

Notes

Introduction

1. Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," trans. Harry Zohn, in his *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt (London: Fontana/Collins, 1973), 263, 262.
2. Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi, *The Cultures of Globalization* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), xii.
3. For a fuller application of this book's argument regarding war and gender to recent events on the international scene, see my "September 11: Masculinity, Justice, and the Politics of Empathy," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 21 (2002): 118–24.
4. If, as Ross Chambers says, "denial is definitional to culture," then my phrase *culture of denial* risks being tautological (see "The War of the Words: The Rhetoric of 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' [An Informal Survey]," *Culture, Theory and Critique* 44 [2003]: 174). But of course it is precisely because the centrality of denial to culture is not normally recognized that the tautology is necessary. With this coinage I therefore wish to call attention to culture's refusal to acknowledge directly its own capacity and responsibility for generating violence and cruelty. On this view, acts of barbarism are among the untold (in both senses of the word) effects of institutions and attitudes that are commonly thought to represent civilization, progress, or modernity. (Recall here Benjamin's famous remark: "There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism" ["Theses," 256].) This book attempts, then, to identify forms and uses of rhetoric that have, over the past two centuries, tended to have harmful or painful consequences—outcomes that may not always be intentional but that may nevertheless be foreseeable and to that extent avoidable.
5. Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 4. Hereafter, this work is cited parenthetically as *BP*.
6. Mark Seltzer, "Wound Culture: Trauma in the Pathological Public Sphere," *October* 80 (Spring 1997): 3–26.
7. See Karyn Ball, "Introduction: Trauma and Its Institutional Destinies," *Cultural Critique* 46 (Fall 2000): 1–44; John Mowitz, "Trauma Envy," *Cultural Critique* 46 (Fall 2000): 273–297; and Lauren Berlant, "The Subject of True Feeling: Pain,

- Privacy, and Politics,” in *Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics, and the Law*, ed. Austin Sarat (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 48–84.
8. See Vamik Volkan, *Blind Trust: Large Groups and their Leaders in Times of Crisis and Terror* (Charlottesville, VA: Pitchstone Publishing, 2004). The expression “chosen trauma” designates “the collective mental representation of an event that has caused a large group to face drastic common losses, to feel helpless and victimized by another group, and to share a humiliating injury” (48). The chosen trauma, like the “chosen glory,” may be transmitted from generation to generation unconsciously through caretaker-child interactions or consciously through symbols, rituals, and other cultural forms. What is important, however, is less the historical event itself than the power of the shared image of it (an image that may be modified by wishes, fantasies, and defenses) to knit the members of a population together in a common sense of identity with respect to the past (47–52). Unfortunately, a chosen trauma may support the idealization of victimhood and “may be used to construct the group as avengers” (49).
 9. On the uses of trauma, see Kirby Farrell, *Post-traumatic Culture: Injury and Interpretation in the Nineties* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 1–33.
 10. I am alluding to the practice of torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and to the less publicized massacres carried out by the Allies of the United States in Afghanistan. Many captives of the United States and the Northern Alliance died as a result of inhumane prison conditions as well. On the abuses in Afghanistan, see Robert Fisk, “We Are the War Criminals Now,” 29 November 2001, <https://argument.independent.co.uk/commentators/story.jsp?story=107292>; “Ce documentaire qui accuse les vainqueurs de crimes de guerre en Afghanistan,” *Le Monde*, 13 June 2002, www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3208-28239-,00.html; and Richard W. Miller, “Terrorism, War, and Empire,” in *Terrorism and International Justice*, ed. James P. Sterba (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 186–205.

Here I refer only to unequivocal contraventions of the Geneva Convention; we should not forget, however, that related if more controversial legal and moral issues surround the USA Patriot Act, American activities in Guantanamo Bay, the large number of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. bombing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children who, even before the invasion of 2003, died as a direct result of U.S.-led economic sanctions. For political and ethical considerations of these events, see Howard Zinn, *Terrorism and War* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002); Arundhati Roy, *War Talk* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2003); Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2004).

11. For some firsthand accounts by former soldiers, see Annick Cojean, “Irak: J’ai déserté,” *Le Monde* 2 no. 68, supplement to *Le Monde* 4 June 2005: 30–37. According to an NPR investigation, soldiers suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) are often seen as “weak” by their superiors, who may obstruct their search for professional help and ultimately discharge them from service. By dismissing the soldiers for “patterns of misconduct” rather than depression or PTSD, the military authorities avoid paying them the benefits

- that they would otherwise be due (“Morning Edition,” National Public Radio, WWNO, New Orleans, 4 December 2006).
12. On pain as a psychologically, culturally, and historically conditioned experience, see David B. Morris, *The Culture of Pain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Roselyne Rey, *The History of Pain*, trans. Louise Elliott Wallace, J.A. Cadden, and S.W. Cadden (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 1–9; Ronald Melzack and Patrick D. Wall, *The Challenge of Pain* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 27–51.
 13. Valerie Hardcastle, *The Myth of Pain* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 101. See also Melzack and Wall, *The Challenge of Pain*, 100, 178.
 14. As I discuss in chapter 1, to feel pain is to engage working memory in a comparison of negative stimuli in the present with similarly negative experiences from the past, more or less “spontaneously” evaluating the particular qualities and the relative gravity of these past and present experiences and—again on the basis of not only evolutionary hardwiring but also learned constructions of the self and the world—responding to the immediate sensation with a strategy of defense (e.g., fight or flight, or freezing). Animals and newborn humans in possession of the transient, nonlinguistic “stream” of consciousness that Antonio Damasio calls the “core self” probably experience a form of pain that is not as qualitatively resonant and subjectively meaningful as that felt by those humans (from as early as 18 months) and animals (e.g., chimpanzees) having an “autobiographical self.” “Autobiographical” or “extended” consciousness is not necessarily linguistic, but it is capable of organizing a large compass of long- and short-term memories and using them as the framework for planning the future. As its name implies, autobiographical consciousness is fully self-reflexive, aware of its own capacity for conceptually coordinating mental images related to the past, present, and future. See Antonio R. Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999); Antonio R. Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain* (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2003). Damasio’s “extended” or “autobiographical” consciousness corresponds roughly to Gerald Edelman’s “higher-order” consciousness, with the important exception that Edelman’s category is largely confined to humans with the capacity for language (I say “largely” because Edelman hedges a bit with respect to chimps). See Gerald M. Edelman, *The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness* (New York: Basic Books, 1989) and Gerald M. Edelman, *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1992).
 15. I borrow the example from Melzack and Wall, *The Challenge of Pain*, 35–36. It seems to me that another explanation for the absence of pain at the moment of injury might be fear-induced analgesia, although that interpretation would not account for the combatant’s *subsequent* freedom from pain related to the wound.
 16. The present discussion of the similarities and differences between specific affects is informed by Jaak Panksepp, *Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 32–35, 187–209, 215–217, 262–269, 274–276. On the need for biologically

- informed theories of affect in the humanities, history, and anthropology, see Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, "Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins," in *Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader*, ed. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 1–31.
17. Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 21, 68–69.
 18. On the cognitive and emotive components of empathy, as well as on the importance of empathy in the development of social awareness and moral sensibility, see Laurence R. Tancredi, *Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 87–88 and 112–113. On the existence of ethical or proto-ethical behavior in certain nonhuman species, see Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens*, 159–165. For a sustained argument for altruism as an evolutionarily selected adaptive mechanism, see Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, *Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
 19. Much of this book is an elaboration of the case for the "worse"; an example of the "better" would be my sense (based on my reading of French media at the time) that France's rejection of a military "solution" to America's suspicion of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was attributable in part to France's having learned about the limits of force from its relatively recent historical experience both as a colonizer and as an occupied country.
 20. LaCapra, *Writing History*, 28, 40–42, uses these terms to designate the milder form of shock experienced by the witness of trauma or of traumatic images or narratives. The witness (spectator, listener, or reader) identifies with the experience of the other but with sufficient detachment to avoid confusing that experience with his or her own.
 21. See the discussion of theories of neurological "kindling" in Elizabeth A. Wilson, *Psychosomatic: Feminism and the Neurological Body* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 24–26.
 22. Jacques Derrida, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides," interview with Giovanna Borradori, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*, ed. Giovanna Borradori, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 85–136.
 23. For example, when confronted with the "terrifying and magnificent spectacle" of violence and evil in nature—"the elusiveness of happiness, confidence betrayed, unrighteousness triumphant and innocence laid low"—Friedrich Schiller's exemplary poet or philosopher abandons his "effeminate" desire to comprehend the "lawless chaos" of the sensuous world and, perceiving that "the relative grandeur outside him" is but "the mirror" of "the absolute grandeur within himself," seizes triumphantly upon "the eternal in his breast." Friedrich von Schiller, *Naive and Sentimental Poetry* and *"On the Sublime": Two Essays*, trans. Julius A. Elias (New York: Ungar, 1966), 210, 209, 205, 210.
 24. In my critical essays, irony and the sublime are partly mediated by allegory, the semiotic expansiveness of which is in turn motivated at certain points by the

- protean interface of irony and the sublime. I have not, however, felt it necessary to theorize allegory to the same extent as the other forms. For some critical and theoretical sources pertaining to allegory, see especially chapter 4 below. For a comparison of allegory with irony and other tropes, see my *The Free Indirect Mode: Flaubert and the Poetics of Irony* (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1988), 12–26.
25. On irony's intellectual investment in the perception of paradox, contradiction, or incongruity, see Douglas C. Muecke, *The Compass of Irony* (London: Methuen, 1969) and Douglas C. Muecke, *Irony and the Ironic*, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1982).
 26. On irony as aggression and disparagement, see Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni, "Problèmes de l'ironie," in *L'Ironie: Travaux du Centre de Recherches Linguistiques et Sémiologiques de Lyon* (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1976), 10–46; Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni, "L'Ironie comme trope," *Poétique* 11 (1980): 108–127; and Linda Hutcheon, *Irony's Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 37–43, 52–54. Hutcheon is sensitive to the potentially affective impact of irony on its interpreter(s). For an influential, if tendentious, characterization of irony as intellectually and socially elitist, see Hegel's critique of Friedrich Schlegel, which is examined from a critical-historical perspective in Joseph A. Dane, *The Critical Mythology of Irony* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1991), 83–118.
 27. On aftermath as the uncanny experience of nondifferentiation between trauma and the survival of trauma, hence, between cause and effect and between past, present, and future, see Ross Chambers, *Untimely Interventions: AIDS Writing, Testimonial, and the Rhetoric of Haunting* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), xxii, 43–44, 288–289. "Aftermath writing"—of which irony is for me a primary figure—designates the simultaneously mimetic and symbolic representation of aftermath as "a state of unresolvable and intolerable tension and suspension" (289).
 28. These alternatives include both nonbelligerent correctives directly applicable to Afghanistan and long-term, comprehensive strategies for preventing terrorism and responding justly to it in the future. For a sampling of such options as well as cogent legal, moral, and rational arguments for their preferability to war, see the following essays in *Terrorism and International Justice*, ed. James P. Sterba (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003): Noam Chomsky, "Terror and Just Response," 69–87; Daniele Archibugi and Iris Marion Young, "Envisioning a Global Rule of Law," 158–170; Claudia Card, "Making War on Terrorism in Response to 9/11," 171–185; Miller, "Terrorism, War, and Empire," 186–205; James P. Sterba, "Terrorism and International Justice," 206–228.
 29. On the pitfalls of the "Bush doctrine" of "preemption," see Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 146–147, 162, 224–225, 261. In light of the implausibility of weapons of mass destruction and ties to al Qaeda as grounds for "pre-emptive" military action against Iraq, defenders of the invasion now seek to justify it as a humanitarian intervention. (The pretext is reminiscent of ex-post facto attempts to portray the bombing of Afghanistan as a campaign to liberate

- indigenous women from the oppressive grip of the Taliban.) On the dangers inherent in attempting to portray the Iraq War as a legitimate humanitarian operation, see Paul Theodoulou, ed., *Humanitarian Intervention*, spec. issue of *Global Dialogue* 7.1–2 (Winter/Spring 2005): 1–141.
30. Emile Zola, *Correspondance*, ed. B.H. Bakker, 10 vols. (Montréal and Paris: Presses de l'Université de Montréal and Éditions du CNRS, 1978–1995), 4: 329. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of French texts are my own. In view of the importance of stylistic analysis to my study, I have provided the original French along with my translations in chapters 3 and 4. In chapter 2, however, the particularly dense interweaving of quoting and quoted texts made it necessary for me to omit most of the original French material in the interest of readability.
 31. Quoted in Roland Barthes, *Michelet*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Farrar, 1987), 101.
 32. Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful*, ed. James T. Boulton (London: Routledge, 1958), 40.

