

Notes

Preface

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, ed. W. Kaufman, New York: Vintage, 1967, §1.
2. Steven Weinberg, *The First Three Minutes*, London: Flamingo, 1983, 149.
3. Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity and the Emancipation of Man 1670–1752*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

1 The Apoptosis of Belief

1. 'Apoptosis: a type of cell death in which the cell uses specialized cellular machinery to kill itself; a cell suicide mechanism that enables metazoans to control cell number and eliminate cells that threaten the animal's survival.' American Psychological Association (APA): apoptosis (n.d.), WordNet® 2.1, Dictionary.com website: <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/apoptosis>.
2. Wilfrid Sellars, 'Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man' in *Science, Perception and Reality*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963a, 1–40.
3. Originally published in 1956 as Vol. I of *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds); reprinted in 1963 in Sellars's *Science, Perception, and Reality*, Routledge & Kegan Paul; and again in 1997 as *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
4. See Paul Churchland, 'Folk Psychology' in P. M. Churchland and P. S. Churchland, *On the Contrary: Critical Essays 1987–1997*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998, 4–5.
5. Originally published in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 78, No. 2, February 1981: 76–90. Reprinted in P. M. Churchland, *A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science*, London: MIT, 1989, 1–22.
6. J. Fodor, *Psychosemantics*, Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1987, xii.
7. There are other versions: Paul Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem' in *Review of Metaphysics* XVII 1, 65 (September 1963), 49–66; Richard Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', *Review of Metaphysics* XIX, 1, 73 (September 1965), 24–54; Stephen P. Stich, *From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case against Belief*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983; Patricia S. Churchland, *Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986; Patricia S. Churchland and Terrence Sejnowski, *The Computational Brain*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
8. For a comprehensive anthology of these and other critiques of EM, see R. N. McCauley ed., *The Churchlands and Their Critics*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.

9. J. Marshall and J. Gurd, 'The Furniture of Mind' in McCauley ed. *The Churchlands*, 176–91.
10. In this regard, the 'state space semantics' which Churchland has elaborated on the basis of his PVA model has been attacked on the grounds that it represents a regression to pre-Kantian empiricism. Thus Fodor and Lepore have argued that Churchland cannot provide conditions of individuation for concepts, which is to say, a criterion for identity of meaning. Consequently he must make do with a criterion of similarity. But he cannot provide a criterion of similarity of meaning for his psychological prototypes without surreptitiously resorting to an empiricist account of the identity conditions for concepts. As a result, the semantic dimensions which are supposed to individuate concepts are simply stipulated with reference to empirical features of the environment, and concepts become compositionally defined on the basis of empirical simples. According to Fodor and Lepore, this presents Churchland with the following dilemma: he can either re-invoke some version of the analytic–synthetic distinction or embrace Humean 'blank slate' empiricism. Churchland has retorted that his account can indeed provide a robust notion of functional similarity for prototypes via discriminatory mechanisms while avoiding the twin perils of associationism and the analytic a priori. Cf. J. Fodor and E. Lepore (1996a), 'Churchland and State Space Semantics' in McCauley ed. 1996, 145–58; P. M. Churchland (1996a), 'Fodor and Lepore: State Space Semantics and Meaning Holism' in McCauley ed. 1996, 273–7; J. Fodor and E. Lepore (1996b), 'Reply to Churchland' in McCauley ed. 1996, 159–62; P. M. Churchland (1996b), 'Second Reply to Fodor and Lepore' in McCauley ed. 1996, 278–83; and P. M. Churchland (1998a) 'Conceptual Similarity across Sensory and Neural Diversity: The Fodor–Lepore Challenge Answered' in P. M. Churchland and P. S. Churchland 1998, 81–112. For a defence of Churchland in this controversy, see Jesse J. Prinz, 'Empiricism and State Space Semantics' in *Paul Churchland*, Brian L. Keeley ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 88–112.
11. A version of this so-called *reductio* of EM is expounded at length by Lynn Rudder-Baker in *Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. Michael Devitt – an ardent opponent of eliminativism – provides a convincing refutation of this line of attack in his 1990 article 'Transcendentalism about Content', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 71, No. 2, 247–63. Despite this and several equally decisive refutations by both Paul Churchland (cf. 1981, 1993) and Patricia Churchland (1981), the 'self-defeating' objection is regularly trotted out by foes of eliminativism.
12. The example is from Patricia Churchland, 'Is Determinism Self-Refuting?' in *Mind*, 90, 1981, 99–101; cited in P. M. Churchland (1989), 22.
13. In his 'Reply to Glymour', Churchland expands on this claim: 'Ceteris paribus, an activated prototype [i.e. an explanation] is better if it is part of the most unified conceptual configuration [...] networks that have formed the simplest or most unified partitions across their activation space are networks that do much better at generalising their knowledge to novel cases. Very briefly, they do better at recognising novel situations for what they are because they have generated a relevantly unified similarity gradient that will catch novel cases in the same subvolume that catches the training case' (P. M. Churchland, 1998c: 286).

