

Appendix: Fieldwork in Battambang Province

Within Battambang province, each district or subdistrict has historically witnessed distinct civil-military relations due to such factors as military balances and proximity to administrative or military bases of the belligerent groups throughout the civil wars. To examine the variation in structural contexts across the districts and mobilization strategies of armed groups, chapter 4 deals with three locations for the analysis of the war. First, the northwestern part of Battambang district, which contained the provincial seat, experienced a strong government influence. Second, eastern Banan was more characteristically a “contested area” between the rebel and government forces. As my informants from that district revealed, Khmer Rouge cadres frequently came into the villages to request rations and call for recruits, although the government forces largely seized control of this area. Among the districts studied in chapter 4, the Khmer Rouge established its presence primarily in the third location, western Moug Ruessei. It was from this district that the Khmer Rouge moved whole populations of some villages to their forests and from which many villagers joined the rebel forces.

In chapter 5, two additional locations are examined. First, Battambang City was controlled by the PRK-Vietnamese government. Second, the border areas with Thailand were a location in which the antigovernment guerrillas lay low and established certain governance. In the civil war between 1979 and 1991, the government largely controlled the eastern Banan, northwestern Battambang, and western Moug Ruessei, although these places were visited by rebels for supply of food and recruitment of combatants.

Key findings from the study of these locations are based on interviews that took place during two time frames, December 2008–January 2009 and May–July 2009. All interviews were conducted by me with the support of an English-Khmer interpreter. My interviews were

open-ended and semi-structured and included women and men, former rebel and government supporters, combatants and civilians, low- to middle-rank commanders and rank and files, and local officials and commoners. The in-depth interviews with my informants, which generally lasted for one to two-and-a-half hours, revealed how both the rebels and the government competed to win popular support and recruits from local villages, and also how villagers reacted to their structural contexts.

In 2000, the northwestern part of Battambang district and western Moun Ruessei were split into the districts of Thma Koul and Koas Krala, respectively. There, I interviewed 95 villagers in all: 32 from Thma Koul, 31 from Banan, and 32 from Koas Krala (map A.). Because of the need to confirm the data I collected during interviews, the research sites were restricted to those three districts so that limited information could be accumulated from a specified geographical scope and checked between interviews. Most of the interviewees were drawn by snowball sampling, although I first relied on the roster of ex-government combatants who were demobilized in 2000 by the Cambodian government.¹ Because eight to nine years had passed since their demobilization, it was not possible to contact all ex-combatants, as some had relocated or were by then deceased. In addition, identifying and locating an entire population of appropriate informants, necessary for the probability sampling, was not easy to accomplish because my interviewees had to be villagers (desirably a balance of combatants and civilians) who had had personal experiences of the civil wars within certain areas.² Therefore, I relied mainly upon each interviewee to introduce me to another person in the village at the conclusion of my interview with them. Although I used a roster of ex-combatants and took a snowball sampling, I tended to visit village chiefs, commune councilors, and other influential persons in local places within these districts and explained the purpose of my fieldwork before starting interviews. These contacts occasionally accompanied me on visits to interviewees' houses to make introductions and ensure that informants felt at ease. Their support was integral, especially when I conducted interviews with former Khmer Rouge cadres in Koas Krala, who were cautious about relating their personal experiences.³

Before examining the patterns of civilian participation in the armed forces in each district, the reliability of my interview data should be scrutinized, as fieldwork in the various research sites has some possible drawbacks. One of the issues is whether sufficient trust existed between the interviewees and the interviewers (i.e., the interpreter and



Map A Location of Fieldwork in Cambodia.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency.

me). Since the subjects of interview were those who tended to have had traumatic experiences during the wars, their personal comfort level was important, not only to obtain reliable data but even to conduct interviews. Although we visited most villages several times and went back and forth between neighboring hamlets to find possible samples, the fieldwork, including the extraction of samples and the conducting

of interviews, was completed in a limited timeframe. The brevity of my stay in the research sites may have undermined the reliability of the interview data, because it was possibly not enough time to build trust with the subjects.

It is also possible that the researcher's lack of sufficient experience and skills in fieldwork may have impaired the depth and comprehensiveness of information taken from the interviewees. While I had grown relatively accustomed to interviewing local people by the end of my stay, as the fieldwork proceeded, my semi-structured and open-ended questions largely converged into the primary concerns of this study (e.g., armed actors controlling a certain place and their mobilization strategies). I would often happen upon unexpected individual recollections from particular respondents, but the format of the interview became less flexible toward the end of the fieldwork. This fixation on interview questions negatively influenced the interpreter as well in that narratives from different respondents tended to be transposed with similar phrasing.

Additional details concerning potential problems with my fieldwork method should be mentioned. Although my interviews took place long after the war, the data collected through interviews contain information in which the respondents' political preferences and biographical details, such as past participation in armed groups, are evident, and, therefore, the confidentiality of the information and anonymity of the subjects are crucial. Following the methods of fieldwork adopted by other researchers, in addition to keeping the data collected under strict surveillance, I neither recorded names nor taped interviews for the sake of anonymity. Rather, notes were taken and later transcribed.⁴

Field research in post-conflict areas requires informed consent, by which respondents should understand the potential risks in granting interviews. There is the possibility, for instance, that the interview may not only cause the individual repeated trauma through recollections of violence and grief but also may expose a respondent's past experiences to others. To ease the problem of asymmetrical power relations with interviewees as much as possible, consent was conveyed orally, as a written record could potentially pose a risk to them. Additionally, some respondents would not be fully literate; therefore, verbal communication was most appropriate.

The approach taken in the interview process was specifically tailored to this study. Contact with local actors assured invaluable first-hand perspectives on incidents in the civil wars. Reliance on official sources would have been inappropriate, because these sources would

not have represented the targeted group of participants. Although useful to explore a large-scale shift in structural context (e.g., overall status of territorial control) in past civil wars, official sources, which are often overrepresented by an elitist view of the conflict, may not reveal participants' true motivations for enlistment. However, oral sources can be problematic, too; recollections can be self-contradictory, incomplete, and biased. Not only can they be influenced by their confusing nature, time, complex psychological and cognitive processes, and subsequent events,⁵ but they are often reshaped by political actors and the post-civil war state, so that recollections consequentially become consistent with the dominant narratives.⁶

Of utmost importance in reviewing my findings was to be cautiously aware of the potential for bias held by the interviewees. Each actor's ideas may have highly depended on his or her background or former position (e.g., as government officials, rebel supporters, or disaffected ex-combatants), and, accordingly, findings extracted from elite-level interviewing had to be double-checked by interviews with rank-and-file combatants and civilians, and vice versa. Similarly, recollections by former rebels were contrasted with those of government soldiers and sympathizers. Weinstein contends that it is necessary to aggregate personal narratives and maximize variation in a broader context by examining how armed groups and civilians interact over time and in different regions.⁷ In my fieldwork in Battambang province, this "broader context" corresponds to each of the research sites, and the aggregation of narratives within each region allowed for a certain variation in recruitment measures. For my interviews, nearly 40 years had passed since the outbreak of the first civil war, and exchanges with the interviewees were conducted through an interpreter, which likely would have had an effect on language nuance. For these reasons, reliability of information collected from those narratives needed to be confirmed through the procedures outlined above.⁸ The samples included individuals whose ages ranged from 48 to 87 at the point of interview.

Notes

Chapter I

1. Scott Gates, "Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46 (1) (2002): 111–130.
2. Terry M. Moe, "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," *Journal of Law, Economics & Organization*, 6 (2) (1990): 213–235; Terry M. Moe, "Power and Political Institutions," *Perspectives on Politics*, 3 (2) (2005): 215–233.
3. The role of power is also recognized in studies of slave labor. For instance, see Michael Suk-Young Chwe, "Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal Agent Model," *Economic Journal*, 100 (403) (1990): 1109–1121; Stefano Fenoaltea, "Slavery and Supervision in Comparative Perspective: A Model," *Journal of Economic History*, 44 (3) (1984): 635–668; Elizabeth B. Field, "Free and Slave Labor in the Antebellum South: Perfect Substitutes or Different Inputs?" *Review of Economics & Statistics*, 70 (4) (1988): 654–659; Elizabeth B. Field, "The Relative Efficiency of Slavery Revisited: A Translog Production Function Approach," *American Economic Review*, 78 (3) (1988): 543–549. For the application to criminal syndicates, see Michele Polo, "Internal Cohesion and Competition among Criminal Organizations," in Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman (eds.), *The Economics of Organized Crime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 87–115; Thomas C. Schelling, "What Is the Business of Organized Crime?" *The American Scholar*, 40 (4) (1971): 643–652.
4. Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), 210.
5. This threshold is indeed arbitrary but employed in other studies as well. See Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
6. Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17.
7. Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms*.
8. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 19.

9. Colin Flint and Peter J. Taylor, *Political Geography: World Economy, Nation-State and Locality* (London: Prentice Hall, 2000), 156.
10. Robert D. Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 25.
11. Anssi Paasi, "Territory," in John Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell, and Gerard Toal (eds.), *A Companion to Political Geography* (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), 117.
12. Sack, *Human Territoriality*, 21–22.
13. For instance, this includes Sihanouk's rejection of foreign aid from the United States. Arnold R. Isaacs, *Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 198.
14. Donald Kirk, "Cambodia 1973: Year of the 'Bomb Halt,'" *Asian Survey*, 14 (1) (1974): 89–100, especially 93–94.
15. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 18.
16. For instance, see Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*.
17. Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," *Rationality and Society*, 11 (3) (1999): 243–285; T. David Mason, "Non-elite Response to State Sanctioned Terror," *Political Research Quarterly*, 42 (4) (1989): 467–492.
18. Steven Rosen, "War, Power and the Willingness to Suffer," in Bruce Russett (ed.), *Peace, War and Numbers* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), 167–183.
19. Outside of their normal jobs or functions in society, however, they may have to cooperate with both sides.
20. Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
21. Claire M. Metelits, "The Consequences of Rivalry: Explaining Insurgent Violence Using Fuzzy Sets," *Political Research Quarterly*, 62 (4) (2009): 673–684.
22. Mark Irving Lichbach, "The 5 Percent Rule," *Rationality and Society*, 7 (1) (1995): 126–128.
23. Michael G. Findley and Scott Edwards, "Accounting for the Unaccounted: Weak-Actor Social Structure in Asymmetric Wars," *International Studies Quarterly*, 51 (3) (2007): 583–606.
24. Unlike influential empirical studies in the 1990s that emphasize the importance of rebels' opportunities, recent works argue that inequality is a major cause of domestic armed conflicts. For instance, see Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian S. Gleditsch, "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison," *American Political Science Review*, 105 (3) (2011): 478–495.
25. The studies that employ this approach are characterized by components such as a dependent variable indicating civil war onset or incidence, independent variables that represent possible causes of conflict, and a regression-based test of these determinants. Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, "Civil War," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(1) (2010): 3–57.
26. For instance, see George Borjas, "Ethnic Capital and Intergenerational Mobility," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 107(1) (1992): 123–150; Christopher Cramer, "Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing: Exploring Growth, Distribution