Chapter 1 From State of Mind to State of War

1. Rachel Bowlby, *Shopping With Freud* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 99.
2. Bowlby, *Shopping*, 100.
3. Bowlby, *Shopping*, 99.
4. Bowlby, *Shopping*, 100.
5. Bowlby, *Shopping*, 101.
6. Bowlby, *Shopping*, 100–101.
7. On the relation between economics, the popular psychology of marketing, and Freud's "economic" model of the psyche, see Bowlby, *Shopping*, 114–119.
8. Bowlby, *Shopping*, 101.
9. Leif H. Finkel, "The Construction of Perception," in *Incorporations*, ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter (New York: Urzone, 1992), 402.
10. Israel Rosenfield, *The Strange, Familiar, and Forgotten: An Anatomy of Consciousness* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 8.
11. Rosenfield, *The Strange, Familiar, and Forgotten*, 7.
12. Francisco J. Varela, "The Reenchantment of the Concrete," in *Incorporations*, 320–338; George Lakoff, *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Edelman, *The Remembered Present*; Edelman, *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire*.
13. Quoted in Bowlby, *Shopping*, 105.
14. Contemporary marketing practices, which include exotically named techniques such as "aromacology" and "neurolinguistic programming," have raised to a higher level of psychological sophistication the art and science of manipulating

- clients. Here again, the customer is usually portrayed as an enemy to be conquered, the object being to induce in him or her a stultifying experience of shock and disorientation; a painful sense of lack or of class inferiority; or regression to a childlike state of dependency on the salesperson. See Douglas Rushkoff, *Coercion: Why We Listen to What "They" Say* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1999).
15. This is the turn of the perceiving subject from an aversive or disempowering affect-idea to a consoling or self-empowering one. As I said in the introduction, the "turn" is governed by metaphor—that is, by the subject's self-preservative identification with the overwhelming force of the object that provokes the aversive sentiment. The alchemy of the sublime therefore entails both the attribution to the self of the powerful qualities of the threatening object and the transmutation of the negative affect into a positive one (e.g., fear into joy).
 16. Bowlby, *Shopping*, 105.
 17. Varela, "Reenchantment," 325.
 18. Melzack and Wall, *The Challenge of Pain*, 242.
 19. See Grover C. Pitts, "An Evolutionary Approach to Pain," *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine* 37 (1994): 275–284.
 20. In fact the "stream" (after William James's "stream of consciousness") is not at bottom a continuous flow but a succession of discrete mental "snapshots" of varying duration that are combined into a semblance of seamless perceptual activity by "coalitions" of neurons communicating from different parts of the brain. The subjective impression of continuity is the result of "hysteresis," a process whereby the aftereffect of a perceptual stimulus lingers just long enough in consciousness to overlap with the next perceptual moment, and so on. The phenomenon is similar to that noted by "persistence of vision" theories, except that the aftereffect is understood to occur (or persist) in the cortex rather than in the retina. See Oliver Sacks's speculations on recent work by Francis Crick and Christof Koch in Oliver Sacks, "In the River of Consciousness," *The New York Review of Books* 51, no. 1 (15 January 2004).
 21. Quoted in Bowlby, *Shopping*, 109.
 22. John R. Searle, "The Mystery of Consciousness," *The New York Review of Books* 62 (1995): 62.
 23. Quoted in Rosenfield, *The Strange, Familiar, and Forgotten*, 50.
 24. On my reading of Walter Benjamin (see especially chapter 4 below), shock is both a feature of mental and material landscapes and a result of the continual interaction between them. It is the everyday violence/trauma of a society given over to transitoriness and mechanical reproducibility; to mass production and mass consumption; and to the rapid succession of haptic, optic, and aural sensations. Benjamin finds the imprint of shock in objects and activities as varied as modern art and architecture, advertising, crowds, traffic, factory labor, gambling, prostitution, and news reports. In chapters 2 through 4, I explore the mediative relations between this kind of everyday shock and larger historical traumas such as revolution and counterrevolution, torture, forced migration, war and civil war, coup d'état, and so on.

25. Edelman, *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire*, 19, 81–98; Edelman, *The Remembered Present*, 37–90.
26. See, in addition to the works by Edelman cited above, his *Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
27. Finkel, “The Construction of Perception,” 399.
28. Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation,” trans. and annotated Martin Thom in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (New York: Routledge, 1990), 11, 19.
29. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1991), 200.
30. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 3–4.
31. Edelman, *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire*, 102. The explanation is worth quoting in full:

In such a system, recall is not stereotypic. Under the influence of continually changing contexts, it changes, as the structure and dynamics of the neural populations involved in the original categorization also change. Recall involves the activation of some, but not necessarily all, of the previously facilitated portions of global mappings. It can result in a categorization response similar to a previous one, but at different times the elements contributing to that response are different, and in general they are likely to have been altered by ongoing behavior.

See also Edelman, *The Remembered Present*, 109–111. For informative essays on the cognitive and neurological bases of different kinds of memory and on the role of implicit social beliefs in promoting errors of recollection, see Daniel L. Schacter and Elaine Scarry, eds., *Memory, Brain, and Belief* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). A succinct summary of recent neurobiological perspectives on memory may be found in Suzanne Nalbantian, *Memory in Literature: From Rousseau to Neuroscience* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
32. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 9–36
33. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 11–12.
34. Peter Alter, *Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Edward Arnold, 1994), 57.
35. Alter, *Nationalism*, 14.
36. See Varela’s (“Reenchantment,” 321, 324) comments on Marvin Minsky, *The Society of Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).
37. Alter, *Nationalism*, 32.
38. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, xiv.
39. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 145.
40. Kristin Ross, *The Emergence of Social Space: Rimbaud and the Paris Commune* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 87.
41. Anderson (*Imagined Communities*, 24) borrows the expression “homogeneous, empty time” from Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (London: Fontana, 1973), 263.
42. The subtitle alters the famous words of Heraclitus, which are, in Charles Kahn’s translation, “War is father of all and king of all” (Charles Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979], 67).

- The sentence is often cited more colloquially, as “War is the father of all things.” I thank Wayne Klein for calling my attention to the reference.
43. I am thinking here of a monistic conception of nature having strong affinities with romantic idealism. For certain German philosophers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries such as Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, the pantheistic integration of nature and spirit, part and whole, sought to naturalize, preeminently, the body of the nation. “In an organized body,” says Fichte, for example, “each part continuously maintains the whole, and in maintaining it, maintains itself also. Similarly, the citizen with regard to the state” (quoted in Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 4th ed. [Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993], 32). Insofar as this model represents nations as spontaneous, natural divisions, it anticipates various forms of class and racial essentialism. Yet the body is central to neo-Kantian theory not only as a commonplace organicist metaphor but as the agent and the object of historical violence. For if nations are unique and divinely ordained entities, war, in the view of the prophets of nationalism, is a means of preserving the purity of a people—the health, the inviolability, of the body politic. Indeed, Fichte writes that, in view of the linguistic and racial distinctiveness of nations, it is “to be expected that each particular state should deem its own culture the true and only civilization, and regard that of other states as mere Barbarism, and their inhabitants as savages—and thus feel itself called upon to subdue them” (quoted in Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 47). War, “a true and proper war—a war of subjugation”—is therefore part of a historical winnowing process whereby humanity “gradually ascends the scale of culture” (quoted in Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 47). For Herder, too, it was only when it had been “irrigated with blood” that the seed of human toil would “shoot up to an unfading flower” (quoted in Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 48). Even Kant, who ultimately disapproved of his successors’ “unscientific” development of his own ethical subjectivism, saw war as a necessary, beneficent feature of humankind’s progression toward freedom and self-fulfilment. “War,” he says, “has something sublime in it” (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J.H. Bernard [London: Hafner, 1951], 102). As Kedourie points out, the ultimate effect of these metaphysical discourses—of their merging of the individual will with that of the state, of their attribution to history of a redemptive telos, an inexorable urge toward the moral “life of Reason” (*Nationalism*, 45)—is to hide beneath an aesthetico-religious terminology “the hard issues of power which, by its very nature, is exercised by some over others. . . . Reason of state begins to partake of sovereign Reason, and necessity of state to seem a necessity for eternal salvation” (*Nationalism*, 40).
 44. Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, “Introduction,” *Gendering War Talk*, ed. Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), ix.
 45. Klaus Theweleit, “The Bomb’s Womb and the Genders of War,” in *Gendering War Talk*, 284.
 46. Nancy Huston, “The Matrix of War: Mothers and Heroes,” in *The Female Body in Western Culture*, ed. Susan Rubin Suleiman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 127, 131.

47. Huston, "The Matrix of War," 131.
48. The quotations are from Carol Cohn, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 12 (1987): 687–718.
49. Huston, "The Matrix of War," 119.
50. Which is not to say that "men" and "women" are the only sexes. See Anne Fausto-Sterling, "The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough," *The Sciences* (March–April): 20–24, and Anne Fausto-Sterling, *Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality* (New York: Basic Books, 2000). On the necessity of historicizing our understanding not only of gender but also of bodies and sex, see Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York: Routledge, 1993).
51. Sara Ruddick, "Notes Toward a Feminist Peace Politics," in *Gendering War Talk*, 114–115.
52. Sara Ruddick, *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 195. Critics have characterized as universalist Ruddick's claims for the relation of maternal practice to an ethics of peace and nonviolence. For discussion of the ways in which the circumstances of race, ethnicity, class, culture, and sexual orientation may shape individual practices of mothering, see Alison Bailey, "Mothering, Diversity and Peace: Comments on Sara Ruddick's Feminist Maternal Peace Politics," *Journal of Social Philosophy* 26 (Spring 1995): 162–182; Alison Bailey, "Mothers, Birthgivers, and Peacemakers: The Need for an Inclusive Account," in *Philosophical Perspectives on Power and Domination*, ed. Laura Duhan Kaplan and Laurence F. Bove (Atlanta: Rodopi, 1997), 275–286; Peta Bowden, *Caring: Gender-Sensitive Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1997).
53. Ruddick, *Maternal*, 188.
54. Ruddick, *Maternal*, 190.
55. Ruddick, *Maternal*, 190.
56. The term *irregular*, it has been suggested to me, may be too strong. Since, however, I am paraphrasing Ruddick at this point, I adopt her usage, but with the proviso that that usage in no way denies most women's basic sense (and expectation) of regularity over time. As my next two quotations of Ruddick indicate, what she seems to mean by *irregular* is "difficult to regulate" and "not always regular."
57. Ruddick, *Maternal*, 190.
58. Ruddick, *Maternal*, 191.
59. Ruddick, *Maternal*, 191.
60. Ruddick, *Maternal*, 191.
61. Ruddick, *Maternal*, 190.
62. Roger Caillois, "Le vertige de la guerre," in his *Quatre essais de sociologie contemporaine* (Paris: Olivier Perrin, 1951), 129, quoted in Huston, "The Matrix of War," 133.
63. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 5, 36. As far as I can tell, "in terms of," here, simply means "in relation to," a sense that is broad enough to describe the turn of

- signification in virtually any trope. But Lakoff and Johnson's analyses make it clear that by "in terms of" they intend (with the exception of a brief discussion of metonymy) "in terms of *similarities* between." On the simultaneous discursivity and materiality of the referent and the political uses of the figural, see also Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (New York: Verso, 1985), especially 93–148.
64. Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors*, 10–13.
 65. Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors*, 139–158.
 66. For further examples of the rhetorical likening of war to procreation, see Huston, "The Matrix of War," 133–134, and Cohn, "Sex and Death."
 67. As noted in the Introduction and in note 15 above, and as will be demonstrated at length in the following chapters, the sublime moves from a "negative" affect (ideas of pain, death, helplessness) to a "positive" one (ideas of power or transcendence) by way of the subject's identification with the overwhelming force of a threatening object.
 68. My thinking about what might be called the political economy of morality and justice is assisted by Wai Chee Dimock, *Residues of Justice: Literature, Law, Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). On the discourses of gender and justice informing America's response to the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, see Ramazani, "September 11," 118–124.
 69. See Anatol Rapoport, *The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict* (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 425–428.
 70. In Butler's Foucaultian and Derridean reading (*Bodies That Matter*) of J.L. Austin's theory of speech acts, it is precisely the citationality of every such act—its reference to, and reiteration of, a prior chain of regulatory discourses—that gives the act its authority or performative force.
 71. Ruddick, "Notes," 114, 115.
 72. Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors*, 58.
 73. See Carol Cohn, "Wars, Wimps, and Women," in *Gendering War Talk*, ed. Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 240:

states are not people. . . . They comprise complex, multifaceted governmental and military apparatuses, each with opposing forces within it, each, in turn, with its own internal institutional dynamics, its own varied needs in relation to domestic politics, and so on. In other words, if the state is referred to and pictured as a unitary actor, what becomes unavailable to the analyst and policy-maker is a series of much more complex truths that might enable him to imagine many more policy options, many more ways to interact with that state.
 74. Cohn, "Wars," 232.
 75. Ruddick, *Maternal*, 199, 203.
 76. If the institution of war is, as Rapoport says, "all activities undertaken in connection with the organization of war," or "all activities related to the preparation for war even when a state of war in the accepted sense does not exist," then the category or system of war exceeds even the relatively broad field of activities

- to which Rapoport wants to limit his definition: “the design of war plans, the manufacture of war material, research directed to designing and improving weapons, training of military personnel, even the development of strategic theories” (*The Origins of Violence*, 335).
77. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 69, 87, 605–610.
 78. See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1979), 168; and Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper (New York: Random House, 1980), 90–91.
 79. Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 74, 76.
 80. Ruddick, “Notes,” 117.
 81. Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 31.
 82. Marina Warner, *Monuments and Maidens: The Allegory of the Female Form* (London: Pan Books, 1987), 251.
 83. Cohn, “Wars,” 239–240.
 84. To summarize my remarks from the opening section of this chapter, I mean by “body image” the conscious and unconscious sense that one has of one’s own body as a total and autonomous form. A dynamic correlation of sensations and perceptions over time (see Rosenfield, *The Strange, Familiar, and Forgotten*, 7–8), this image is the very basis for the seemingly unified consciousness that is necessary to our everyday making of meaning. Compare Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, in *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey, vol. 19 (Oxford: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 26: “The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego”; it is “ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of the body.”
 85. Cohn, “Wars,” 232.
 86. Ruddick, *Maternal*, 114.
 87. Arthur Kleinman, “Pain and Resistance: The Delegitimation and Relegitimation of Local Worlds,” in *Pain as Human Experience: An Anthropological Perspective*, ed. Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, Paul E. Brodwin, Byron J. Good, and Arthur Kleinman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 171–173.
 88. See Ruddick, *Maternal*, 95, 97; Ruddick, “Notes,” 114, 115.
 89. Ruddick, “Notes,” 114.
 90. Cohn, “Wars,” 242.
 91. See, for example, a former GI’s attempt to come to terms with the memory of the American massacre, on 26 July 1950, of hundreds of South Korean civilian refugees (“mostly women and children,” he notes) as they fled the invading North Korean army near the small provincial town of No Gun Ri: “Some of the guys in my unit have talked about this over the years. But we never really wanted it to come out. We didn’t want the people to think we were a bunch of women and baby killers. But war is hell, and in war, it’s the innocent people who suffer the most” (Edward Daily, “I’ve Tried to Repent,” *Newsweek* [11 October 1999]: 59). What is at issue here is not the veracity of the statement as such, but its adequacy as a psychopolitical explanation.