14. 'FP, like any other theory, is a family of learned vectorial prototypes, prototypes that sustain recognition of current reality, anticipation of future reality, and manipulation of ongoing reality' (P. M. Churchland, 1998b: 15).
15. 'Whether FP is false and whether it will fail to reduce are empirical issues whose decisive settlement must flow from experimental research and theoretical development, not from any arguments a priori' (P. M. Churchland, 1998b: 10).
16. '[T]he folk-semantic notion of "reference" is without any real integrity. Reference is uniquely fixed neither by networks of belief, nor by causal relations, nor by anything else, because there is no single uniform relation that connects each descriptive term to the world in anything like the fashion that common sense supposes' (P. M. Churchland, 1989: 276–7).
17. Thus, Churchland invokes Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity to underline the extent to which 'new theories often bring with them a novel and proprietary vocabulary for describing the observable world, a vocabulary that can augment or even displace the old observational vocabulary' (P. M. Churchland 1998b: 18).
18. Churchland himself frequently adduces the argument that Ptolemaic astronomy could have happily continued 'explaining' and accommodating recalcitrant astronomical data by piling virtual epicycle upon virtual epicycle. Cf. for instance P. M. Churchland's 'Densmore and Dennett on Virtual Machines and Consciousness' in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. LIX, No. 3, 1999, 767.
19. Cf. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962; and P. M. Churchland 1989: 191.
20. Since writing the above, I have learnt that a very similar criticism of Churchland has already been formulated (with far greater concision) by Teed Rockwell in his 1995 paper 'Beyond Eliminative Materialism: Some Unnoticed Implications of Churchland's Pragmatic Pluralism', available at <http://cogprints.org/379/00/BeyondEM.html>. Cf. also Rockwell's *Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Non-Dualist Alternative to Mind-Brain Identity Theory*, Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2005.
21. See especially the following texts by Fodor: 'Review of Dawkin's *Climbing Mount Improbable*', 'Deconstructing Dennett's Darwin', 'Is Science Biologically Possible? Comments on Some Arguments of Patricia Churchland and of Alvin Plantinga', and 'Review of Stephen Pinker's *How the Mind Works* and Henry Plotkin's *Evolution in Mind*'. All four essays can be found in Fodor's *In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2000.
22. Cf. Andy Clark, 'Dealing in Futures: Folk Psychology and the Role of Representation in Cognitive Science' in McCauley ed., 1996, 86–101; and also Floris van der Burg and Michael Eardley, 'Does the Man on the Clapham Omnibus Have a Labcoat in his Pocket? Eliminative Materialism is Based on a Valid Argument from the False Premise That Folk-Psychology is an Empirical Theory', in *PLI: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 9. *Parallel Processes: Philosophy and Science*, 139–55, 2000.
23. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book*, tr. F. Kersten, London: Kluwer, 1982.
24. J. Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992, 121.

