

Notes and References

1 Where is NATO Going?

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2 Thinking NATO through Theoretically

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37. Our three selected theories correspond roughly to the typology of Jack Snyder who suggests that realism, liberalism and idealism (constructivism) are the three dominant theories of IR. See his 'One World, Rival Theories', *Foreign Policy*, No. 145, 2004, pp. 53–62. Zoltan Barany and Robert Rauchhaus have, like us, utilized these three theories in order to consider NATO and have offered a similar rationale for doing so. Their study, however, does not undertake the systematic and extensive testing of propositions which we undertake here. See their 'Explaining NATO's Resilience: Is International Relations Theory Useful?' *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 32(2), 2011, pp. 286–307.
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39. On these grounds, we have not pursued an elaboration of Critical Theory despite its growing standing within the field of Security Studies. We are in agreement with Ken Booth that the merits of the sub-field of Critical Security Studies (CSS) lie in critique (questioning 'the knowledge-claims of the powerful') and reconstruction (posing emancipatory alternatives to 'business-as-usual' practices of security). These two tasks, while valid in their own right, offer little practical guidance for the sort of exercise undertaken here, namely the investigation of a specific research question relating to NATO's development. Indeed, CSS, according to Booth, rejects the very basis for such investigation, considering it infused with the false claims to objectivity of positivist Social Science, divorced from the practice of emancipation and 'implicated in the replication of associated practices' of world politics. That said, Booth also concedes that CSS 'is a relatively new approach' that has yet to fully engage with 'detailed policy analysis' and 'discussions about security in concrete circumstances'. Consequently, unlike the three theories we have selected, CSS offers little direct analysis of NATO and no clear propositions relevant to our own analysis of the Alliance. See K. Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 172, 244–5, 264–6.
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47. J. Grieco, 'Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics', in M. W. Doyle and G. J. Ikenberry (eds), *New Thinking in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 164–8; B. Frankel, 'Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction', in B. Frankel (ed.), *Realism: Restatements and Renewal* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xiv–xx.
48. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, pp. 4–5.
49. Neo-realists draw a distinction between alliances as a response to power (a position associated with Kenneth Waltz) and as a response to threat (a position associated with Stephen Walt). For instance, during the Cold War, Canada, Turkey and the states of western Europe did not seek to balance the power of the US even though it possessed capabilities sufficient to overwhelm them. Rather they sought through NATO to balance the Soviet Union. As Stephen Walt explains, '[a]lthough the distribution of power is an extremely important factor, the level of threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions.' The Soviet Union by these criteria posed more of a threat than did the US. Walt's analysis is generally regarded as an important advance on Waltz and we follow his terminology in this section. See Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*. The quotation is from p. 5.
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70. Hyde-Price, *European Security in the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 86–90; K. Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', pp. 20–5; J. J. Mearsheimer, 'Why is Europe Peaceful Today?' *European Political Science* Vol. 9(3), 2010, pp. 388–90.
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4 NATO Enlargement

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104. D. Price (rapporteur), *Military Preparations of NATO Candidate Countries*, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Report, Sub-committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities, AV 182 DSC/FC (02) 5 rev. 1, November 2002, p. 5.
105. This discussion draws on data presented in NATO, *Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence*, Communiqué PR/CP(2010)078, 10 June 2010.
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109. M. H. Clemmesen, ‘Before Implementation of the Membership Action Plan: Baltic States’ Defence Development until the Present’, *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, 2, 1999, pp. 35–42; R. Norkus, ‘Lithuania’s Contribution to International Operations: Challenges for a Small Ally’, *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, Vol. 8, 2006, pp. 167–71; and Linkevicius, ‘Lithuanian National Plans and Priorities before the Prague Summit’.
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112. Price, *Military Preparations of NATO Candidate Countries*, para. 46 and 44.
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114. Macedonia, *Annual National Program of the Republic of Macedonia for NATO Membership 2007/2008*, paras 330–1.
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116. I. Biró and M. P. Ulrich, *The National Security Strategy and Transformation of the Hungarian Defence Forces* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2005), p. 8.
117. 'Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Informal Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers', Budapest, Hungary, 10 October 2009, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-89948164-B7401A40/natolive/opinions_47177.htm.
118. Croatian and Macedonian defence planning, despite its limited participation in combat operations, explicitly targeted the original 40 per cent and 8 per cent benchmarks prior to the decision to admit both states into the Alliance. Croatia, Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Defence Review*, p. 19; and Macedonia, *Annual National Program of the Republic of Macedonia for NATO Membership 2007/2008*, para. 266.
119. Congressional Budget Office, *The Costs of Expanding the NATO Alliance* (Washington, DC: CBO, 1996), p. 11.
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125. Ratiu, *The Romanian Armed Forces*, para. 10; Romania, *Romania's National Security Strategy*, pp. 5 and 7; Koenders, *Report. NATO Enlargement*, para. 44; Price, *Military Preparations of NATO Candidate Countries*, para. 44; and Bulgaria, *National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria*, 1995, para. 40.
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127. Croatia, *The Program of the Government of the Republic of Croatia for the 2003–2007 Mandate*, paras 35 and 32.
128. Albania, *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Albania*, para. 16.3; idem, 'National Security, NATO Membership, Albania's Contribution to Global Peace and Security'; Croatia, *The Program of the Government of the Republic of Croatia for the 2003–2007 Mandate*, para. 32; Macedonia, *Annual National Program of the Republic of Macedonia for NATO Membership 2007/2008*, paras 42–7, and Macedonia, *Strategic Defence Review*, paras 15 and 22.
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79. *Bucharest Summit Declaration (Press Release 2008 049)*, para. 23, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html>.
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81. 'NATO: Czech FM Explains the Georgia, Ukraine Compromise', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 4 April 2008, at <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079737.html>.
82. These were the status of Kosovo, the future of the CFE treaty, missile defence and NATO enlargement.
83. *Meeting of the NATO–Russia Council at the level of Heads of State and Government held in Bucharest* (Brussels: NATO, 2008), at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-050e.html>.
84. D. Yost, 'The US Debate on NATO Nuclear Deterrence', *International Affairs*, Vol. 87(6), 2011, pp. 1416–17.
85. M. Webber, *Inclusion, Exclusion and the Governance of European Security* (Manchester etc.: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 16–18.
86. This definition of identity change is derived from M. Finnemore, *National Interests and International Society* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 5–13.
87. I. B. Neumann and V. Pouliot, 'Untimely Russia: Hysteresis in Russian–Western Relations over the Past Millennium', *Security Studies*, Vol. 20(1), 2011, pp. 105–37.
88. V. Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO–Russia Diplomacy* (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 2.
89. President Boris Yeltsin, speech to the Russian Supreme Soviet, February 1992, cited in M. Webber, 'The Emergence of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 26(3), 1993, p. 262.
90. R. Sakwa, 'Russia and Europe: Whose Society?' *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 33(2), 2011, p. 197–214.
91. *Perceptions of Russia: A Survey among European and American Elites* (Berlin: The Aspen Institute, 2005).
92. D. Averre, 'From Pristina to Tskhinvali: The Legacy of Operation Allied Force in Russia's Relations with the West', *International Affairs*, Vol. 85(3), 2009, p. 591.
93. 'Joint Statement at NATO–Russia Council Meeting', Lisbon, 20 November 2010 at <http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2010/November/20101120161455su0.8716787.html>.

