, yesterday all-powerful, tomorrow powerless). (Dynastic and other conflicts within inevitable.)

Degree of organisation very high—maximum

(β) The more or less big, moderately-liberal bourgeoisie.

((Here I include the liberal landlords, the top financiers, the merchants, manufacturers, etc., etc. This = σ lords and masters of a bourgeois country. "Can do anything."))

Degree of organisation very slight

Conflicts between the groupings inevitable; but all stand for a Constitution even now, and still more so tomorrow.

Ideological leaders—in abundance, from among the officials, landlords, and journalists.

(γ) The petty-bourgeois and peasant section. Tens of millions.

The "people" *par excellence*.

Degree of organisation—minimum

Greatest state of benightedness and disorganisation.

Their plight most desperate, they have most to gain *directly* from the revolution. The greatest instability (to day—for the revolution, tomorrow—for "law and order" after slight improvements).

Democracy. Ideological leaders—a great number of democratic intellectuals. The Socialist-Revolutionary "type."

(δ) The proletariat.

Very high level of organisation, and discipline

Revolutionary-minded. Critical attitude towards the petty bourgeoisie. Has *fewer* ideological leaders than all the others—only the Social-Democratic intelligentsia and the educated Social-Democratic workers. Compared with the preceding groups numerically very much weaker, but *Kampffähigkeit*^a very much stronger.

Object of the struggle = *Republic* (including *all* democratic liberties, the **m i n i m u m p r o g r a m m e** and far-reaching social reforms).

α —absolutely against.

β —*for* a Constitution, *against* the Republic ($\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$). ((Bargaining.))

γ —in a revolutionary moment (not firmly) *for* the Republic ((the unstable elements of the struggle)).

δ —wholly and entirely *for* the Republic.

June–July 1905

APPENDIX C

“WHOM TO ELECT TO THE STATE DUMA”

**Citizens! See to it That the Whole People Clearly Understands
What the Chief Parties Are that Are Fighting in the Elections
in St. Petersburg and What Each of Them Strives For!¹**

What Are the Three Chief Parties?

<i>The Black Hundreds</i>	<i>The Cadets</i>	<i>The Social-Democrats</i>
They are—the Union of the Russian People, the monarchists, the Party of Law and Order, the Union of October Seventeenth, the Commercial and Industrial Party, the Party of Peaceful Renovation.	They are—the party of “people’s” freedom or Constitutional-“Democratic” (in reality liberal-monarchist) Party, the Party of “Democratic” Reforms, the radicals, etc.	<i>The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party</i> . It is the party of the class-conscious-workers of all the nationalities of Russia, of Russians, Letts, Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians, Tatars, etc.

Whose Interests Do the Three Chief Parties Defend?

<i>The Black Hundreds</i> defend the present tsarist government, they stand for the landlords, for the government officials, for the power of the police, for military courts, for pogroms.	<i>The Cadets</i> defend the interests of the liberal bourgeois, the liberal landlords, merchants and capitalists. The Cadets are a party of bourgeois lawyers, journalists, professors and such like.	<i>The Social-Democrats</i> are the party of the working class, defending the interests of all the working and exploited people.
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What Do the Three Chief Parties Strive For?

The Black Hundreds strive for the preservation of the old autocracy, the lack of rights of the people, the unlimited rule over it of the landlords, officials and police.

The Cadets strive for the transfer of power into the hands of the liberal bourgeoisie. The monarchy; by preserving the police and military regime, is to safeguard the capitalists' right to rob the workers and peasants.

The Social-Democrats strive for the transfer of all power into the hands of the people, i.e., a democratic republic. The Social-Democrats need complete freedom in order to fight for socialism, for the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital.

What Kind of Freedom do the Three Chief Parties Want to Give the People?

The Black Hundreds do not give the people any freedom, any power. All power is for the tsarist government. The rights of the people are: to pay taxes, to toil for the rich, to rot in gaol.

The Cadets want the kind of "people's freedom" which will be subordinated, firstly, to the Upper Chamber, i.e., to the landlords and capitalists; secondly, to the monarchy, i. e., the tsar with the irresponsible police and armed forces. One-third of the power to the people, one-third to the capitalists and one-third to the tsar.

The Social-Democrats want complete freedom and all power for the people, all officials to be elected, the soldiers to be freed from barrack servitude, and the organisation of a free, people's militia.

How Do the Three Chief Parties Regard the Peasants' Demand for Land?

The Black Hundreds defend the interests of the feudal landlords. No land for the peasants. Only the rich to be allowed to buy land from the landlords by voluntary agreement.

The Cadets want to preserve the landlord system of agriculture by means of concessions. They propose redemption payments by the peasants which already once before in 1861 ruined the peasants. The Cadets do not agree that the land question should be settled by local committees elected by universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

The Social-Democrats want to abolish our landlord system of agriculture. All land must be transferred to the peasants absolutely, with out redemption payments. The land question must be settled by local committees elected by universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

What Can the Three Chief Parties Achieve if Their Whole Struggle is Successful?

The Black Hundreds, using every possible means of struggle, can cause the people to be finally ruined and all Russia subjected to the savagery of military courts and pogroms.

The Cadets, using only “peaceful” means of struggle, can cause the pogrom-mongers’ government to buy off the big bourgeoisie and the rich in the countryside at the cost of petty concessions, while it will chase out the liberal chatter-boxes for insufficiently servile speeches about the beloved, blameless, inviolable, constitutional monarch.

The Social-Democrats, using every possible means of struggle, including an uprising, can, with the aid of the politically conscious peasantry and urban poor, win complete freedom and all the land for the peasants. And with freedom, and with the help of the class-conscious workers of all Europe, the Russian Social-Democrats can advance with rapid strides to socialism.

**Citizens! Vote at the Elections for Candidates
of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party!
Social-Democrats and the Trudovik Parties**

Citizens! Anyone who wants to take an intelligent part in the elections to the State Duma must first of all clearly understand the difference between the three main parties. The *Black Hundreds* stand for pogroms and the violence of the tsarist government. The *Cadets* stand for the interests of the liberal landlords and capitalists. The *Social-Democrats* stand for the interests of the working class and all the working and exploited people.

Anyone who wants to uphold intelligently the interests of the working class and all working people must know which party is really able most consistently and resolutely to defend these interests.

**Which Parties Claim to Defend the Interests
of the Working Class and all Working People?**

The party of the working class, the *Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*, based on the standpoint of the class struggle of the proletariat.

Trudovik parties, i.e., parties based on the standpoint of the small proprietor:

The Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

The Trudovik (Popular Socialist) Party and *the non-party Trudoviks*.

Whose Interests do these Parties Actually Defend?

The interests of the proletarians, whose conditions of life deprive them of all hope of becoming proprietors and cause them to strive for completely changing the whole basis of the capitalist social system.

The interests of the petty proprietors, who struggle against capitalist oppression, but who, owing to the very conditions of their life, strive to become proprietors, to strengthen their petty economy and to enrich themselves by means of trade and hiring labour.

How Steadfast are These Parties in the Great World-Wide Struggle of Labour Against Capital?

The Social-Democrats cannot allow of any reconciliation of labour and capital. They organise the wage-workers for a ruthless struggle against capital, for the abolition of private ownership of the means of production and for the building of socialist society.

The toilers' parties dream of abolishing the rule of capital but, owing to the conditions of life of the petty proprietor, they inevitably waver between fighting jointly with the wage-workers against capital and striving to reconcile workers and capitalists by the conversion of all the working people into petty proprietors, with equal division of land, or guaranteed credit, and so on.

What Can These Parties Achieve by Completely Fulfilling Their Ultimate Aims?

The conquest of political power by the proletariat and the conversion of capitalist into social, large-scale, socialist production.

The equal distribution of land among petty proprietors and small peasants, in which case there will inevitably be a struggle between them again, giving rise to a division into rich and poor, workers and capitalists.

What Kind of Freedom for the People are These Parties Trying to Achieve in the Present Revolution?

Complete freedom and full power for the people, i. e., a democratic republic, officials to be subject to election, the replacement of the standing army by universal arming of the people.

Complete freedom and full power for the people, i. e., a democratic republic, officials to be subject to election, the replacement of the standing army by universal arming of the people.

A combination of democracy, i. e., full power of the people, with the monarchy, i. e., with the power of the tsar, police and officials. This is just as senseless a desire and just as treacherous a policy as that of the liberal landlords, the Cadets.

What Is the Attitude of These Parties to the Peasants' Demand For Land?

The Social-Democrats
demand the transfer of
all the landlords' land to
the peasants with out any
redemption payments.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries
demand the transfer of all the
landlords' land to the peasants
without any redemption
payments.

The Trudoviks demand
the transfer of all the
landlords' land to the
peasants, but they allow
redemption payments,
which will ruin the
peasants, so that this
is just as treacherous
a policy as that of the
liberal landlords, the
Cadets.