- and Conflict Linkages,” London: School of Oriental and African Studies, WP 73 (1999); Jonathan Goodhand, “Enduring Disorder and Persistent Poverty: A Review of the Linkages between War and Chronic Poverty,” *World Development*, 31 (3) (2003): 629–646; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity and Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Frances Stewart, “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities,” *Oxford Development Studies*, 28 (3) (2000): 245–262.
27. Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 76 (2) (1968): 169–217.
 28. Herschel I. Grossman, “Kleptocracy and Revolutions,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, 51 (2) (1999): 267–283.
 29. Paul Collier, “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44 (6) (2000): 839–853.
 30. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, 50 (4) (1998): 563–573. See also Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War* (Washington DC: World Bank, 1999); Paul Collier, “Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective,” in Mats R. Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 91–111.
 31. This variable is expected to capture the ease of instant taxation by looting. However, it is important to note that some natural resources are “lootable,” but others are rather “obstructable.” Ross claims that, unlike diamonds or drugs, oil cannot be easily plundered by unskilled groups and individuals. Rather, it is associated with such rebellious activities as blowing up pipelines, extracting revenues from oil companies, and kidnapping oil workers and managers. Michael L. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Case Studies,” *International Organization*, 58 (1) (2004): 35–67.
 32. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56 (4) (2004): 563–595.
 33. James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review*, 97 (1) (2003): 75–90.
 34. For instance, natural resources and democracy measures.
 35. For instance, infant mortality and ethnic and religious fractionalization.
 36. For instance, the Middle East and North Africa and the 1960s.
 37. The difference between these two groups of scholars is in how they have interpreted the implications of the independent variables. For instance, although Fearon and Laitin find that oil-dependent states are more prone than others to the risk of civil war, they regard this as an effect of the weak state that often grants unbalanced privilege to particular groups of people, dismissing the resource-predation thesis offered by Collier and Hoeffler. See Nicholas Sambanis, “Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War,” *Perspectives on Politics* 2 (2) (2004): 259–279, especially 261. According to Fearon and Laitin, proxies for state capacity and strength (e.g., per capita income) are robust predictors of the onset of civil war; that is, a state’s

inability to police the countryside is a situation that favors rebellion. Collier and Hoeffler's emphasis on the impact of natural resources does not deny attention to state capacity. However, they also use per capita income to measure state strength, assuming not only that rich states are bureaucratically more capable and have more resources to defend themselves against rebellion, but also that higher income increases opportunity costs of rebellion.

38. Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection in Civil War," *Comparative Political Studies*, 41 (8) (2008): 1043–1068.
39. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 97–99.
40. Collier and Hoeffler drop observations of ongoing civil war, and Fearon and Laitin code those periods as 0s in order to consider war onsets that occur in countries with ongoing civil war.
41. Sambanis, "Using Case Studies," 261.
42. Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection," 1063.
43. Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24 (1998): 423–452, especially 446.
44. Charles King, "The Micropolitics of Social Violence," *World Politics*, 56 (3) (2004): 431–455.
45. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Nicholas Sambanis, "The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design," in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds.), *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, 2 vols (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005), 1–33, especially 21.
46. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), 57–59.
47. This situation resembles some other cases, such as the Rwandan civil war of 1990–94, in which the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPT) was based in Uganda.
48. The Lon Nol government was backed by the United States, but the PRK was aligned with the socialist government of Vietnam.
49. Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Civil Wars," in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 416–434; Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict," *American Political Science Review*, 104 (3) (2010): 415–429.
50. Kalyvas, "Civil Wars," 426.
51. Nicholas Sambanis, "Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45 (3) (2001): 259–282, especially 262.
52. For instance, ethnic civil wars are due mainly to political grievances rather than lack of economic opportunity, and ethnic heterogeneity is related differently to each type of war.
53. Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection."
54. *Ibid.*, 1045–1047.
55. They are, for instance, material rewards, the benefits of collaborating with an armed group that is perceived as winning, and coercion.
56. Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection," 1059.

57. Jon Elster, "Interpretation and Rational Choice," *Rationality and Society*, 21 (1) (2009): 5–33, especially 21 and 25. To avoid the problem, Elster suggests that researchers rely on materials less likely to be influenced by misrepresentation (e.g., letters, diaries, reported conversations, uncensored drafts, and observations by third parties).
58. Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
59. This problem is recognized also as *differential item functioning* (DIF). Gary King et al., "Enhancing the Validity and Cross-Cultural Comparability of Measurement in Survey Research," *American Political Science Review*, 97 (4) (2003), pp. 567–583, especially 568.
60. Alok K. Bohara, Neil J. Mitchell, and Mani Nepal, "Opportunity, Democracy, and the Exchange of Political Violence: A Subnational Analysis of Conflict in Nepal," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50 (1) (2006): 108–128, especially 110.

Chapter 2

1. For instance, see Christian Davenport, David A. Armstrong II, and Mark Irving Lichbach, "From Mountains to Movements: Dissent, Repression and Escalation to Civil War," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego (2006); Mark Irving Lichbach, Christian Davenport, and David A. Armstrong II, "Contingency, Inherency, and the Onset of Civil War," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago (2004); Nicholas Sambanis and Annalisa Zinn, "The Escalation of Self-Determination Movements: From Protest to Violence," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia (2003).
2. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
3. Consensus has not necessarily been reached as to whether the protection of civilians by armed groups is considered *public goods* (Julia A. Heath et al., "The Calculus of Fear: Revolution, Repression, and the Rational Peasant," *Social Science Quarterly*, 81 (2) (2000): 622–633) or *selective incentives* (Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew A. Kocher, "How 'Free' is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem," *World Politics*, 59 (2) (2007): 177–216) for potential collaborators.
4. Gordon Tullock, "The Paradox of Revolution," *Public Choice*, 11 (1) (1971): 89–99. See also Allen Buchanan, "Revolutionary Motivation and Rationality," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 9 (1) (1979): 59–82; Gregory S. Kavka, "Two Solutions to the Paradox of Revolution," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 7 (1) (1982): 455–472; Gregory S. Kavka, *Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*.
5. For instance, see Mark Granovetter, "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, 83 (6) (1978): 1420–1443; Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective

- Action,” *American Political Science Review*, 80 (2) (1986): 472–487; Karen A. Rasler, “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution,” *American Sociological Review*, 61 (1) (1996): 132–152; Thomas C. Schelling, “Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons and Daylight Saving. A Study of Binary Choices with Externalities,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 17 (3) (1973): 381–428; Thomas C. Schelling, *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978).
6. Russell Hardin, *Collective Action* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). The role of convention in interest groups is analogous to that in armed groups in civil war. For instance, historical circumstances in certain areas in which rebellious movements have been active may contribute to the support of antigovernment movements because the residents are more likely to find themselves in networks of social relations with organized dissidents.
 7. Dennis Chong, *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Oran R. Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Michael Taylor, *The Possibility of Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Dissident leaders may convince followers that (1) their problems are shared also by people in other communities, (2) the current conditions are unjust, (3) the state is responsible for their grievances, and (4) each one’s contribution to the movement is significant for the overthrow of the present situation. See T. David Mason, *Caught in the Crossfire: Revolutions, Repression, and the Rational Peasant* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 88.
 8. For instance, Michael Hechter argues that when individuals perceive that their lives are bound to membership in a particular group, they will either leave the group or come to consider that they share vital interests with its members and begin to engage in political activity. In the latter case, individuals are willing to accept the group obligations imposed on them as a condition of access to the joint good. Michael Hechter, *Principles of Group Solidarity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 10. See also Ravi Bhavnani, “Ethnic Norms and Interethnic Violence: Accounting for Mass Participation in the Rwandan Genocide,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 43 (6) (2006): 651–669; James S. Coleman, *Foundation of Social Theory* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1990); Lee A. Fujii, 2008, “The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide,” *Security Studies*, 17 (3) (2008): 568–597; Jack A. Goldstone, “Is Revolution Individually Rational? Groups and Individuals in Revolutionary Collective Action,” *Rationality and Society*, 6 (1) (1994): 139–166; Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536–1966* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Gerald Marwell and Pam Oliver, *The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Anthony R. Oberschall, “Rational Choice in Collective Protests,” *Rationality and Society*, 6 (1) (1994): 79–100; Roger D. Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); James W. White, “Rational Rioters: Leaders, Followers, and Popular Protest in Early Modern Japan,” *Politics and Society*, 16 (1) (1988): 35–69.

9. Mason, *Caught in the Crossfire*, 90–91.
10. However, there is still a counterview to this argument. See the following section on nonmaterial selective incentives.
11. George Graham, “People’s War? Self-Interest, Coercion and Ideology in Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 18 (2) (2007): 231–248, especially 244–245; Gordon H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerrilla Mobilization,” *Third World Quarterly*, 28 (2) (2007): 295–320, especially 300.
12. For instance, Albert O. Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Howard Margolis, *Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); T. David Mason, “Individual Participation in Collective Racial Violence: A Rational Choice Synthesis,” *American Political Science Review*, 78 (4) (1984): 1040–1056.
13. Jean-Paul Azam, “On Thugs and Heroes: Why Warlords Victimize Their Own Civilians,” *Economics and Governance*, 7 (1) (2006): 53–73; James DeNardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Jeffrey Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Mason, “Nonelite Response;” T. David Mason and Dale A. Krane, “The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 33 (2) (1989): 175–198; Kalyvas and Kocher, “How ‘Free’ Is Free Riding?” Mason contends that, when state repression becomes indiscriminate, civilians are more likely to join the rebels for the sake of their survival. T. David Mason, “Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant,” *Public Choice*, 86 (1–2) (1996): 63–83. See also T. David Mason, “Women’s Participation in Central American Revolutions: A Theoretical Perspective,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 25 (1) (1992): 63–89.
14. Richard Maclure and Myriam Denov, “‘I Didn’t Want to Die So I Joined Them’: Structuration and the Process of Becoming Boy Soldiers in Sierra Leone,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18 (1) (2006): 119–135, especially 123. See also Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan, “The Consequences of Child Soldiering,” *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 92 (4) (2010): 882–898; Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(2) (2008): 436–455; Kalyvas, “Civil Wars;” Kalyvas and Kocher, “How ‘Free’ Is Free Riding?”
15. Carlos Ivan Degregori, “Harvesting Storms: Peasant *Rondas* and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho,” in Steve J. Stern (ed.), *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 128–157; Harry R. Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France 1942–1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Steve I. Levine, *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchouria, 1945–1948* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
16. Herschel I. Grossman, “Make Us a King: Anarchy, Predation, and the State,” *European Journal of Political Economy*, 18 (1) (2002): 31–46; Jack Hirshleifer,