25. D. Dennett, *Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006.
26. J. Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, tr. David B. Allison, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
27. Cf. M. Henry, *The Essence of Manifestation*, tr. G. Etskorn, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. We will return to Heidegger, Henry, and phenomenology in chapters 5 and 6.
28. Cf. T. Metzinger, *Being No-One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity*, London: MIT Press, 2004.

2 The *Thanatosis* of Enlightenment

1. Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* tr. Edmund Jephcott, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002.
2. Andreas Huyssen distinguishes these five registers as follows: '[F]irst, in relation to the critique of the commodity form and its powers of reification and deception, a thoroughly negative form of mimesis [*Mimesis ans Verhärtete*]; secondly, in relation to the anthropological grounding of human nature which, as Adorno insists in *Minima Moralia*, is 'indissolubly linked to imitation'; third, in a biological somatic sense geared toward survival, as Adorno had encountered it in Roger Caillois's work [...]; fourth, in the Freudian sense of identification and projection indebted to *Totem and Taboo*; and, lastly, in an aesthetic sense that resonates strongly with Benjamin's language theory, as it relates to the role of word and image in the evolution of signifying systems.' Andreas Huyssen, 'Of Mice and Mimesis', *New German Critique*, No. 81, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Autumn 2000), 66–7.
3. Adorno had reviewed Caillois's 1934 text 'La Mante religieuse' (originally published in *Minotaure* 5 [1934]: 23–6) in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 7 (1938): 410–11. Also relevant in this regard is Caillois's 'Mimétisme et psychasthénie légendaire', originally published in *Minotaure* 7 (1935): 4–10, which we will discuss below. Both texts are included in Caillois's *L'Homme et le sacré*, Paris: Gallimard, Folio/Éssais, 1988 (first published in 1938). English versions can be found in *On the Edge of Surrealism: A Roger Caillois Reader*, C. Frank and C. Nash (eds), Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.
4. We will return to *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* in Chapter 7, where we will reconsider Freud's account of the death-drive.
5. Cf. Sigmund Freud, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' in *The Penguin Freud Library. Vol. 11: On Metapsychology*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1991, 270–338.
6. The implication, more pathetic than provocative, is unavoidable: Einstein and Himmler are separated merely by degrees, not kind.
7. Jay Bernstein, *Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics*, Cambridge: CUP, 2001, 191.
8. Roger Caillois, *L'Homme et le sacré*, Gallimard, Folio/Éssais 1988, 86–122.
9. I owe this formulation to Nigel Cooke's remarkable essay 'The Language of Insects' in *Sandwich 1: Autumn*, London: SecMoCo Publishing, 2004.
10. E. Minkowski, 'Le problème du temps en psychopathologie' in *Recherches Philosophiques*, 1932–33, 239; *Le Temps vécu. Études phénoménologiques et psychopathologiques*, Paris: L'évolution Psychiatrique, 1933; *Lived Time*,

- tr. N. Metzel, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970; *La Schizophrénie*, Paris: Payot, Rivages, 1997 (originally published 1927).
11. *Phagocytosis* is a process describing the engulfment and destruction of extracellularly derived materials by phagocytic cells, such as macrophages and neutrophils.
 12. Roger Caillouis, 'Mimétisme et psychasthénie légendaire' in *L'Homme et le sacré*, Gallimard, Folio/Éssais, 1988.
 13. In this regard, the veritable analogue for the dialectic of enlightenment is not Homer's *Odyssey* but rather David Cronenberg's *The Fly* (1986), whose protagonist declares: 'I was an insect who dreamed he was a man – and loved it – but now the dream is over and the insect is awake.'