92. One striking cinematic example of this “genre” would be Steven Spielberg’s immensely popular *Saving Private Ryan* (1998). For an insightful critique of the film, see Louis Menand, “Jerry Don’t Surf,” *New York Review of Books* 45, no. 14 (24 September 1998): 7–8.
93. Ruddick, *Maternal*, 194.
94. As Elizabeth A. Wilson puts it, “Even if we were to accept the notion of a single, exemplary female body, is it not also the case that the sexual specificity of such a body extends to the skin, the internal organs, the nervous system, bone structure, biochemistry, etcetera?” (*Neural Geographies: Feminism and the Microstructure of Cognition* [New York: Routledge, 1998], 57).
95. Melanie Klein, “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” in her *Contributions to Psychoanalysis, 1921–1945*, ed. Ernst Jones (London: The Hogarth Press, 1948), 282.
96. Melanie Klein, “On Identification,” in *New Directions in Psychoanalysis: The Significance of Infant Conflict in the Pattern of Adult Behavior*, ed. Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann, R.E. Money-Kyrle (New York: Basic Books, 1957), 310.
97. Klein, “On Identification,” 312.
98. Or, more specifically, “a correlative tension of the narcissistic structure in the coming-into-being (*devenir*) of the subject” (Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits, A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan [New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1977], 22).
99. Julia Kristeva, *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 13.
100. The state is termed “primary narcissism” in Freud’s first theory of the psychical apparatus (in “On Narcissism: An Introduction” and *Totem and Taboo*) and “secondary narcissism” in his second topography (in *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*; and *The Ego and the Id*). For a discussion of this shift in Freudian terminology, see Jean Laplanche and J.B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1973), 255–257, 337–338.
101. Kristeva, *Powers of Horror*, 10.
102. Otto Rank, *The Trauma of Birth* (New York: Dover, 1993), 20.
103. Lacan, *Ecrits*, 263.
104. For some striking historical examples, see Edward M. Hundert, *Lessons from an Optical Illusion: On Nature and Nurture, Knowledge and Values* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995], 5.
105. Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 60, 60.
106. On the infant’s evolution from increasingly coordinated sensorimotor schemas (e.g., seeing, sucking, listening, grasping) to primitive conceptual schemas such as object, space, and time, see the summary of Piaget’s genetic epistemology in Hundert, *Lessons*, 63–72.
107. This assertion presupposes pain’s normative function, its constitutive role in the making of the ego; and, of course, anxiety is, as we have seen, necessary for normal development, for carving out the lines of the early body image: only, in other words, because the child feels frustration—both of its demand and of its need—does it come to perceive the mother as other. The mother, to be an

object, must be *the* first object of the infant's blame. At her best the mother is, says Winnicott (D.W. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality* [New York: Basic Books, 1971]), only "good enough"—able to relieve, forestall, but not preempt, hunger, discomfort, anxiety, distress. By "allowing" needs and wants to materialize at all, by being sometimes absent and yet sometimes overeager, by turning her attention or her love toward *other* objects, this well-intentioned mother only "persecutes" the child. Expelled from a nurturing uterine space that supplied every need *before* it arose, the postnatal child now awaits satisfaction from a world it no longer feels it controls—a world, that is, where subject and object, motion and time, emerge as effects, perceptual concomitants, of recurrent encounters with intolerable pain. Thus, that experience that *deprives* us of objects—that, at its extreme, negates the object world—is the very same experience that made up the world, that motivated any knowledge of things in the first place. But it is pain's location at identity's origin—its function, precisely, as a normal growth factor—that makes it such a threat, potentially, to survival; that accounts for the urgency of the mind's flight from it, for the energy and the violence of the counterassertion.

An important question naturally arises here: do such narcissistic counter-reactions oppose pain and not pleasure? Yes, in one sense; in another sense, no. If the fear of annihilation is itself a form of pain, then that pain (that sense of danger) must inhabit extreme pleasure; for once a basic body scheme is (painfully) sketched out, merging with the "good" mother (desire's complete fulfilment) brings with it not just plenitude but fear of loss of self—a fear that resurrects, perhaps, at pleasure's farthest limit, the paranoid perception of a cruel, devouring mother. "In the very first months of the baby's existence," it conceives of the mother or the fragments of her body as "actually dangerous—persecutors who it fears will devour it, scoop out the inside of its body, cut it to pieces, poison it—in short, compassing its destruction by all the means which sadism can devise" (Melanie Klein, "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States," in her *Contributions to Psychoanalysis, 1921–1945*, ed. Ernst Jones [London: Hogarth Press, 1948], 282). Indeed, throughout its first few years, the infant vacillates between pleasurable fusion and the terror of engulfment: "the child goes from contented oneness, fulfilled primary love, and feelings of trust and omnipotence to feelings of helplessness and ambivalence at the mother's power and her control of satisfactions and proximity; from assertions of separateness, rejection, and distancing of the mother to despair at her distance and fleeing to the mother's arms" (Chodorow, *Mothering*, 73). Danger, then, accompanies both pain and joyful union—the wish to maintain splitting and the wish to pass beyond it, to give up death-like feelings for the absolute of death. Abjection, says Kristeva, is "above all ambiguity"—"a border" that does not "cut off the subject from what threatens it" (*Powers of Horror*, 9); pain, as I would put it, need not be monolithic, not purified unpleasure neatly "cut off" from its pleasure. What sublimity repudiates, yet at the same time uses, may be *either* violent rupture *or* that rupture's frightful failure—the failure of division in the bliss of *jouissance*. Let *either* here be *neither*, still the point remains the same: if splitting and castration do

- indeed rehearse our birth, then one aspect of that trauma that they variously repeat is the terror that the birth itself may never be complete. Return to the womb, then, is doubly barred—by the pain of being severed from the mother, to be sure, but also, if I may, by the pain of *losing* pain—the panic at relinquishing the boundaries of the self. This panic may explain, I think, why masculinist ethics are mistrustful of “surrendering” to nonsadistic pleasure; why pleasure, for the warrior, must be always controlled, derived from subject-ing, that is, at once the self and other.
108. Kristeva, *Powers of Horror*, 9, 10.
 109. Philip Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State,” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1988): 55, quoted by Michael Taussig, “Maleficium: State Fetishism,” in *Fetishism as Cultural Discourse*, ed. Emily Apter and William Pietz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 219.
 110. Taussig, “Maleficium,” 220.
 111. Taussig, “Maleficium,” 218.
 112. Juliet Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (New York: Vintage, 1975), 5.
 113. Taussig, “Maleficium,” 221.
 114. Taussig, “Maleficium,” 222.
 115. Taussig, “Maleficium,” 223.
 116. Taussig, “Maleficium,” 221.
 117. Sigmund Freud, “Fetishism,” in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), 357, 357.
 118. Taussig, “Maleficium,” 218, 219.
 119. Warner, *Monuments and Maidens*, 272, 277, 277.
 120. Warner, *Monuments and Maidens*, 124.
 121. Sigmund Freud, “Medusa’s Head,” in *Sexuality and the Psychology of Love*, ed. Philip Rieff (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1963), 212–213.
 122. Octave Mannoni, *Clefs pour l’imaginaire ou l’autre scène* (Paris: Seuil, 1969), 9–33.
 123. See Sigmund Freud, “Fetishism”; Sigmund Freud, “Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes,” in *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, 24 vols. (Oxford: The Hogarth Press, 1953–1973), 19: 248–258; Sigmund Freud, “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence,” in *Standard Edition* 23 (1953–1973): 275–278; and Sigmund Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1989), 89–93.
 124. Marcia Ian, *Remembering the Phallic Mother: Psychoanalysis, Modernism, and the Fetish* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 9. It is precisely the effort to evade psychic tension—to, in effect, turn ambivalence into equivalence—that characterizes the historical concept of the fetish. If, indeed, in Freud and Marx, *fetishism* retains the suggestion of false and irrational belief, that is because earlier discourses on the fetish had already linked it to the taming of difference, to the soothing of anxiety through the simulation of sameness. This function is inferrable from the etymology of the word *fetish*, which William Pietz traces from *factitius* (in Latin, *made, manufactured, fabricated, artificial*) to the medieval Portuguese *feitiço* (*magic*) and the pidgin

term *Fetisso* (either *man-made* or *counterfeit, fraudulent*). (See William Pietz, "The Problem of the Fetish, I," *Res* 9 [Spring 1985]: 6; William Pietz, "The Problem of the Fetish, II," *Res* 13 [Spring 1987]: 24–25; and William Pietz, "The Problem of the Fetish, IIIa," *Res* 16 [Autumn 1988]: 105. Hereafter, these articles are cited parenthetically as *PF*). Implied by the term were the "evil-making" of sorcery and witchcraft, the African making-sacred of "trivial" objects, and the making or the faking of commercial forms of value. For the idea of the fetish arose "in the cross-cultural spaces of the coast of West Africa," during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in response to the novel commercial situation induced by European mercantile forays (*PF* I: 5). "For Europeans seeking to trade commodities and to establish reliable social relations to facilitate this commerce, the idea of the Fetisso emerged as a pragmatically totalized and totalizing explanation of the strangeness of African societies" (*PF* IIIa: 116). Belonging, initially, to the idiom of middlemen, the term "brought a wide array of African objects and practices under a category that, for all its misrepresentation of cultural facts, enabled the formation of more-or-less noncoercive commercial relations between members of bewilderingly different cultures" (*PF* II: 23). So as a catchall used condescendingly by the "enlightened" Europeans to (mis)describe the belief systems of alien societies, the term *fetish* itself served fetishistic ends. Revealing, as it did, a crisis of value, it promised to resolve into a makeshift homogeneity the discomfiting evidence of cultural alterity.

In view of my concern with the interrelations of war, defensiveness, pain, and sexuality, there are a few particularly noteworthy historical features of the fetish. A fundamental theme throughout the genealogy of discourses on the fetish seems to be "that of the subjection of the human body (as the material locus of action and desire) to the influence of certain material objects that, although cut off from the body, function as its controlling organs" (*PF* I: 10). In European travel accounts of the customs and beliefs of African peoples, for example, the fetish was understood to have to the body a supplementary, restorative, or protective relation. Fetishes held the power of life and of death; they deflected, or allayed, ill health and bad fortune; and *they protected the user from harm during war*. The fetish had as well a "marked sexual dimension" *PF* I: 6, the earliest manifestation of which is found in the efforts of Christian jurisprudence to control female sexuality (witchcraft, abortion, and other "crimes of women") (*PF* II: 33). Travelogues reported on the role of the fetish in ensuring the faithfulness of African wives. It seems to me, however, that it was the African woman herself who was the European navigator's own privileged fetish; for insofar as she (like her fetish ornaments) was held to embody, in the eyes of the merchants, a primitive conflation of lust and superstition, of religious values and "excessive sexual passion" (*PF* IIIa: 114); insofar, that is, as the black African woman may have typified, for the voyagers, an African mentality (an imaginary construct whose principal "error" was its fetishistic mixing-up of unrelated values [*PF* IIIa 109]), a discourse on the fetish again turns fetishistic, revealing its unacknowledged parasitic ties to the "impure" metaphysic that it wishes to condemn. So if it was,

for the precolonials, the ignorant confusion of separate values, or systems of value, and the projection of those values onto material objects (“capriciously chosen and childishly personified” [PF IIIa 109]) that became the purported essence—the “explanatory principle” (PF IIIa: 111)—for the African disposition to dishonesty and corruption (PF IIIa: 115), then the “making” of black women into the embodiment of that principle—of a whole culture’s allegedly benighted epistemology—was a similarly arbitrary overestimation of the explanatory value of an artificial construct. In the writings of the explorers, women tend to incarnate not only promiscuity but also “instinctive mendaciousness” (PF IIIa: 120), the “immoral perversion of reason” and of public authority (PF IIIa: 119), and the “irrational passion for unregulated power” (PF IIIa: 120). Women are, accordingly, both the problem and the solution, as an inextricably ideological and sexual anxiety—an anxiety associated, I suggest, with birthing bodies—is brought under control by gender stereotypes, comforting myths about all female bodies—*Western* fetishes such as “vapeurs hystériques” (PF IIIa: 120).

125. My thinking on these issues is influenced by Nancy Chodorow, *The Power of Feelings: Personal Meaning in Psychoanalysis, Gender, and Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
126. Chodorow, *Mothering*, 129.
127. See Chodorow, *Mothering*, 95; Naomi Schor, “Female Fetishism: The Case of George Sand,” in *The Female Body in Western Culture*, ed. Susan Rubin Suleiman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 363–372; Naomi Schor, “Fetishism and Its Ironies,” *Nineteenth-Century French Studies* 17 (Fall–Winter 1988–1989): 89–97; Jane Marcus, “The Asylums of Antaeus: Women, War, and Madness—Is there a Feminist Fetishism?” in *The New Historicism*, ed. Harold Veesser (New York: Routledge, 1989), 132–151; Patricia Yaeger, “The ‘Language of Blood’: Toward a Maternal Sublime,” *Genre* 25 (Spring 1992): 5–24; Elizabeth Grosz, “Lesbian Fetishism?” in her *Space Time, and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 141–154.
128. Ian, *Remembering*, 176–177.
129. Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: Avon Books, 1965), 436.
130. On primal phantasies, see Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, “Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality,” in *Formations of Fantasy*, ed. Victor Burgin, James Donald, and Cora Kaplan (New York: Methuen, 1986), 5–34. For a study of Jungian archetypes in relation to the birth trauma, see Stanislav Grof, *Psychology of the Future: Lessons from Modern Consciousness Research* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000). Grof believes that, for most individuals, biological birth is the most profound emotional and physical trauma experienced in life. On his view, later memories and experiences (or “systems of condensed experience”) overlay and extend aspects of the birth experience, which, in itself, may be divided into four prototypical stages, or “perinatal matrices.” The patterns of thought, feeling, and imagery encountered in the perinatal matrices reach, according to Grof, beyond individual

- biography and into transpersonal phenomena such as the collective unconscious, universal myths, and past-life experiences.
131. See Chodorow, *The Power of Feelings*, 46–47.
 132. See, for example, Peter W. Nathanielsz, *Life in the Womb: The Origin of Health and Disease* (Ithaca: Promethean Press, 1999).
 133. Many possible implications of the new reproductive technologies for traditional categories of identity formation are reviewed in Bowlby, *Shopping*, 82–93.
 134. Wilson (*Neural Geographies*, 204) hypothesizes as follows the ontological inseparability of sexuality and cognition:

The facilitating movements and effects of neurocognitive breaching are libidinal. That is, the flow of activation across a neural network is an affective movement that could be described in terms of microintensities, tensions, repetitions, and satisfactions. . . . So rather than considering the vicissitudes of libidinal force (sexuality) to be secondary effects or “constructions” around, after, or upon the materiality of cognition or neurology, they could more acutely be taken to be the very stuff of cognition and neurology. . . . [S]exuality is not just one manifestation of cognitive functioning; instead, cognitive functioning is one manifestation of the sexualized breaching of neurocognitive matter.
 135. So while my argument has to do primarily with gender, its implications necessarily extend to the mapping of gender myths onto “analogous” social and biological hierarchies. In the late nineteenth century, for example, as Anne McClintock shows, colonized peoples and the “dangerous classes” were stigmatized by association with “female atavism,” while the inherent degenerateness of, say, the white female “race” was explained by reference to the pseudoscientific kinship of women with children, savages, or apes (Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* [New York: Routledge, 1989], 52–56, 118–120, 181–185).
 136. Yaeger, “Maternal Sublime,” 18.
 137. Janet Beizer, *Ventriloquized Bodies: Narratives of Hysteria in Nineteenth-Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 260.
 138. See Laplanche and Pontalis, “Fantasy.”
 139. On retranscription, revision, or deferred action, see Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, 111–114. The key Freudian texts are “A Project for a Scientific Psychology,” and “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis.”
 140. Ian, *Remembering*, 34.
 141. Regarding the difference of meaning (or of emphasis) between *facilitation* and *breaching*—both of which translate Freud’s notion of *Bahnung*—see the translator’s note in Jacques Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” in his *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 329. Bass’s note is brought to my attention by Wilson in the course of her discussion of breaching as *différance* in *Neural Geographies*, 146–166.