- The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); David Keen, "Introduction," *Adelphi Papers*, 38 (320) (1998): 9–13; David Keen, *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone* (London: James Currey, 2005). Speaking from an economic perspective, whether economic motivations are opportunistic or not, individuals' opportunity costs for participation in acts of violence are likely to be low because, under the circumstances, they cannot expect sufficient returns from regular economic activities. This, for instance, is when unemployment is high and returns from productive activities such as agriculture are low. See Collier and Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War"; Grossman, "Make Us a King"; Barbara F. Walter, "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research*, 41 (3) (2004): 371–388.
17. McCormick and Giordano, "Things Come Together," 306.
 18. Pamela E. Oliver, "Formal Models of Collective Action," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 19 (1993): 271–300, especially 273.
 19. Chong, *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement*, 32–33; Mark Irving Lichbach, "What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary?" *World Politics*, 46 (3) (1994): 383–418, especially 390; Douglas Van Belle, "Leadership and Collective Action: The Case of Revolution," *International Studies Quarterly*, 40 (1) (1996): 107–132, especially 109.
 20. DeNardo, *Power in Numbers*, 56; Mason, *Caught in the Crossfire*, 95.
 21. Eamon Collins (with Mick McGovern), *Killing Rage* (New York: Granta Books, 1999); Karl-Dieter Opp, "Soft Incentives and Collective Action: Participation in the Anti-Nuclear Movement," *British Journal of Political Science*, 16 (1) (1986): 87–112.
 22. Frank Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-Gangs* (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960).
 23. Valery Tishkov, *Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). See also Steven E. Finkel, Edward N. Muller, and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action," *American Political Science Review*, 83 (3) (1989): 885–903; Edward N. Muller, Henry A. Dietz, and Steven E. Finkel, "Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebellion: The Case of Peru," *American Political Science Review*, 85 (4) (1991): 1261–1282; Muller and Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action"; Karl-Dieter Opp, *The Rationality of Political Protest* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); Karl-Dieter Opp, "Process of Collective Political Action: A Dynamic Model and the Results of a Computer Simulation," *Rationality and Society*, 3 (2) (1991): 215–251; Karl-Dieter Opp, "Repression and Revolutionary Action: East Germany in 1989," *Rationality and Society*, 6 (1) (1994): 101–138; Karl-Dieter Opp and Christian Gern, "Dissident Groups, Personal Networks and Spontaneous Cooperation—The East German Revolution of 1989," *American Sociological Review*, 58 (5) (1993): 659–680; Moris Silver, "Political Revolution and Repression: An Economic Approach," *Public Choice*, 17 (1) (1974): 63–71.
 24. Francisco G. Sanín, "Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of Civil War and Criminality from the Colombian Experience," *Politics & Society*, 32 (2) (2004): 257–285. Not only the Colombian guerrillas but also other insurgents are

- reported to have joined the rebellion due to emotions such as anger and moral outrage, and the desire for revenge. For instance, see Sam Adams, *War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir* (South Royalton: Steerforth Press, 1994); Richard Berman, *Revolutionary Organization: Institution-Building within the People's Liberation Armed Forces* (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1974); Mervyn Brown, *War in Shangri-La: A Memoir of Civil War in Laos* (London: Radcliffe Press, 2001); Lynn Horton, *Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of Nicaragua, 1979–1984* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1998); Aarti Iyer, Toni Schmader, and Brian Lickel, “Why Individuals Protest the Perceived Transgressions of Their Country: The Role of Anger, Shame, and Guilt,” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33 (4) (2007): 572–587; Ralph Thaxton, *Salt of the Earth: The Political Origins of Peasant Protest and Communist Revolution in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Martijn Van Zomeren et al., “Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is! Explaining Collective Action Tendencies through Group-based Anger and Group Efficacy,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 87 (5) (2004): 649–664; Francis J. West, *The Village* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). Fear and revenge can motivate people to participate in pro-government militias as well. See David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005).
25. Graham, “People’s War?” This also refers to one’s sense of belonging to a group (Kay Deaux et al., “Ideologies of Diversity and Inequality: Predicting Collective Action in Groups Varying in Ethnicity and Immigrant Status,” *Political Psychology*, 27 (1) (2006): 123–146; Bernd Simon and Bert Klandermans, “Politicized Collective Identity: A Social Psychological Analysis,” *American Psychologist*, 56 (4) (2001): 319–331; Henri Tajfel and John Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Inter-group Conflict,” in William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel (eds.), *The Social Psychology of Inter-group Relations* (Monterey: Brooks/Cole, 1979), 33–47) and success in achieving group goals (Burt Klandermans, *The Social Psychology of Protest* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Turner et al., *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987)).
 26. Elizabeth J. Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
 27. Lorraine Bayard de Volo, “The Nonmaterial Long-Term Benefits of Collective Action Empowerment and Social Capital in a Nicaraguan Women’s Organization,” *Comparative Politics*, 38 (2) (2006): 149–167, especially 151–152. Wilson also claims that purposive selective incentives can exist when the collective good is political. James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
 28. Daniel Brook, “The Continuum of Collective Action,” *Peace Review*, 13 (2) (2001): 265–271, especially 265.
 29. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 96 and 100.
 30. *Ibid.*, 101.
 31. *Ibid.*, 101–102.

32. This is because the former, due to its shared identities or ideologies with the population, can construct relationships with civilians that allow its effective recruitment, extraction of resources, and governance. On the other hand, the latter rarely constructs institutions with the local population that provide it with necessary information for effective control and the selective punishment of defectors. Since the infrastructure of this type of rebel group is based on the abundance of material goods and participants who are attracted by material rewards (although the amount of necessary resources is supposed to be constant), these groups are permissive of civilian abuses in order to maintain their membership. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 204–206.
33. Lisa Hultman, “Battle Losses and Rebel Violence: Raising the Costs for Fighting,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 19 (2) (2007): 205–222, especially 207. See also Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War,” *American Political Science Review*, 100 (3) (2006): 429–447; Marie-Joëlle Zahar, “Protégés, Clients, Cannon Fodder: Civilians in the Calculus of Militias,” in Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram (eds.), *Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
34. Jean-Paul Azam, “Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups: Lessons for State Formation in Africa,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46 (1) (2002): 131–153.
35. Andrew W. Martin, John D. McCarthy, and Clark McPhail, “Why Targets Matter: Toward a More Inclusive Model of Collective Violence,” *American Sociological Review*, 74 (5) (2009): 821–841, especially 826. Armed groups may also seek media attention and the opportunity to present their agenda to an audience. See Carol W. Lewis, “The Terror That Failed: Public Opinion in the Aftermath of the Bombing in Oklahoma City,” *Public Administration Review*, 60 (3) (2000): 201–210; McCormick and Giordano, “Things Come Together.”
36. Claire M. Metelits, *Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior* (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 23 and 25.
37. Metelits observes that some groups shift from solicitous to the violent treatment of civilians, and vice versa, even in cases in which resources remain fixed. She argues that coerciveness of governance is a function of active rivalry between groups because, given that the presence of rivals and competition leads to a scarcity of resources, the “most efficient method of extracting resources quickly is through the use of force.” Metelits, *Inside Insurgency*, 27. The groups, therefore, behave in a less coercive manner toward civilians when they are not faced with rivals. See Metelits, “The Consequences of Rivalry,” 10–11. Kasfir also observes that the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda could establish noncoercive democratic village management in territories it controlled when the NRA soldiers were secure and that it withdrew this commitment when it was under military pressure. Nelson Kasfir, “Guerrillas and Civilian Participation: The National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981–86,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43 (2) (2005): 271–296.

38. For the discussion of contractual and coercive civil-military relations, see Claire M. Metelits, "The Logic of Change: Pushing the Boundaries of Insurgent Behavior Theory," *Defense & Security Analysis*, 25 (2) (2009): 105–118.
39. Humphreys and Weinstein, "Who Fights?"
40. Kristine Eck, "Coercion in Rebel Recruitment," in *Raising Rebels: Participation and Recruitment in Civil War*, Doctoral Dissertation, Uppsala University (2010).
41. Bernd Berber and Christopher Blattman, "The Logic of Child Soldiering and Coercion," *International Organization*, 67 (1) (2013): 65–104.
42. *Ibid.*, 79–80.
43. In this context, coercion is cheap. Berber and Blattman consider this is likely also when armed groups have access to natural resource bases and their foreign patrons are insensitive to human rights violations. Berber and Blattman, "The Logic of Child Soldiering and Coercion," 95.
44. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 211–213.
45. Kalyvas raises additional mechanisms that translate control into collaboration: shielding, mechanical ascription, credibility of rule, the provision of benefits, monitoring, and self-reinforcing by products. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 124.
46. *Ibid.*, 111, 132, and 226–228.
47. For instance, see Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless?"; Mason, "Nonelite Response"; Joel S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Tullock, "The Paradox of Revolution."
48. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 258–259.
49. For criticisms of theories of control from this perspective, see Metelits, *Inside Insurgency*.
50. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*.
51. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*.
52. Marion Clawson and Jack L. Knetch, *Economics of Outdoor Recreation* (Washington DC: Resources for the Future, 1966).
53. Many massacres committed by the rebels are reported in villages where residents defected by joining newly formed militias. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless?"
54. Mason, *Caught in the Crossfire*, 166.

Chapter 3

1. Mark Irving Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
2. *Ibid.*, 337.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49 (4) (2005): 598–624; Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*.
5. Mason, *Caught in the Crossfire*, 146.

6. Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, "Fighting Fire with Fire? How (Not) to Neutralize an Insurgency," *Civil Wars*, 9 (4) (2007): 378–401, especially 380.
7. Jeffrey Herbst, "The Organization of Rebellion in Africa," Paper presented at the Joint World Bank and Princeton University Workshop, Princeton (2000), 26; Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 104. This perspective is reflected in studies that deal with the competition between government and rebel groups over public support and recruitment. For instance, see Azam, "Looting and Conflict"; Gates, "Recruitment and Allegiance"; Herschel I. Grossman, "Insurrections," in Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds.), *Handbook of Defense Economics*, Vol 1. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995): 191–212; McCormick and Giordano, "Things Come Together"; Opp, "Process of Collective Political Action"; Mason, "Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant."
8. Heath et al., "The Calculus of Fear." Rebel capabilities may be determined by their ability to obtain support from the civilian population. Wood claims that weak rebel groups that lack these capabilities are unable to provide their supporters with sufficient material incentives to encourage voluntary collaboration. Reed M. Wood, "Rebel Capacity and Strategic Violence against Civilians," *Journal of Peace Research*, 47 (5) (2010): 601–614.
9. Joseph K. Young, "Iron Fists or Velvet Gloves? Evaluating Competing Approaches to Counterinsurgency," Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (ISA), Chicago (2007), 24–25.
10. T. David Mason, Joseph P. Weingarten, and Patrick J. Fett, "Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars," *Political Research Quarterly*, 52 (2) (1999): 239–68; T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40 (4) (1996): 546–568.
11. Jenny Pearce, "Policy Failure and Petroleum Predation: The Economics of Civil War Debate Viewed 'From the War-Zone,'" *Government and Opposition*, 40 (2) (2005): 152–180, especially 161. To raise the government's costs for fighting, weak rebels tend to engage in the killing of civilians. Hultman argues that this militarily cheaper and easier strategy may eventually impose costs on the government because such action challenges its authority, as the government is responsible for the protection of civilians and also because it causes social disorder. Hultman, "Battle Losses and Rebel Violence," 206.
12. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1970); Mason, *Caught in the Crossfire*.
13. Findley and Edwards, "Accounting for the Unaccounted," 590. Therefore, scholars of counterinsurgency emphasize the importance of intelligence as one of the conditions for successful counterinsurgency practices. For instance, see Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, 85 (3) (2005): 8–12.
14. James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organizations*, 49 (3) (1995): 379–414.

15. Sabine C. Carey, "The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression," *Political Research Quarterly*, 59 (1) (2006): 1–11, especially 3.
16. Metelits, "The Consequences of Rivalry," 2. Skaperdas also shows that warlords compete for turf where taxable resources and rents from mines are available, and that the competition between them often results in "lower material welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting." Stergios Skaperdas, "Warlord Competition," *Journal of Peace Research*, 39 (4) (2002): 435–446, especially 435.
17. Mason, *Caught in the Crossfire*, 146–149.
18. Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest"; Muller and Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action."
19. Findley and Young, "Fighting Fire with Fire?" 381.
20. Ibid; Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority*, 20–21.
21. Aguilera Peralta and Beverly distinguish such paramilitary groups from irregular groups, which are military groups "acting with structural, tactical, and strategic autonomy from the regular army and police." Gabriel Aguilera Peralta and John Beverly, "Terror and Violence as Weapons of Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," *Latin American Perspectives*, 7 (2/3) (1980): 91–113, especially 110.
22. In such a situation, civilians may tolerate the activities of militias. David Kowalewski, "Counterinsurgent Paramilitarism: A Philippine Case Study," *Journal of Peace Research*, 29 (1) (1992): 71–84, especially 71–73.
23. H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter Sederberg, "Vigilantism," in H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter Sederberg (eds.), *Vigilante Politics* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976).
24. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless?"; Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma*, 58.
25. Repression is "behavior that is applied by governments in an effort to bring about political quiescence and facilitate the continuity of the regime through some form of restriction or violation of political and civil liberties." Christian Davenport, *Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 6. For the literature on state repression, see Ronald A. Francisco, "The Relationship between Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Evaluation in Three Coercive States," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39 (2) (1995): 263–282; Ronald A. Francisco, "Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in Two Democratic States," *American Journal of Political Science*, 40 (4) (1996): 1179–1204; Douglas A. Hibbs, *Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis* (New York: Wiley, 1973); Mark Irving Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 31 (2) (1987): 266–297; Will H. Moore, "Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing," *American Journal of Political Science*, 42 (3) (1998): 851–873; Opp, "Repression and Revolutionary Action"; Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl, "Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest," *Social Forces*, 69 (2) (1990): 521–547; Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest"; Lawrence W. Sherman, "Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal Sanction," *Journal of*

- Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 30 (4) (1993): 445–473; Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
26. Ronald A. Francisco, *Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000); Steve R. Garrison, “The Road to Civil War: An Interactive Theory of Internal Political Violence,” *Defense and Peace Economics*, 19 (2) (2008): 127–151, especially 130.
 27. Mason, *Caught in the Crossfire*, 145.
 28. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, 46–47; Ahmed Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 99–104; Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 155; Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 142.
 29. Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53 (3) (2009): 331–362, especially 335. The rebels may choose to sit back and watch the government’s indiscriminate violence against civilians who have been unfriendly to them. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 157–158.
 30. Wood, “Rebel Capacity and Strategic Violence.”
 31. Will H. Moore, “Rational Rebels: Overcoming the Free-Rider Problem,” *Political Research Quarterly*, 48 (2) (1995): 417–454, especially 434. The causal relationship is also undetermined because we do not have enough counterfactual evidence (that is, an increase in the number of rebel troops given the absence of state indiscriminate violence) and clues to show direct causality, rather than indirect through some intervening variables. Lyall argues that indiscriminate state violence erodes rebel resources through forcible population resettlement because it reduces the population that functions as a rebel’s tax base and guarantees its supply lines. It also imposes constraints on the rebels if civilians blame them for inaction against state violence or if the rebels need to change current tactics to prevent civilian defections. Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?” 333–334 and 336–338.
 32. Jannie Lilja, “Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds? Rebel Strategies to Attain Constituent Support in Sri Lanka,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21 (2) (2009): 306–326, especially 309–310.
 33. For instance, the rebels’ strategy of control is determined by information (Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*), finances (Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*), their violence as a signaling device (Hultman, “Battle Losses and Rebel Violence”), or constituent pressure (Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011)).
 34. Ana Arjona and Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Recruitment into Armed Groups in Colombia: A Survey of Demobilized Fighters,” in Yvan Guichaoua (ed.), *Mobilizing for Violence: Armed Groups and Their Combatants* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Kalyvas, “Wanton and Senseless?”
 35. Findley and Young, “Fighting Fire with Fire?” 384.
 36. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*; Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*.
 37. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 219.
 38. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 169–171 and 173.

39. Findley and Edwards, "Accounting for the Unaccounted," 587.
40. *Ibid.*, 588–590; Mason, *Caught in the Crossfire*, 109.
41. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 145.
42. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless?"
43. As Klandermans suggests, willingness to participate is different from actual participation because willingness is theoretically one of the conditions for actual participation. However, it is also true that, prior to actual participation, there are almost no better indicators available for researchers. Also for organizers, estimations of willingness have a significant meaning in determining their strategy. In this sense, willingness to participate should be considered relevant on its own. Bert Klandermans, "Individuals and Collective Action," *American Sociological Review*, 50 (6) (1985): 860–861.
44. Mason, *Caught in the Crossfire*, 166.
45. This argument belongs to the studies that focus on the competition over "market" shares between opposing armed actors. For instance see DeNardo, *Power in Numbers*; Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority*; Mason, "Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant"; Tullock, "The Paradox of Revolution." Garrison also takes into consideration the population of competing sides and their attributes to examine the changes in the number of supporters. Garrison, "The Road to Civil War."
46. For instance, when demanded (or threatened) by an armed group, civilians often have to provide the group with supplies including food, water, and shelter.
47. Civilians often support both groups because the armed forces are able to manipulate civilians' short-term estimates of fear and gain, thereby giving them a reason to aid both sides. Mason, *Caught in the Crossfire*, 146 and 159.
48. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 165.
49. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 171.
50. Metelits, "The Consequences of Rivalry," 2.
51. Weinstein defines high-commitment individuals as those who "are dedicated to the cause of the organization and willing to make costly investments today in return for the promise of rewards in the future." Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 9.
52. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 104.
53. Mason, *Caught in the Crossfire*, 167. See also Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma*, 114–116.
54. Gates, "Recruitment and Allegiance."
55. The population may sometimes consist of potential political entrepreneurs, who organize themselves against the ruler. Moore, "Rational Rebels," 440–441.
56. Findley and Young, "Fighting Fire with Fire?" 383.
57. Weinstein, "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment," 606–607.
58. John Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's Liberation Front: 1975–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 124–125.
59. Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War*, 271–272.
60. Wood, "Rebel Capacity and Strategic Violence," 605.

61. Benedikt Korf, "Functions of Violence Revisited: Greed, Pride and Grievance in Sri Lanka's Civil War," *Progress in Development Studies*, 6 (2) (2006): 109–122, especially 119–120.
62. Military strength or weakness of an armed group is relative. Wood, "Rebel Capacity and Strategic Violence." For example, it is possible that a "stronger" rebel group among other rebel groups across a country can be weak if the government forces in a given country are more militarily capable than the group.
63. This exact point may coincide with Weinstein's argument that rebel groups with little social endowments are more likely to use coercive measures against civilians. In addition, I partially agree with Wood's point that weak groups tend to resort to civilian abuses. See Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*; Wood, "Rebel Capacity and Strategic Violence."
64. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 213.
65. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 191–192.
66. Timothy Wickham-Crowley, *Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 35.
67. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 208.

Chapter 4

1. Norodom Sihanouk, *War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia* (New York: Random House, 1980).
2. Gregory Procknow, "Khmer Rouge: Recruitment and Selection and Training and Development," Documentation Center of Cambodia (2009), 3–4.
3. Nat J. Colletta and Michelle L. Cullen, *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2000), 31.
4. Isaacs, *Without Honor*, 198.
5. John L. S. Girling, "The Resistance in Cambodia," *Asian Survey*, 12 (7) (1972): 549–563, especially 555–557.
6. Ben Kiernan, "The Smlaut Rebellion, 1967–68," in Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua (eds.), *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942–1981* (London: Zed Press, 1982), 167.
7. The rebels were designated as the Khmer Rouge (or Red Khmer) by Sihanouk at this time.
8. Wilfred P. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970–1975* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997), 55.
9. David P. Chandler, *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 84.
10. Malcolm Caldwell and Lek Tan, *Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), 228.
11. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 69.
12. Craig Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea* (Boulder: Westview, 1984), 237; Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 467–486 and 492; Hal Kosut (ed.), *Cambodia and the Vietnam War* (New York: Facts in File, 1971), 67–69.