6 NATO and the European Union

1. See D. P. Calleo, *The Atlantic Fantasy: The US, NATO and Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); and E. Mandel, *Europe versus America? Contradictions of Imperialism*, Trans. M. Rosedale (London: New Left Books, 1970).

2. On unipolarity, see G. J. Ikenberry (ed.), *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); and M. E. Brown, O. R. Coté, Jr, S. M. Lynn-Jones and S. E. Miller (eds), *Primacy and its Discontents: American Power and International Stability* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009).
3. NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance. Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006*, para. 41, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_56425.htm?selectedLocale=en; North Atlantic Council, *Bucharest Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008*, para. 3, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm; North Atlantic Council, *Riga Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006*, Press Release (2006)150, para. 14; North Atlantic Council, *Declaration on Alliance Security Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009*, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm?selectedLocale=en; M. Albright (chair), *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO* (Brussels: NATO, 17 May 2010), p. 24; and North Atlantic Council, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon*, 20 November 2010, paras 25 and 32, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm.
4. The most important strategic statements for the EU are the European Council, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/7837.pdf>; European Council, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World*, S407/08, Brussels, 11 December 2008, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=266&lang=en>. Those for NATO include North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept. Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999*, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en; NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance. Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006*, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_56425.htm?selectedLocale=en; North Atlantic Council, *Declaration on Alliance Security Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009*, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm?selectedLocale=en; and *Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon*, 19 November 2010 at <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>.
5. See, respectively, A. J. K. Bailes, 'The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History,' *SIPRI Policy Paper*, No. 10 (Stockholm: SIPRI, February 2005), p. 12; and A. Toje, 'The 2003 European Security Strategy: A Critical Analysis', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 10(1), 2005, 125–30.
6. See R. Whitman, 'Road Map for a Route March? (De-)civilianizing through the EU's Security Strategy', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 11(1), 2006, p. 8; S. Duke, 'The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does it Make Sense for Secure Alliances in a Better World?' *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 9(4), 2004, p. 463; B. May and M-B. Stumbaum (eds), *NATO versus EU? Security Strategies for Europe* (Berlin: German Council on Foreign Relations, 2005).

7. On the first point, see N. Gnesotto, 'European Strategy as a Model', *Newsletter No. 9* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), p. 1; on the second, see R. Polenz, *The EU Security Concept: Implications for NATO and the EU*, 167 PCTR 04 E (Brussels: NATO Parliamentary Assembly), paras 44 and 49.
8. For the EU, see Council of the EU, 'Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', 16 June 2003, at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/76328.pdf; Council of the EU, 'Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', Document No. 10354/1/03, Brussels, 13 June 2003, at <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st10/st10354en03.pdf>; *EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/august/tradoc_118532.en03.pdf; and European Commission, *Conceptual Framework on the ESDP Dimension of the Fight against Terrorism*, 22 November 2004, available at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/14797Conceptual_Framework_ESDP.pdf. For NATO, see *Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Press Communiqué, M-NAC-1(94)45, 9 June 1994, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940609a.htm>; and *NATO's Response to Terrorism*, Press Release M-NAC-2 (2001)159, 6 December 2001, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-159e.htm>.
9. See J. Sperling and E. Kirchner, *Recasting the European Order: Security Architectures and Economic Cooperation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); J. Sperling (ed.), *Two Tiers or Two Speeds? The European Security Order and the Enlargement of the European Union and NATO* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); and M. Webber, *Inclusion, Exclusion, and the Governance of European Security* (Manchester University Press, 2007).
10. The EU acquired the WEU's Petersberg tasks in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and arguably a weak version of the WEU Article 5 commitment in the Lisbon Treaty. The ESDP acquired a civilian dimension at the 2000 Fiera Council, followed by the 2004 'Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP' and the 2010 Civilian Headline Goal in 2008. For a brief overview of this development, see B. Lasheras, C. Pohlmann, C. Katsioulis and F. Liberti, *European Union Security and Defence White Paper: A Proposal*, January 2010, pp. 46–9, at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07075.pdf>.
11. The WEU was later absorbed into the EU and so here it is regarded as a proxy for European threat perceptions.
12. WEU Council of Ministers, *European Security: A Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries* (Madrid: WEU, 14 November 1995), pp. 10–16, paras 92 and 79.
13. Council of the European Union, *The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World*, pp. 2–6 and 65. This catalogue of risks was a response to the demonstrated vulnerability of national cyber-networks to external disruption (as in the case of an attack on Estonia widely assumed to have emanated from sources in Russia), the temporary disruption of oil supplies to Europe owing to the Ukrainian–Russian pricing dispute and piracy along the shipping routes from the Persian Gulf to Europe, and the potential for the irreversible damage to European societies owing to climate change. See Kirchner and Sperling, *EU Security Governance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), Chapter 4; and T. Balzacq (ed.), *The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Governance, Neighbours, Security* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
14. See North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué, Turnberry*, 7–8 June 1990, para. 10; North Atlantic Council, *NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe*, Press