142. Edelman is describing here the neuronal organization of prelinguistic concepts, or of “primary” consciousness. “Primary consciousness may be composed of phenomenal experiences such as mental images, but it is bound to a time around the measurable present, lacks concepts of self, past, and future, and lies beyond direct descriptive individual report from its own standpoint” (*Bright Air, Brilliant Fire*, 115). But it is precisely the continued development of self-reflexive mapping—the mapping of the processes of primary consciousness itself—that leads to symbolic, or “higher-order,” consciousness—the consciousness of being conscious, of having a past and a future, and of having a self that is socially defined (Edelman, *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire*, 124–136). From this I extrapolate even further modes of awareness, predicated on the self-mapping of ever more complex forms of thought.

Chapter 2 Gender and War in Zola’s *Au Bonheur des Dames*

1. Emile Zola, *Les Rougon-Macquart: Histoire naturelle et sociale d’une famille sous le second Empire*, ed. Henri Mitterand, 5 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1960–1967), 3: 1680. Hereafter, this work is cited parenthetically as *RM*.
2. The scare quotes accompanying this reference to Darwinism are intended to signal my distance not only from Zola’s social Darwinism but also from any popular or scientific theory of evolution that neglects the random and contingent nature of genetic, morphological, and behavioral changes over time. Natural selection is not a universal optimizing process that can “explain” every characteristic of every existing species, nor is it a historical force that determines relative fitness exclusively at the level of the individual organism. Selection is determined in varying degrees by biological, environmental, and cultural factors, and occurs among groups as well as individuals, with the differentiation among groups sometimes being the more decisive effect for evolutionary history. Contrary, then, to the ruthless individualism, rigid hierarchism, and unilateral determinism that characterize Zola’s version of the “survival of the fittest,” altruism—the sacrifice of one’s own chances of survival in order to benefit the survival and reproduction of others—is a significant and demonstrable adaptive mechanism. Such is the case even if we can never know with certainty whether a given instance of altruism was “really” motivated by purely unselfish thoughts or impulses. See Sober and Wilson, *Unto Others*. For readings of Darwin that are sensitive to the heterogeneity and reciprocity of evolutionary forces, see Daniel C. Dennett, *Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life* (New York: Touchstone, 1996) and Wilson, *Psychosomatic*, 63–95.

3. Emile Zola, *Correspondance* 7: 244: "L'enfantement d'un livre est pour moi une abominable torture. . . ."
4. The appropriation and supercession of the feminine by the masculine is figured as well in passages where Jean tenderly mothers Maurice, nursing his wounds with "maternal gestures" (*RM* 5: 481) more comforting than any a woman could provide: "Maurice sank into his arms, allowing himself to be carried like a child. Never had a woman's embrace been as dear to him" (*RM* 5: 521).
5. This assertion, which Zola makes in his 1891 article "Sedan," is closely echoed in *La Débâcle*, *RM* 5: 413, 454.
6. See Kristin Ross, Introduction to *The Ladies' Paradise*, by Emile Zola (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), xix: "If memories and images of the violent . . . insurgents had receded somewhat during the repressive decade following the Commune, they would be newly awakened by the 1880 amnesty that allowed thousands of deported Communards to return to France."
7. As Henry Céard writes to Zola in June of 1892,

You can excuse and legitimize war all you like, your entire book condemns your theories and belies your paradoxes. It certainly does not encourage a taste for battle. On the contrary, it inspires horror of it. . . . To remake France sounds nice, but are you sure that her regeneration will not better come from intelligence exalted by peace rather than brutality exasperated by war? (*RM* 5: 1462)
8. See Emile Zola, *Le Roman expérimental* (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1971). Zola's use of the terms *virile* and *virility* in *Le Roman expérimental* was called to my attention by Beizer, *Ventriloquized Bodies*, 171 and Dorothy Kelly, "Experimenting on Women: Zola's Theory and Practice of the Experimental Novel," in *Spectacles of Realism: Gender, Body, Genre*, ed. Margaret Cohen and Christopher Prendergast (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 231–232.
9. In addition to the examples I analyze in this chapter, I offer the following summary as a reminder of the force and consistency with which the novel encodes commercial competition as war or revolution: Bourras's staunch refusal to sell his house to Mouret is, says the narrator, "a declaration of war" (*RM* 3: 407). Geneviève, at whose funeral the old shopkeepers rally, is "like the first victim shot down in a time of revolution" (*RM* 3: 742). Forced out of the Bonheur, Robineau starts his own business, swearing to "demolish," "sink," "kill" the department store (*RM* 3: 575) by undercutting the price of its best-selling silk. "[U]sing his adversary's weapons" (*RM* 3: 576) of newspaper advertising and large window displays, he launches a "decisive battle" against Mouret's "colossus" (*RM* 3: 571). In the course of the ensuing "duel," both sides exchange "terrible blows" with "heroic resolution" until, having achieved its apotheosis in a "mania" of price-slashing, the "great battle of the silks" ends in Robineau's "Waterloo" (*RM* 3: 750). Inside the store, the salesclerks engage in a "struggle for existence" in which "the strong devour the weak" (*RM* 3: 421); customers "kill" one another in pursuit of desirable bargains (*RM* 3: 644); expendable employees are "executed" by their superiors (*RM* 3: 431, 712); and, as the "war" between two rival departments turns increasingly "violent," the salespeople come to blows,

- hurl accusations of “treason,” and attack each other with words “as piercing as bullets” (*RM* 3: 519).
10. A glance at a few of the titles currently to be found in the “Business,” “Marketing,” or “Management” section of popular bookstores is revealing in this regard: *Store Wars: The Battle for Mindspace and Shelvespace* (by Judith Corstiens and Marcel Corstiens [New York: John Wiley, 1995]); *Swim with the Sharks without Being Eaten Alive: Outsell, Outmanage, Outmotivate, and Outnegotiate Your Competition* (by Harvey Mackay [New York: Morrow, 1996]); and *Eating the Big Fish: How Challenger Brands Can Compete against Brand Leaders* (by Adam Morgan [New York: John Wiley, 1999]).
 11. “The national symbolic” names those official and popular discursive practices by means of which the national identity of a people is created and maintained. According to Lauren Berlant, desire circulates through these cultural images, rituals, monuments, and narratives to produce a “fantasy of national integration,” a simultaneously collective and personal historical memory that makes a particular nation-state appear not only intelligible but also inevitable to those individuals born within its geographic and political boundaries: “Modern citizens are born in nations and are taught to perceive the nation as an intimate quality of identity, as intimate and inevitable as biologically-rooted affiliations through gender or the family.” Since, however, this “pseudo-genetic condition” cannot fully control nor disguise the many complexities and ambiguities that are inherent in political, civil, and private spheres of life, the “content of this [national] fantasy” is not fixed and unchanging but instead “a matter of cultural debate and historical transformation.” See Lauren Berlant, *The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia, and Everyday Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 20, 22.
 12. Throughout the present study I translate the term *un peuple* (“a people”) as a *nation*. I also follow the common if technically inexact practice of using *nation* and *nation-state* interchangeably. On the historical development of the word *nation* and the synonymy, since the sixteenth century, between *nation* and *people* in French usage, see Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 4–11 and 160–188.
 13. Leora Auslander, *Taste and Power: Furnishing Modern France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 402.
 14. Auslander, *Taste and Power*, 411.
 15. Auslander, *Taste and Power*, 383.
 16. On education, divorce, and feminism during this period, see Susanna Barrows, *Distorting Mirrors: Visions of the Crowd in Late Nineteenth-Century France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 9, 47–55.
 17. Ross, Introduction, xviii.
 18. Gabriel Tarde, “Les Crimes des foules,” *Archives de l’anthropologie criminelle* 7 (1892): 373.
 19. Gabriel Tarde, *L’Opinion et la foule* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1922), 195.
 20. Warner, *Monuments and Maidens*, 251. In chapter 1 above, I discuss the structural duplicity of these emblems as well as the articulation of that structure within the broader frame of state fetishism.

21. Regarding Zola's skepticism toward the principle of universal suffrage and his belief in government by an elite of positivist scientists and artists, see Frederick Brown, *Zola: A Life* (New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1995), 448, 641, and Brian Nelson, *Zola and the Bourgeoisie: A Study of Themes and Techniques in "Les Rougon-Macquart"* (Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1983), 24–25. In this connection we should note that the role played by the department store in both the “revolution from above” and the “democratization of luxury” was a pedagogical one: as Michael Miller writes of the Bon Marché (one of Zola's models for the Bonheur des Dames), it became the ruling class's “instrument of social homogenization, a means of disseminating the values and life style of the Parisian upper middle-class” to French society as a whole. “It did this by so lowering prices that the former's possessions became mass consumer items. But it also did this by becoming a kind of cultural primer.” Showing people “how they should dress, how they should furnish their home, and how they should spend their leisure time, . . . the Bon Marché became a medium for the creation of a national middle-class culture” (Michael B. Miller, *The Bon Marché: Bourgeois Culture and the Department Store, 1869–1920* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981], 183).

- To instill “universal” principles of reason and good taste was likewise the purpose of etiquette books, interior decoration manuals, and fashion magazines (see, in addition to Auslander, Philip Nord, “Republican Politics and the Bourgeois Interior in Mid-Nineteenth-Century France,” in *Home and Its Dislocations in Nineteenth-Century France*, ed. Suzanne Nash [Albany: State University Press of New York, 1993], 193–214; Philippe Perrot, *Fashioning the Bourgeoisie: A History of Clothing in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Richard Bienvenu [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994]; and Sima Godfrey, “Haute Couture and Haute Culture,” in *A New History of French Literature*, ed. Denis Hollier [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989], 761–769). In their appeal to the mobile gaze and their commodification of spectacle itself, department stores continued, in a more “popular” venue, the nationalizing project already begun by schools, museums, libraries, and expositions. Indeed, much as wax museums, panoramas, and the “theater” of the public morgue, department stores functioned as a kind of visual corollary for the mass daily newspaper, contributing in this way to a shared set of assumptions regarding history, current events, and the nature of “reality” itself. See Vanessa R. Schwartz, *Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Paris* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
22. Jules Michelet, *Journal*, 4 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1962, 1967), 2: 328. Regarding Michelet's influence on Zola, see Brown, *Zola*, 74–75.
23. See Charles Bernheimer, *Figures of Ill Repute: Representing Prostitution in Nineteenth-Century France* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 202–208, and Carol A. Mossman, *Politics and Narratives of Birth: Gynocolonization from Rousseau to Zola* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 208–216.
24. See, for example, *RM* 3: 581, 587.
25. Freud, “Fetishism,” 353.