3 The Enigma of Realism

1. Q. Meillassoux, *Après la finitude. Éssai sur la nécessité de la contingence*, Paris: Seuil, 2006, 39.
2. 'Billion' and 'trillion' will be used throughout, following their now internationally accepted US usage, as meaning a thousand million and a million, million respectively.
3. Graham Harman has elaborated a profound critique of this tendency in contemporary philosophy, seeing in it an avatar of a generalized anti-realism. Whether the relation in question is the epistemological relation between mind and world, the phenomenological relation between noesis and noema, the ekstastic relation between *Sein* and *Dasein*, the prehensive relation between event-objects, or the processual relation between matter and memory, Harman argues that this premium on relationality occludes the discontinuous reality of objects in favour of their reciprocal idealizations. Harman's startlingly original interpretation of Heidegger provides the point of departure for his complete re-orientation of phenomenology away from the primacy of the human relation to things and towards things themselves considered independently of their relation to humans or each other. Accordingly, the fundamental task for this 'object-oriented philosophy' consists in explaining how autonomous objects can ever interact with each other, and to that end Harman has developed a particularly ingenious theory of 'vicarious causation'. Harman first outlines the rudiments of this project in *Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects*, Chicago: Open Court, 2002 and develops it further in *Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things*, Chicago: Open Court, 2005.
4. Here are some paradigmatic expressions of the correlationalist credo from three canonical continental philosophers: Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger:

Against the scientific prejudice – The biggest fable of all is the fable of knowledge. One would like to know what things-in-themselves are; but behold, there are no things-in-themselves! But even supposing there were an in-itself, an unconditioned thing, it would for that very reason be unknowable! [...] [S]omething that is of no concern to anyone *is* not at all.

(Nietzsche 1968: §555)

The existence of Nature *cannot* be the condition for the existence of consciousness, since Nature itself turns out to be a correlate of consciousness: Nature *is* only as being constituted in regular concatenations of consciousness.

(Husserl 1982: 116)

Given in and through this liberation [from the natural attitude] is the discovery of the universal, absolutely self-enclosed and absolutely self-sufficient correlation between the world itself and world-consciousness [...] the absolute correlation between beings of every sort and every meaning, on the one hand, and absolute subjectivity, as constituting meaning and ontic validity in this broadest manner, on the other hand. [...] [D]uring the consistently carried-out epochē, [the world] is under our gaze purely as the correlate of the subjectivity which gives it ontic meaning, through whose validities the world 'is' at all.

(Husserl 1970: 151–2)

Of course only as long as Dasein *is* (that is, as long as an understanding of Being is ontically possible), 'is there' Being. When Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in-itself'. In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. *In such a case* it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not.

(Heidegger 1962: 255)

5. Q. Meillassoux, *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*, tr. R. Brassier, London: Continuum 2008.
6. At the time of writing (2007), these objections have only been communicated verbally or in writing to Meillassoux; they have yet to appear in print.
7. This is essentially Slavoj Žižek's position: '[T]he only way effectively to account for the status of (self-)consciousness is to assert the ontological incompleteness of "reality" itself; there is "reality" only insofar as there is an ontological "gap", a "crack", in its very heart, that is to say, a traumatic excess, a foreign body which cannot be integrated into it' (Žižek 2006: 242). The thesis that consciousness or subjectivity is not a substantial entity but rather an insubstantial gap fissuring the ontological order lies at the heart of Žižek's (brilliant) hybridization of Lacan and Hegel. To his considerable credit, and in conformity with his commitment to a 'dialectical materialism', Žižek has consistently engaged with cognitive science (cf. Žižek 2006: 146–250). However, it is difficult to square Žižek's putative 'materialism' with his assertion that reality itself is structured around the traumatic kernel of subjectivity. If reality in-itself is necessarily constituted in relation to the fissure of self-consciousness, then all those material processes which, according to Darwin, preceded the emergence of self-consciousness, must be dismissed as phantasmatic 'false memories' generated by a delirious transcendental subject.
8. I am indebted to Graham Harman, Robin Mackay, and Damian Veal for all these critical points.
9. Though Kant would certainly not endorse an instrumentalist conception of science, it is his formula which most succinctly summarizes the way in

which correlationists render the empirical reality of scientific objects dependent upon transcendental conditions of objectivation: 'The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience' (Kant: A 158/B 197).