**Citizens! Vote at the Elections for Candidates of
the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party!**

November 23, 1906

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE

THIS BOOK, CONSCIOUSLY AND INTENTIONALLY, PRIVILEGES LENIN'S voice, and hopefully the reader who has read it appreciates that decision. For that reason I thought it best not to encumber the text, including the endnotes (for the most part) with other voices. Now is the time to bring the Leninologists into the conversation, given how extensive and influential their literature and voice is. But in no way does this interrogation pretend to be exhaustive. The focus here is solely on those who speak to Lenin's electoral and parliamentary strategy and differ in one way or another with what I present. Admittedly, attention is given mainly to those with most visibility, and I recognize that I may have missed voices that didn't get the attention they deserve. What I cover here could easily become a stand-alone article or even maybe a book—but not at this time. If it ends up being no more than an outline, sketch, or even an inspiration for either, then it has served its purpose. The organization of this review follows the order of the subject matter of the book and prioritizes the literature alluded to in the endnotes in reference to the text.

One body of literature neglected here, only for lack of language skills, is the Russian scholarship. What I can say is that I'm aware of its existence because it figures sometimes into the English-language scholarship, which is often about correcting the heavy hand of Stalinist orthodoxy. Thus in responding to the English-language literature, I indirectly address at least some of the Russian-language scholarship.

CHAPTER 1: WHAT MARX AND ENGELS BEQUEATHED

One thing, hopefully, this chapter has done is put to rest the long-standing myth as reiterated by David Lane in 1981: "Marx and Engels were principally concerned with the anatomy and dynamics of capitalism. While they both believed that inherent laws governing the system would lead to the victory of the proletariat, they said very little about the tactics of the struggle, they provided no interpretation of the ways that the proletariat

had to be organized or the kind of alliances which had to be arranged for the working class to become a ruling class. Lenin, however, was particularly concerned with these questions and with the political organization of the proletariat in Russia.¹ Thirty years later Sheri Berman made a similar claim: “[O]rthodox Marxism could not furnish them [‘Parties acting in Marx’s name’] with a strategy for using their power to achieve any practical goals. Orthodox Marxism in general had little to say about the role of political organizations, since it considered economic forces rather than political activism to be the prime mover of history.”²

My book *Marx and Engels* refutes this widely held but thoroughly disingenuous orthodoxy and, more pertinent here, its blinders to their electoral/parliamentary strategy and practice.³ This chapter distills the relevant findings of the book. One of the striking things about most standard accounts of the history of European social democratic parties is the failure to acknowledge the critical role of Marx and Engels in their origins, as I document. A notable example is Stefano Bartolini’s *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980*, which otherwise provides a thoughtful discussion about the ideological roots of those parties.⁴ There is, however, an important exception to this myopia. Two heralded books of Adam Przeworski took seriously (or appeared to) the pronouncements of the two founders of communism about electoral politics.⁵ He argued, in fact, that the reformist outcome of European social democracy can be traced to their electoral strategy. Encouraging, as they did, working-class parties to enter the electoral/parliamentary arenas inevitably resulted in their class-collaborationist character. As representatives of a minority layer of society, they were forced to attenuate their demands in order to win parliamentary seats.

Przeworski’s argument, which continues to be accepted as wisdom in political science, is based, however, on an egregious misrepresentation of Marx and Engels and a selective reading of the social democratic experience. I document in a 2010 article the numerous ways in which he distorted their texts—in at least one case putting words into Marx’s mouth.⁶ If Przeworski is to be believed, Marx and Engels, and not the subsequent leaders of social democracy, were responsible for its reformist outcome. And to try to make his case, Przeworski, in *Paper Stones*, offers apparently convincing evidence based on the actual record of those parties that such an outcome was unavoidable. But his is a selective reading of the evidence, because there is at least one social democratic party missing in his account—the party that Lenin led. This book, which details the Bolshevik experience in the electoral/parliamentary arena is—as I could only suggest in my article—therefore a refutation of Przeworski’s claims.

Przeworski isn't alone in distorting Marx and Engels's electoral strategy. Others have done the same, especially when it comes to Engels. The latter is alleged to be the real author of social democratic reformism. An example is Manfred Steger's attempt, like that of Przeworski, to justify Bernstein's subsequent revisionism; see his "Friedrich Engels and the Origins of German Revisionism: Another Look," in Steger and Terrell Carver, *Engels after Marx* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999). A more recent version of this tendency is Tristram Hunt's *Marx's General: The Revolutionary Life of Friedrich Engels* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009), 338–44. The evidence I provide in this chapter on Engels in his final years, especially his fight against opportunism, gives lie to all such efforts to defang him.

As for Marx and Engels's writings and activities in relation to the Russian movement, the last section of this chapter, the striking thing about the Marxological and Leninological literatures is the virtual absence of any mention of them. The reason, I suspect, has to do with the social democratic leanings of most of their authors, who have a vested interest in defending the alleged Chinese Wall between Marx and Engels on one side and Lenin on the other. Why until now the dots between the former and the latter, specifically the making of the Bolshevik Revolution, have never been connected is therefore understandable.

CHAPTER 2: REVOLUTIONARY CONTINUITY; LENIN'S POLITICS PRIOR TO 1905

Allowing Lenin to speak for himself as this book does stands in sharp contrast, as discussed in the Conclusion to *LES1917*, to that of a classic Leninologist account: Alfred G. Meyer's *Leninism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), particularly Chapter 3, "Democracy." While Meyer provides quotes from Lenin, easily three-fourths of the text is his voice—to prove that Lenin wasn't really a democrat despite what the quotes say. Meyer, I suspect, like so many of his kindred, is a victim of what I call in the Preface the *post hoc* fallacy—a tendency to read pre-October 1917 Lenin through the lens of what later occurred in the Soviet Union—that is, the Stalinist counterrevolution. Since he couldn't find the antidemocrat smoking gun in Lenin's words or actions prior to 1917, he had to invent it with his spin on the quotes he did provide.

Robert Service's trilogy three decades later, *Lenin: A Political Life*, is also, like Meyer's *Leninism*, a selective reading of Lenin, but because of its length, it is more elaborate and informed.⁷ He included, for example, a few lines from *What the "Friends of the People" Are* but conveniently omitted any mention of Lenin's emboldened words "**Social-Democrats**" and

“Democracy.”⁸ Any evidence that Lenin took civil liberties seriously, as in his 1897 “Draft and Explanation of a Program for the Social Democratic Party,” is also absent in Service’s account.

More important than the Leninological misrepresentations is Hal Draper’s claim that Lenin himself misrepresented Marx and Engels’s “dictatorship of the proletariat,” therefore “facilitating (though certainly not causing) the societal counterrevolution represented by Stalin.”⁹ If the Leninologist crowd hasn’t found the smoking gun to make their case, then perhaps someone more capable and credible has. According to Draper, the dictatorship of the proletariat for Marx and Engels “meant nothing more and nothing less than ‘rule of the proletariat’—the ‘conquest of political power’ by the working class, the establishment of a workers’ state in the immediate postrevolutionary period.”¹⁰ But Marx and Engels were not, as Draper seems to imply, interested in the proletariat’s “conquest of political power” as an end in itself but rather the use of that power to carry out socialist transformation. And the latter would require, as the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* makes all so clear, “despotic inroads” on capital and its property—that is, the use of force. In four successive locations the *Manifesto*, which, again, Lenin knew all so well, explicitly or indirectly sanctions the use of force.¹¹ To fault, as Draper does, Lenin for incorporating the use of force into his usage of the dictatorship of the proletariat—the misrepresentation charge—is to engage in what the latter sometimes called pettifogging or, perhaps more correctly, only a textual rather than a political analysis of what they meant by the term. Such a reading of Lenin, I argue, is what Draper is alluding to when he writes that Lenin’s first take on the term is “about the Plekhanov-type *abrogation of democratic rights in specific situations* and nothing else.”¹² But Draper never addresses the more important political question that Lenin in the later context of the Revolution of 1905–7 had to answer: whether “despotic inroads” includes the “abrogation of democratic rights” and therefore whether they are legitimate from a revolutionary point of view and one that Marx and Engels would have endorsed.