- Communiqué M-1(91)44, 6–7 June 1991, para. 6.IV, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c910607b.htm>; NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, part I, para. 10; part II, para. 20; J. Hoekama, *The New NATO: Security for an Undivided Europe*, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, November 1998, para. 21, at <http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/1998/ar266dsc-e.asp>; and NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, para. 21.
15. NATO, *Alliance's 'New' Strategic Concept*, paras 7–14 and 20. See also, Defence Planning Committee, 'Final Communiqué', 11 December 1992, para. 2, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c921211a.htm>.
 16. See NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, para. 24; North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, 14 May 2002, para. 3; NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, para. 2; and Albright, et al., *NATO 2020*, pp. 6–7.
 17. Illustrative are NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, para. 24; *Riga Summit Declaration*, para. 45; Albright, et al., *NATO 2020*, p. 13; and North Atlantic Council, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, paras 13, 15 and 19.
 18. NATO, *Bucharest Declaration*, paras 37, 47 and 48; Albright, et al., *NATO 2020*, pp. 7 and 11; and North Atlantic Council, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, paras 8, 12 and 19.
 19. Lord Robertson, 'Our Grandchildren's NATO', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 8(4), 2003, p. 510; NATO, 'Declaration of the Heads of State and Government', 11 January 1994, paras 17 and 18; NATO, *Strategic Concept*, para. 24; NATO, *NATO's Response to Terrorism*, paras 6 and 9; North Atlantic Council, 'Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of NAC', 14 May 2002, para. 4; North Atlantic Council, *Istanbul Summit Communiqué. Issued by the Heads of State and Government in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, Press Release (2004)096, 28 June 2004, para. 3; NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, paras 2 and 5; *Riga Summit Declaration*, para. 42; and North Atlantic Council, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, para. 10.
 20. NATO, Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 9 June 1994, paras 2, 7 and 12–13; NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, paras 22–3; and North Atlantic Council, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, para. 14.
 21. NATO, *Declaration on Alliance Security*. See also, Albright, et al., *NATO 2020*.
 22. For an analysis of threat assessment and policy responses by the major NATO member states and the EU, see E. J. Kirchner and J. Sperling (eds), *Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007); and E. J. Kirchner and J. Sperling (eds), *National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010).
 23. European Council, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World*, pp. 2–7, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=266&lang=en>.
 24. See Kirchner and Sperling, *EU Security Governance*, pp. 234–42.
 25. *Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, 20 November 2010, para. 9, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm.
 26. The WEU identified those tasks in 1992 when the Europeans perceived a need for autonomous crisis-management operations in a post-Cold War environment and as the rationale for a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO. WEU Council of Ministers, *The Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn, 19 June 1992, § III, para. 4, at <http://www.weu.int.documents/920619peten.pdf>.

27. S. Marsh and W. Rees, *The European Union in the Security of Europe: From Cold War to Terror War* (Abingdon, Oxon.: 2012), p. 49.
28. NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, para. 6.
29. NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, paras 13 and 18.
30. NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, para. 3; NATO, *Riga Summit Declaration*, para. 41; NATO, *Declaration on Alliance Security*, para. 7.
31. NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, para. 7.
32. For statements on these themes, see 'Statement of John R. Bolton before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives on the "European Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policies – Implications for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance"', 10 November 1999, pp. 1–3, at http://www.house.gov/international_relations/full/testimony/bolton.htm. See also S. R. Sloan, 'The United States and European Defence', *Chaillot Papers* 39 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, April 2000), pp. 42–8; and K. Donfried and P. Gallis, 'European Security: The Debate in NATO and the European Union', *CRS Report to Congress* (n. d.), pp. 8–9, at <http://www.fpc.gov/crseu.htm>.
33. J. Howorth and J. T. S. Keeler, 'The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy', in J. Howorth and J. T. S. Keeler (eds), *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 8–9.
34. Western European Union, *WEU Maastricht Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance* (London: Press and Information Section, 10 December 1991), para. 5.
35. WEU Council of Ministers, *WEU Contribution to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference of 1996* (Brussels: Press and Information Service, 14 November 1995), paras 36–40.
36. WEU Council of Ministers, *Kirchberg Declaration* (Luxembourg: 9 May 1994), § 3.
37. There is a significant legacy component in the arrangements between WEU–NATO and those that evolved between NATO and EU. See A. Missiroli, 'EU–NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33(1), 2002, pp. 10–13; and H. Ojanen, 'The EU and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 44(1), 2006, p. 70.
38. WEU, *WEU Contribution to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference*, para. 61.
39. The evolution of the ESDP and the mutual assistance clause of the Lisbon Treaty led to the formal dissolution of the WEU in 2010.
40. See 'Joint Declaration on European Defence', Franco–British Summit, St Malo, December 1998, at <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html>.
41. NATO, 'Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Statement to the North Atlantic Council', Brussels, December 8, 1998, at <http://www.useu.be/issues/albr129.html>.
42. The purpose was to reassure 'Alliance member states that Europe's autonomous efforts would be compatible and complementary to NATO's strategic and military orientations'. See J-P. Kucheyda, *Cooperation in the Operational Area between the EU and NATO – Reply to the Annual Report of the Council*, European Parliament, 51st Session, Document A/1918, 7 December 2005, p. 10.
43. The ESS noted that this agreement would enhance 'the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework of the strategic partnership between the two organizations in crisis management'. European Council, *European Security Strategy*,

