

Notes

1 Introspection as Inner Perception

1. Or, perhaps more accurately, they disagreed about the interpretation of results. See Monson and Hurlburt (1993) for an interesting reevaluation of the debate.

2 Poking Out the Inner Eye

1. Of course, this is not an entirely original claim on my part. Multiple philosophers have criticized and/or rejected the perceptual account of introspection in various ways. See Lyons (1986), Dennett (1991), and Shoemaker (1994a and b) for a few noteworthy examples. This previous work has helped unearth problems with the perceptual account and, in part, inspires some of the reasons I give in this chapter for rejecting the view that introspection is a kind of perception.
2. There is significant debate in the philosophy of perception concerning the relationship between perception and sensation (see e.g., Schwartz, 2004), from those who identify perception with computational processes, distinct from the sensory stimulations that serve as their input (e.g., Marr, 1982; Gregory, 1998), to those who understand perception itself in sensorimotor terms (e.g., Gibson, 1986; Noë, 2004), but we need not enter that territory here. All that the present point requires is that there is a dependent causal relationship between sensation and perception (even if they may be discernible as distinct processes), which ought to be a modest enough requirement to accommodate most accounts of perception.
3. Exactly what kinds of objects we perceive in ordinary perceptual experience is an interesting and not easily answerable issue (see e.g., Gendler & Hawthorne, 2006; Hawley & Macpherson, 2011), but I will be as non-committal as possible on the topic here. For our immediate purposes in this section, the term 'object' should be understood generically, as whatever it is we perceive in ordinary experience (whether they be things or events, sense data or mind-independent material things, need not be settled here).
4. See my 'Scan Thyself' for more on Philip K. Dick and self-knowledge, as explored through his work and life (Butler, 2011b).
5. This transition from direct realism to representationalism is merely rhetorical, with no intention of being an accurate description of the nature of mental states and their relationship to brain states.
6. For what it is worth, I find Ruth Millikan's biosemantic approach to mental content to be the most plausible functionalist account aired on the topic thus far, understanding the representational content of beliefs and other mental states in terms of evolutionarily-adaptive relational func-

tions vis-à-vis biological organisms and their environmental interactions (Millikan, 1993).

7. This is, of course, related to the previous question concerning perceptual objects. However, it is a distinctly different question. In theory at least, one could agree that there are no perceptual objects in introspection but answer affirmatively to the question of qualia, maintaining that while we do not perceive actual objects in introspection, distinctive phenomenal qualities of mental states appear to us in a perceptual or perception-like manner. As an analogy, consider pain. One could argue that pains are not perceived as objects, despite the fact that they have distinctive phenomenal qualities through which they may be identified. This possibility is one reason to treat these two domains separately.
8. It is important to note that I do not mean 'unified functional process' in the sense that there is only one identifiable process involved. It is now clear that there are distinguishable informational pathways involved in specific kinds of visual information processing. There are, for instance, separate dedicated areas of the brain for detecting color, shape, motion, faces, and perhaps other aspects of vision (Gregory, 1998; Farah, 2000; Gaulin & McBurney, 2001, pp. 106–109; Palmer & Palmer, 2002, pp. 60–65; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). My point here is that these individual processes, while they each constitute a functional unity in themselves, can also be said to more broadly constitute a functional unity in terms of general visual perception. They all work together to integrate visual environmental information into the various purposes of the organisms that have them.
9. See Byrne and Whiten (1988) for an interesting account that emphasizes strategic manipulation and deception in explaining the evolution of human intelligence.

4 Knowing Our Own Consciousness

1. For example, Colin McGinn has recently argued that consciousness should itself be understood as a kind of knowingness (2008).
2. One might wonder how this could be achieved in actuality. Perhaps her capacity to sense red has been disabled somehow. Since this is only a thought experiment, however, we can set aside the real-world requirements of Mary's circumstances.
3. It is worth noting that Jackson too has more recently accepted that the knowledge argument fails to dismiss physicalism. See his *Forward and Postscripts* in Ludlow et al. (2004).
4. For an influential earlier development of the concept of acquaintance, see Russell (1910). It is also worth noting that acquaintance-like characterization of introspection appears in the recent methodological approach in the scientific study of consciousness proposed by Petitmengin and Bitbol (2009). See my Butler (2011a) for an analysis and critique of their reliance upon acquaintance.

5 Introspection through Cognition

1. Excluding cases of misrepresentation, of course, such as the fascinating phantom limb cases studied by Ramachandran and others. See Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998).
2. I will return to the topic of language in Chapter 7, detailing the introspective roles of language in inner speech, but without making commitments there to the issues surrounding introspection and external cognition I have touched on here, for the reason that the claims I make about inner speech need not depend upon the more controversial extended mind perspective. For those who follow Clark (1998; 2008) and others in regarding language as an external cognitive artifact, however, the introspective dimensions of external cognition and inner speech may be profitably brought together.

6 Understanding Our Own Beliefs and Desires

1. I will return to some of this territory in the final chapter, addressing social cognition more broadly and the roles our social relationships with others can play in our understanding of ourselves.
2. In fact, the rarity of folk psychological theorizing claimed by Gallagher and Ratcliffe may dovetail nicely with the rarity and relative difficulty of introspection I emphasized earlier in rejecting the idea of a dedicated introspective faculty in the mind.
3. To be clear, I am not saying that this is the case, but rather only that it is possible. See Heyes (1998) for a critical review of this topic.
4. Furthermore, Hutto's narrative practice account is a plausible bridge between the claims I am making here about folk psychology and the claims I will make in the next chapter about language. For the immediate purposes of this chapter, however, such a connection is unnecessary.

7 The Internal Monologue

1. See Hurlburt (1990) regarding reports of inner speech. For evidence that inner speech utilizes the same brain areas as vocalized speech and external speech perception, see McGuire et al. (1996), who conclude that 'silent articulation of sentences involves activity in an area concerned with speech generation, while imagining speech is associated with additional activity in regions associated with speech perception (p. 29).' I will focus on auditory inner speech, due to the commonality of auditory language imagery and my own experience with it, but it is interesting to consider how comparable language imagery may occur in non-auditory sensory modalities. What experiential form do introspective propositional thoughts take for the deaf, for instance? Do thoughts occur through visual or tactile signs of language? Does a deaf person fluent in a gestural sign language feel her own thoughts through gesture images, for instance? These are fascinating and worthwhile issues to explore, but I must set them aside here. For an interesting window into the experience of sign language as a voice, see Sacks (1989).

2. He has further refined his views in subsequent publications, though increasingly tied to his work defending modularity and dual systems theory, which need not concern us here.
3. To be clear, the cognitive functions of language described here are not necessarily tied to the conception of language as an external artifact. I am sympathetic with Clark's extended mind approach to cognition, as discussed earlier in Chapter 5, but the introspective functions of language are not dependent on an external conception of language. For a sympathetic challenge to the externality of Clark's account of language, see Wheeler (2004).
4. For more on self-reference and related phenomena, I recommend the unique and entertaining work of Douglas Hofstadter (1979; 2007), who makes much more of it than I do here.
5. For recent work on this topic, see Moran (2001), Finkelstein (2003), and Bar-On (2004).
6. For entry into the literature on self-deception, see McLoughlin and Rorty (1988) and Dupuy (1998).

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