Less important (at least for purposes here) is Draper’s other charge that Lenin’s “two-class dictatorship,” specifically his democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, clashed with Marx and Engels’s understanding of class politics. I disagree because, as I point out in my *Marx and Engels*, they promoted and defended the revolutionary “people’s alliance” in the context of the 1848–49 upheavals, a coalition not unlike, I argue, Lenin’s “two-class dictatorship.”¹³ To say that it “is not our present task, fortunately, to discuss the merits and demerits of this solution of Lenin’s to the crucial problem of the Russian revolution”

(p. 85) sounds like a cop-out that permits textual at the expense of political analysis.¹⁴ Draper's failure to even acknowledge—in what purports to be an exhaustive exposition of Lenin's views on the dictatorship of the proletariat, specifically the latter's most concrete defense of his formulation after its initial launching in 1905—his polemic with Martov in 1909¹⁵ gives credence to such a characterization. It's worth noting in this context Lenin's disagreement—rightly, in my opinion—with Engels's labeling of the Paris Commune as the “dictatorship of the proletariat.”¹⁶ Exactly because Lenin had to function in the laboratory of the class struggle could he confidently do so—the only instance I know of in which he disagreed with either of the founders of the communist movement.

Lenin the putschist is another favorite hobbyhorse of Lenin bashers. This calumny derives from their time-worn misrepresentation of how the Bolsheviks led the working class to power in October in 1917. It is in turn employed to search for the smoking gun in Lenin's background, the roots of his supposed propensity for a conspiratorial-putschist minority-led revolution. But if the actual record prior to 1917 doesn't yield such evidence, as the quotes I provide on his views on terrorism and armed struggle would suggest, then its employers are compelled to invent it—exactly what Service and Figes do. While the former only hints at the culprit,¹⁷ the latter spins a full-flung tale. The “Russian revolutionary tradition . . . of conspiratorial politics . . . [and] putschist tactics” via the Narodniks, especially Peter Tkachev (who was once the target of Engels's critique of such a *modus operandi*), is what really informed Lenin's politics, his Marxist protestations notwithstanding.¹⁸ Lars Lih, who devotes six pages to the allegation, rightly concludes that the “idea that Lenin used Tkachev as a reliable guide to on-going political decisions in 1904–5 or any other time is totally absurd.”¹⁹

When it comes to Lenin's party-building project, Leninology gets quite creative. About his first take on the subject, *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* (1897), Service writes, “He urged social-democrats to set about ‘the education, disciplining and organization of the proletariat.’ The imagery is trenchantly hierarchical; its bursts through all the qualifying language of the sentences around it. Discipline was always a key theme in his thought.”²⁰ But rather than reproduce “the qualifying language of the sentences around” what Lenin actually wrote, as I do in presenting the text, Service offers his own “qualifying language.” Here is the complete sentence that Lenin wrote: “[Russian social democrats] think that the fight against the autocracy must consist not in organizing conspiracies, but in educating, disciplining and organizing the proletariat, in political agitation among the workers which denounces every

manifestation of absolutism, which pillories all the knights of the police government and compels this government to make concessions"²¹—not quite the “trenchantly hierarchical” tone that Service imputes.

But innuendo isn't sufficient for Service. When the counterfactuals are all too evident, he suffers a bout of myopia. Lenin, in his *Our Immediate Task* (1899), posed two key questions about how to reconcile rank-and-file control from below with the need for a centralized party in the context of near-absolutist Czarist Russia, both of which I reproduce in full. In this instance Service is especially duplicitous. Not only does he conveniently ignore the second question, but he baldly misrepresents what Lenin actually wrote: “But significantly, [Lenin] left his cumbersome phrased question unanswered.”²² As the reader can easily verify in Chapter 2, pp. 24–25, Lenin offered very concrete proposals on how to answer both questions, suggestions that, again, challenge the standard Leninological portrait of him as the domineering ogre who sought to impose his program on the working class.

“Lenin the ogre” and the related “Lenin the Jacobin” have their origin in the aftermath of the historic Second Congress of the RSDLP in 1903, which resulted in the Bolshevik-Menshevik split. Both Trotsky and Luxemburg were their original authors—Trotsky in particular, as his biographer Issac Deutscher convincingly documents.²³ Both polemicized against Lenin's book, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, his assessment of the congress and defense of his position. Only in April 1917 did Trotsky put away his differences with Lenin—certainly on the organizational question—and join forces with him. As for what had been his position vis-à-vis that of Lenin, “its profound erroneousness,” he wrote in 1941, “had been long ago demonstrated both in theory and practice.”²⁴ There is no evidence that Luxemburg, unlike Trotsky, reconsidered her stance. In his response to her criticism of his book, Lenin argued that she misunderstood his approach to party organizing,²⁵ which lends credence to Lars Lih's argument that she actually never read the book.²⁶

Perhaps the most egregious example of misrepresentation in the annals of Leninology was performed by Bertram Wolfe in his *Three Who Made a Revolution*.²⁷ After having begun for about a hundred pages somewhat objectively about Lenin, or at least pretending to, Wolfe had his supposed aha! moment—the proverbial smoking gun at last found. Buried in Lenin's polemic about the 1903 RSDLP conference, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, was the incriminating evidence. In it, page unspecified, Wolfe alleges that

centralism becomes a revolutionary virtue *per se* for all lands and all circumstances of struggle. One looks in vain in [*OSFTSB*] for what was in the

preceding works: some tribute to the desirability and corrective and educative force of democracy. On the contrary: “Burocratism versus democratism, i.e. precisely centralism versus autonomy, such is the organizational principle of revolutionary social democracy as against that of the opportunists. The latter principle strives to go from below upward, and therefore defends as far as possible and wherever possible autonomy and democracy . . . But the organizational principle of revolutionary social democracy strives to go from the top downward, and defends the enlargement of the rights and plenary powers of the central against the parts.”

“This,” Wolfe explains, “is the most naked expression of faith in hierarchy and distrust of democracy to be found in all of Lenin’s writings. Only the isolation from the criticism of equals and the stubborn tendency to cherish most what was most under attack could have wrung from him such an extreme statement . . . [W]hen we seek to understand the Russian state after Lenin came to power, and when we watch the formation of the Communist International, we shall have to keep this one-sided utterance in mind, for it takes an authoritarian party to make an authoritarian state.”²⁸ There, according to Wolfe, is the key to understanding the Stalinist counterrevolution that came in the wake of the Bolshevik triumph in 1917—this uncharacteristic “extreme statement” of Lenin in praise of “centralism” and “hierarchy” and of “distrust in democracy.” I leave aside the pitfalls in Wolfe’s reductionist argument about the reasons for the Stalinist counterrevolution, an issue I address in Chapter 3 in *Lenin’s Electoral Strategy from 1907 to the Revolution of October 1917: The Ballot, the Streets—or Both*. The focus here is on the smoking gun that he claimed to have found.

Let’s look now at what Lenin actually wrote—the full paragraph and this time with the page numbers. I embolden what Wolfe selected from the original, taking into account different translations.

Perhaps the only attempt to analyze the concept bureaucracy is the distinction drawn in the new *Iskra* (No. 53) between the “formal *democratic* principle” (author’s italics) and the “formal *bureaucratic* principle.” This distinction (which, unfortunately, was no more developed or explained than the reference to the non-*Iskra*-ists) contains a grain of truth. **Bureaucracy versus democracy** is in fact **centralism versus autonomism**; it is **the organizational principle of revolutionary Social-Democracy as opposed to the organizational principle of opportunist Social-Democracy. The latter strives to proceed from the bottom upward, and, therefore, wherever possible and as far as possible, upholds autonomism and “democracy,”** [Lenin’s all-important scare quotes are dropped in Wolfe’s rendering] carried (by the overzealous) to the point of

anarchism. The former strives to proceed **from the top downward, and upholds an extension of the rights and powers of the center in relation to the parts.** In the period of disunity and separate circles, this **top** from which **revolutionary Social-Democracy strove to proceed organizationally** was inevitably one of the circles, the one enjoying most influence by virtue of its activity and its revolutionary consistency (in our case, the *Iskra* organisation). In the period of the restoration of actual Party unity and dissolution of the obsolete circles in this unity, this top is inevitably the *Party Congress*, as the supreme organ of the Party; the Congress as far as possible includes representatives of all the active organizations, and, by appointing the central institutions (often with a membership which satisfies the advanced elements of the Party more than the backward and is more to the taste of its revolutionary than its opportunist wing), makes them the top until the next Congress. Such, at any rate, is the case among the Social-Democratic Europeans, although little by little this custom, so abhorrent in principle to anarchists, is beginning to spread—not without difficulty and not without conflicts and squabbles—to the Social-Democratic Asiatics.²⁹

Let's "cut to the chase." The "top" that Lenin was referring to and what Wolfe inexcusably omitted was "the Party Congress"—that is, the representative body ("as far as possible" under police state conditions) of the local organizations and committees and in power "until the next Congress." In countries that enjoyed greater political liberty, the congress was composed of democratically elected delegates from the local level. Thus the centralization that Lenin fought for was the kind of organizational structure that existed in virtually all social democratic parties. At the heart of the fight with the "autonomists" was their desire to maintain or reluctance to give up the local sovereignty that they had long been accustomed to exercising and not yield to the sovereignty of a higher body—that is, the party congress. Only an honest reading of Lenin's words—all of them—conveys what he actually meant.