- p. 12. The operationalization of the agreement has been tweaked as needed. In the wake of the EU-led Operation Concordia, for instance, dissatisfaction with the modalities of the Berlin-Plus agreement initiated a sharper demarcation of EU and NATO command responsibilities that reinforced the political capacity of the EU to act independently of NATO without running the risk of disengagement or disaffection. A. Monaco, 'Bosnia: The Litmus Test for the NATO-EU Strategic Relationship?' *NATO Notes*, Vol. 6(2), 2004, pp. 3–5, at http://www.isiseurope.org/pdf/2008_artrel_137_2004_archives_8_nato_notes_v6n2.pdf.
44. Council of the European Union, *Annex to the Permanent Arrangements on EU/NATO Consultation and Cooperation on the Implementation of Paragraph 10 of the Washington Communiqué*, 13676/00 ADD 1, Brussels, 11 November 2000.
 45. D. Ducarme, *A Common Security and Defence Strategy for Europe – Reply to the Annual Report of the Council*, Document A/2028 (Paris: Assembly of the Western European Union, 2 December 2008), paras 66–7, at http://www.assemblyweu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2028.php#P262_62004.
 46. W. van Eekelen, *Report. NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy*, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Defence and Security Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation, October 2001, paras 62–5, at <http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/2001/au-200-3.asp>; C. Goerens, *NATO: Transformation and Strategic Partnership with the EU – Reply to the Annual Report of the Council*, Document A/1951 (Paris: Assembly of the Western European Union, 18 December 2006), para. 25, at http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2006/1951.pdf; Ducarme, *A Common Security and Defence Strategy for Europe*, para. 64; and Political and Security Committee, Council of the European Union, *Draft Single Progress Report on the Development of the EU Military Capabilities*, 8715/09, 23 April 2009, para. 24, at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st08/st08715.en09.pdf>. On the issue of a veto over the use of assets, see NATO, *Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Florence on 24 May 2000*, Press Release M-NAC-1(2000)52, 24 May 2000, para. 29. For a more positive assessment of the Berlin-Plus arrangements, see P. Cornish, *EU and NATO: Co-operation or Competition?* EP-ExPol-B-2006-14, PE 348.586 (Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Polities of the Union, 2006), pp. 10–12, at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?file=18355>.
 47. Ducarme, *A Common Security and Defence Strategy for Europe*, paras 63–9; J-P. Kucheida, *The EU Battlegroups – Reply to the Annual Report of the Council*, Document A/1964 (Paris: Assembly of the Western European Union, 5 June 2007), paras 40–57, at http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2007/1964.php#P271_36982; and European Union Military Staff, *EU Military Rapid Response Concept*, 5654/09, 23 January 2009, pp. 8–9, at <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/apr/eu-council-military-rapid-response.pdf>.
 48. The hostile American reaction to the 'Gang-of-Four' proposal to establish an independent EU planning cell and headquarters at Tervuren in 2004 strongly suggested that the American concern with duplication was as much about power as inefficiency. See S. Biscop, *NATO, ESDP and the Riga Summit: No Transformation Without Re-equilibration* (Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2006), p. 10.
 49. The Lisbon Treaty added the tasks of joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention, and post-conflict stabilization. See

- G. Grevi, 'ESDP Institutions', in G. Grevi, D. Helly and D. Keohane (eds), *European Security and Defence Policy: the First Ten Years (1999–2009)* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2009), p. 62.
50. Grevi, 'ESDP Institutions', pp. 31–2.
 51. European Commission, 'European Union Military', *Operation of the Council Secretariat*, 14703/07 Annex, p. 123, at [http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/eufp/files/EUMS%20\(2005\).pdf](http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/eufp/files/EUMS%20(2005).pdf).
 52. European Commission, 'European Union Military', p. 124.
 53. The Civil–Military Cell has been described as 'the EU's only genuine operations centre with direct links to member states' governments and military'. Kucheida, *Cooperation in the Operational Area between EU and NATO*, para. 70. The EUMS has a full spectrum planning capability, at least on paper, for managing an EU operation. It has planning cells responsible for concepts and capabilities, intelligence, operations, logistics, and communications and information systems. See EUMS, *Impetus: The Bulletin of the EUMS*, No. 6, 2006, p. 5.
 54. Grevi, 'ESDP Institutions', p. 41.
 55. Council of the European Union, *EU Concept for Force Generation*, 10690/08, 16 June 2008, p. 6. The early expectation was that the EU would rely on NATO for the purposes of force generation.
 56. See van Eekelen, *NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy*, para. 68.
 57. See M. Minniti, *NATO–EU Security Cooperation*, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 176 PCNP 05 E, p. 2, at <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=675>; Council of the European Union, *EU–NATO ad hoc Working Groups*, 10025/1/00 REV 1, 5 July 2000; and M. Webber, 'Presentation to the Meeting on "EU–NATO Assets and Interoperability"', hosted by DCAF, ISIS Europe, and MEP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski', European Parliament, 13 April 2010.
 58. See Cornish, *EU and NATO: Co-operation or Competition?*.
 59. J. Bialos and S. L. Koehl, *The NATO Response Force. Facilitating Coalition Warfare through Technology Transfer and Information Sharing* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2005), p. 2.
 60. The operations included the provision of security for the Athens Olympic Games and Afghan national elections in 2004, disaster relief in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005–6.
 61. J. Ringsmose, 'NATO's Response Force: Finally Getting It Right?', *European Security*, Vol. 18(3), 2009, pp. 287–95.
 62. European Union Military Staff, *EU Military Rapid Response Concept*, p. 10.
 63. European Union Military Staff, *EU Military Rapid Response Concept*, p. 15.
 64. General Affairs and External Relations Council, 'Headline Goal 2010 Approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004 Endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004', para. 4, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>; and European Union Military Staff, *EU Military Rapid Response Concept*, pp. 7–10.
 65. Grevi, 'ESDP Institutions', p. 63.
 66. The criteria for a member state to qualify as a participant in permanent structured cooperation, in addition to meeting a set of capabilities benchmarks, also contains obligations to a number of undertakings: meeting the equipment expenditure benchmark (of 20 per cent of military expenditure) and the defence expenditure benchmark (of 2 per cent of GDP); pooling resources and being able to offer specialized capabilities; enhancing the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of forces; and meeting the shortfalls catalogued in