26. “[A]n early twentieth-century proverb held that ‘Germany is never so happy as when she is pregnant with war’” (Huston, “The Matrix of War,” 133).
27. The fact that we now take for granted the easy cohabitation of the discourses of business and violence disguises the originary urgency of their association. Working from René Girard’s anthropology of mimetic desire, Michel Aglietta and André Orléan (*La Violence de la monnaie* [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982]) argue that the money form developed, historically, as a means of diffusing and controlling violent rivalry between exchanging parties. On this view, modern buying and selling relations are the expression of an “acquisitive violence” that has been displaced into socially normalized forms of competitive self-differentiation such as profit-making, speculation, and market monopoly. My point here is that something of this sublimated violence may rise close to the surface not only in moments of dire economic crisis (Aglietta and Orléan’s claim) but also in the smallest of day-to-day commercial transactions. Contrary to the consumerist cliché of shopping as therapy, the simple exchange of money and goods can provoke anxiety, panic, or aggression because the buyers and sellers involved remain at some level acutely aware of the vital role that money has to play in securing both bodily survival and social identity.
28. Another instance of affective brinkmanship occurs in the heat of the great winter sale, where Octave “himself [was] gripped by the physical need to bathe in his own success. With sensual delight he lost his breath; against his limbs he felt a kind of lingering kiss from his whole clientele” (*RM* 3: 492).
29. See Beizer, *Ventriloquized Bodies*, 171.
30. Ross, “Introduction,” xii.
31. On Marx’s concept of raw materials, including the distinction between raw materials and fuel, see G.A. Cohen, *Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 37–55.
32. In the same chapter on the sale of summer novelties, Madame de Boves and Madame Marty have a less combative relationship with the crowd than do the pregnant or nursing women; their surrender to the overwhelming force of the throng suggests less a violent expulsion from the bliss of the womb than a difficult but ultimately pleasurable return to it, to the oceanic inner sanctum of a consumer’s paradise: “They advanced but very slowly, the breath squeezed out of them, held upright by the gentle warmth of shoulders and bellies; and their satisfied desire took pleasure in this painful approach” (*RM* 3: 618).
33. The punitive and moralizing tone of these passages appears to represent a perversion of what Thomas Laqueur has called “the humanitarian narrative”—detailed legal, medical, and novelistic descriptions of bodily injury that evoke compassion for the injured while raising questions of causality, responsibility, and equitable redress (see Thomas W. Laqueur, “Bodies, Details, and the Humanitarian Narrative,” in *The New Cultural History*, ed. Lynn Hunt [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989], 176–204). However, as Wai Chee Dimock reminds us in her *Residues of Justice*, 140–167, nineteenth-century humanitarianism did not eschew the infliction of pain as a form of moral pedagogy, a “purgative” (154) or curative suffering whose long-term benefit was calculated

- to minimize suffering within the community as a whole. According to this fundamentally economic form of reasoning, pain was a resource to be “*instrumentally distributed*” (162) among criminals, the poor, and other socially marginal groups, both for their own good and for the higher good of the nation. If, as both Dimock and Laqueur point out, the utilitarian rationalization of pain coincided historically with the rise of capitalism and the consolidation of the field of tort law (a consolidation driven, in large part, by the expanding rate of industrial accidents), then the same mode of cognition that enabled compassionate identification with the pain of others worked simultaneously to limit compassion; for instrumental thinking not only extended but also circumscribed, quite narrowly at times (see Dimock, *Residues of Justice*, 158–161), the boundaries of legal and moral responsibility for different types of harm. In this context, the apparent distance between Zola’s social and moral sensibilities in *Germinal*, on the one hand, and *Au Bonheur des Dames*, on the other, may be seen to reflect a more general contradiction endemic to humanitarianism itself. This is once again a contradiction between recognition and disavowal.
34. The Roussel Law, which was designed in part to discourage wet-nursing, was adopted by the National Assembly on 23 December 1874. It required that all children under the age of two who were placed with paid nurses or guardians outside their parents’ homes were subject to the surveillance of the state, “with the goal of protecting their lives and health.” . . . The law required both the parents who placed their children and the nurses who took them to register these facts with the local authorities. (George D. Sussman, *Selling Mothers’ Milk: The Wet-Nursing Business in France, 1715–1914* [Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press], 1982, 166).
See also Nord, “Republican Politics,” 201, and Mary Jacobus, “Incorruptible Milk: Breast-Feeding and the French Revolution,” in her *First Things: The Maternal Imaginary in Literature, Art, and Psychoanalysis* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 207–230. Increasingly, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was believed that, with the untainted milk of their natural mothers, children absorbed the civic and moral virtues that would one day help to make of them proper citizens and soldiers, mothers and consumers. One can easily imagine Zola concurring with Saint-Just’s remark: “The mother who has not nursed her baby ceases to be a mother in the eyes of the fatherland” (Jacobus, “Incorruptible Milk,” 215).
 35. Robert A. Nye, “The Medical Origins of Sexual Fetishism,” in *Fetishism as Cultural Discourse*, ed. Emily Apter and William Pietz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 15.
 36. Brown, *Zola*, 779.
 37. Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 23, 5.
 38. Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” trans. Harry Zohn, in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt (London: Fontana/Collins, 1973), 226.
 39. “All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war” (Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” 243).
 40. Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” 244.

41. Susan Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 97.
42. Walter Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, trans. Harry Zohn (London: NLB, 1973), 166.
43. See, for example, *RM* 3: 544, 657.
44. Zola, *Roman expérimental*, 194.
45. Zola, *Roman expérimental*, 198–199.
46. Rachel Bowlby, *Just Looking: Consumer Culture in Dreiser, Gissing and Zola* (New York: Methuen, 1985), 11.
47. This sublime “‘body-within-the-body’ exempted from the effects of wear and tear” is the abstract but socially effective (or “real”) function of money, its exchange value. Ontologically homologous with the unconscious, this “real abstraction” is at once articulated and sustained by the symbolic order. See Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (New York: Verso, 1989), 17–19.
48. Benjamin, “Theses,” 257.
49. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (New York: International Publishers, 1967), 1: 76.
50. On the genesis of the money form, see Marx, *Capital*, 54–75. For illuminating interreadings of Marx and Zola to which my own work owes much inspiration, see David F. Bell, *Models of Power: Politics and Economics in Zola’s “Rougon-Macquart”* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988) and Bowlby, *Just Looking*.
51. Compare Nietzsche’s “mnemotechnics,” an official technology of memory that strategically inflicts pain (penal violence, for example) to overcome collective forgetfulness and instill within the citizen both a social conscience and a sense of intrinsic national destiny (Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale [New York: Vintage Books, 1987], 57–96). For a detailed study of the ways in which sociocultural contexts can shape traumatic memories, see Ruth Leys, *Trauma: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). Leys argues that traumatic memories are not unmediated and unchanging inscriptions of past events that must therefore be considered perfectly “literal,” that is, timelessly and unerringly accurate, both subjectively for the victim and objectively, or referentially, in the world. Traumatic memories are instead, like other kinds of memory, subject to social and environmental influences, as well as to the usual mechanisms of unconscious symbolization such as screening, distortion, condensation, displacement, secondary revision, deferred action, and transference.
52. Compare *RM* 3: 725: “[Madame Aurélie] made a show of going off every evening on her husband’s arm, for they were brought closer together by misfortune, realizing that evil had arisen from the neglect of their home.”
53. The emblem of this decadent aristocracy is Octave’s former schoolmate, Vallognosc, who is “from an old parliamentary family, a poor and sullen nobility” (*RM* 3: 448) that is dwindling through hereditary “exhaustion” (*RM* 3: 451). Vallagnosc’s effeminacy is underscored by his shamefully prolonged financial and moral dependency on his widowed mother (a dependency that he shares with his sisters [*RM* 3: 449]) and by his engagement to Blanche de Boves, by

whose aunt he hopes one day to come into an inheritance. With his “weak voice” (*RM* 3: 697), his useless liberal education, his snobbish apathy (*RM* 3: 448–452), and his hysterical inclination to weeping (*RM* 3: 795), Vallagnosc is portrayed as the antithesis of Octave. And here again it is the sickly, passive, “feminine” character who is artistically barren, while the “masculine” character is intellectually fertile: “acting” and “creating,” Octave “watches [his creations] grow” (*RM* 3: 697, 451).

54. Zola’s anxiety over the increasing difficulty of classifying women socially and sexually prompts the following ominous remark from his working notes: “A society collapses when married women compete with courtesans” (Une société tombe lorsque la femme mariée fait concurrence à la fille) (Emile Zola, Notes de travail, Bibliothèque nationale [Paris], *Nouvelles Acquisitions françaises* 10313, fol. 229, quoted in Nelson, *Zola and the Bourgeoisie*, 54 [translation modified]).
55. In *La Débâcle*, we recall, it is Jean, a member of the peasant class and patriotic counterrevolutionary, who is “healthy from having grown . . . in the soil of work and thrift” (*RM* 5: 871).
56. [T]he great sale of winter novelties . . . was an important affair; the store was risking its fortune on it. . . . Mouret was throwing himself into speculation like a poet, with such ostentation, such a need for the colossal, that everything seemed bound to give way beneath him. . . . [T]hey trembled on seeing him gamble everything in the coffers on one hand of cards . . . without holding a penny in reserve. (*RM* 3: 420)

Later in the same chapter, Octave breathlessly recounts to Baron Hartmann the story of the store’s “successive enlargements, the profits continually reinvested in the business, . . . the store risking its existence with each new sale, in which the entire capital was wagered on a single hand of cards” (*RM* 3: 456).

57. Mannoni, *Clefs pour l’imaginaire*.
58. Zola, *Roman expérimental*, 78, 74.
59. Jacques Derrida, *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe*, trans. Pascale Anne-Brault and Michael B. Naas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 14. Derrida is speaking specifically of the conventional Western conception of Europe as a cape or headland (*cap* in French), but he also plays subsequently with the etymological and semantic associations of the term with *la capitale* (the capital city of a country) and *le capital* (monetary capital).
60. The claim is made by Dennis Hollier, who goes on to say that “[i]n seventeenth-century Latin the first meaning of *conceptus* is “fetus.” See Dennis Hollier, *Against Architecture: The Writings of Georges Bataille*, trans. Betsy Wing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 147.
61. Wilson, *Neural Geographies*, 124–125.
62. For additional images of headless women in *Au Bonheur Des Dames*, see *RM* 3: 414, 630–631, and 780.
63. Ross, “Introduction,” xvi.
64. Nye, “Medical Origins,” 17.
65. Emile Zola, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Henri Mitterand, 15 vols. (Paris: Cercle du Livre Précieux, 1967), 10: 1380, quoted in Brown, *Zola*, 448.
66. Beizer, *Ventriloquized Bodies*, 7.

67. Bernheimer, *Figures of Ill Repute*, 254.
68. Wilson, *Neural Geographies*, 131.
69. Wilson, *Neural Geographies*, 130.
70. Among late nineteenth-century localizationists, it was Broca in particular who advanced this even “more finely tuned hierarchy within the cortex itself” (Wilson, *Neural Geographies*, 131).
71. Tarde, *L'Opinion et la foule*, 195; Michelet, *Journal*, 2: 328.
72. John C. Lapp, “Taine et Zola: Autour d’une correspondance,” *Revue des sciences humaines*, fasc. 87 (1957): 319, quoted in Barrows, *Distorting Mirrors*, 94.
73. Hippolyte Taine, *Hippolyte Taine, sa vie et sa correspondance*, 4 vols. (Paris: Hachette, 1902–1907), 4: 39, 45, quoted in Barrows, *Distorting Mirrors*, 82.
74. Tarde, “Crimes des foules,” 358.
75. Henry Fournial, *Essai sur la psychologie des foules: Considérations médico-judiciaires sur les responsabilités collectives* (Lyon: A. Storck; Paris: G. Masson, 1892), 23, quoted in Barrows, *Distorting Mirrors*, 132.
76. See Antonio R. Damasio, *Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Avon Books, 1994), especially 180–183, and Joseph LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). See also Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens*; Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza*; Paul D. MacLean, *The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role in Paleocerebral Functions* (New York: Plenum, 1990); and Panksepp, *Affective Neuroscience*.
77. Damasio, *Descartes’ Error*, 128.
78. Alter, *Nationalism*, 57.
79. Jean Borie (*Zola et les mythes* [Paris: Seuil, 1971], 43) reads the recurrent motif of the *fêlure* (crack or gap) in *Les Rougon-Macquart* as the biological analogue of original sin or of a primordial crime (such as the founding murder in Freud’s *Totem and Taboo*). For Naomi Schor (*Zola’s Crowds* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978], 18), the *fêlure* designates the “first organic lesion” (*RM* 1: 3), the “origin of the ‘curse’ of the Rougon-Macquart family alluded to in the preface of *La Fortune des Rougon*.” Gilles Deleuze (*Logique du sens* [Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1969], 378) identifies the *fêlure* as “Death, the death Instinct,” while Michel Serres (*Feux et signaux de brume, Zola* [Paris: Editions Grasset, 1975], 59–70) elaborates a theory of the crack, or flaw, as a simultaneously organic and thermodynamic interchange between loss and excess, equilibrium and disequilibrium, suffering and healing. For Serres, the Zolien *fêlure* is a kind of energetic tension, an economy that keeps the physiological, genealogical, and textual motor moving, working, producing. In a reading more specifically concerned with sex and gender, Janet Beizer links this mythical *fêlure* directly to the sexual “fault” of Adélaïde, the hysterical matriarch of *La Fortune des Rougon*, such that female sexuality becomes the symbolic source “not only [of] the propagation of the eponymous Rougon-Macquart dynasty, but also [of] the analogous textual generation” (*Ventriloquized Bodies*, 172).
80. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. S.W. Ryazanskaya (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 125.

81. Carl Von Clausewitz, quoted in Gaston Bouthoul, *La Guerre* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), 21.
82. Clausewitz, *On War*, 69, 87, 605–610.

Chapter 3 Nervous History: Irony and the Sublime in Flaubert's *L'Education sentimentale*

1. Linda Orr, *Headless History: Nineteenth-Century French Historiography of the Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 160.
2. Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," *New Left Review* 146 (1984): 53–92.
3. See Marjorie Garber, "Compassion," in *Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion*, ed. Lauren Berlant (New York: Routledge, 2004), 19.
4. See E. Anne Kaplan, *Trauma Culture: The Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005): "What I call 'empty' empathy is empathy elicited by images of suffering provided without any context or background knowledge" (93). In American television and newspaper coverage of the Iraq War, for example, "empty empathy" was derived in part from "the focus on individuals rather than on the larger issues to do with the reason for war on Iraq, its global impact, its effect on America's political alliances worldwide, and especially its devastating impact on Iraqi women, children, and innocent civilians" (94–95).
5. The possibility that recognizing someone else's pain may provide the witness with pleasure—that is, with the moral satisfaction of having felt concern over another's suffering without necessarily doing anything about it—is implicit in the very etymology of the terms *compassion*, *sympathy*, and *empathy*. Take for example the term *compassion*, whose etymological and historical usage are summarized by Garber ("Compassion," 20):

From the fourteenth century to the beginning of the seventeenth, the word (deriving from Latin *com*, together, and *pati*, to suffer) was used to describe both *suffering together with one another*, or "fellow feeling," and an emotion felt *on behalf of another who suffers*. In the second sense, compassion was felt not between equals but from a distance—in effect, from high to low: "shown towards a person in distress by one who is free from it, who is, in this respect, his superior." When the first sense fell out of use, which it did fairly quickly, the remaining sense hovered between charity and condescension.

Regarding the social effectiveness or ineffectiveness of compassion as a moral response, see Kathleen Woodward, "Calculating Compassion," in *Compassion*, 59–86.