As far as I can determine this is the first published exposure of Wolfe's legerdemain. Even Paul LeBlanc, in his sympathetic account about Lenin, *Lenin and the Revolutionary Party* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1990), and which makes a number of critical references about Wolfe's book, missed his machinations. It can't be overstated how influential the book was from its appearance in 1948—and it is still in print. It was greeted with accolades by luminaries such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Edmund Wilson, and Isaiah Berlin and was for decades required reading on many a university course syllabus. Again, because Wolfe was a former "insider," a functionary for Stalin, it gave his account credibility that none other had ever had. Note, also, what makes Wolfe's accusation

effective—feigned surprise at what he supposedly discovered, in such contrast to “what was in [Lenin’s] preceding works” that gave “tribute to the desirability and corrective and educative force of democracy.” Wolfe’s tenure as a staffer in Comintern makes it hard to resist recalling the title of Trotsky’s instructive book about the organization’s *modus operandi*, *The Stalinist School of Falsification*. If anyone could distort the real Lenin, Wolfe had the requisite credentials and skills. I suspect that the reason Wolfe hasn’t been detected until now is that his claim *hoc* sounds credible given the mainstream narrative—informed by a *post hoc* reading of the Russian revolution.

CHAPTER 3: “THE DRESS REHEARSAL” AND THE FIRST DUMA

J. L. Keep claims that Lenin “was exultant at the dissolution” of the First Duma, and to “many of his hearers the course which Lenin now recommended savored of ‘Blanquism.’”³⁰ By the latter, Keep was referring to Lenin’s call for the need to make preparations for a possible military confrontation with the regime. And consistent with Keep’s Blanquist characterization of Lenin, the latter “advised the social-democratic deputies against trying to make contact with the electorate.” Nothing could be further from the truth, as the evidence I provide, and what Keep is silent about, for Lenin’s strategy for the RSDLP fraction shows. It was the regime that went to extraordinary lengths to prevent contact between the two. Keep betrays more confusion when he writes that Lenin “warned the workers with uncharacteristic caution not to strike until they were fully prepared, urging instead the formation of special committees to mobilize the peasants.”³¹ Only for those like Keep who didn’t understand Lenin’s politics was it “uncharacteristic” to advise revolutionary restraint.

It is possible to read, as Keep does, inconsistency into Lenin’s tactics regarding the dissolution but only if one ignores that by end of the First Duma, as I think the evidence demonstrates and as Lenin admits, the institution had in fact—despite his initial skepticism—been of use. So the idea that he was “exultant” about its dissolution only makes sense if he hadn’t changed his mind. Thus Keep is in a quandary in trying to explain why Lenin opposed boycott of the elections to the Second Duma. He, according to Keep, “seemed unsure of this position and took refuge in vague contradictory definitions of the new course. Perhaps the most plausible explanation of his change of tactics is that, although he was now aware of the improbability of an uprising in the near future, he dared not admit in public what he recognized in private”³²—that is, “Lenin the devious.” The contradictions reside only in Keep’s reformist brain, which

couldn't understand Lenin's revolutionary utilitarian or, better, Marxist approach to the electoral/parliamentary process.

Keep's real sympathies are revealed in his final comments about Lenin: "In so far as Lenin's deliberate policy of 'exposing' the Kadets helped to alienate popular support from the assembly and facilitate its dissolution, his tactics toward the first State Duma in 1906 may be said to have foreshadowed his own forcible dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1918."³³ Not only did Lenin's actions in 1906 undermine Russia's first experiment with liberal democracy, we're told, but they explain the Stalinist counterrevolution that came in the wake of Lenin's death—two birds with one stone, and how convenient! Figes, forty years later, at least recognizes that the Cadets were their own worst enemies and didn't need a Lenin to blame.

NOTES

PREFACE

1. V. I. Lenin, “Left-Wing” Communism—An Infantile Disorder, in *Collected Works*, vol. 31 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), p. 61. Hereafter, citations from his *Collected Works* will be designated as in this case: 31, p. 61.
2. Like Marxologists (and unlike Marxists and Leninists), Leninologists pretend to be nonpartisan in pursuit of “objective research.” The reality in both cases is otherwise; for the duplicity of the Leninologists, see “A Critical Review of the Relevant Literature.” I owe the distinction to Hal Draper, *Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution*, vol. 1 (New York: Monthly Review, 1977).
3. I recognize that Lenin’s portrait by his enemies is complicated. Some of them actually praise what they see as his organizing skills while disdaining his politics. A classic example is Samuel Huntington’s assessment in his *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967). Huntington’s portrait may in fact be the inspiration for such neoconservatives as William Kristol; “neoconservative foreign policy thinking has all along indulged a romance of the ruthless—an expectation that small numbers of people might be able to play a decisive role in world events, if only their ferocity could be unleashed” (Paul Berman, *New York Times Book Review*, March 26, 2006).
4. At the end of his influential career, Leninologist Leopold Haimson appears to have had a greater appreciation of the Bolshevik leader. But he still couldn’t resist reading him through the lens of the Stalinist outcome of the Russian Revolution. See his “Lenin’s Revolutionary Career Revisited: Some Observations on Recent Discussion,” *Kritika* 5, no. 1 (2004): 79.
5. See “A Critical Review of the Relevant Literature: Chapter Two” for what might be the most blatant example.
6. Richard Pipes, *The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archive* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).
7. I discuss in my *Marx, Tocqueville, and Race in America: The “Absolute Democracy” or “Defiled Republic”* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003), pp. 161–71, how these two overturns were actually linked.

Just as I was completing the manuscript, I discovered Roland Boer’s *Lenin, Religion, and Theology* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), a most informative treatment of a hitherto neglected dimension of the Bolshevik leader. I didn’t have time to give it more than a cursory glance other than the references to Lenin vis-à-vis Duma politics—none of which appear to be problematic. However, I beg to differ with his claim about those who argue, like Trotsky and Krupskaya (Lenin’s widow), that “Lenin was thoroughly consistent and faithful to Marx throughout his life, operating with a grand socialist narrative

that moved . . . to the glorious construction of communism. The problem with this position is not only that it must end with a narrative of disappointment, for Lenin found after the revolution that events did not turn out as expected, but also that it must smooth over the many times Lenin took an unexpected direction” (p. 7). Readers of this book and its companion volume will be able to determine if one of “many times” applied to his electoral/parliamentary strategy. Relevant here, though, is the false assumption that neither Lenin nor his mentors, Marx and Engels, were prepared for defeats or counterrevolutions. Nothing could be further from the truth. The authors of the *Communist Manifesto* recognized this reality about the class struggle in the second paragraph of the first part of the document. Proletarian defeats, a few pages later, were more common than victories. And the living class struggle, from the coup d’état of Louis Bonaparte in 1851 to the defeat of the Communards of Paris in 1871—whose lessons Lenin had internalized—made theory real.

8. Doug Jenness, *Lenin as Election Campaign Manager* (New York: Pathfinder, 1971).
9. “Marx and Engels’s Electoral Strategy: The Alleged versus the Real,” *New Political Science* 32, no. 3 (September 2010): 367–87.
10. *Marx and Engels: Their Contribution to the Democratic Breakthrough* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000).
11. Nadezhda Krupskaya, *Memories of Lenin* (London: Panther Books, 1970), p. 145.
12. Robert Service, *Lenin: A Political Life*, vol. 2 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 353n32.

CHAPTER 1

1. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 28 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), pp. 241–42. Hereafter, the designation will be as follows: 28, pp. 241–42.
2. For another discussion of the topic, see my “Marx and Engels’s Electoral Strategy: The Alleged versus the Real,” *New Political Science* 32, no. 3 (September 2010): 367–87.
3. “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1975–2004), pp. 28–29. Hereafter, citations from the *MECW* are designated as follows: *MECW* 3, pp. 28–29. For details on Marx and Engels’s political evolution, see my *Marx and Engels: Their Contribution to the Democratic Breakthrough* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000), ch. 1, and my *Marx, Tocqueville, and Race in America: The “Absolute Democracy” or “Defiled Republic”* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003), ch. 1.
4. Chapter 1 in my *Marx, Tocqueville* distills Marx’s path to communist conclusions based on his reading of the US case.
5. *MECW* 6, p. 333.
6. *MECW* 27, p. 271.
7. *MECW* 7, p. 3.