- the EU's Capability Development Plan. See 'Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation Established by Article I-41(6) and Article III-312 of the Constitution', *Official Journal of the European Union*, 16 December 2004, Article 2 (a–d).
67. 'Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation', p. 63. Notably, the far-reaching 2010 Anglo-French defence agreement referenced neither permanent structured cooperation, the CSDP or the EDA. See Prime Minister's Office, *UK–France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation*, 2 November 2010, paras 24 and 25, at <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/statements-and-articles/2010/11/uk%E2%80%93france-summit-2010-declaration-on-defence-and-security-co-operation-56519>.
 68. S. J. Smith, 'EU–NATO Cooperation; A Case of Institutional Fatigue?', *European Security*, Vol. 20(2), 2011, pp. 243–64.
 69. Berggrav is the Supreme Allied Command Transformation Representative in Europe for NATO. See SDA Monthly Roundtable, *The Outlook for Security and Defence Technologies* (Brussels: Bibliothèque Solvay and Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, 5 May 2008), p. 20. A similar assessment is made by S. Eldon, 'Reaffirming NATO's Transatlantic Indivisibility could help Define its new "Strategic Concept"', in G. Merritt (ed.), *Revisiting NATO–ESDP Relations, Part I and II. SDA Discussion Paper* (Brussels: Bibliothèque Solvay, 2008), p. 25.
 70. See P. de Vestel, 'Defence Markets and Industries in Europe: Time for Political Decisions?' *Chaillot Papers*, No. 21 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 1995); and N. Gnesotto (chair), *European Defence: A Proposal for a White Paper* (Paris: EUISS, 2004), p. 111. NATO standards currently function as the departure points in most EU documents on the European defence sector, particularly on matters impinging upon the standardization of military equipment within Europe. See European Commission, *European Defence – Industrial and Market Issues. Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy*, COM(2003) 113 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003, § 3.1.1.
 71. European Union, 'Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007', *Official Journal of the European Union*, 2007/C 306/01, 50, 17 December 2007, pp. 36–7.
 72. European Union, 'Treaty of Lisbon', Article 1, Article 28 A, para. 2. The goal of operational autonomy assumes some dependence on external sources of military equipment but seeks to assure operational independence, while the goal of procurement autonomy assumes that operational autonomy is only possible if the military equipment is not subject to an external veto. This distinction separates British and French ambitions for a European (and national) DTIB. Whereas the British are satisfied with operational autonomy rather than procurement independence, the French seek both 'where, in view of our political choices, sharing or pooling resources is not an option'. See United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper*, Cm 6697 (Norwich: TSO, 2005), p. vii and § A1.21; and France, Ministry of Defence, *The French White Paper on Defence and National Security* (New York: Odile Jacob Publishing Corporation, 2008), p. 254. See also, European Defence Agency, *A Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base*, Brussels, 14 May 2007, pp. 1 and 3, at <http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=30&id=211>; and F. Bekkers et al., *TNO Report: Final. Development of a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base* (Delft: September 2009), §1.1, at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/files/edem_final_report_en.pdf.