13. The Lon Nol government and U.S. officials estimated that there were 45,000–55,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in the country in 1971. Peter A. Poole, “Cambodia: The Cost of Survival,” *Asian Survey*, 12 (2) (1972): 148–155, especially 152–153.
14. Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 95 and 97.
15. Marlowe Hood and David A. Ablin, “The Path to Cambodia’s Present,” in David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood (eds.), *The Cambodian Agony* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), xxvii.
16. Kirk, “Cambodia 1973,” 93–94.
17. Isaacs, *Without Honor*, 219–220.
18. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 28.
19. Isaacs, *Without Honor*, 196.
20. The government imposed martial law on June 1, 1970.
21. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 71 and 87; Sheldon W. Simon, *War and Politics in Cambodia: A Communications Analysis* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1974), 36.
22. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 110. The problems remained unresolved throughout the civil war. Isaacs, *Without Honor*, 219.
23. Poole, “Cambodia,” 152.
24. Some government soldiers had to beg food from villagers to feed themselves and their families because they had not been paid for several months following the defeat of Operation Chenla II. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 123 and 135.
25. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 87.
26. Isaacs, *Without Honor*, 249; Simon, *War and Politics in Cambodia*, 42–43. More than 3,500 soldiers in service deserted at the beginning of 1975.
27. Caldwell and Tan, *Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War*, 347.
28. Isaacs, *Without Honor*, 189–191.
29. Bernard K. Gordon and Kathryn Young, “The Khmer Republic: That Was the Cambodia That Was,” *Asian Survey*, 11 (1) (1971): 26–40, especially 39; Isaacs, *Without Honor*, 208.
30. Caldwell and Tan, *Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War*, 299.
31. Philip Short, *Pol Pot: Anatomy of a Nightmare* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), 249. Thousands of rural villagers flowed into Phnom Penh to escape from air raids and to seek safety in early 1973, and the population of the capital doubled. Hood and Ablin, “The Path to Cambodia’s Present,” xxx; Judy A. Mayotte, *Disposable People? The Plight of Refugees* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1992), 23.
32. Short, *Pol Pot*, 206; Caldwell and Tan, *Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War*, 311–312.
33. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 113.
34. Isaacs, *Without Honor*, 230.
35. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 195 and 217. Nearly 20,000–30,000 men had been conscripted by the beginning of 1975. Isaacs, *Without Honor*, 248.
36. *Ibid.* Full conscription was neither conducted nor enforced through the civil war. Michael Vickery, “Looking Back at Cambodia, 1942–76,” in Ben

- Kiernan and Chanthou Boua (eds.), *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942–1981* (London: Zed Press, 1982), 109.
37. Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 93–94.
 38. Simon, *War and Politics in Cambodia*, 21; Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 112; Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia, 1930–1975* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 345.
 39. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 146.
 40. Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 97.
 41. Ben Kiernan, “Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia,” Monograph series 41 (Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993), 4. Along with the volunteers for government forces as discussed in the previous section, these individuals satisfy the requisite for high-commitment recruits who were willing to participate in an armed force for long-term and future rewards. See Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*. Moreover, the rewards promised by rebels were not simply material but significantly oriented to ideological appeals, as the abolishment of capitalism was considered necessary for a higher standard of living.
 42. Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 7.
 43. Even before 1970, the central government’s intent to capitalize on the rebels’ weakness in the cities and to corral civilians for counterinsurgency had served to increase the rural population’s isolation from the urban political administration and to strengthen peasant support for the resistance. Kiernan, “The Samlaut Rebellion, 1967–68,” 191.
 44. Simon also argues that Lon Nol’s government control was limited to major cities and, therefore, there was a political vacuum in the countryside in which the rebels could move in. Simon, *War and Politics in Cambodia*, 119. As a result, rebels headed toward the rice-growing areas and cut off routes into the capital and other major cities. Caldwell and Tan, *Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War*, 304.
 45. *Ibid.*, 313.
 46. Caldwell and Tan, *Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War*, 350; Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 315–316.
 47. Girling, “The Resistance in Cambodia,” 560; Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 345–346.
 48. The Khmer Rouge also selected militiamen, from the local population, who performed economic, social, and military tasks. They were farmers by day and soldiers by night until they were replaced by full-time youth militiamen. Caldwell and Tan, *Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War*, 352; Ben Kiernan, “Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” in Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua (eds.), *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942–1981* (London: Zed Press, 1982), 285.
 49. Kiernan, “Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” 285.
 50. Kate Frieson, “Reluctant Comrades: The Peasantry and the Red Khmers, 1970–75,” Unpublished paper (1991).
 51. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 197; Donald Kirk, “Cambodia 1974: Governments on Trial,” *Asian Survey*, 15 (1) (1975): 53–60, especially 59.

- Among them, 1,500 civilians managed to elude the roundup and joined Khmer Rouge's army instead.
52. Hood and Ablin, "The Path to Cambodia's Present," xxix. Several reasons are recognized for the implementation of collectivization: to ensure that enough food was produced for rebel forces; to introduce socialist institutions; and to develop an autonomous revolutionary style. Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 105.
 53. MayEbihara, "Revolution and Reformation in Kampuchean Village Culture," in David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood (eds.), *The Cambodian Agony* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), 22; Hood, and Ablin, "The Path to Cambodia's Present," xxx.
 54. Kirk, "Cambodia 1974," 59.
 55. Kiernan, "Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement," 275–276.
 56. There are other possible explanations for this shift in recruitment method. For instance, Metelits claims that armed groups in civil war shift their treatment of civilians from noncoercive to coercive, and from coercive to noncoercive, as the rivalry between groups shifts. When the presence of rivals brings about a scarcity of not only material but also human resources, the groups behave in a more coercive manner toward civilians. And accordingly, their relationship with civilians becomes less coercive if they are less threatened by rivals. Eck similarly contends that conflict dynamics determines whether armed groups use coercion against civilians; they tend to rely on coercive measures of recruitment when military imperatives require an increase in troops. Although armed forces may employ positive incentives whenever they can, they often have to have an adequate number of troops, whether recruits are collected through forcible mobilization, for example, when they confront frequent military engagement with rivals and loss in battle needs to be promptly recovered with the provision of additional recruits. Thus, both explanations assume that compelling circumstances force an armed group to use negative incentives, because they continuously need to resort to coercion so that a steady supply of resources is not interrupted and because combatants mobilized through coercive recruitment are less committed and often escape or even desert to rival groups. However, neither thesis fits into the shift in recruitment methods of the Khmer Rouge during this period because Khmer Rouge forces no longer faced severe rivalry with, but rather largely overwhelmed, the government forces. Eck, "Coercion in Rebel Recruitment"; Metelits, *Inside Insurgency*; Metelits, "The Consequences of Rivalry."
 57. Caldwell and Tan, *Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War*, 352.
 58. Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 319 and 321.
 59. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 147 and 166.
 60. Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 98.
 61. Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 269–270.
 62. Short, *Pol Pot*, 246.
 63. Caldwell and Tan, *Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War*, 287; Kiernan, "The Smlaut Rebellion, 1967–68," 181.
 64. Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 93–94.
 65. Caldwell and Tan, *Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War*, 314.
 66. Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 80.

67. Alexander Hinton, *Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 58.
68. Short, *Pol Pot*, 220.
69. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 12–13 and 140.
70. Issarak is the anti-French, Khmer nationalism movement backed by the Thai government.
71. Jean Delvert, *Le Paysan Cambodgien* (Hague: Mouton & Co, 1961), 639.
72. Kiernan, “The Samlaut Rebellion, 1967–68,” 185.
73. *Ibid.*
74. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, 208.
75. The abuses include the expropriation of villagers’ properties and the execution of civilians. Interview by the author, June 14, 2009, Ta Thok village, Thipakdei commune, Koas Krala district, Battambang province, Cambodia.
76. Isaacs, *Without Honor*, 269.
77. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.
78. The authorities, according to an informant, attempted to conscript villagers two to three times a month at maximum. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.
79. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
80. For instance, Ang Cheung village. Interview by the author, July 18, 2009.
81. Interview by the author, July 19, 2009, Ang Cheung village.
82. Interviews by the author, June 28, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village and July 5, 2009, Thmei village.
83. Interview by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village.
84. *Ibid.*
85. He remembers that the rebels attempted to persuade villagers, especially in 1972 and 73. Interview by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village.
86. If a family had five members, they had to buy five guns.
87. Villagers were not necessarily reluctant to buy guns because they were always threatened by the Khmer Rouge. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.
88. Interviews by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Tboung and Tumpung Cheung villages.
89. Interview by the author, July 18, 2009, Ang Tboung village.
90. One interviewee was told by a village chief that he was old enough to join the army when he became 18 years old. Interview by the author, July 18, 2009, Ang Tboung village.
91. Interview by the author, July 19, 2009, Ang Tboung village.
92. If they returned to the office and joined the army, the parents would be released. *Ibid.*
93. Interview by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
94. Interview by the author, June 28, 2009, Tumpung Tboung.
95. However, a money quota to the officials allowed conscripts to return home. Interviews by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village and July 11, 2009, Ta Sei village.
96. Interview by the author, July 12, 2009, Chrouy Mtes village.
97. *Ibid.*

98. Even the poorest villagers had to sell their cows to buy weapons. Interview by the author, July 19, 2009, Ang Cheung village.
99. Ibid.
100. Interview by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Tbound village.
101. They eventually returned to kill villagers with whom they had conflicts. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Tbound village.
102. Interview by the author, July 11, 2009, Ta Sei village.
103. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
104. Interviews by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Tbound village, and July 18, 2009, Ang Tbound village, and July 19, 2009, Ang Cheung village.
105. Interview by the author, July 12, 2009, Chrouy Mtes village.
106. Interviews by the author, July 18, 2009, Ang Cheung village and July 19, 2009, Ang Cheung village.
107. Interviews by the author, January 11, 2009, Bay Damram village.
108. Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Toul Chranieng village.
109. Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Kampong Chaeng village.
110. Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Sdau village.
111. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
112. Interview by the author, January 11, 2009, Kampong Chaeng village.
113. Interview by the author, December 28, 2008, Doang village.
114. Militiamen were in charge not only of defending villages by themselves but of escorting government soldiers when they came by the villages. Ibid.
115. Interview by the author, January 11, 2009, Bay Damram village. The interviewee, who used to be a group leader taking care of ten families, remembers that the government forces did not request any other things from the villagers.
116. Interview by the author, January 3, 2009, Entek Chit village.
117. Interview by the author, December 20, 2009, Banan village.
118. Interview by the author, January 11, 2009, Bay Damram village.
119. Interview by the author, January 11, 2009, Kampong Chaeng village.
120. One informant insists that there was no conscription, at least in Ta Kream village. Interview by the author, June 27, Ta Kream village.
121. Interview by the author, January 3, 2009, Entek Chit village. In this village, according to the informant, village chief determined who would go into the military.
122. An ex-government combatant in Doang village also remembers that he was told to attend a Banan district meeting and was conscripted there. Interview by the author, December 28, 2008, Doang village.
123. Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Tuol Chranieng village.
124. Interview by the author, January 10, Toul Chranieng village.
125. Interviews by the author, January 3, Entek Chit village; January 10, Sdau village; and January 11, Bay Damram village.
126. Interview by the author, January 11, 2009, Kampong Chaeng village.
127. Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Tuol Chranieng village.
128. Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Sdau village.
129. Interview by the author, December 27, 2008, Bay Damram village.
130. Interview by the author, December 20, 2008, Banan village.