8. Engels reproduced a somewhat abridged version of the *Demands* in his article “On the History of the Communist League” in 1885, *MECW* 26, pp. 312–30, which did not include, for reasons not clear, the sixth demand and the accompanying clarification quoted here; it’s possible that forty years later he didn’t have a clean copy of the original. This might explain why Lenin, as far as I can tell, did not employ the *Demands* to support his arguments about the peasantry, specifically the alliance between workers and the small peasantry. Had he known what Marx and Engels had advocated I have no doubt that Lenin would have drawn on their authority to support his case.
9. For details, see my *Marx and Engels*, specifically the Index entries “democratic centralism,” “party: internal democracy,” “norms and obligations,” “rules.”
10. *MECW* 48, p. 425. See also Engels’s more detailed comment on internal party democracy in *MECW* 49, p. 11.
11. In Cologne, at least, the League, owing to Gottschalk’s opposition, boycotted the elections. Jonathan Sperber, *Karl Marx: A Nineteenth-Century Life* (New York: Liveright, 2013), p. 221.
12. *MECW* 8, p. 227–28. On the discussion within the worker’s movement on this question, see Oscar Hammen, *The Red ’48ers: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1969), pp. 360–61. Contrary to Hammen, the context for this quote makes clear that the “party” is indeed the “people’s alliance” of the *Demands* and not the communist party of the *Manifesto*.
13. *MECW* 8, p. 514.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 288–89.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 390.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 391.
17. David Riazanov, *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: An Introduction to Their Lives and Works* (New York: Monthly Review, 1973), p. 100.
18. *L3*, p. 37.
19. *MECW* 10, p. 284, my italics.
20. *Ibid.*
21. In my “Marx and Engels’s Electoral Strategy,” I criticize Adam Przeworski for flagrantly misrepresenting Marx and Engels’s view on this and subsequent points.
22. For a comparison of Marx and Engels’s assessment of the 1848 revolution in France and that of Tocqueville, see Chapter 5 in my *Marx and Engels*.
23. *MECW* 10, p. 137.
24. *MECW* 11, p. 79. It might be noted that this is not a translation, because the original series was in English—published in the *New York Daily-Tribune* under Marx’s name.
25. *MECW* 41, p. 453. Uppercase indicates that the original is in English.
26. *MECW* 8, p. 215.
27. *MECW* 20, p. 12, my italics.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
29. *MECW* 42, pp. 54–55.

30. Ibid., pp. 92–93. Marx, in a letter to Engels in May 1865, voiced similar suspicions about the one-time Chartist leader Ernest Jones: “[B]etween ourselves, *he is only* trying to use our Association for electoral agitation” (Ibid., p. 155). When Jones asked Marx in November 1868 to assist his parliamentary bid, he politely declined. The GC, he said, “does not get mixed up ELECTIONEERING” (MECW 43, p. 166). If the reader is wondering how Marx dealt with the fact of his own class origins in his role in the IWMA, see my *Marx and Engels*, pp. 185–88.
31. MECW 42, p. 314.
32. MECW 44, pp. 100–101.
33. MECW 41, p. 400.
34. Ibid., p. 467. Unbeknownst to Marx at the time, the summer of 1863, Lassalle met secretly with Bismarck to effect such a quid pro quo. In his letter to the chancellor, which included the statues of the GGWA, Lassalle gloated over “the constitution of *my* empire, which perhaps you’d have to envy me! But this miniature picture will plainly convince you how true it is that the working class feels instinctively inclined to dictatorship if it can first be rightfully convinced that such will be exercised in its interests.” He then proposed to Bismarck that the Crown become, in partnership with him lording over the German working class, a “social dictatorship.” Hal Draper, *Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution*, vol. 4 (New York: Monthly Review, 1990), p. 55. How perceptive Marx had been in suspecting Lassalle of aspiring to be “a future working men’s dictator”!
35. MECW 41, p. 467.
36. MECW 22, p. 328.
37. MECW 23, p. 175. Almost 25 years later Engels reiterated this point; see MECW 50, p. 276.
38. MECW 22, pp. 417–18.
39. MECW 22, p. 617. Henri Tolain, a French member of the IWMA who had been elected to the National Assembly “as a representative of the Working classes” prior to the outbreak of the Commune, sided with Versailles against the insurgents. Because of his actions, the IWMA expelled him as a traitor; see *ibid.*, p. 297.
40. Ibid., p. 618.
41. Ibid., p. 427.
42. Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (New York: New Press, 1996), p. 10. Though not on Sassoon’s list, I’m including the French party of Jules Guesde that Marx collaborated with.
43. MECW 45, p. 283.
44. Ibid., pp. 6–7.
45. Draper, *Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution*, vol. 2, pp. 516 and 600.
46. MECW 45, p. 403.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., p. 405.
49. Ibid., pp. 406–7.

50. Ibid., p. 408.
51. Ibid., p. 399.
52. Ibid., pp. 423–24. As the reader probably realizes, *social democracy* had a different meaning in the Marxist movement at this stage from what it would acquire subsequently.
53. Ibid., p. 400.
54. Ibid., p. 408.
55. Ibid., pp. 413–14.
56. Contrary to what David McLellan, *Karl Marx: His Life and Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 438, suggests, Marx did have an opinion of Bernstein and company, at least in September 1879, which was not very flattering: “They are poor *counter-revolutionary* windbags” (Ibid., p. 413).
57. *MECW* 46, p. 42.
58. Ibid, p. 150.
59. *MECW* 45, p. 9. For useful details about the elections, see my *Marx and Engels*, specifically the Index entries “democratic centralism,” “party: internal democracy,” “norms and obligations,” “rules.” Regarding Jacoby’s biography, see Hal Draper, *The Marx-Engels Glossary* (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), p. 103.
60. *MECW* 45, p. 7.
61. *MECW* 24, p. 248.
62. *MECW* 23, p. 255.
63. *MECW* 24, p. 249.
64. *MECW* 49, p. 135.
65. *MECW* 46, p. 8.
66. *MECW* 26, p. 272.
67. *MECW* 50, p. 29. For Engels’s first usage of the military analogy regarding elections, see *MECW* 48, pp. 39–40.
68. See “A Critical Review of the Relevant Literature: Chapter 1” for examples of literature that subscribe to the defanged Engels allegation.
69. *MECW* 46, p. 44.
70. *MECW* 24, p. 340.
71. *MECW* 47, p. 210.
72. *MECW* 48, p. 30.
73. *MECW* 50, p. 155.
74. Ibid., pp. 159–60.
75. *MECW* 47, p. 342.
76. Ibid., p. 223.
77. *MECW* 48, p. 423.
78. *MECW* 27, p. 227.
79. Ibid., p. 271.
80. *MECW* 50, pp. 486 and 489.
81. *MECW* 27, p. 519.
82. Ibid., pp. 78–79.
83. Ibid., p. 241.
84. Ibid., pp. 6 and 10.

85. *MECW* 48, p. 456.
86. *MECW* 49, p. 267.
87. *MECW* 48, p. 452.
88. *MECW* 50, p. 369.
89. *MECW* 47, pp. 201–2.
90. *MECW* 50, p. 369.
91. *MECW* 49, p. 502. As for Engels's opinion of the Fabians, "its chief object is to convert your *bourgeois* to socialism and so introduce the thing *peacefully* and *constitutionally*" (*MECW* 48, p. 449).
92. *MECW* 46, p. 413.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
94. *MECW* 48, pp. 267–68.
95. *MECW* 50, p. 261.
96. Karl Kautsky, *The Class Struggle (Erfurt Program)* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), p. 2.
97. *MECW* 49, pp. 367–68.
98. Kautsky, *The Class Struggle*, pp. 186–88, my italics. Note that the version I employ is a "somewhat condensed English translation" of the original (p. 2).
99. Przeworski's *Capitalism and Social Democracy*, the second chapter, is the most persuasive. See also Sheri Berman, "Social Democracy's Past and Potential Future," in *What's Left of the Left: Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging Times*, ed. James Cronin, George Ross, and James Shoch (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).
100. Maximillien Rubel and Margaret Manale, *Marx without Myth: A Chronological Study of His Life and Work* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 251. This rendering compares favorably to that of *MECW* 43, p. 551.
101. *MECW* 43, p. 424.
102. *Ibid.*, p. 450.
103. *MECW* 45, p. 103. "Longer than he expected" refers to the revolutionary upheavals in Germany that came in the wake of the Russian Revolution in October 1917.
104. *MECW* 43, p. 462.
105. *MECW* 44, p. 396.
106. Institute of Marxism-Leninism, *The General Council of the First International, 1868–1870: Minutes* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), p. 220.
107. *MECW* 24, p. 200.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 359.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 371.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
112. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 252. For Marx's praise of Russian terrorists like Zasulich, see *MECW* 46, pp. 45 and 83.
114. *MECW* 45, p. 296.
115. *MECW* 24, p. 103.