6. This is to say that the decoding of irony may itself be prompted by conscious or unconscious feelings (or “body states”) that have come to be associated, through experience and socialization, with particular classes of stimuli (object, situation, or event). In a given social situation where decision making is required (and I include the interpretive act of reading in this category of situation), somatic markers reduce the need for sifting through an abundance of facts and imagined scenarios by providing the interpretant with an intuitive grasp of the most relevant information and alternatives. The main regions of the brain involved in establishing these “dispositional representations” or “theories” are the prefrontal and the somatosensory cortices. Damasio, *Descartes’ Error*, 173–189.
7. Here as in chapters 1 and 2, the sublime is associated with emotion and disavowal, irony with the recognition of logical error, including the error of trying to maintain the categorical purity of either emotion or reason. The intellection by which I characterize ironic perception should not therefore be conflated with the sublime “reason” of the preceding chapters, which was a kind of false consciousness marked by the disavowal of its own inherent affects and contradictions.
8. See my discussion in chapter 1 above of Melanie Klein’s association of splitting with a terrifying sense of disintegration that she calls “feelings akin to death”; in the same chapter see also my comments on Julia Kristeva’s notion of abjection. On the kinship and difference between pain and death, see *The Body in Pain*, 31, 49, 53.
9. Michael Taussig, *The Nervous System* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 1.
10. On genesis amnesia as “history turned into nature, i.e. denied as such,” see Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 78–79: “The ‘unconscious’ is never anything other than the forgetting of history which history itself produces by incorporating the objective structures it produces in the second nature of habitus.” For an examination of the cultural and historical transformations giving rise to genesis amnesia in the nineteenth century, see Richard Terdiman, *Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 3–32.
11. A few examples, notable for the range of texts they treat and for their critical sophistication, are Ross Chambers, *The Writing of Melancholy: Modes of Opposition in Early French Modernism*, trans. Mary Seidman Trouille (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), Richard Terdiman, *Discourse/Counter-Discourse: The Theory and Practice of Symbolic Resistance in Nineteenth-Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), and Nathaniel Wing, *The Limits of Narrative: Essays on Baudelaire, Flaubert, Rimbaud and Mallarmé* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
12. Rodolphe Gasché, “‘Setzung’ and ‘Übersetzung’: Notes on Paul de Man,” *Diacritics* 11, no. 4 (1981): 36–57.
13. I think of modes as semantic-emotive effects that may coincide with other categories, such as figure, theme, or genre. For a discussion of mode, see Lionel Duisit, *Satire, parodie, calembour: Esquisse d’une théorie des modes dévalués* (Saratoga: Anma Libri, 1978), 2–3, 8–13. Instead of focusing on rhetorical modes, studies of *L’Education sentimentale* have tended to map concurrent

- movements of plot and theme. See, for example, Victor Brombert, "L'Education sentimentale: Profanation and the Permanence of Dreams," in his *The Novels of Flaubert: A Study of Themes and Techniques* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 125–185; Victor Brombert, "Flaubert and the Articulations of Polyvalence," in his *The Hidden Reader: Stendhal, Balzac, Hugo, Baudelaire, Flaubert* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 136–147; Victor Brombert, "Idyll and Upheaval in L'Education sentimentale," *The Hidden Reader*, 130–135; Peter Brooks, "Retrospective Lust, or Flaubert's Perversities," in his *Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative* (New York: Random, 1984), 171–215; Dominick LaCapra, "Collapsing Spheres in Flaubert's *Sentimental Education*," in his *History, Politics, and the Novel* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 83–110; Dolf Oehler, "L'Echec de 1848," *L'Arc* 79 (1980): 58–68; and Hayden White, "The Problem of Style in Realistic Representation: Marx and Flaubert," in *The Concept of Style*, ed. Berel Lang (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), 213–229.
14. Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'Idiot de la famille*, 3 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1971–1972), 1: 33.
 15. Flaubert's quest for individual self-expression included his uncomfortable awareness that he was working in a medium whose industrial iteration and mass distribution deprived the work of art of its uniqueness. And that awareness reflected developments in the cultural imagination; indeed, the association between linguistic dispossession, the loss of aesthetic "aura" (Benjamin, "The Work of Art," 223), and (mechanical) reproducibility is implicit in the very etymology of the word *cliché*, whose figurative sense emerged from certain processes belonging to the modern printing industry. See Ruth Amossy and Elisheva Rosen, *Les Discours du cliché* (Paris: CDU et SEDES, 1982), 5–6; Claude Bellanger, Jacques Godechot, Pierre Guiral, and Fernand Terrou, eds., *Histoire générale de la presse française*, 5 vols. (Paris: PUF, 1969), 2: 13–26; and Ann Jefferson, *Reading Realism in Stendhal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 25–33. Although figurative use of the term *cliché* did not become widespread until the second half of the nineteenth century, the concept itself arose with the French Revolution. For 1789 marks symbolically the loss of a universally sanctified principle of authority, the diversification and relativization of discourses in the public domain, and the birth of the cult of individualism—all events contributing to a social context where unchecked circulation and repetition could depersonalize and devalue any figure of speech (see Amossy and Rosen, *Discours du cliché*, 5–9).
 16. See Terdiman, *Discourse/Counter-Discourse*, 203.
 17. Schiller, "On the Sublime"; Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry*; Kant, *Critique of Judgment*.
 18. Neil Hertz, "A Reading of Longinus," in his *The End of the Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 6, 7, 14.
 19. Thomas Weiskel, *The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology of Transcendence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 4.
 20. Longinus, *On the Sublime*, trans. James A. Arieti and John M. Crosset, *Texts and Studies in Religion* 21 (New York: Mellen, 1985), 7.3.

21. Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 12.4–5.
22. Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 7.2.
23. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International, 1972), 15. Deborah Jenson has argued that romantic literature demonstrates an anxiety of belatedness with respect to the “great” or “original” revolution, yet at the same time reinscribes as social wound that revolution’s traumatic failure to reconcile its political ideals of liberty and equality. See Deborah Jenson, *Trauma and Its Representations: The Social Life of Mimesis in Post-Revolutionary France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).
24. What I call *polemical irony* also commonly travels under the name *stable irony* (Wayne C. Booth, *A Rhetoric of Irony* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961]) or *verbal irony* (Muecke, *The Compass of Irony*). In its canonical form, polemical irony relies on the implied author’s latent, intended meaning. This meaning always affirms the moral or intellectual superiority of implied author and implied reader over the victim(s) of the irony. In this regard, polemical irony is theoretically distinct from romantic irony, which suggests that ironist and audience are both victims of profound and inescapable epistemological uncertainties. On the potential for slippage, however, between polemical irony, romantic irony, and poststructuralist notions of difference, see Vaheed Ramazani “Lacan/Flaubert: Towards a Psycho poetics of Irony,” *Romanic Review* 80 (1989): 548–559 and Ramazani, *The Free Indirect Mode*, chapters 3 and 4.
25. Compare Hayden White’s definition of irony as the recognition of (1) the eternal return of the same human folly in different guises and (2) the impossibility of establishing objective historical truths (Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973], 37–42). A connection between historical irony and historical sublimity is implicit in Hayden White, “The Politics of Historical Interpretation: Discipline and De-sublimation,” in his *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 58–82.
26. Gustave Flaubert, *L’Education sentimentale*, in his *Oeuvres complètes*, 2 vols. (Paris: Seuil, 1964), 2: 8–163. Subsequent references to the second volume of this edition appear in parentheses in my text. The Gallimard edition of Flaubert’s correspondence, which currently includes letters written from 1830 through December 1875, will also be cited parenthetically in my text. See Gustave Flaubert, *Correspondance*, ed. Jean Bruneau, 4 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1973–1998).
27. Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France and The Rights of Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1961), 21–22.
28. Friedrich Schlegel, *Literary Notebooks, 1797–1801*, ed. Hans Eichner (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), 114.
29. Muecke, *The Compass of Irony*, 6, 29, 220, 247.
30. This statement relies of course on the two senses of *history* (event and chronicle). Compare the dichotomy “events”/“calendar” in Marx’s comment, in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, on the unrepresentable confusion of interests that brought

- Louis Napoleon to power: "history without events; development, whose sole driving force seems to be the calendar, wearying with constant repetition of the same tensions and relaxations" (43). But whereas Marx sees this nondialectical negation of historical meaning as an aberration to be corrected by socially responsible praxis (see Sandy Petrey, "Representing Revolution," *Diacritics* 9.2 (1979): 2–16), Flaubert, in *L'Education*, posits the terrifying void in and of history as the norm.
31. Weiskel, *The Romantic Sublime*, 26.
 32. Jonathan Culler, *Flaubert: The Uses of Uncertainty* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), 103.
 33. This return may be explained in part by the unusual capacity of the clichés of popular romance to resist the complete erosion of affect. On the equivocal cultural status of the romantic cliché, see Duisit, *Satire*, 42–44.
 34. Revising the Freudian theory of the death instincts, Derrida and Lacan often invoke death in defining the structure of signification: the "presence" of the sign marks only the death (the absence) of other signs and of the referent. See, for example, Jacques Derrida, "Différance" in his *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 18–19; Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena* in his *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, trans. David B. Allison, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 1–104; Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), part 2, chapters 2 and 3; and Jacques Lacan, "Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir dans l'inconscient freudien," in his *Écrits* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), 802–803. Since these formulations assume that language is primary in the constitution of the self, they are not merely metaphorical ways of speaking about the arbitrariness of the sign. If meaning and being are consubstantial, then both may be regarded as provisional substitutes for what they at once desire and defer.
 35. Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'Idiot de la famille*, 1: 40.
 36. Barthes, *Michelet*, 84, 83.
 37. Quoted in Barthes, *Michelet*, 101, 103.
 38. Barthes, *Michelet*, 17.
 39. Roland Barthes, *S/Z* (Paris: Seuil, 1970), 146.
 40. Paul de Man, "The Rhetoric of Temporality," in his *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*, 2nd rev. ed., *Theory and History of Literature*, vol. 7 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 222.
 41. Schiller, "On the Sublime," 205.
 42. Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry*, 67.
 43. Victor Brombert points out the double meaning of *êtreindre* in this context ("Idyll," 133–134). Longinus brings together violent passion and the sublime in his comments on Sappho's ode (*On the Sublime*, 10.1–3). Precedents for the attribution of sublimity to war or to the representation of war include Longinus's description of Hector's murderous descent on the Greeks (*On the Sublime*, 10.5–6); Bernard Lamy's allusion to the "sublime Character" of the "Combats, sieges, Wars," in Vergil's *Aeneid* (quoted in Theodore E.B. Wood,

- The Word "Sublime" and Its Context, 1650–1760* [The Hague: Mouton, 1972], 75); and Kant's suggestion that war, by commanding the courage and vigor of a people, "has something sublime in it" (*Critique of Judgment*, 102).
44. For a rich thematic study of the correspondence between Marie Arnoux (whom Frédéric betrays with Rosanette) and the Second Republic, see Oehler, "L'Échec de 1848."
 45. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 97.
 46. For Brombert, the metaphysical grandeur of nature contrasts ironically with both the meaninglessness and the insignificance of the political upheaval ("Idyll," 134). I propose instead that the significance of both the natural and the political lies precisely in their Meaninglessness.
 47. Schiller, "On the Sublime," 207.
 48. Schiller, "On the Sublime," 210.
 49. See White, *Metahistory*, 155.
 50. Following Sartre in *L'Idiot de la famille*, Culler (*Flaubert*, 157–185) shows that stupidity in Flaubert's novels is monumental in both intellectual and aesthetic senses, an observation phrasable in terms relevant to my discussion. Stupidity is not merely a mode of thought and behavior found in a good many of Flaubert's characters; it is also a mode of perception induced in the reader by essentially the same trope (the act of metaphor) that inaugurates the assertive phase of the sublime. Autotelic descriptions, devices for isolation and fragmentation, and thematic indeterminacy structure the stupid gaze as essentially dehumanizing; stupidity turns the novelistic world into an opaque, meaningless surface that the mind can explore in a self-directed dream. Stupidity (or reverie) and the sublime overlap, then, as moments of joy stimulated by an excess of the signifier. Yet, as far as I can tell, stupidity in Culler's definition does not necessarily comprise (except perhaps for the artist in the throes of creative production) the element of anxiety or pain that we associate with the sublime. Nor does it imply the willful, agonistic, and unifying impulse of the sublime; rather, stupidity denotes a gratuitous, serene, and disintegrative mental activity. Still, many of the famous passages from Flaubert's correspondence cited by Culler in his discussion of stupidity describe the ideal work of art as a vast and unfathomable object that leaves the reader or spectator feeling crushed, stunned, dizzy, or exalted. In my view, such passages (which for reasons of space I cannot reproduce here) are compelling (i.e., sublime in their own right) articulations of an aesthetics of the sublime.
 51. For a synopsis of the relevant issues, see Jahan Ramazani, *Yeats and the Poetry of Death: Elegy, Self-Elegy, and the Sublime* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 128–133. Ramazani acknowledges the structural aggressivity of the sublime but argues against the assumption that the mode must therefore be intrinsically suited to any one political perspective.
 52. Rejecting socialism, universal suffrage, and conservative royalism, Flaubert embraced the idea of an intellectual (but also natural and financial) aristocracy that would make of politics a positive science. Flaubert's personal ideology and its similarities with the political theories of Ernest Renan and Hippolyte Taine are examined in Antoine Compagnon, *La Troisième République des lettres, de Flaubert à Proust* (Paris: Seuil, 1983), 253–314.

53. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Use and Abuse of History*, trans. Adrian Collins, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1985), 5.
54. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, *Theory and History of Literature* 10 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 81.