10. I owe this expression to Graham Harman.
11. We shall attempt to elaborate some of the conceptual resources required for such a task via a critical discussion of the work of François Laruelle in Chapter 5.
12. 'In general, our consideration of the nature of contradiction has shown that it is not, so to speak, a blemish, an imperfection or a defect in something if a contradiction can be pointed out in it. On the contrary, every concrete thing, every Notion, is essentially a unity of distinguished and distinguishable moments, which by virtue of their determinate, essential difference, pass over into contradictory moments. This contradictory side of course resolves itself into nothing, it withdraws into its negative unity. Now the thing, the subject, the Notion, is just this negative unity itself; it is inherently self-contradictory, but is no less the contradiction resolved: it is the ground that contains and supports its determinations' (Hegel 1989: 442).
13. Indeed, though Heidegger and Wittgenstein are probably the most renowned exemplars of this resurgence of religiosity in twentieth-century European philosophy, they are far from unusual in this regard. Twentieth-Century European philosophy harbours what can only be described as a profoundly conflicted attitude towards Judeo-Christian monotheism. Thus the avowed atheism of figures such as Bachelard, Badiou, Carnap, Cavailles, Neurath, Reichenbach, Sartre, Schlick, Deleuze, and Waismann is more than counterbalanced by the theological overtones in the works of Adorno, Benjamin, Bloch, Derrida, Gadamer, Henry, Horkheimer, Jaspers, Levinas, Marion, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, and Scheler. The latter all seem to hold Judeo-Christian theology in far higher philosophical regard than the cognitive achievements of modern scientific rationality. Husserl and the neo-Kantians hold an equivocal position here: like Kant before them, they declared their allegiance to the ideals of scientific rationality; yet at the same time their understanding of the latter seems to have been wholly compatible with, or at least did not rule out, an embrace of Judeo-Christian monotheism – hence Cohen's Judaism, Husserl's Lutheranism, and so on. In this regard, their stance typifies post-Kantian fideism: since neither God's existence nor his non-existence can be rationally demonstrated, it is perfectly possible to reconcile a commitment to scientific rationality with a commitment to Judaism or Christianity. It is worth mentioning in this connection the striking similarities between Meillassoux's attack on correlationist fideism in *Après la finitude* and Lenin's assault on clericalist idealism in *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (originally published 1908, tr. A. Fineberg, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972); especially in Chapter 1, sections 2 and 3, where Lenin lambasts the 'correlativist' theory of subject and object which he explicitly connects to 'fideism'. My thanks to Damian Veal for pointing these parallels out to me. Though he does not mention him, Lenin's tract may well have provided a source of inspiration for Meillassoux's book. That the 'correlativism' excoriated by Lenin in 1908 remains in full force a hundred years later is both a testament to the continuing relevance

of Lenin's intervention and a depressing reminder of mainstream academic philosophy's seemingly imperturbable idealism. Whether or not *Après la finitude* was partly inspired by *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Meillassoux's profoundly original speculative alternative to correlationism quells any suggestion of imitation.