131. Interview by the author, December 20, 2008, Banan village.
132. Interview by the author, January 3, 2009, Changhour Svay village.
133. Interviews by the author, December 20, 2008, Bay Damram village.
134. Ibid.
135. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
136. Interviews by the author, January 10, 2009, Sdau village.
137. Interview by the author, May 30, 2009, Krang Svat village. However, another interviewee argues that the Khmer Rouge could not perfectly control the village, and this is the reason why the rebels took the residents into forests. Interview by the author, June 6, 2009, Krang Svat village.
138. Interview by the author, May 31, 2009, Krang Svat village. An interviewee insists that local residents in the village were ethnic minorities. Interview by the author, May 30, 2009, Krang Svat village.
139. Interview by the author, May 31, 2009, Krang Svat village.
140. Interview by the author, May 30, 2009, Krang Svat village.
141. Interview by the author, June 21, 2009, Krang Svat village.
142. Interview by the author, June 21, 2009, Krang Svat village.
143. Interview by the author, June 20, 2009, Prey Sen village.
144. Interview by the author, June 6, 2009, Banteay Char village. Some government officials belonged to both the authority and the resistance and offered food and ammunitions to the Khmer Rouge. Interview by the author, June 20, 2009, Prey Sen village.
145. Interview by the author, June 13, 2009, Kantuot village.
146. Interviews by the author, May 30 and 31, 2009, Krang Svat village.
147. Interview by the author, June 21, 2009, Krang Svat village.
148. Interview by the author, June 6, 2009, Banteay Char village.
149. Interviews by the author, June 13, 2009, Kantuot village and June 14, 2009, Ra village.
150. Interviews by the author, May 31, 2009, Krang Svat village.
151. Isaacs, *Without Honor*, 204–205.

Chapter 5

1. Colletta and Cullen, *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital*, 28.
2. Michael Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982* (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1984), 215–216.
3. Michael Clodfelter, *Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the Indochina Wars, 1772–1991* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 1995), 281.
4. Hood and Ablin, “The Path to Cambodia’s Present,” xli–xliii.
5. Timothy Carney, “The Heng Samrin Armed Forces and the Military Balance in Cambodia,” in David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood (eds.), *The Cambodian Agony* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), 180–212, especially 202–204 and 207.
6. Justus M. van der Kroef, “Cambodia: From ‘Democratic Kampuchea’ to ‘People’s Republic,’” *Asian Survey*, 19 (7) (1979): 731–750, especially 732–733.

7. Michael Leifer, "Kampuchea in 1980: The Politics of Attrition," *Asian Survey*, 21 (1) (1981): 93–101, especially 93–94.
8. Ibid.
9. Timothy Carney, "Kampuchea in 1981: Fragile Stalemate," *Asian Survey*, 22 (1) (1982): 78–87, especially 78–79.
10. Timothy Carney, "Kampuchea in 1982: Political and Military Escalation," *Asian Survey*, 23 (1) (1983): 73–83, especially 74–75.
11. Margaret Slocomb, "The K5 Gamble: National Defense and Nation Building under the People's Republic of Kampuchea," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 32 (1) (2001): 195–210, especially 200.
12. Short, *Pol Pot*, 421.
13. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Kampuchea: Protracted Conflict, Suspended Compromise," *Asian Survey*, 24 (3) (1984): 314–334, especially 315. For details about refugee camps, see also Justus M. van der Kroef, "Refugees and Rebels: Dimensions of the Thai-Kampuchean Border Conflict," *Asian Affairs*, 10 (1) (1983): 19–36.
14. Michael Eiland, "Kampuchea in 1984: Yet Further from Peace," *Asian Survey*, 25 (1) (1985): 106–113, especially 106–109; Short, *Pol Pot*, 421.
15. For instance, the Sihanoukist rebels insisted that about 10,000 troops were operating in the interior, and it is also reported that 1,000 KPNLF troops were in the country. Michael Eiland, "Cambodia in 1985: From Stalemate to Ambiguity," *Asian Survey*, 26 (1) (1986): 118–125.
16. Evan Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 223–224.
17. Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia in 1986: Beginning to Tire," *Asian Survey*, 27 (1) (1987): 115–124, especially 116–117.
18. Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987: Sihanouk on Center Stage," *Asian Survey*, 28 (1) (1988): 105–115, especially 105–106. The Khmer Rouge troops numbered 28,000 or fewer. Murray Hiebert, "That Annual Exercise," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 10 (1987), 23. Chanda argues that only the Sihanoukist force, the Armée Nationale Sihanoukienne (ANS), grew and was effective in 1987, in that it successfully engaged in political propaganda work and the infiltration of the PRK administration. Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987," 106.
19. Khatharya Um, "Cambodia in 1988: The Curved Road to Settlement," *Asian Survey*, 29 (1) (1989): 73–80, especially 79.
20. Slocomb, "The K5 Gamble," 208.
21. Khatharya Um, "Cambodia in 1989: Still Talking but No Settlement," *Asian Survey*, 30 (1) (1990): 96–104, especially 100–101.
22. Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge*, 237, 307, and 308–309; Benny Widiono, *Dancing in Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and the United Nations in Cambodia* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 84–85.
23. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Cambodia in 1990: The Elusive Peace," *Asian Survey*, 31 (1) (1991): 94–102, especially 97–98.
24. A high percentage of Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, and Siem Reap were under the control of the resistance forces in 1991. Frederick Brown,

- “Cambodia in 1991: An Uncertain Peace,” *Asian Survey*, 32 (1) (1992): 88–96, especially 93.
25. *Ibid.*, 93; Mayotte, *Disposable People?* 93–94.
 26. In addition to regular and regional troops, the KPRAF had local forces. Michael Vickery, *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986), 124.
 27. Slocomb, “The K5 Gamble,” 209.
 28. PAVN stands for the People’s Army of Vietnam.
 29. U.S. CIA, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 041139GMT, July (1982); Vickery, *Kampuchea*, 125.
 30. Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge*, 230.
 31. *Ibid.*, 56.
 32. Michael Leifer, “Kampuchea 1979: From Dry Season to Dry Season,” *Asian Survey*, 20 (1) (1980): 33–41, especially 38–39.
 Due to an adequate supply of rice seed, however, the crop in 1980 became more than twice that of 1979 and more than half an average prewar crop (Vickery, 1984, p.239).
 33. Stephen R. Heder, *Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance* (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, 1980), 10–12.
 34. For instance, the Banan district committee in Battambang province was composed of a party leader of the district, a district chief, and committee members in charge of social and cultural affairs, economic affairs, and military affairs, respectively. Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Sdau village.
 35. Ea Meng-Try, “Kampuchea: A Country Adrift,” *Population and Development Review*, 7 (2) (1981): 209–228, especially 222.
 36. Heder, *Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance*, 14–15.
 37. The police also hired former Khmer Rouge cadres, as long as they had defected by May 1978 and had been obedient to the PRK authority. Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge*, 75.
 38. Despite the co-optation policy, the PRK and Vietnamese feared the risk of widespread defections and consequential instability because many provincial leaders were appointed because of their broad contact with former Khmer Rouge cadres. The risk of defection of former Khmer Rouge cadres varied according to region. The authorities feared the high risk of large-scale defections in Siem Reap province but controlled Kampong Thom province well enough that high-level defections were not likely there. Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge*, 105.
 39. Leifer, “Kampuchea in 1980,” 35; Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, 266.
 40. Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge*, 41 and 169; Stephen Orlov, “The New Cambodia War,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, 16 (5) (1981): 145, 147–149, especially 148; Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, 221–224. Scholars interpret the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in different ways. Martin concludes that it was Vietnamese economic and cultural imperialism. Marie A. Martin, “Vietnamised Cambodia: A Silent Ethnocide,” *Indochina Report*, 7 (1986): 1–31; Marie A. Martin, *Cambodia: A Shattered Society* (M. W. McLeod, Trans.) (Berkeley: University California Press, 1994).

- Vickery emphasizes the progress achieved by support from the Vietnamese. Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*; Vickery, *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society*. The Vietnamese at least acknowledged that there existed misunderstandings between Cambodians and their troops. Douglas Pike, *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam* (London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1986), 71.
41. Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987," 119.
 42. Amnesty International, *Kampuchea: Political Imprisonment and Torture* (London, 1987), 22–69 and 70–73.
 43. Elizabeth Becker, "Kampuchea in 1983: Further from Peace," *Asian Survey*, 24 (1) (1984): 37–48, especially 44.
 44. Ebihara, "Revolution and Reformation," 36; Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge*, 91.
 45. Um, "Cambodia in 1989," 102–103.
 46. Meng-Try, "Kampuchea," 218–219.
 47. Slocomb, "The K5 Gamble," 205.
 48. Becker, "Kampuchea in 1983," 45.
 49. Gennady I. Chufirin, "Five Years of the People's Revolutionary Power in Kampuchea: Results and Conclusions," *Asian Survey*, 24 (11) (1984): 1143–1150, especially 1147.
 50. Thomas Clayton, *Education and the Politics of Language: Hegemony and Pragmatism in Cambodia, 1979–1989* (Honk Kong: University of Hong Kong, 2000), 83. See also Eva Mysliwiec, *Punishing the Poor: The International Isolation of Kampuchea* (Oxford: Oxfam, 1988).
 51. Becker, "Kampuchea in 1983," 47.
 52. Vickery, *Kampuchea*, 124–125.
 53. Carney, "Kampuchea in 1981," 80.
 54. Carney, "The Heng Samrin Armed Forces and the Military Balance," 190–191.
 55. Chanda, "Cambodia in 1986," 118–119; Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987," 107; Vickery, *Kampuchea*, 124.
 56. Slocomb, "The K5 Gamble," 202.
 57. Eiland, "Cambodia in 1985," 120–121.
 58. Carney, "The Heng Samrin Armed Forces and the Military Balance," 191.
 59. Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge*, 228–229.
 60. Carney, "Kampuchea in 1982," 79.
 61. K referred to the first initial of *kar karpier* (defense). This was the fifth plan of defense of eight.
 62. Margaret Slocomb, "Forestry Policy and Practices of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, 1979–1989," *Asian Survey*, 42 (5) (2002): 772–793, especially 786–787.
 63. Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, 317.
 64. Chanda, "Cambodia in 1986," 118–119.
 65. Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, 261.
 66. *Ibid.*, 262.
 67. Clayton, *Education and the Politics of Language*, 99 and 102.
 68. *Ibid.*, 103–104, 108, and 155.