Chapter 4 Writing in Pain: Baudelaire's Urban Poetics

1. Stallybrass and White, *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression*, 192.
2. Walter Benjamin, "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire," trans. Harry Zohn, in his *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt (London: Fontana/Collins, 1973), 167. See also Ross Chambers, "Are Baudelaire's 'Tableaux parisiens' about Paris?" in *On Referring in Literature*, ed. Anna Whiteside and Michael Issacharoff (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 95–110. In reference to the "Tableaux parisiens," Chambers notes that Paris is the "illocutionary context, or code, . . . metaphoric of the modern," that gives "point" to the poetic utterance (102, 99).
3. Charles Baudelaire *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Claude Pichois, 2 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1975–1976), 1: 275–276.
4. Leo Bersani, "Boundaries of Time and Being: Benjamin, Baudelaire, Nietzsche," in his *The Culture of Redemption* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 85.
5. See, for example, in "Le Peintre de la vie moderne": "j'affirme que l'inspiration a quelque rapport avec la *congestion*, et que toute pensée sublime est accompagnée d'une secousse nerveuse, plus ou moins forte, qui retentit jusque dans le cervelet" (I would even assert that inspiration has something in common with *convulsion*, and that every sublime thought is accompanied by a nervous shock, more or less violent, that reverberates deep within the brain) (*Oeuvres complètes*, 2: 690). But Baudelaire is well aware that pain also threatens creativity, for he fears "de voir s'user et périlcliter, et disparaître, dans cette horrible existence pleine de secousses, l'admirable faculté poétique, la netteté d'idées, et la puissance d'espérance qui constituent en réalité mon capital" (seeing used up, depleted, and disappear—in this horrible existence full of shocks—the admirable poetic faculty, the clarity of thought, and the power of hope that in fact constitute my capital) (Charles Baudelaire, *Correspondance*, ed. Claude Pichois, 2 vols. [Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1973], 1: 327). See also the discussion of pleasure and pain in Leo Bersani, *Baudelaire and Freud* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), and "Boundaries," 71–73.
6. For a detailed analysis of the ways in which Baudelaire's writing registers the effects of private and public history—the emergence of market society and the poet's financial dispossession at the hands of his stepfather; the usurpation of

- the democratic ideals of 1830 and 1848 by the authoritarian regime of Napoleon III—see Eugene W. Holland, *Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis: The Sociopoetics of Modernism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). “History,” says Holland, “is . . . related metonymically to a text in two *different* ways: both as its context (producing effects) and as its referent (produced in response)” (*Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis*, 262).
7. On allegory, see Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, trans. John Osborne (London: NLB, 1977); on irony and allegory, see de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” 187–228. For suggestive studies of the interaction between irony and allegory in Baudelaire’s verse poetry, see Ross Chambers, “Memory and Melancholy,” in his *The Writing of Melancholy*, 153–173; and Nathaniel Wing, “The Danaides Vessel: On Reading Baudelaire’s Allegories,” in his *The Limits of Narrative*, 8–18. Clarifying work on allegory in *Le Spleen de Paris* has been done by Marie Maclean, *Narrative as Performance: The Baudelairean Experiment* (New York: Routledge, 1988).
 8. On the inaccessibility or hostility of pain to language, see Scarry, *The Body in Pain*, 3–11.
 9. Scarry, *The Body in Pain*, 14. We must keep in mind that, for Scarry, both the recognition and the expression of pain necessarily involve empathetic identification with the suffering body. If empathy is absent, then what has been represented (or apprehended) is not pain but something else. The power, the immediacy, and the factual certainty of pain have been used to substantiate (to make “real,” “immediate,” “certain,” etc.) a cultural construct that would otherwise lack credibility.
 10. Benjamin, “Motifs,” 167.
 11. Benjamin, “Motifs,” 177.
 12. Benjamin, “Motifs,” 165.
 13. On the meaning and etymology of the terms *Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung* (both of which are translated as “experience”), see Jonathan Arac, “Walter Benjamin and Materialist Historiography,” in his *Critical Genealogies: Historical Situations for Postmodern Literary Studies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 182. As Bersani points out, Benjamin’s historicization of Freud’s theory of the relation between perception, unconscious memory, and traumatic dreams gives to the unreflective an emphasis and a value that are not found in Freud’s discussion. Yet Freud’s argument (in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*) is “not invulnerable to a certain historical translation” (Bersani, “Boundaries of Time and Being,” 52).
 14. Benjamin, “Motifs,” 186.
 15. Benjamin, “Motifs,” 165.
 16. For a review of the critical and philosophical issues arising from Benjamin’s attempt to fuse dialectical materialism with mystical theology, see Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing*, 216–252.
 17. Benjamin, “Motifs,” 165. Similarly, though to significantly different ends, Jean-Paul Sartre notes the defensive attitude conveyed by Baudelaire’s “cramped, stiff, abrupt gait” and by his clothing, which, in its “aggressiveness,” becomes “almost an act” (*Baudelaire*, trans. Martin Turnell [Norfolk: New Directions, 1950], 110, 113, 151).

18. See Benjamin, "Motifs," 164, 165, 166.
19. See Benjamin, "Motifs," especially 163–166. In the case of what I am calling expressions of "adaptive self-defense," the English translation sometimes uses synonyms to render a single term that is repeated in the German original (or originals, since Benjamin not only refers to but also quotes Freud). I am grateful to Rebecca Karoff for her generous assistance in checking the English translation against the relevant passages from the German text.
20. This is not to say that these two concepts are inherently uncompromised. On the complicity of the aura with traditional structures of power and with the capitalistic values to which it seems to be opposed, see Bersani, "Boundaries," 60–63.
21. Walter Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, trans. Harry Zohn (London: NLB, 1973), 171.
22. Regarding the influence of the newspaper on Baudelaire, see, in addition to Benjamin ("Motifs," and *Charles Baudelaire*, 27–34), Terdiman, *Discourse/Counter-Discourse*, 117–146; Jonathan Monroe, *A Poverty of Objects: The Prose Poem and the Politics of Genre* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 96–97; and Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 147–148.
23. My understanding of opposition as an appropriative practice arising from and within power itself is informed by Foucault (see especially *Discipline and Punish; The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley [New York: Random House, 1978], 92–102; and *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper [New York: Random House, 1980]); Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); and by Ross Chambers's brilliant theoretical extension and critical implementation of both Foucault and Certeau in *Room for Maneuver: Reading (the) Oppositional (in) Narrative* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
24. My present discussion of the purpose of the artifact and of the reversion of the system of production from artifact into weapon is influenced by Scarry's interpretation of Marx's philosophy of work in *The Body in Pain*, 243–277.
25. On Baudelaire's "decadent" rhetoric of sickness and of convalescence, see Barbara Spackman, *Decadent Genealogies: The Rhetoric of Sickness from Baudelaire to D'Annunzio* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 33–104; for another, more biographical interpretation of the relation between venereal disease, art, and politics in Baudelaire, see Michel Butor, *Histoire Extraordinaire: Essay on a Dream of Baudelaire's*, trans. Richard Howard (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969), 40–47, 74–84, 136. For useful social and psychological insights into Baudelaire's aesthetics of prostitution, see Jonathan Arac, "Charles Baudelaire," in *The Romantic Century: Charles Baudelaire to the Well-Made Play*, vol. 7 of *European Writers*, ed. Jacques Barzun and George Stade (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985), 1332; Lloyd Spencer, "Allegory in the World of the Commodity: The Importance of *Central Park*," *New German Critique* 34 (Winter 1985–1986): 66–68; Charles Bernheimer, *Figures of Ill Repute*, 1: 71–74; Bersani, *Baudelaire*

- and Freud, 8–15; Bersani, “Boundaries of Time and Being,” 69–86; Walter Benjamin, *Central Park*, trans. Lloyd Spencer with the help of Mark Harrington, *New German Critique* 34 (Winter 1985–1986): 40–41, 52–53; and Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire*, 55–57, 166, 171.
26. “LE 2 DÉCEMBRE m’à physiquement dépolitiqué” (THE 2ND OF DECEMBER physically depoliticized me) (Baudelaire, *Correspondance*, 1: 188). Baudelaire coins the verb *dépolitiqué* instead of using the usual (but less vituperative sounding) *dépolitisé*.
 27. This perception is discussed by Stallybrass and White, *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression*, 131–136; Paul Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 36–37; Louis Chevalier, *Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris pendant la première moitié du XIXe siècle* (Paris: Plon, 1958); Barrows, *Distorting Mirrors*.
 28. Compare Scarry, *The Body in Pain*, 17: “some forms of pain therapy explicitly invite the patient to conceptualize a weapon or object inside the body and then mentally push it out—a process that has precedents in much older remedies that often entailed a shaman or doctor mimetically ‘pulling’ the pain out of the body with some appropriately shaped object.”
 29. Sigfried Giedion, *Space, Time and Architecture*, 5th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 275.
 30. In psychoanalytic terms, the sublime is often described as a kind of reaction-formation, a countercahexis whose governing trope is metaphor: the subject overcomes pain—transforms or translates ideas of pain into joy—by identifying with the (power of the) threat.
 31. The expression “ideas of pain” comes from Edmund Burke, but the provision that the expression underscores—that the subject who experiences the sublime must imagine rather than feel (that is, rather than feel with genuine urgency) fear, pain, or threat of danger—is an important feature both of Burke’s and of Kant’s theory of the sublime. See Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry*, 39–40; and Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 98–101, 103, 109.
 32. Baudelaire’s irony, like Flaubert’s, must, I believe, be understood as metairony—as the ironic relation and, at the same time, as the ironization of the relation between irony and the sublime. But in the absence of that magisterial asyndeton and epic vision of history that, as we saw in the previous chapter, transmutes Flaubert’s metairony into a consoling (if temporary) metasublime, Baudelaire’s metairony remains aporetic, painful, or pained. This reading is fundamentally in accord with the critical consensus—from Suzanne Bernard, *Le Poème en prose de Baudelaire jusqu’à nos jours* (Paris: Nizet, 1959), to Barbara Johnson, *Défigurations du langage poétique: la seconde révolution baudelairienne* (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), to J.A. Hiddleston, *Baudelaire and Le Spleen de Paris* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987)—that the encounter in *Le Spleen de Paris* between irony and lyricism only yields more irony. Of course, these critics’ conceptions of irony differ, and Barbara Johnson even avoids using the term *irony*. Yet her deconstruction of the boundary between lyricism and cliché constitutes both an ironic reading and, implicitly at least, a reading of irony. Two important books on Baudelaire’s irony and oppositionality appeared

- after I had published a condensed version of this chapter as “Writing in Pain: Baudelaire, Benjamin, Haussmann,” *Boundary 2* 23, no. 2 (1996). The first, Sonya Stephens’s *Baudelaire’s Prose Poems: The Practice and Politics of Irony* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), focuses on Baudelaire’s use of genre, puns, commonplaces, and caricature. The second, Debarati Sanyal’s *The Violence of Modernity: Baudelaire, Irony, and the Politics of Form* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) is a penetrating exploration of irony, trauma, and violence in politics and art. While neither of these studies discusses the textual mediation of pain to the extent that I do, both fruitfully complement my approach here, particularly in their attentiveness to the dialectical relationship between literary text and social praxis.
33. Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry*, 40.
 34. I shall discuss “Les Yeux des pauvres” in relation to the structure of torture, but of course, many of Baudelaire’s poems, both in prose and in verse, would lend themselves to similar analysis. One need think only of the pervasive motif of the *victime* and the *bourreau*, as well as the frequent representation of the suffering of the disenfranchised (of, for example, the widow and the poor, the *saltimbanque* and the glazier, the beggar and the prostitute, the fool and the poet). Some of Baudelaire’s prose poems (“Le Gâteau” and “Assommons les pauvres!” to name only the most obvious) might usefully be analyzed in the light of the structure of war.
 35. Or not primarily pain. On the ambiguity of *work* as a synonym both for pain (specifically, for “controlled discomfort”) and for the pleasure of creation, see Scarry, *The Body in Pain*, 169–171.
 36. Georges Haussmann, *Mémoires du Baron Haussmann*, 3 vols., 3rd ed. (Paris: Victor-Havard, 1890–1893), 3: 54–55.
 37. Haussmann, *Mémoires*, 3: 54.
 38. Haussmann, *Mémoires*, 2: 257.
 39. Jeanne Gaillard, *Paris, la ville, 1852–1870: l’urbanisme parisien à l’heure d’Haussmann* (Paris: Champion, 1977), 39.
 40. For a study of late nineteenth-century medical, psychological, and anthropological theories about the crowd, see Susanna Barrows, *Distorting Mirrors*. Barrows shows that theorists perceived the crowd—which they associated with women, alcoholics, and the underclass—as ruled by, and ultimately as *being*, a form of “contagion,” “illness,” “infectious malady,” “fever,” “epidemic,” or “germ.”
 41. Haussmann, *Mémoires*, 2: 57, 2: 200–201.
 42. Compare Foucault on the dual structure of normalization: “within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm introduces, as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual differences” (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 184). To the extent that such measurement is used to determine value, one is reminded, inevitably, of the function of money as universal equivalent.
 43. Either term might be translated as “cut,” “opening,” or “breach.”
 44. Françoise Choay, *The Modern City: Planning in the Nineteenth-Century*, trans. Marguerite Hugo and George R. Collins (New York: George Braziller, 1969), 18.