14. In Meillassoux's eyes, the fact that the third thesis is not derived directly from the principle of factuality but relies on independent considerations renders it considerably more precarious than the first two. Meillassoux makes it clear that he views this as a shortcoming which he hopes to remedy in future work. Cf. Meillassoux, *Après la finitude*, 152–3.
15. 'Freedom is not simply the opposite of deterministic causal necessity: as Kant knew, it means a specific mode of causality; the agent's self-determination. There is in fact a kind of Kantian antinomy of freedom: if an act is fully determined by preceding causes, it is, of course, not free; if, however, it depends on the pure contingency which momentarily severs the full causal chain, it is also not free. The only way to resolve this antinomy is to introduce a second-order reflexive causality: I am determined by causes (be it direct brute natural causes or motivations), and the space of freedom is not a magic gap in this first-level causal chain but my ability retroactively to choose/determine which causes will determine me' (Žižek 2006: 203). In Žižek's Hegelianism, the subject achieves its autonomy by retroactively positing/reintegrating its own contingent material determinants: freedom is the subjective necessity of objective contingency. But by dissolving the idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect, Meillassoux's absolutization of contingency not only destroys materialist 'determinism' understood as the exceptionless continuity of the causal nexus, but also the idealist conception of subjective 'freedom' understood in terms of the second-order reflexive causality described by Žižek. The subject cannot 'choose' or determine its own objective determination when the contingency of all determination implies the equal arbitrariness of every choice, effectively erasing the distinction between forced and un-forced choice. Thus it becomes impossible to distinguish between objective compulsion and subjective reflexion, phenomenal heteronomy and noumenal autonomy. The principle of factuality collapses the distinction between first and second order levels of determination, thereby undermining any attempt to distinguish between objective heteronomy and subjective autonomy.
16. 'Nothingness' is here understood as the simple negation of all determinate existence. We shall see in Chapters 5 and 6 that there is an alternative definition of nothingness in terms of the determinate identity of 'being-nothing' and we will try to show why this is perfectly conceivable.
17. Cf. M. Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, tr. G. Fried & R. Polt, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000; and *The Principle of Reason*, tr. R. Lilly, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996.
18. L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, tr. D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness, London: Routledge, 1974.
19. Cf. D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. C. Mossner, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, Book I, Part III, 117–229.
20. Though Meillassoux states unequivocally that Popper's anti-inductivism continues to assume the principle of the uniformity of nature, this is debatable.

In fact, Popper's position is far more nuanced than Meillassoux makes out. Popper seems to distinguish between the metaphysical interpretation of the principle as a thesis about reality, which is unfalsifiable, and its scientific function as a methodological rule which makes no substantial assumptions about the nature of reality. Thus in *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* Popper writes:

Consistently with my attitude toward other metaphysical questions, I abstain from arguing for or against faith in the existence of regularities [...] This principle [of the uniformity of nature], it seems to me, expresses in a very superficial way an important methodological rule, and one which might be derived, with advantage, precisely from a consideration of the non-verifiability of theories. [...] I think [...] that it would be a mistake to assert that natural regularities do not change (This would be a kind of statement that can neither be argued against nor argued for.) What we should say is, rather, that it is part of our *definition* of natural laws if we postulate that they are to be invariant with respect to space and time; and also if we postulate that they are to have no exceptions. Thus from a methodological point of view, the possibility of falsifying a corroborated law is by no means without significance. It helps us to find out what we demand and expect from natural laws. And the 'principle of the uniformity of nature' can again be regarded as a metaphysical interpretation of a methodological rule – like its near relative the 'law of causality'.

(Popper 2002a: 250–1)

Elsewhere, Popper seems to reject the principle on the grounds that it is identical with the principle of induction. Thus in *Conjectures and Refutations*, he writes:

[T]here is a third way of violating the principle of empiricism. We have seen how it can be violated by constructing a theory of knowledge which cannot do without a principle of induction – a principle that tells us in effect that the world is (or very probably is) a place in which men can learn from experience; and that it will remain (or very probably remain) so in future.

(Popper 2002b: 394)

A world in which learning is possible is a uniform world; where uniformity defaults, learning, and a fortiori science, becomes impossible. Yet far from ruling it out, this is precisely a possibility which Popper claims rationalism must embrace. Thus David Miller strongly denies that Popperian critical rationalism is committed to any metaphysical version of the principle of uniformity: 'Science does not presuppose uniformity, it proposes it, and then attempts to dispose of its proposals' (Miller 2004: §1). Whether this distinction between scientific proposing and metaphysical presupposing is viable is a complex issue which I shall not pursue further here. But cf. Miller, 1994: Ch. 2, §2a and Miller 2006: esp. Ch. 4, §3.