116. *MECW* 46, p. 198.
117. *MECW* 24, p. 426.
118. *MECW* 48, p. 46.
119. *MECW* 46, p. 83.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
121. *MECW* 26, p. 294.
122. *MECW* 47, p. 264.
123. *Ibid.*, p. 280.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 281.
125. On some details about Zasulich's close relationship with Engels, especially after she moved from Geneva to London in 1894, see Jay Bergman, *Vera Zasulich: A Biography* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), ch. 4.
126. *MECW* 27, p. 433.
127. Draper, *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution*, vol. 2, p. 272.
128. For details, see Draper and E. Haberkern, *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, Vol. V: War & Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review, 2005), especially ch. 8.
129. *MECW* 48, p. 135.
130. *MECW* 27, p. 245.
131. *MECW* 50, p. 20.

CHAPTER 2

1. See "A Critical Review of the Relevant Literature: Chapter 2" in *Lenin's Electoral Strategy from 1907 to the October Revolution of 1917* (hereafter, *LES1917*) for details.
2. *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 44 (New York: International Publishers, 1975–2004), p. 396. Hereafter, citations from the *MECW* are designated as follows: *MECW* 44, p. 396.
3. Much ink has been spilt on Lenin's familial situation and its influence on his political trajectory, especially the execution of his brother Alexander, all of which is beyond the purview of this book. On his biography, Leon Trotsky's *The Young Lenin* (New York: Doubleday, 1972) is particularly useful.
4. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 540. Hereafter, citations from his *Collected Works* will be indicated as in this case: *L*, p. 540.
5. Lenin anxiously tried to get a copy as soon as it was available (*3Z*, p. 68). Interestingly, the Russian Narodnik Nikolai Danielson, living in St. Petersburg, appears to have been the first party contact to receive from Engels the publisher's galley (*MECW* 50, p. 280)—another indication of the importance that he and Marx lent to the Russian movement.
6. Trotsky, *The Young Lenin*, p. 185.
7. Philip Pomper, *Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin: The Intelligentsia and Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 32–33.
8. Lars Lih, *Lenin Rediscovered: What Is to Be Done in Context* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 377–84, correctly disputes the frequent charge that Lenin never

- got over the Narodnik influence but misses an opportunity to show how Marx himself found Chernyshevsky attractive.
9. L, pp. 289–92, italics and bold in the original.
 10. *Ibid.*, p. 504.
 11. Both documents are inconvenient for Leninologists. See “A Critical Review of the Relevant Literature: Chapter 2” in *LES1917*.
 12. *MECW* 27, p. 271. In his “Appendix II,” Lenin cites the relevant texts of Marx and Engels to make his case. Particularly noteworthy is the young Lenin’s familiarity with the Marx-Ruge correspondence, 1842–43. These letters, underappreciated until today, reveal the process by which Marx broke with the young Hegelians, a necessary step on his road to communism. That Lenin could so early unearth them and see their significance speaks volumes about how well schooled he was in Marx’s project.
 13. *Ibid.*, p. 439.
 14. Lars Lih’s claim that Lenin was essentially an offspring of the German Social Democratic Party, Kautsky specifically, was the target of my critique, “A Return to Lenin—But without Marx and Engels?” *Science and Society* 73, no. 4 (October 2009): 452–73.
 15. 4, pp. 92–93.
 16. 2, pp. 26–27.
 17. Robert Service, *Lenin: A Political Life*, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 61–62.
 18. 2, pp. 117–18. See “A Critical Review of the Relevant Literature: Chapter 2” in *LES1917* for Leninological myopia about Lenin’s views on civil liberties.
 19. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
 20. *Ibid.*, p. 278.
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 285.
 22. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
 23. *Ibid.*, p. 333.
 24. *Ibid.*, pp. 333–34. Subsequent quotations can be found on pages 335–38.
 25. *Ibid.*, pp. 335–37.
 26. 2, p. 343.
 27. 4, p. 239.
 28. Hal Draper, *Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, Vol. 3: The “Dictatorship of the Proletariat”* (New York: Monthly Review, 1986).
 29. 6, pp. 26–27. Plekhanov’s original states, “[I]n order to effect its revolution, the proletariat must have command of political power, which will make it master of the situation and enable it ruthlessly to smash all the obstacles it will come up against on the road to its great goal. In this sense the dictatorship of the proletariat is an essential political condition of the social revolution” (*Ibid.*, pp. 21–22). Lenin’s marginal notes are intriguing: “‘Master of the situation,’ ‘ruthlessly to smash,’ ‘dictatorship’??? (The social revolution is enough for us.)” Do his question marks suggest that he was uncertain about Plekhanov’s usage of the term or of the term itself? His proposed rewording appears to be his effort to clarify.

30. See my “Marx and Engels’s Electoral Strategy: The Alleged versus the Real,” *New Political Science* 32, no. 3 (September 2010): 375 for details.
31. Lenin’s comments on the *Manifesto*—4, p. 49—about the “dictatorship of the proletariat” are evidence for Draper’s claims. See “A Critical Review of the Relevant Literature: Chapter 2” in *LES1917* for a discussion of Draper’s position.
32. 4, pp. 211–12.
33. For the complete wording of the two demands in the Erfurt Program, see Gary Steenson, *After Marx, Before Lenin: Marxism and Socialist Working Class Parties in Europe, 1884–1914* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), pp. 298–99. Regarding Lars Lih’s position that Lenin was a “Russian Erfurtian,” see his *Lenin Rediscovered*, pp. 111–58, and my critique in “A Return to Lenin—But Without Marx and Engels?”
34. 4, pp. 238–39.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 273–74. The program adopted by the Second Congress of the RSDLP in 1903 begins by calling for the “overthrow of the Tsarist autocracy and its replacement by a democratic republic, the constitution of which would ensure: 1. Sovereignty of the people—that is, concentration of supreme state power wholly in the hands of a legislative assembly consisting of representatives of the people and forming a single chamber. 2. Universal, equal and direct suffrage, in elections both to the legislative assembly and to all local organs of self-government.” *1903: Second Ordinary Congress of the RSDLP, Complete Text of the Minutes* (London: New Park Publications, 1978), p. 6.
37. 4, p. 238.
38. 5, pp. 418–20.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 512.
40. 6, pp. 187–89, 193.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 190–94.
42. For a discussion of this frequently made charge, see “A Critical Review of the Relevant Literature: Chapter 2” in *LES1917*.
43. 6, pp. 103–4.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 467.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 478.
46. In 2005 two Russian scholars, also convinced that their forbearers had democratic instincts, published a study on the elections to the first two state Dumas from the vantage of three provinces to make their case. Since the few things they say about Lenin are positive, it’s unfortunate that they didn’t know what he thought about elections and the details of his involvement in the RSDLP elections to the Second Duma—what I suspect they would have welcomed and another rationale for this book. See Natal’ia Borisovna Selunskaja and Rolf Torstendahl, *The Birth of Democratic Cultures in Late Imperial Russia: Reforms and Elections to the First Two National Legislatures, 1905–1907* (Stockholm: Altus History, 2012).
47. 4, p. 237.
48. 6, p. 473.

49. Z, p. 442. Regarding “America,” the extant record isn’t enlightening.
50. *MECW* 44, p. 258. Again, uppercase indicates the original in English.
51. 5, p. 18.
52. L, p. 320.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 298.
54. See my *Marx and Engels: Their Contribution to the Democratic Breakthrough* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000), ch. 2, for details on how they addressed the issue.
55. On how it came about and how it was organized, see Richard Pipes, *Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885–1897* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 83–86. The editors of the *Collected Works* also provide details on its organization in 2, pp. 546–47.
56. 5, pp. 466–67.
57. 2, p. 330.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 340–41.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 349.
60. This reading of Lenin’s words is markedly different from a Leninological spin on them. See “A Critical Review of the Relevant Literature: Chapter 2” in *LES1917*.
61. 4, pp. 217–18.
62. Service is particularly duplicitous in this regard. See “A Critical Review of the Relevant Literature: Chapter 2” in *LES1917*.
63. 4, pp. 218–19.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 326.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 291.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
67. 34, p. 57.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
69. Later correspondence with Plekhanov and Axelrod (*Ibid.*, pp. 81–85) reveals an atmosphere of give and take when it came to editorial and substantive differences. Chapter 3 in Israel Getzler’s *Martov: A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1967) is also useful.
70. 5, p. 423.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 425.
72. 6, p. 53.
73. 5, p. 472.
74. *Ibid.*, pp. 472–73.
75. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Industrial Democracy* (London: Longmans, Green, 1897); Lenin and his wife Krupskaya translated it in 1900. Karl Kautsky, *Der Parlamentarismus, die Volksgesetzgebung und die Sozialdemokratie* (Stuttgart: J. H. W. Dietz, 1893).
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 477–82.
77. Lars Lih’s *Lenin Rediscovered* is an invaluable source for a number of reasons but not the least for the context for *WITBD*. Chapter 8, “The Organisational Question: Lenin and the Underground,” is especially useful.