73. European Defence Agency, *An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs*, (Brussels: EDA, 3 October 2006), para. 69, at <http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?id=146>.
74. *Ibid.*, para. 6; European Defence Agency, *A Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base*, paras 6 and 8.
75. European Defence Agency, *A European Defence Research and Technology Strategy*, November 2008, at www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx?fileid=494; European Defence Agency, *European Armaments Co-operation Strategy*, October 2008, at www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx?fileid=493; European Defence Agency, *A Guide to the EDA's New European Defence Equipment Market*, 2006, at www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx?fileid=163.
76. European Defence Agency, *A European Defence Research and Technology Strategy*, para. 1.
77. European Defence Agency, *Framework for a European Defence Research and Technology Strategy* (Brussels: EDA, May 2007), paras 2 and 5–6, at http://eda.europa.eu/Libraries/Documents/Brochure_EDA_Strategic_Framework.sflb.ashx.
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79. European Defence Agency, *Framework for a European Defence Research and Technology Strategy*, paras 10 and 13. These objectives are significant owing to two factors: the barriers to trade with the United States in the defence equipment market owing to an unwillingness to compromise the existing margin of technological superiority currently enjoyed by American armed forces, and the clear concern that the primary competitor for weapons systems inside and outside Europe are US prime contractors.
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82. European Commission, *European Defence*, § 2.2; and European Commission, *Green Paper*, p. 3.
83. European Defence Agency, *Armaments Co-operation Strategy*, p. 7–9.
84. *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.
85. B. Schmitt, *Towards a European Defence Equipment Market: The Green Paper on Defence Procurement* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, January 2005), at <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/rep05-01.pdf>.
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89. S. de Vaucorbeil, 'The Changing Transatlantic Defence Market', in D. Keohane (ed.), *Towards a European Defence Market*, *Chaillot Paper*, No. 113 (Paris: EUISS, November 2008), p. 99.
90. Bekkers et al., *TNO Report: Final*, § 3.2.6. S. de Vaucorbeil relates, for example, that the US withheld an export licence for a major component of the European ASTER missile during the imbroglio over Iraq in 2003. See de Vaucorbeil, 'The Changing Transatlantic Defence Market', p. 103.
91. J. C. Rood, 'The U.S.–U.K. Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty: Entering a New Era of Transatlantic Defence Cooperation', 26 September 2007, at <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/105478.htm>; House of Commons, Defence Committee, *UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty: Government Response to the Committee's Third Report of Session 2007–08*, HC 375 (London: TSO, 2008), para. 14.
92. United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper*, A3.21.
93. A. M. Gomes, 'The Steps Europe Must Take Towards a Common Defence Marketplace', in G. Merritt (ed.), *Revisiting NATO–ESDP Relations, Part I and II. SDA Discussion Paper* (Brussels: Bibliothèque Solvay, 2008), p. 29.
94. Although this consolidation of the European defence sector indicates that the emergence of a more robust and competitive defence sector capable of achieving economies of scale and reducing wasteful duplication of effort, the European market share of the top 100 defence firms has declined from 32.8 per cent to 26.50 per cent, while the US share has risen slightly from 61.20 per cent to 63.86 per cent. Raw data drawn from *Defence News Top 100*, at http://www.defensenews.com/archives_top.php.
95. K. G. Vlachos, *Safeguarding European Competitiveness: Strategies for the Future European Arms Production and Procurement*, Occasional Paper 4 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 1995), Table 4.
96. J-P. Darnis, *Lessons Learned from European Defence Equipment Programmes*, Occasional Paper, No. 69 (Paris: EUISS, October 2007), p. 18.
97. The UK spending review announced in October 2010 provided for an 8 per cent real-term reduction of UK defence expenditure between 2011–12 and 2014–15, although the Ministry of Defence claimed this would not take the UK below the 2 per cent of GDP benchmark. See 'Information about Key Areas of the Defence Budget' (n. d.) at <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/Organisation/KeyFactsAboutDefence/DefenceSpending.htm>.
98. Defence spending percentages are taken from *Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence* (NATO: Public Diplomacy Division, March 2010), Table 3. at http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110309_PR_CP_2011_027.pdf.
99. National data drawn from NATO, *Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence*, Communiqué PR/CP(2010)078, 10 June 2010; European Defence Agency, *Defence Data of EDA Participating Member States in 2008* (Brussels: EDA, 2009); European Defence Agency, *European–United States Defence Expenditures in 2008* (Brussels: EDA, 2009); OECD, 'Defence Budget R&D as a Percentage of Total GBAORD', *Main Science and Technology Indicators* (Paris: OECD, 2010), p. 47; and Eurostat, *General Government Expenditure by Function (COFOG)*, at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_statistics/data/database. The relatively low level of EU defence expenditures as compared to

- those of the US is more vividly revealed from the vantage point of per capita defence expenditure (€406 to €1532 in 2008), expenditure per soldier (€111,198 to €332,699) or investment per soldier (€23,781 to €127,296).
100. NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, paras 52 and 53; NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, paras 13 and 16.
 101. NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, paras 20 and 24.
 102. NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, paras 6 and 7.
 103. NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, para. 16.
 104. NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, para. 18.
 105. North Atlantic Council, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, paras 12, 19, 25 and 37.
 106. UK Parliament Select Committee on Defence, 'Joint Declaration Launching European Defence Capabilities Initiative, UK–Italian Summit', 19–20 July 1999, at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmdfence/264/26422.htm.
 107. The most important are *Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration*, Brussels, 20 November 2000, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Military%20Capabilities%20Commitment%20Declaration.pdf>; *Capabilities Improvement Conference*, Brussels, 19 November 2001, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Capabilities%20Improvement%20Conference%202001-%20HR%20SOLANA.pdf>; *European Capabilities Action Programme*, Brussels, 19–20 November 2001, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/European%20Capability%20Action%20Plan%20-%20Excerpt%20Press%20Release%20November%202001.pdf>; Michel Barnier, Chairman of Working Group VIII, Defence Convention, *Final Report of Working Group VIII – Defence (Barnier Report)*, CONV 461/02 WG VIII 22 (Brussels: The Secretariat, the European Convention, 16 December 2002); *Declaration on Military Capabilities*, Brussels, 19–20 May 2003, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Declaration%20on%20EU%20Military%20Capabilities%20-%20May%202003.pdf>; European Defence Agency, *An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs*; Council of the European Union, *Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities*, Brussels, 11 December 2008; EDA, 'Capability Development Plan' (8 July 2008) in *European Defence Agency's Strategic Framework* (Brussels: EDA, 2010); and the semi-annual *Single Progress Report on the Development of EU Military Capabilities*, 8715/0, Brussels, 23 April 2009 and 8234/10, Brussels, 6 April 2010.
 108. At the 2005 Hampton Court Summit, the Council of Ministers noted the implementation of five 'flagship' EU-wide defence projects in the areas of C³ (command, control and communications), unmanned aerial vehicles, air-to-air refuelling, strategic lift and armed fighting vehicles. European Defence Agency, *Report by the Head of the European Defence Agency to the Council* (Brussels: EDA, 2006), paras 3–5, at www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx?fileid=99.
 109. Council of the European Union, *Capabilities Improvement Chart I/2006*, at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/89603.pdf; idem, *European Security and Defence Policy. EU Operations*, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en>.
 110. D. Keohane and C. Blommesteijn, 'Strength in Numbers? Comparing EU Military Capabilities in 2009 with 1999', *ISS Brief* 05, December 2009, pp. 1–4, at <http://www.iss.eurpoa.eu>. The EU member states have access to Russian and Ukrainian AN-124-100 heavy-lift aircraft under the terms of the Strategic Airlift Interim