69. Leifer, "Kampuchea in 1980," 99; Orlov, "The New Cambodia War," 149; William Shawcross, *The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).
70. Carney, "The Heng Samrin Armed Forces and the Military Balance," 191.
71. Slocomb, "The K5 Gamble," 201.
72. *Ibid.*, 206.
73. Whereas Thai traders charged Cambodians more than the goods were worth, these Thai traders were heavily taxed by the warlords and the rebels controlling the areas. Mayotte, *Disposable People?* 45.
74. Becker, "Kampuchea in 1983," 43; Slocomb, "The K5 Gamble," 206–207.
75. *Ibid.*, 207.
76. Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge*, 44. Cambodian refugees along the Thai-Cambodia border numbered 600,000–700,000 by the end of 1979 and 350,000 in 1985. Hood and Ablin, "The Path to Cambodia's Present," xlv. Another estimate claims that there were 150,000 refugees in camps in Thailand (i.e., Camp Sakeo 1, Sakeo 2, Khao I Dang) at the beginning of 1980. Meng-Try, "Kampuchea," 221.
77. It also made the camps militarized; there was no gun control over the civilians, and as a result many of them possessed AK-47 rifles. Mayotte, *Disposable People?* 53.
78. Orlov, "The New Cambodia War," 148.
79. Michael Vickery, "Refugee Politics: The Khmer Camp System in Thailand," in David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood (eds.), *The Cambodian Agony* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), 308.
80. Mayotte, *Disposable People?* 50.
81. Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, 253.
82. Vickery, "Refugee Politics," 298.
83. Clayton, *Education and the Politics of Language*, 83–84; Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, 219; Vickery, "Refugee Politics," 298–299.
84. Eiland, "Kampuchea in 1984," 112.
85. Clayton, *Education and the Politics of Language*, 95 and 154.
86. Although several orphanages were established in Site 2 (KPNLF) by the volunteer agencies, it is commonly known that one of the orphanages was a source for recruits by the resistance. Andrew S. Kanter, "Topics for Our Times: Life in a Refugee Camp—Lessons from Cambodia and Site 2," *American Journal of Public Health*, 85 (5) (1995): 620–621.
87. van der Kroef, "Kampuchea," 330.
88. Short, *Pol Pot*, 412.
89. Carney, "The Heng Samrin Armed Forces and the Military Balance," 201.
90. Short, *Pol Pot*, 417.
91. Leifer, "Kampuchea in 1980," 98–99.
92. Orlov, "The New Cambodia War," 147.
93. Because the militia forces and regular government forces were needed to protect forestry bases from the Khmer Rouge, the military and state authorities in the forest regions were additionally paid and allowed to extract an extra 3 to 5 percent bonus over the stipulated amount of timber. Slocomb, "Forestry Policy and Practices," 788–789.

94. Widyono, *Dancing in Shadows*, 45, 87, 89, and 92–93. Due to these resources, estimates on the viability of the Khmer Rouge tend to vary. According to Short, the group had enough arms and financial resources to fight even in 1992. Short, *Pol Pot*, 431.
95. Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge*, 39.
96. Short, *Pol Pot*, 410; Vickery, “Refugee Politics,” 296.
97. However, in 1988 when the Vietnamese forces began to withdraw, the Khmer Rouge moved thousands of people to repatriation villages in jungle areas in the interior to build its base.
98. Clodfelter, *Vietnam in Military Statistics*, 284; Mayotte, *Disposable People?* 77. Site 8 had been under the control of the Khmer Rouge until the 1984–1985 offensive, at which point they were driven away to Thailand by the Vietnamese troops.
99. Amnesty International, *Kampuchea*, 22–69 and 70–73; Mayotte, *Disposable People?* 79–80.
100. Short, *Pol Pot*, 418–419.
101. However, even after the establishment of the coalition, armed clashes had continued, especially between the Khmer Rouge and other noncommunist groups.
102. Becker, “Kampuchea in 1983,” 41–42; Hood and Ablin, “The Path to Cambodia’s Present,” lv.
103. Interview by the author, June 21, 2009, Chhnal Moan village. Vickery argues that this was a reason why people moved to the border in the desire to obtain cash. Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*.
104. *Ibid.*, 317. An ex-Khmer Rouge commander was also aware of this point. Interview by the author, June 21, 2009, Chhnal Moan village.
105. Interview by the author, May 31, 2009, Krang Svot village.
106. Interview by the author, June 6, 2009, Krang Svot village.
107. Slocomb, “The K5 Gamble,” 207–208.
108. Mayotte, *Disposable People?* 78–79.
109. Vickery, “Refugee Politics,” 303.
110. For the KPNLF, the Vietnamese was the primary enemy, and the Khmer Rouge was the second target. See Orlov, “The New Cambodia War,” 149.
111. Carney, “Kampuchea in 1982,” 77–78; Carney, “The Heng Samrin Armed Forces and the Military Balance,” 197–198.
112. Orlov, “The New Cambodia War,” 149.
113. Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, 268 and 269.
114. Those who could receive money from relatives who had resettled in foreign countries were taxed by Thai guards and the camp administrators.
115. Kanter, “Topics for Our Times,” 620.
116. Carney, “The Heng Samrin Armed Forces and the Military Balance,” 197–198.
117. Carney, “Kampuchea in 1982,” 76.
118. Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, 314.
119. Interview by the author, December 21, 2008, Phum Sampov village.
120. They occasionally brought music tapes to village galas. Interview by the author, June 20, 2009, Prey Sen village.

121. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
122. FUNCINPEC soldiers carried photos of Sihanouk when entering villages in the interior and distributed them to local villagers to lure them to refugee camps. Interview by the author, June 7, 2009, Krang Svot village.
123. Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge*, 140; Hood and Ablin, "The Path to Cambodia's Present," xlix-l; Vickery, "Refugee Politics," 323.
124. Vickery, *Cambodia 1975-1982*, 257.
125. Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge*, 4, 39, 147, and 296. The local armed forces participated in smuggling, controlled the distribution of K5 materials, and seized new tracts of land to develop or exploit.
126. Meng-Try, Ea, "Kampuchea," 219.
127. Chuftrin, "Five Years of the People's Revolutionary Power," 1148; van der Kroef, "Cambodia in 1990," 97.
128. Interview by the author, June 21, 2009, Chhnal Moan village.
129. However, the government encouraged those displaced people to return to their villages after 1992. Interview by the author, June 6, 2009, Banteay Char village.
130. Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Sdau village.
131. Interview by the author, June 21, 2009, Krang Svot village.
132. Interviews by the author, May 30 and June 7, 2009, Krang Svot village.
133. Interview by the author, June 7, 2009, Krang Svot village.
134. Interview by the author, May 31, 2009, Krang Svot village.
135. As discussed above, while the Vietnamese tried to establish collective agricultural farming and its attempt eventually failed, the village had a development committee that took on rice-seed banking and infrastructure construction. Interview by the author, January 3, 2009, Entek Chit village.
136. Interview by the author, January 13, 2009, Svay Prakeab village.
137. Interview by the author, December 28, 2008, Sasar Pok village.
138. He was later returned after over 150 villagers negotiated with the cadres over his release. Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Sdau village.
139. Interviews by the author, January 10, 2009, Tuol Chranieng and Kampong Chaeng villages.
140. Interview by the author, December 20, 2008, Banan village.
141. Interview by the author, December 21, 2008, Kouk Ampil village.
142. Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Sdau village.
143. Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Tuol Chranieng village.
144. Interview by the author, December 27, 2008, Bay Damram village.
145. According to female interviewees who were also cooks, pecuniary incentives motivated them to serve the military. Interviews by the author, December, 27, 2008, Entek Chit and Voat Kantueu villages.
146. There were some girls who fell in love with Khmer Rouge cadres and eloped with them. Interviews by the author, January 4, 2009, Kampong village.
147. Interview by the author, December 27, 2008, Bat Sala village. However, as in Battambang district, even militiamen were sent to the frontlines with military soldiers. Interview by the author, January 11, 2009, Kanhchroang village.
148. Interview by the author, December 28, 2008, Sasar Pok village.

149. They tend to consider there were only “volunteers” in the village militia or military. Interviews by the author, January 10 and 11, 2009, Kampong Chaeng village.
150. More civilians were conscripted in larger villages.
151. Interview by the author, January 3, 2009, Enteak Chit village.
152. He joined the military in 1982 and came back to the village in 1984. Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Sdau village.
153. Interview by the author, January 3, 2009, Chamkar Svay village.
154. According to a former village chief, the tax rate of rice was 50 kg per hecter, although some poor farmers asked for a discount to 20 kg. The rate remained the same between 1983 and 1989, and no tax was imposed after 1989. Interview by the author, January 11, 2009, Bay Damram village.
155. Interview by the author, January 13, 2009, Svay Prakeab village.
156. Interview by the author, December 21, 2008, Kouk Ampil village.
157. Interview by the author, December 28, 2008, Doang village.
158. Ibid.
159. Interview by the author, December 21, 2008, Kouk Ampil village.
160. Interview by the author, January 4, 2009, Doang village.
161. Interview by the author, December 27, 2008, Bay Damram village.
162. Interview by the author, January 4, 2009, Doang village.
163. Interviews by the author, June 28, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.
164. For this reason, when Khmer Rouge soldiers came in, men often fled, while women stayed in the village. Interview by the author, June 28, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.
165. According to an interviewee, about 1,000 Khmer Rouge soldiers were camped at Lake Tonle Sap. He also asserts that Khmer Rouge soldiers came in the village almost every day and visited nearby villages alternately. Interview by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.
166. However, at this time, those who stayed in the village were shot by Khmer Rouge soldiers. Interview by the author, June 28, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.
167. Interviews by the author, July 11, 2009, Ta Sei village.
168. Interviews by the author, July 12, 2009, Chrouy Mtes village. According to one of the informants, Khmer Rouge soldiers came in the village two or three times a month.
169. Interview by the author, May 31, 2009, Krang Svot village.
170. Interviews by the author, July 18, 2009, Ang Tboung village.
171. Interviews by the author, July 18 and 19, 2009, Ang Cheung village.
172. Interviews by the author, July 19, 2009, Ang Cheung village.
173. Interviews by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
174. Interviews by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
175. According to an informant in Thmei village, Khmer Rouge soldiers came in about once a year. Interview by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village.
176. Interviews by the author, July 4 and 5, 2009.
177. Several interviewees assert that the Vietnamese soldiers sometimes robbed villagers of their properties. Interviews by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village.