21. Meillassoux borrows this reconstruction of the frequentalist argument from Jean-René Vernes's *Critique de la raison aléatoire, ou Descartes contre Kant*, Paris: Aubier, 1982. However, where Vernes endorses the argument, Meillassoux opposes it.
22. This is the upshot of Heidegger's reinterpretation of Kant in his *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, tr. R. Taft, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990.
23. Cf. Meillassoux 2006: 164. Though Meillassoux does not cite him, Bertrand Russell makes precisely the same point in the opening paragraphs of his *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*:

Ever since Kant [...] there has been what I regard as a mistaken tendency among philosophers to allow the description of the world to be influenced unduly by considerations derived from the nature of human knowledge. To scientific common sense (which I accept) it is plain that only an infinitesimal part of the universe is known, that there were countless ages during which there was no knowledge, and that there probably will be countless ages without knowledge in the future. Cosmically and causally, knowledge is an unimportant feature of the universe; a science which omitted to mention its occurrence might, from an impersonal point of view, suffer only a very trivial imperfection. In describing the world, subjectivity is a vice. Kant spoke of himself as having effected a 'Copernican revolution', but he would have been more accurate if he had spoken of a 'Ptolemaic counter-revolution', since he put Man back at the centre from which Copernicus had dethroned him.

(Russell 1948: 9)

24. I have substituted 'ancestral phenomenon' for 'accretion' in the original passage. Since the accretion of the earth is obviously an example of an ancestral phenomenon, this substitution is intended to clarify the philosophical import of the passage without overly distorting the meaning of the original text.
25. Cf. Hilary Putnam's 'The Meaning of "Meaning"' in *Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers Volume 2*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 236.

4 Unbinding the Void

1. Cf. A. Badiou, *Manifeste pour la philosophie*, Paris: Seuil, 1989; *Manifesto for Philosophy* tr. Norman Madarasz, Albany, NY: SUNY, 1999; 'Philosophy and Mathematics: Infinity and the End of Romanticism' in *Theoretical Writings* ed. R. Brassier and A. Toscano, London and New York: Continuum, 2004, 21–38.
2. A. Badiou, *L'être et l'événement*, Paris: Seuil, 1988; *Being and Event*, tr. Oliver Feltham, London and New York: Continuum, 2006.
3. For an illuminating examination of the relation between Aristotle's and Badiou's characterizations of the task of ontology, cf. Jean-Toussaint Desanti's 'Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology of Alain Badiou' in *Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy*, ed. Peter Hallward, London: Continuum, 2004, 59–66.