- Solution. Planned acquisitions include the joint purchase of three C-17s and approximately 180 A400M transport aircraft as well as A330 air-to-air refuelling tankers. The European Air Transport Fleet, which provides opportunities for fractional ownership of A300M or C130 aircraft, will increase the overall number of aircraft available for EU operations. See European Defence Agency, *European Air Transport Fleet Launched*. Press Release, 10 November 2008, at <http://www.eda.europa.eu/newsitem.aspx?id=422>; and J. Herz, 'Military Capabilities – A Step Forward in ESDP?' *European Security Review*, No. 46, 2009, p. 4.
111. J. Solana, 'Remarks' (At the informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers), S0097/04, Brussels, 5–6 April 2004.
 112. A group of prominent European defence analysts argued that Europe would be 'unlikely to achieve full interoperability with the US' and should target a 'network enabled rather than network centric operations'. The goal, in this view, would be a 'degree of cooperability with US forces [...] Europeans could focus on those network-centric capabilities that enable them to operate with the United States' and acquire the ability to "plug" in to the network via highly interoperable C4ISTAR elements'. See Gnesotto et al., *European Defence: A Proposal for a White Paper*, p. 107–8.
 113. A. Toje, 'The EU, NATO and European Defence – A Slow Train Coming?' *Occasional Paper*, No. 74 (Paris: EUISS, December 2008), pp. 20 and 26–7.
 114. North Atlantic Council, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, para. 37.
 115. Lisbon Treaty, Article (2).
 116. NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, para. 16j; Council of the European Union, *PMG Recommendations on Concrete Measures to Improve EU–NATO Cooperation*, 17344/08, 8 December 2009; Lisbon Treaty, Article 2(d). Similarly, the European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative (November 2008) underscored the importance of enhancing autonomous EU military capabilities and intra-European interoperability without violating national obligations to NATO or the desire for interoperability with US forces.
 117. European Defence Agency, *An Initial Long-Term Vision*, para. 58.
 118. EUMC Interoperability Study summarized in the Council of the European Union, 'Single Progress Report on the Development of EU Military Capabilities for the First Semester of 2010', 8234/10, 6 April 2010, para. 22.
 119. H. Binnendijk and R. L. Kugler, 'Transforming European Forces,' *Survival*, Vol. 44(3), 2002 p. 122 and 126.
 120. H. Binnendijk and R. L. Kugler, 'Adapting Forces to a New Era: Ten Transforming Concepts', *Defence Horizons* No. 5 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, November 2001), p. 5.
 121. P. C. Nolin (general rapporteur), *Interoperability: The Need for Transatlantic Harmonisation*, 177 STC 06 E Rev 1, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, November 2008, para. 66.
 122. Allied Command Transformation, *NATO Network-centric Enabled Capability (NNEC): Introduction to the NNEC Roadmap*, ACT-NNEC-RM-004/02, Draft 0.2, October 2009, pp. 10–11, at http://nnec.act.nato.int/Press/02_ACT%20Technical%20note_An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20NNEC%20Roadmap.doc. A fourth milestone, 'continued refinement increment', provides for future unanticipated developments and contingencies.
 123. See A. Dominguez, 'The NNEC Roadmap: Demonstration of Use and Analysis Capabilities', ACT/NNEC, 26/27 October 2009, at http://nnec.act.nato.int/Press/03_ACT%20Brief%20on%20NNEC%20Roadmap%20and%20Roadmap%

- 20Analysis.ppt#672, 25 October 2009 Strategic Analysis Conclusions and recommendations.
124. Bialos and Koehler, *The NATO Response Force*, para. 60.
 125. Nolin, *Interoperability*, para. 59.
 126. Kucheida, *Cooperation in the Operational Area between EU and NATO*, para. 9.
 127. Nolin, *Interoperability*, paras 39 and 57.
 128. H. Kopold, 'Standardization of Military Equipment – the Need for Cooperation', *European Standardization Journal*, August 2007, pp. 10–11.
 129. Cornish, *EU and NATO: Co-operation or Competition?* p. 19.
 130. See Ringsmose, 'NATO's Response Force: Finally Getting it Right?' p. 292–3.
 131. Barry Posen proposed that British defence spending could serve as a reliable benchmark in a *Financial Times* op-ed piece cited in P. Cornish, 'NATO: The Practice and Politics of Transformation', *International Affairs*, Vol. 80(1), 2004, pp. 71–2.
 132. See W. Thies, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO* (Armonk, NY and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2003).
 133. J. L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Strategy*, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 107–14; A. Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European–American Relations since 1945* (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 122–8; and L. Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 71–5.
 134. There is a vast literature on the economic rather than strategic considerations driving the US preoccupation with burden-sharing in the 1960s and 1970s in particular. See G. F. Treverton, *The 'Dollar Drain' and American Forces in Germany: Managing the Political Economics of the Alliance* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978); E. Thiel, *Dollar-Dominanz, Lastenteilung und Amerikanische Truppenpräsenz* (Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1979); and P. Williams, *The Senate and US Troops in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).
 135. For a recent analysis, see J. Ringsmose, 'NATO Burden-sharing Redux: Continuity and Change after the Cold War', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 31(2), 2010, pp. 319–38. Earlier assessments include R. de Wijk, 'Convergence Criteria: Measuring Input or Output', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 6(3), 2000, pp. 397–417; A. Missiroli, 'Ploughshares into Swords? Euros for European Defence', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 8(1), 2003, pp. 5–33; and J. Howorth, 'Why ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance', in J. Howorth and J. Keeler (eds), *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 209–38.
 136. J. Smith and M. Williams, *What Lies Beneath: The Future of NATO through the ISAF Prism* (Washington, DC: CSIS and London: RUSI, 31 March 2008), p. 3, at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080331_nato.pdf.
 137. This argument was first presented in J. Sperling and M. Webber, 'NATO: From Kosovo to Kabul', *International Affairs*, Vol. 85(3), 2009, pp. 491–512. See also S. N. Siegel, 'Bearing their Share of the Burden: Europe in Afghanistan', *European Security*, Vol. 18(4), 2009, pp. 461–82.
 138. NATO operations after 1990 are comprehensively examined in Chapter 3.
 139. By February 2010, for example, the American share of forces committed to ISAF increased to 56.55 per cent of the total NATO and non-NATO EU member-state forces committed to ISAF, while the European share declined to 40.05 per cent, while the US share increased to 69.02 per cent and that of Europe declined to