45. Haussmann, *Mémoires*, 2: 318.
46. On the rebuilding of Paris as profitable industry, see T.J. Clark, *The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and His Followers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 54; and Giedion, *Space, Time, and Architecture*, 767.
47. Kant puts it this way:
 We need not fear that the feeling of the sublime will lose by so abstract a mode of presentation—which is quite negative in respect of what is sensible—for the imagination, although it finds nothing beyond the sensible to which it can attach itself, yet feels itself unbounded by this removal of its limitations; and thus that very abstraction is a presentation of the Infinite, which can be nothing but a mere negative presentation, but which yet expands the soul.
 Or, more succinctly: “although no adequate presentation [of the ideas of reason] is possible . . . , by this inadequateness that admits of sensible presentation [they] are aroused and summoned into the mind” (*Critique of Judgment*, 115, 84).
48. See Chambers, *Room for Maneuver*, 185: “Recourse to sublimity is not an escape from representation and rhetoric but itself a rhetorical device, another form of representation. . . . [T]here is no communication that is not mediated; and the denial of mediation is itself a mediated communication, not ‘sublimity’ but a representation of the sublime.”
49. As Karl Marx has shown in volume 1 of *Capital*, the commodity refers not to the physical labor of the producer but to other commodities; not to its own material properties but to the general equivalence of the money form; not to use-value but to price. In other words, the significance of commodities—the pain that they preempt (in the consumer) as well as the pain out of which they are born (in the producer)—is always elsewhere. The violence of commodities, therefore, is double: on the one hand, they “forget” the body of the producer; on the other hand, they displace the self-awareness of the consumer from the sentient experience of shock to inorganic objects, objects that function as the mirror of a permanently new—infinately renewable—body. The “illusion of novelty,” says Benjamin, “is reflected, like one mirror in another, in the illusion of infinite sameness. The product of this reflection is the phantasmagoria of ‘cultural history’ in which the bourgeoisie enjoyed its false consciousness to the full” (Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire*, 172). Modern renewal—whether the ritualistic renewal of money and fashion or Haussmann’s renewal of the capital of fashion—suppresses difference (the otherness of pain) beneath a structure of specular repetition. Novelty, then, is the bourgeoisie’s complacent belief that there will never be anything new, that each new turn in history will bring only the return of the same class interests and control. On the relation between novelty and history, see Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing*; and Terry Eagleton, *Walter Benjamin, or, Towards a Revolutionary Criticism* (New York: Verso, 1981). On the etymological, psychological, and economic connections between specularly and speculation, see Bell, *Models of Power*, 59–61, 73–74.
50. Žižek, *Sublime Object*, 18–19.
51. Haussmann, *Mémoires*, 2: 200.

52. In Žižek's, reading of Hegel's critique of Kant, Kant "remains a prisoner of the field of representation" precisely because he "presupposes that the Thing-in-itself exists as something positively given beyond . . . representation." In the Kantian dialectic of Idea and phenomena, says Žižek, the notion of the Unpresentable "remains the extreme point of the logic of representation," its "negative limit."

Hegel's position is, in contrast, that there is *nothing* beyond phenomenality, beyond the field of representation. The experience of radical negativity, of the radical inadequacy of all phenomena to the Idea, . . . is already *Idea itself as "pure," radical negativity*. Where Kant thinks that he is still dealing only with a negative presentation of the Thing, we are already in the midst of the Thing-in-itself—for *this Thing-in-itself is nothing but this radical negativity*. In other words—in a somewhat overused Hegelian speculative twist—the negative experience of the Thing must change into the experience of the Thing-in-itself as radical negativity. The experience of the Sublime thus remains the same: all we have to do is to subtract its transcendent presupposition—the presupposition that this experience indicates, in a negative way, some transcendent Thing-in-itself persisting in its positivity beyond it. In short, we must limit ourselves to what is strictly immanent to this experience, to pure negativity, to the negative self-relationship of the representation. (Žižek, *Sublime Object*, 205–206).

It seems to me, however, that with this experience of an unreifiable negativity—and with the concomitant possibility, in Hegel, of experiencing absolute negativity in some small and contingent fragment of the real—we are dealing no longer with the sublime per se but with irony.

53. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Explained*, trans. Don Barry, Bernadette Maher, Julian Pefanis, Virginia Spate, and Morgan Thomas (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 13.
54. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Explained*, 15. See also Jean-François Lyotard, *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 106, 101, 90.
55. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Explained*, 15, 13.
56. Lyotard, *The Inhuman*, 106.
57. Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire*, 37.
58. Ah! vous voulez savoir pourquoi je vous hais aujourd'hui. Il vous sera sans doute moins facile de le comprendre qu'à moi de vous l'expliquer; car vous êtes, je crois, le plus bel exemple d'imperméabilité féminine qui se puisse rencontrer.

Nous avons passé ensemble une longue journée qui m'avait paru courte. Nous nous étions bien promis que toutes nos pensées nous seraient communes à l'un et à l'autre, et que nos deux âmes désormais n'en feraient plus qu'une; — un rêve qui n'a rien d'original après tout, si ce n'est que, rêvé par tous les hommes, il n'a été réalisé par aucun.

Le soir, un peu fatiguée, vous voulûtes vous asseoir devant un café neuf qui formait le coin d'un boulevard neuf, encore tout plein de

gravois et montrant déjà glorieusement ses splendeurs inachevées. Le café étincelait. Le gaz lui-même y déployait toute l'ardeur d'un début, et éclairait de toutes ses forces les murs aveuglants de blancheur, les nappes éblouissantes des miroirs, les ors des baguettes et des corniches, les pages aux joues rebondies traînés par les chiens en laisse, les dames riant au faucon perché sur leur poing, les nymphes et les déesses portant sur leur tête des fruits, des pâtés et du gibier, les Hébés et les Ganymèdes présentant à bras tendu la petite amphore à bavaroises ou l'obélisque bicolore des glaces panachées; toute l'histoire et toute la mythologie mises au service de la goinfrerie.

Droit devant nous, sur la chaussée, était planté un brave homme d'une quarantaine d'années, au visage fatigué, à la barbe grisonnante, tenant d'une main un petit garçon et portant sur l'autre bras un petit être trop faible pour marcher. Il remplissait l'office de bonne et faisait prendre à ses enfants l'air du soir. Tous en guenilles. Ces trois visages étaient extraordinairement sérieux, et ces six yeux contemplaient fixement le café nouveau avec une admiration égale, mais nuancée diversement par l'âge.

Les yeux du père disaient: «Que c'est beau! que c'est beau! on dirait que tout l'or du pauvre monde est venu se porter sur ces murs.»—Les yeux du petit garçon: «Que c'est beau! que c'est beau! mais c'est une maison où peuvent seuls entrer les gens qui ne sont pas comme nous.»—Quant aux yeux du plus petit, ils étaient trop fascinés pour exprimer autre chose qu'une joie stupide et profonde.

Les chansonniers disent que le plaisir rend l'âme bonne et amollit le cœur. La chanson avait raison ce soir-là, relativement à moi. Non seulement j'étais attendri par cette famille d'yeux, mais je me sentais un peu honteux de nos verres et de nos carafes, plus grands que notre soif. Je tournais mes regards vers les vôtres, cher amour, pour y lire *ma* pensée; je plongeais dans vos yeux si beaux et si bizarrement doux, dans vos yeux verts, habités par le Caprice et inspirés par la Lune, quand vous me dites: «Ces gens-là me sont insupportables avec leurs yeux ouverts comme des portes cochères! Ne pourriez-vous pas prier le maître du café de les éloigner d'ici?»

Tant il est difficile de s'entendre, mon cher ange, et tant la pensée est incommunicable, même entre gens qui s'aiment! (Baudelaire, *Oeuvres complètes*, 1: 317–318)

59. Gaillard, *Paris*, 528.
60. Clark, *The Painting of Modern Life*, 67, 207–208.
61. See Clark, *The Painting of Modern Life*, 23–78 (especially 50 and 69); on the policing of the streets see Gaillard, *Paris*, 528–529, 622–623, nn. 16, 17.
62. On the privatization of the street, see François Bédarida and Anthony R. Sutcliffe, “The Street in the Structure and Life of the City: Reflections on Nineteenth-Century London and Paris,” in *Modern Industrial Cities: History, Policy, and Survival*, ed. Bruce M. Stave (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981), 21–38.
63. The rise of functional division and localization are studied by Lutz Niethammer, “Some Elements of the Housing Reform Debate in Nineteenth-Century

- Europe: Or, On the Making of a New Paradigm of Social Control,” in *Modern Industrial Cities*, 129–164.
64. I borrow this definition of legibility from Kevin Lynch, *The Image of the City* (Cambridge, MA: The Technology Press and Harvard University Press, 1960), 2, 89. Compare Fredric Jameson’s concept of mapping in his “Postmodernism,” 89–92.
 65. For a reading of Baudelaire’s theory and practice of the sublime, see Suzanne Guerlac, *The Impersonal Sublime: Hugo, Baudelaire, Lautréamont* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 68–122. Guerlac notes that Baudelaire receives Kantian and Longinian notions of sublimity from Edgar Allan Poe (especially from his “Poetic Principle”) and from Thomas de Quincey. Elements of the Burkean sublime descend to Baudelaire from Diderot’s aesthetic writings. And, explains Guerlac, Baudelaire follows Poe in using *beauty* as sometimes inclusive of what would later become known as the sublime (*Impersonal Sublime*, 68–69, 206 nn. 1, 3, 5). I should mention here that Guerlac explicitly distinguishes the philosophical ground of her study (a study that is, she says, in dialogue with the work of Jean-François Lyotard) from precisely that American tradition (represented by, among others, Harold Bloom, Neil Hertz, and Thomas Weiskel) that informs my approach to the sublime. The result of this difference is that, in her critical analyses, Guerlac treats as forms of sublimity the kinds of irresolvable textual tensions that I read as (or in the theoretical context of) irony.
 66. Romanticism and privacy are linked by Bédarida and Sutcliffe, “The Street,” 29.
 67. On the technological evolution of the streetlight during this period, see David H. Pinkney, *Napoleon III and the Rebuilding of Paris* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 72–74. That public lighting had long been associated in the popular mind with the repressive authority of the state is demonstrated by Wolfgang Schivelbusch, “The Policing of Street Lighting,” *Yale French Studies*, no. 73 (1987): 61–74.
 68. For Maclean (*Narrative as Performance*, 115), the mural is a backdrop and the pavement is the stage. I do not disagree, but begin with the premise that the “backdrop” is readable, first, as a stage.
 69. On “ordered disorganization” as a commercial manipulation of time and space aimed at the disorientation, seduction, indeed *construction* of the consumer, see Terdiman, *Discourse/Counter-Discourse*, 117–146.
 70. See Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 7.2: “You see, by true sublimity our soul somehow is both lifted up and—taking on a kind of exultant resemblance—filled with delight and great glory, as if our soul itself had created what it just heard.”
 71. Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 82.
 72. *Discipline and Punish*, 200. On the “invisibility” of the poor as a source of fear in the nineteenth century, see Stallybrass and White, *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression*, 134–135; on the invisibility of power as a feature of the panopticon, see Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 202.
 73. Gaillard, *Paris*, 267–268.

74. Baudelaire, *Oeuvres complètes*, 2: 691–692.
75. We recall here, as in section 3 above, the etymological derivation of *proletariat* from *proles*, or *offspring*.
76. Baudelaire, *Oeuvres complètes*, 1: 291–292.
77. *Vagabondage*—“a pure creation of penal law”—had, by the middle of the century, come to designate people who were without family, without regular work, and without fixed domicile. See Ross, *The Emergence of Social Space*, 55–59, 64.
78. Among the urban poor, “traditional roles in the family could be distributed differently, members could become relatively independent, and intermediary forms could develop between ‘private’ life and class comradeship” (Niethammer, “Some Elements of the Housing Reform Debate,” 134–135).
79. For an examination of the reasons why the rate of death from disease remained high among working-class Parisians despite Haussmann’s public health policies, see Anthony Sutcliffe, *The Autumn of Central Paris: The Defeat of Town Planning 1850–1970*, Studies in Urban History, vol. 1 (London: Edward Arnold, 1970), 103–105.
80. According to Clark, the phrase belongs to the language of the worker as illustrated in Denis Poulot’s *Le Sublime, ou Le Travailleur comme il est en 1870 et ce qu’il peut être* (Clark, *The Painting of Modern Life*, 67).
81. See, in addition to the second section above, Haussmann, *Mémoires*, 2: 257 and 3: 240.
82. “Vagabonds are victims of dangerous heredity and carriers of the fatal germ of *dégénérescence*; ‘contagious,’ in both the medical and social sense of the term, they are the incarnation of a social illness that strikes not so much an individual as a family, a generation, a lineage” (Ross, *The Emergence of Social Space*, 57).
83. B. Friedmann, *Die Wohnungsnot in Wien* (Wien, 1857), quoted by Niethammer, “Some Elements of the Housing Reform Debate,” 138.
84. Chambers, *Room for Maneuver*, xv.
85. As Scarry observes, it is precisely because the regime is highly unstable that it resorts to torture as a means of substantiating its claim to power (*BP* 27).
86. On Marx, Benjamin, and the referentiality of the commodity, see note 49 above.
87. Baudelaire, *Oeuvres complètes*, 1: 662.
88. “L’amour veut sortir de soi, se confondre avec sa victime, comme le vainqueur avec le vaincu, et cependant conserver des privilèges de conquérant” (Baudelaire, *Oeuvres complètes*, 1: 650; the quotation is from “Fusées” in the *Journaux intimes*). See also in “Fusées”: “L’amour, c’est le goût de la prostitution. . . . Qu’est-ce que l’art? Prostitution” (Love is a taste for prostitution. . . . What is art? Prostitution) (Baudelaire, *Oeuvres complètes*, 1: 649).
89. Baudelaire, *Oeuvres complètes*, 1: 291. These well-known lines from “Les Foules” juxtapose the superior pleasures of the “bain de multitude” (the crowd-bath) with “[c]e que les hommes nomment amour” ([w]hat people call love) (Baudelaire, *Oeuvres complètes*, 1: 291). But in the broader context of Baudelaire’s aesthetics, the effects of love are frequently analogous to those of the “bain de multitude.”

90. Sartre, *Baudelaire*, 107.
91. I echo (with modification) the famous line from “Le Reniement de Saint Pierre”: “un monde où l’action n’est pas la sœur du rêve” (Baudelaire, *Oeuvres complètes*, 1: 122).
92. Compare Paul de Man’s characterization of irony as “the undoing of the deconstructive allegory of all tropological cognitions, the systematic undoing, in other words, of understanding. As such, far from closing off the tropological system, irony enforces the repetition of its aberration” (Paul de Man, *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979], 301).
93. Baudelaire, *Oeuvres complètes*, 1: 676.
94. Anthony Vidler, in *The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), uses the terms *homely* and *unhomely* to translate *heimlich* and *unheimlich*, respectively.
95. Dori Laub says that, in the memory of its survivors, the traumatic event stands “outside the parameters of ‘normal’ reality, such as causality, sequence, place and time. The trauma is thus an event that has no beginning, no ending, no before, no during and no after” (Felman and Laub, *Testimony*, 69).
96. Felman and Laub, *Testimony*, 78.

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