78. Fifteen months after it was written and disseminated, Lenin recognized in January 1904 that the letter had the same standing as *WITBD* as a founding document for the organization norms he fought for.
79. 6, p. 235.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 241–42.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
82. *Ibid.*, pp. 246–47.
83. *Z*, p. 208. See also 34, p. 149.
84. *Z*, p. 389.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 267.
86. Lenin's characterization of intellectuals drew heavily on conclusions that Kautsky had reached, as can be seen on pp. 322–24 of *OSFTSB*.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 261. See also, *1903: Second Ordinary Congress of the RSDLP*, p. 314.
88. *Z*, p. 178.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 474.
90. For details and one of the most brazen misrepresentations of Lenin's views, see "A Critical Review of the Relevant Literature: Chapter Two" in *LES1917*.
91. *Z*, pp. 115–17.
92. Lenin had certainly been no saint at the congress, as he admitted in correspondence and publicly. To Potresov, he wrote, "I realize that I often behaved and acted in a state of frightful irritation, 'frenziedly'; I am quite willing to admit *this fault of mine to anyone*" (34, p. 164). And in *OSFTSB* he wrote, "I had admitted my personal harshness openly both in the letter to the *Iskra*-ist and at the League Congress" (*Z*, p. 370).
93. *Ibid.*, p. 395.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 479.
95. *MECW* 48, p. 484.

CHAPTER 3

1. *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 45 (New York: International Publishers, 1975–2004), p. 278. Hereafter, citations from the *MECW* are designated as follows: *MECW* 45, p. 278.
2. Behind the scenes, as the rest of the letter reveals, Marx was doing all he could to weaken Russia's diplomatic position vis-à-vis England.
3. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 7 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), pp. 199–200. Hereafter, citations from his *Collected Works* will be indicated as in this case: *Z*, pp. 199–200.
4. 5, p. 74. So much, then, for the oft-alleged "Leninist approach of 'the worse the better'" as repeated in the *Financial Times*, Oct. 28, 2010.
5. Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Viking, 1996), p. 171.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
7. 8, pp. 21–22.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

9. For a general overview of the 1905 Revolution, see Sidney Harcave, *First Blood: The Russian Revolution of 1905* (New York: MacMillan, 1964). Figes is useful for more recent research.
10. *8*, p. 28.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 375–78.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 385–89.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 534–36.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 560–68.
17. *2*, p. 25.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
19. *MECW* 27, p. 191.
20. *2*, p. 141. As far as I can tell, it was Mary-Alice Waters who first pointed out in print Lenin's disagreement with Engels in her "The Workers' and Farmers' Government: A Popular Revolutionary Dictatorship," *New International* 1, no. 3 (1984): 44–45, 54. In what purports to be a definitive treatment of Lenin's usage of the phrase, Hal Draper's *The "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" from Marx to Lenin* (New York: Monthly Review, 1987), no mention of his correction to Engels is made.
21. *2*, p. 145.
22. See Alfred Levin, *The Second Duma: A Study of the Social-Democratic Party and the Russian Constitutional Experiment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), pp. 7–10, for details.
23. *2*, p. 179.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 182–84.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 258.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 258–61.
29. *34*, p. 353.
30. *2*, pp. 383–84.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 344–46.
32. In "Tasks of Revolutionary Army Contingents," written at the end of October, Lenin elaborates a bit on the problem of "extremes . . . that should not be forgotten" (*Ibid.*, p. 422).
33. *Ibid.*, p. 354.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 461.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 431–32.
36. Figes, p. 197.
37. *10*, p. 163. For corroborating evidence from a fellow Bolshevik about how broadly the "elective principle" was applied in the new setting, see Lars Lih's "Fortunes of a Formula: From 'DEMOCRATIC Centralism' to 'democratic CENTRALISM,'" *John Riddell, Marxist Essays and Commentary* (blog),

April 14, 2013, <http://johnriddell.wordpress.com/2013/04/14/fortunes-of-a-formula-from-democratic-centralism-to-democratic-centralism>.

38. *IQ*, pp. 20–21.
39. For some details on the Tammerfors conference, see *ibid.*, p. 527. The evidence about Lenin's change of heart comes from B. Gorev, the other Bolshevik who initially opposed the boycott; see Robert Service, *Lenin: A Political Life*, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 149. For more sources for Lenin's about-face, see J. L. H. Keep, "Russian Social-Democracy and the First State Duma," *Slavonic & East European Review* 34, no. 82 (December 1955): 198n90.
40. *IQ*, p. 136.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
43. *II*, p. 80.
44. *IQ*, p. 212.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 237–38.
47. *MECW* 26, p. 272.
48. *IQ*, p. 249.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 280.
51. *MECW* 27, p. 433.
52. *IQ*, p. 295.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 293.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 362.
55. Service, vol. 1, p. 155. Tony Cliff, *Building the Party: Lenin 1893–1914* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2002), p. 218, says "we" was a minority of one: Lenin.
56. According to Alan Woods, *Bolshevism, the Road to Revolution: A History of the Bolshevik Party from the Early Beginnings to the October Revolution* (London: Wellred Publications, 1999), p. 276, the Mensheviks "originally refused to participate in elections, but then changed their position to one of a 'semi-boycott.'" Woods is presumably referring to the aforementioned joint statement they issued with the Bolsheviks prior to the elections.
57. *IQ*, p. 313.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 361.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 303–4.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 362.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
62. Lenin revealed that hard bargaining with the Mensheviks took place in agreeing to the organization question—mainly about the percentage of party members needed to call a congress—but only briefly (*ibid.*, p. 372). Though Service devotes five pages to the Fourth Congress, vol. 1, pp. 151–55, his total silence on the democratic centralism decision is deafening.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
64. Figs, p. 202.

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 215–16.
66. *IO*, pp. 398–99.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 402. For photos of the RSDLP Duma deputies in the First and Second Dumas, see A. J. Sack, *The Birth of the Russian Democracy* (New York: Russian Information Bureau, 1918), pp. 147–48 and 153–55, respectively.
68. *IO*, pp. 402–5.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 408. *Nevskaya Gazeta* also provided an account of Lenin's speech, p. 407, and the differences with that of *Volna* are instructive.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 409.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 554.
72. Lenin noted a couple of weeks later that the government "has banned public meetings and has announced that it will take proceedings against those responsible for the meeting" in which he spoke (*ibid.*, pp. 444–45).
73. *Ibid.*, pp. 424–25.
74. Geoffrey A. Hosking, *The Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government and Duma, 1907–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 19.
75. *IO*, p. 457.
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 414–17.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 422.
78. *Ibid.*, pp. 428–29.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 431.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 440–41.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 432–33.
82. Definitive proof would require an analysis of *Nevskaya Gazeta* and *Kuryer* [*The Courier*], the two Menshevik dailies, to see if anyone in its camp was as active as Lenin in trying to influence the Duma fraction. I suspect not, since he made no mention of anyone in that daily doing the same; it would have been out of character for him not to do so.
83. *Ibid.*, pp. 434–35.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 486.
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 458–59, and 438.
86. *Ibid.*, pp. 486–87.
87. Hosking, p. 20.
88. *IO*, pp. 449, 471, 480.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 515.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 501.
91. *Ibid.*, pp. 510–13.
92. *II*, pp. 20–23.
93. *Ibid.*, pp. 24–26.
94. *Ibid.*, pp. 32–37.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
96. *Ibid.*, pp. 43–47.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 482.
98. *Ibid.*, pp. 61–62.
99. *Ibid.*, pp. 69–72.

100. Figes, p. 219.
101. *IL*, pp. 90–93.
102. *Ibid.*, pp. 96–100.
103. *Ibid.*, pp. 101–4.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 107. Hosking, pp. 20–21n25, notes the same article that Lenin referred to in the progovernment daily about an Austrian-German intervention. Unfortunately, he doesn't consider the significance of Lenin's reading of this and his response.
105. *MECW* 6, p. 382.
106. For an opinion that claims that Lenin did “gloat” and thus welcomed the Duma's dissolution, see “A Critical Review of the Relevant Literature: Chapter 3” in *Lenin's Electoral Strategy from 1907 to the Revolution of October 1917: The Ballot, the Streets—or Both*.
107. *IL*, pp. 111–17.
108. Figes, p. 221.