- 27.96 per cent in January 2011. Author calculation from data presented in NATO, *International Security Assistance Force and Afghan National Army Strength & Laydown*, 1 February 2010, at http://info.publicintelligence.net/isaf_troops_20100201.pdf; and NATO, *International Security Assistance Force: Key Facts and Figures*, 6 January 2011, at <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/2012-01-06%20ISAF%20Placemat.pdf>.
140. NATO, 'Counter-piracy Operations' at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm; and European Union, 'EU Maritime Operation against piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia – Operation ATALANTA)' at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eunavfor-somalia/factsheets?lang=en>.
 141. Data derived from SIPRI, *SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database*, at <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/pko>; and Council of the European Union, *EU Operations*, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en>.
 142. The Europeans accounted for 86 per cent of the Allied troops committed to SFOR (a burden-sharing index of 1.65), 90 per cent of the Allied troops committed to KFOR (a burden-sharing index of 1.72) and 51 per cent of the Allied troops committed to ISAF (a burden-sharing index of 0.97).
 143. See Sperling and Webber, 'NATO: From Kosovo to Kabul', pp. 506–7.
 144. The Europeans took political lead in shaping and financing the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. See E. J. Kirchner and J. Sperling, *EU Security Governance*, pp. 89ff.
 145. On NATO and 'risk', see M. J. Williams, *NATO, Security and Risk Management: From Kosovo to Kandahar* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).
 146. On the EU and 'soft balancing', see S. G. Jones, *The Rise of European Security Cooperation* (Cambridge: University Press, 2007).
 147. B. R. Posen, 'European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity?' *Security Studies*, Vol. 15(2), 2006, pp. 149–86.
 148. The UK–France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation not only addressed Anglo-French initiatives to enhance European force projection capabilities consistent with NATO, but the importance of net-centric warfare capabilities (paras 19 and 20). See Prime Minister's Office, *The UK–France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation*. Moreover, the joint endorsement of the proposed expansion of the ALTBMD system was defined as 'coherent with the level of the threat arising from the Middle East' (para. 23). R. Kemping, J. Mawdsley and S. Steinicki claim that the Anglo-French agreement signalled the demise of the CSDP and the supremacy of NATO. See 'Turning Away from CSDP. Franco–British Bilateralism in Security and Defence Policy', *SWP Comments 30* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2010), p. 4.
 149. On 'modern hatreds' as a source of regional disturbance, see S. J. Kaufmann, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). We shall return to the notion of 'milieu goals' in the concluding chapter.
 150. This role and capability is fully documented in Kirchner and Sperling, *EU Security Governance*.
 151. 'Interview given by Alain Juppé, Ministre d'Etat, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs', *France Info*, at <http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article2282>.
 152. See T. Terriff and F. Osinga, 'The Diffusion of Military Transformation to European Militaries', in T. Terriff, F. Osinga and T. Farrell (eds), *A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 206–9.

153. The unanimity provision is evident in Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty. It is generally assumed that a 'common defence' within the EU would not obtain the support of a number of EU members, including the UK, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands and the majority (if not all) the post-communist accession states.

7 Conclusion

1. L. S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); W. J. Thies, *Why NATO Endures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
2. R. Lugar, 'NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business: A Call for US Leadership to Revive and Redefine the Alliance', Presentation to the Open Forum of the US Department of State, 2 August 1993. On the US disinterest in NATO (and Europe) after the Cold War, see J. J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 15(1), 1990, p. 47.
3. R. E. Osgood, 'NATO: Problems of Security and Collaboration', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 54(1), 1960, pp. 106–7.
4. Osgood, 'NATO: Problems of Security and Collaboration', p. 115.
5. This development has produced what Julianne Smith referred to as the 'inclusion illusion'. See J. Smith, *The NATO–Russia Relationship. Defining Moment or Déjà Vu?* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2008), p. 2.
6. This distinction is derived from the well-known categorization of Arnold Wolfers. See 'The Goals of Foreign Policy', in his *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 67–80.
7. R. E. Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966); Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United*.
8. C. A. Kupchan and C. A. Kupchan, 'The Promise of Collective Security', *International Security*, Vol. 20(1), 1995, pp. 52–61; C. A. Kupchan, 'NATO's Final Frontier: Why Russia Should Join the Atlantic Alliance', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89(3), 2010, pp. 100–12.
9. T. Risse-Kappen, 'Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO', in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (ed.), P. J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
10. E. Adler, 'The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 14(2), 2008, p. 196.
11. V. Kitchen, *The Globalization of NATO: Intervention, Security and Identity* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010), p. 119.

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