178. The former village chief insists that he attempted to reeducate and persuade civilians to quit being spies. Village chiefs were responsible for maintaining the order in villages as well as reporting the number and composition of residents. Interview by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village.
179. District chiefs received an order of conscription from a provincial governor who was ordered by the prime minister. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Tbound village.
180. Interview by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Tbound village.
181. However, some volunteers were not accepted due to government concern that they would defect to the rebels with their weapons. Interview by the author, June 27 and 28, 2009, Tumpung Tbound village.
182. Interview by the author, December, 21, 2008, Phnum Sampov village.
183. Interview by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
184. Interview by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village.
185. Villagers were conscripted also as K5 workers, and ten villagers from different families were alternately sent to the border areas.
186. Interview by the author, July 11, 2009, Ta Sei village.
187. A couple of conscripts were exempted because they were in dire poverty and had no one else who could take care of their families.
188. Interviews by the author, July 12, 2009, Chrouy Mtes village.
189. Interviews by the author, June 28, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
190. Interviews by the author, July 18, 2009, Ang Tbound village. A variation of volunteer motivations can be found also in other villages (e.g., Thmei village). Interview by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village.
191. Interviews by the author, July 19, 2009, Ang Cheung village.
192. Interviews by the author, June 28, 2009, Tumpung Tbound village.
193. For instance, an interviewee remembers that villagers in Chrouy Mtes village “wanted” to join the militia. Interview by the author, July 12, 2009, Chrouy Mtes village.
194. Interviews by the author, June 27 and 28, 2009, Tumpung Tbound village.
195. Interview by the author, July 11, 2009, Ta Sei village.
196. However, younger men tended to be assigned to military and older villagers to militia. Interview by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
197. Interviews by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village, and July 18, 2009, Ang Tbound village.
198. Interview by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
199. The village militia was neither equipped nor trained to counter Khmer Rouge forces. Therefore, the militias often avoided fighting them. Interview by the author, June 28, 2009, Tumpung Tbound village.
200. Ibid.
201. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Tbound village.
202. Interview by the author, July 12, 2009, Chrouy Mtes village.
203. Interview by the author, July 18, 2009, Ang Tbound village.
204. Ibid.
205. Interview by the author, June 21, 2009, Chhnal Moan village. Another informant insists that about 90 families were living in Chhnal Moan commune and 20 families in Chhnal Moan village. Interview by the author, June 20, 2009, Prey Sen village.

206. Interview by the author, June 14, 2009, Ra village.
207. Interviews by the author, June 13, 2009, Kantuot village.
208. Ibid.
209. Interview by the author, June 13, 2009, Kantuot village.
210. Interviews by the author, June 14, 2009, Ra village.
211. Interviews by the author, June 13, 2009, Kantuot village.
212. For instance, an interviewee in Phnum Sampov village fled to the border to join the KPNLF in 1979. Interview by the author, December 21, 2008, Phnum Sampov village.
213. Interviews by the author, December 20, 2008, Svay Prakeab village and June 21, 2009, Chhnal Moan village.
214. In the camp, 12 families were organized into a single group by the administration. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
215. Ibid. Another informant, who fled to the border, also knew that refugees were fed by the United Nations. Interview by the author, January 11, 2009, Bay Damram village.
216. Interviews by the author, January 4, 2009, Doang village and June 27, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
217. Interview by the author, June 21, 2009, Chhnal Moan village.
218. Interviews by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village. According to an ex-KPNLF combatant, he feared being injured but had no choice but to serve in the force. Interview by the author, December 20, 2008, Svay Prakeab village.
219. Interviews by the author, December 20, 2008, Bay Damram village, January 4, 2009, Doang village, and June 21, 2009, Chhnal Moan village.
220. He had been a unit commander of the Khmer Rouge force (100 troops) since 1973. His experience helped him become a KPNLF commander controlling 470 troops. Interview by the author, June 6, 2009, Banteay Char village.
221. Interviews by the author, December 28, 2008, Doang and Sasar Pok villages, and June 20, 2009, Prey Sen village.
222. Interview by the author, May 30, 2009, Banteay Char village.
223. Interview by the author, May 31, 2009, Krang Svav village. Another informant revealed that he was also arrested and interrogated by the Vietnamese when deserting from the Khmer Rouge to the PRK-Vietnamese side. Interview by the author, June 20, 2009, Prey Sen village.
224. Interview by the author, May 31, 2009, Krang Svav village.
225. Interview by the author, December 28, 2008, Doang village.
226. Interview by the author, June 6, 2009, Krang Svav village.
227. Interview by the author, June 14, 2009, Chay Balangk village.
228. Interview by the author, June 7, 2009, Krang Svav village.

Chapter 6

1. It even assumes that the motivation is determined by the contexts.
2. For instance, the cost comes from risks of denunciation by neighbors and punishment by the government.

3. David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53 (4) (2009): 570–597.
4. Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (5) (2002): 615–637.
5. When a government confronts more than one rebel group, the conflict may include multiple dyads. For instance, the Iraqi government fought both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) throughout the 1980s. I take not a dyad but such a conflict as a cross-section unit because a country-level factor (e.g., land area, economic development, and political regime) may possibly influence those domestic rebel groups. That is, values of rebel strength in a single country are assumed not to be fully independent but rather are likely to be correlated.
6. David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, "Uppsala Conflict Data Expansion Non-State Actor Information Codebook," 2009.
7. Ibid.
8. Halvard Buhaug and Scott Gates, "The Geography of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research*, 39 (4) (2002): 417–433.
9. Clionadh Raleigh et al., *Conflict Sites: 1946–2005*, v2.0 (2006).
10. Wood, "Rebel Capacity and Strategic Violence."
11. Buhaug and Gates, "The Geography of Civil War."
12. Halvard Buhaug and Päivi Lujala, "Accounting for Scale: Measuring Geography in Quantitative Studies of Civil War," *Political Geography*, 24 (4) (2005): 399–418.
13. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless?"; Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma*.
14. Dwight Lee and Richard McKenzie, "Reexamination of the Relative Efficiency of the Draft and the All-Voluntary Army," *Southern Economic Journal*, 58 (3) (1992): 644–654; Thomas Ross, "Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruitment," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 37 (1) (1994): 109–131; John Warner and Beth Asch, "The Economic Theory of a Military Draft Reconsidered," *Defense and Peace Economics*, 7 (4) (1996): 297–311.
15. See Bethany Lacina, "Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50 (2) (2006): 276–289.
16. Guillaume R. Frechette, "Random-Effects Ordered Probit," *Stata Technical Bulletin*, 59 (2001): 23–27; Guillaume R. Frechette, "Update to Random-Effects Ordered Probit," *Stata Technical Bulletin*, 61 (2001): 12.
17. Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder, "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses," *Political Analysis*, 14 (1) (2005): 63–82.
18. The statistically significant control variables in model 8 are *Country Size*, *Rival Rebels*, *Population Density in Conflict*, *GDP per Capita*, and *Democracy*.
19. Kalyvas and Matthew A. Kocher, "How 'Free' Is Free Riding?"
20. See Gleditsch et al, "Armed Conflict 1946–2001."
21. For instance, Hultman, "Battle Losses and Rebel Violence."
22. The t-test suggests that there is a significant difference between the incompatibilities of territory (1.521) and government (1.918).

Chapter 7

1. These do not deny that there were female combatants in the Cambodian civil wars.
2. For instance, Arjona and Kalyvas, "Recruitment into Armed Groups in Colombia"; Blattman and Annan, "The Consequences of Child Soldiering"; Humphreys and Weinstein, "Who Fights?"; Kalyvas and Kocher, "How 'Free' Is Free Riding"; Aderoju Oyefusi, "Oil and the Probability of Rebel Participation among Youths in the Niger Delta of Nigeria," *Journal of Peace Research*, 45 (4) (2008): 539–555; Jocelyn S. Viterna, "Pulled, Pushed, and Persuaded: Explaining Women's Mobilization into the Salvadoran Guerrilla Army," *American Journal of Sociology*, 112 (1) (2006): 1–45; Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*; Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War*.
3. For instance, Sergio Koc-Menard, "Fragmented Sovereignty: Why *Sendero Luminoso* Consolidated in Some Regions of Peru but Not in Others," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30 (2) (2007): 173–206; Alex McDougall, "State Power and Its Implications for Civil War Colombia," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32 (3) (2009): 322–345.
4. Mason, *Caught in the Crossfire*, 103.
5. Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 101.

Appendix

1. Former rebels (FUNCINPEC and KPNLF) in the civil war after 1979 were integrated into the government forces after the peace agreement was achieved in 1992. Khmer Rouge soldiers also joined the government army after its dissolution.
2. Before starting each interview, I asked the interviewee about his or her age and birthplace. If the individual had been too young or outside the research sites during the civil wars, I ended the interview. Despite the imposed limitation on timeframe and site, almost all interviewees were from the designated districts.
3. As others did, I found local residents willing to talk about their painful experiences. See Marie Smyth and Marie-Therese Fay, *Personal Accounts from Northern Ireland's Troubles: Public Conflict, Private Loss* (London: Plute Press, 2000), 3. But there were also villagers, especially former Khmer Rouge cadres, who declined to participate in an interview. This may be because the ongoing Khmer Rouge trials have implanted a fear of being sued, even though only high-rank officials are on trial.
4. Elizabeth J. Wood, "The Ethical Challenges of Field Research in Conflict Zones," *Qual Sociol*, 29 (3) (2006): 373–386.
5. Michael F. Brown and Eduardo Fernández, *War of Shadows: The Struggle for Utopia in the Peruvian Amazon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Carey Goldberg, "Studies Say Old Memories Can Be Lost," *Boston Globe*, December 30 A₁ (2003); Daniel Mendelsohn, "What Happened to Uncle Shmiel?" *New York Times Magazine*, July 14 (2002): 24–55.
6. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 402.
7. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 355.

8. As these specific issues (i.e., years and communication) were prevalent throughout the samples, one may question whether the cross-checking procedures discussed were appropriate. I still insist that open-ended questions for the respondents were effective to collate details between recollections. For instance, some informants remembered the Khmer Rouge's assault of villages more clearly than the government's conscription, while others had a vivid memory of the latter. In each interview, I could repeatedly ask related questions on a subject and delve into a specific topic if necessary. As a result, each interview highlighted particular aspects of the conflict more than others. Although, as expected, recollections frequently overlapped, they also varied significantly. This study assumes that these differentiated data are cross-checkable.

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