CHAPTER 4

1. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 11 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), pp. 130. Hereafter, citations from his *Collected Works* will be indicated as in this case: *IL*, p. 130.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 138, 148.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 141–48.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 259–60.
5. The history of the norm of democratic centralism—still very much a work in progress at this point—would reveal that carrying out a line of action one disagreed with gave one more authority to challenge it, if necessary, later.
6. Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Viking, 1996), p. 224.
7. *IL*, p. 212.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 219, 224.
9. See Alfred Levin, *The Second Duma: A Study of the Social-Democratic Party and the Russian Constitutional Experiment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), p. 280, for more details, including bibliographic sources.
10. *IL*, p. 501.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 514.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 284–85.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 300, italics in original.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 313–16.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 459. For details on how “from the beginning of the electoral campaign the administration actively interfered in an attempt to influence the results,” see Levin, pp. 60–64.
16. *IL*, p. 415.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 465.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

19. *12*, pp. 18–19.
20. Specifically, “The Workers’ Party Election Campaign in St. Petersburg,” “The Social-Democrats and the Duma Elections” (both in *11*), and “The Protests of the Thirty-One Mensheviks” (in *12*). For the Menshevik view of the meeting, see Levin, pp. 57–58.
21. *11*, p. 426.
22. Recently published documents of Cadet internal deliberations ought to allow for an assessment of Lenin’s claim. See Alexandra Korros, “The Kadet Party and the Elusive Ideal of Internal Democracy,” *Kritika* 5, no. 1 (winter 2004): 117–36.
23. They even, apparently, had a daily, *Trud* [*Labor*], but it must have been only momentarily, since no copies have ever been found (*12*, p. 523).
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–53.
25. Victoria Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion: Workers’ Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900–1914* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), p. 309. Bonnell provides some useful details on how the workers’ curia elections were conducted for the First Duma (pp. 309–10).
26. *12*, p. 62.
27. Bonnell, p. 314.
28. See *MECW* 50, p. 29.
29. *12*, pp. 62–65.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 89–91.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 115–17.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 108–11.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 149. Beyond St. Petersburg, “The Social-Democrats drew heavily from the suppressed minorities in the Caucasian towns, the mining population of Siberia and the Caucasus, and the great Caspian and Black Sea ports with their aggressive seamen and longshoremen” (Levin, p. 67).
35. *12*, p. 120.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
37. The Bolsheviks also began about this time an illegal organ, *Rabochy* [*Worker*], within St. Petersburg that lasted until June 1907. It’s interesting to compare the tone of the two publications. *Novy Luch*, during its brief existence, was much more circumspect in an eventually unsuccessful effort to get by regime censors.
38. *12*, p. 198. This is from Lenin’s article “The Elections to the Duma and the Tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats” for *Die Neue Zeit*, his most detailed analysis of the election returns. Written for a German-speaking social democratic readership, it’s also didactic and provides a clear explanation of the differences between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. That Kautsky, the editor of the organ, was willing to grant space to Lenin is noteworthy. He had denied, it may be remembered, Lenin such an opportunity in 1904 when the Bolshevik leader wanted to respond to Luxemburg and Trotsky’s critique of the Bolsheviks coming out of the Second Congress of the RSDLP. The difference this time, I

suspect, is that Kautsky recognized that Lenin was writing about a real revolution in which he was an important protagonist.

39. For details on the fraction, its election, social composition, and organization, see Levin, ch. 3.
40. *I2*, p. 154.
41. See Levin, pp. 92–94, for details.
42. *I2*, pp. 162–63.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 189–92.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
47. Levin, p. 112n24.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 112–23. Though Levin makes no mention of Lenin's involvement in all of this, his draft response to Stolypin's address (see following) shows that he was indeed an actor in the drama. Why he ignores Lenin's draft in what appears to be an otherwise thorough examination of the published record is not clear. Police reports, if still extant, might fill in the gaps.
49. Levin, p. 122.
50. *I2*, pp. 194–95.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 244.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 309.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 248.
54. See Levin, pp. 176–85, for details about the context.
55. *I2*, pp. 273–75.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 282–86.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 296–99.
59. The German original was published in Stuttgart, 1906.
60. *I2*, pp. 361–74.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 439–40.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 448–50. For more details on Prokopovich and the issue of the fraction employing “expert” opinion, see Levin, pp. 74–75. Lenin's critique of Prokopovich is reminiscent of Marx's warning about “le pedestal” for the bourgeoisie in 1865 in the First International.
63. On the report, why Lenin was able to give it, and the significance of the outcome of the vote, see his very informative article, “The Attitude towards Bourgeois Parties,” *I2*, pp. 489–509.
64. Lenin's most explicit statement of his differences with Trotsky on the peasant question came two years later in “The Aim of the Proletarian Struggle in Our Revolution”: “Trotsky's major mistake is that he ignores the bourgeois character of the revolution and has no clear conception of the transition from this revolution to the socialist revolution.” Lenin then analyzes the “mistakes” that derived from the “major” one (*I5*, pp. 371–74). Part of the problem, I contend, is that Trotsky, because he was imprisoned, didn't get a chance to witness what Lenin

- did—the politicization of the peasantry along the line that the latter expected beginning with the First Duma.
65. *I2*, pp. 456–68.
 66. *Ibid.*, p. 506.
 67. *Ibid.*, p. 508.
 68. See Levin, pp. 200–201, 210–11, for details, and *I2*, p. 229, on what a “socialist view of the budget” would look like.
 69. Alexinsky’s speech on political terror on March 22—Levin, pp. 266–67—would be another example. The trial of the social democratic deputies, to be discussed later, revealed that the *Okbrana*, or state security, indeed had an extensive collection of documents about the fraction’s activities obtained largely from informants.
 70. Levin, p. 123.
 71. A related issue is a set of conferences in which the party participated in November 1906 to discuss its military and armed strategy. See Lenin’s “Apropos of the Minutes of the November Military and Combat Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party,” *I2*, pp. 409–18, and Levin, pp. 282–83.
 72. Levin, p. 324.
 73. Levin, p. 343.
 74. On their fate, see Chapter 1, *Lenin’s Electoral Strategy from 1907 to the Revolution of October 1917: The Ballot, the Streets—or Both*, p. 42.
 75. *Ibid.*, p. 348.
 76. *I2*, p.
 77. *I3*, pp. 101–3.
 78. Levin, p. 353.

APPENDIX A

1. Original text available at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/communist-league/1850-ad1.htm>.
2. Original text available at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm>.

APPENDIX B

1. Original text available at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1905/jul/00.htm>.
2. [Footnote from source] One word illegible.—*Ed.*
3. [Footnote from source] “As the thoroughness of the historic action increases, the magnitude of the mass whose cause it represents will also increase.”—*Ed.* (See Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Critique* [Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1956], p. 410.)
4. [Footnote from source] Fighting capacity.—*Ed.*

APPENDIX C

1. [Footnote from source] The leaflet “Whom to Elect to the State Duma” was written prior to the elections to the Second Duma. In the article “The Government’s Falsification of the Duma and the Tasks of the Social Democrats,” Lenin called this leaflet a poster “about the three *chief* parties” that took part in the Duma elections. The leaflet was printed in Vyborg by the editorial board of *Proletary* as a supplement to No. 5; it appeared in three editions (one in full and two abridged) in St. Petersburg in 1906. In the abridged form it was also published by the Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kostroma, and Kharkov committees of the RSDLP; by the Ob group of the RSDLP; the Central Committee of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Territory; and the Central Committee of the Latvian Social-Democrats. Original text available at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1906/nov/23f.htm>.

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE

1. David Lane, *Leninism: A Sociological Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 43.
2. Sheri Berman, *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 13.
3. *Marx and Engels: Their Contribution to the Democratic Breakthrough* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000).
4. Stefano Bartolini, *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980: The Class Cleavage* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
5. Adam Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), coauthored with John Sprague.
6. “Marx and Engels’s Electoral Strategy: The Alleged versus the Real,” *New Political Science* 32, no. 3 (September 2010): 367–87.
7. Robert Service, *Lenin: A Political Life* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985–95).
8. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 51.
9. Hal Draper, *The “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” from Marx to Lenin* (New York: Monthly Review, 1987), p. 105.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
11. See my “Marx and Engels’s Electoral Strategy,” p. 375, for details.
12. Draper, “*Dictatorship of the Proletariat*,” p. 83.
13. Nimtz, *Marx and Engels*, p. 345n101.
14. Draper, “*Dictatorship of the Proletariat*,” p. 85.
15. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 15 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), pp. 371–74. Hereafter, citations from his *Collected Works* will be indicated as in this case: 15, pp. 371–74.
16. 2, p. 141.

17. Service, vol. 1, p. 38.
18. Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Viking, 1996), pp. 145–46.
19. Lars Lih, *Lenin Rediscovered: What Is to Be Done in Context* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 377–83.
20. Service, vol. 1, p. 77.
21. *Z*, p. 341.
22. Service, vol. 1, p. 76.
23. Issac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879–1921*, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), pp. 83–97.
24. Trotsky, *Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence* (New York: The Universal Library, 1941), p. 112.
25. *Z*, pp. 472–83.
26. Lih, pp. 526–27.
27. Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution: A Biographical History* (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1984).
28. *Ibid.*, p. 259.
29. *Z*, pp. 394–95.
30. J. L. H. Keep, “Russian Social-Democracy and the First State Duma,” *Slavonic & East European Review* 34, no. 82 (December 1955): 195.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 199.

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