4. This is a point made by Peter Hallward in *Badiou: A Subject to Truth*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, 276.
5. Cf. Badiou, *Being and Event*, Meditation 7. This 'greater than' is to be understood in terms of the concept of quantity, which is defined in terms of cardinality. Badiou establishes the concept of cardinality and the immeasurability of the excess of inclusion over belonging with reference to the Cohen–Easton theorem in Meditation 26 of *Being and Event* (Badiou 1988: 293–309, 2006a: 265–280).
6. For Badiou, ontology is necessarily indifferent to spatio-temporal categories: being qua being has nothing to do with space and/or time – this is of a piece with his Platonism.
7. The void only becomes discernible within a situation as a result of the dysfunctioning of the count which gives rise to the 'ultra-one' of the event; cf. *Being and Event*, Meditations 17 and 18.
8. Cf. Badiou, *Being and Event*, Meditation 3.
9. Cf. Wahl's incisive paper 'Presentation, Representation, Appearance' in *Alain Badiou. Penser le multiple* ed. Charles Ramond, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002, 169–87.
10. These metaontological concepts must be distinguished from the metaontological use of the term 'being', which Badiou is careful not to reify into a concept. 'Being' is simply a proper name – that of the empty set, \emptyset – for the unrepresentable.
11. Cf. Badiou, *Manifeste pour la philosophie*, 69.
12. For the distinction between truth and knowledge, cf. *Being and Event*, Meditations 31 to 36, and also 'On Subtraction' and 'Truth: Forcing and the Unnameable' in *Theoretical Writings*, 103–33.
13. Cf. Badiou, *Being and Event*, Meditation 16.
14. Cf. Badiou, *Being and Event*, Meditation 35.
15. For Badiou's account of the impasse of ontology cf. *Being and Event*, Meditation 26. Badiou seems to disavow the appeal to transcendence insofar as he aligns it with the onto-theological orientation which he sees exemplified in the theory of 'large cardinals'. A large cardinal is one whose existence is not deducible from the axioms of set-theory and hence requires the assertion of a supplementary axiom. Such an axiom is stronger than the one which guarantees the existence of a limit-ordinal and the succession of transfinite alephs. The theory of large cardinals fends off the measurelessness of ontological excess by positing the existence of super-alephs that circumscribe it 'from above'. But it is necessary to distinguish between the assertion of the existence of transcendent objects, such as the super-alephs, which do not acknowledge the impasse of ontology, since they do not force a decision as to the value of the power-set of the smallest denumerable infinity, aleph-null; and the assertion of unobjectifiable transcendence, which is precisely the transcendence of decision, i.e. subjective intervention, vis-à-vis the immanent objective parameters of ontological discourse. It is insofar as he endorses the latter option that Badiou can be described as an advocate of radical transcendence.
16. This is the crux of the distinction between natural situations, which are characterized by the maximal equilibrium between presentation and re-presentation and circumscribed by aleph-null, smallest denumerable infinity; and historical

- situations, for which that transitivity no longer obtains since they harbour singularities (evental sites) which are potential loci for the singularization of excess. Cf. *Being and Event*, Meditations 11–16.
17. A. Badiou, *Le Concept de modèle. Introduction a une épistémologie matérialiste des mathématiques*, Paris: Maspero, 1969. I have discussed the latter in 'Badiou's Materialist Epistemology of Mathematics' in *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, Vol. 10, No. 2, August 2005, 135–49.
 18. This is François Wahl's recommendation. He argues that Badiou fails to establish a necessary link between the inconsistency of being and the consistency of presentation and concludes that subtractive ontology remains insufficient. Thus, he suggests 'the ontology of presentation and of beings, the ontology of the multiple determinations of being, still remains to be done' (Wahl 2002: 187).
 19. A. Badiou, *Logiques des mondes. L'être et l'événement*, 2, Paris: Seuil, 2006.

5 Being Nothing

1. For a detailed bibliography see Laruelle 2003 in *Angelaki*, Vol. 8, No. 2: *The One or the Other: French Philosophy Today*, August 2003, 188–9.
2. 'The Transcendental Method' is an article which Laruelle contributed to the *Universal Philosophical Encyclopedia* Vol. 1, ed. André Jacob, Paris: PUF, 1989b, 71–80.
3. In *Angelaki*, Vol. 8, No. 2: *The One or the Other: French Philosophy Today*, 2003, 173–88.
4. Cf. for instance Laruelle 1989a.
5. Cf. particularly *Philosophy and Non-philosophy*. I have tried to provide a fuller (and uncritical) account of the scope and remit of non-philosophy as Laruelle sees it in 'Axiomatic Heresy: The Non-Philosophy of François Laruelle', *Radical Philosophy* 121, September/October 2003, 24–35.
6. See for instance Laruelle 1986, Ch. VII, 213–40. As an assiduous student of Heidegger and Derrida, Laruelle is careful to avoid casual uses of the term 'essence' (unless it is to speak of an 'essence-without-essence'), preferring to talk of the 'identity' of philosophy instead. But what he calls 'identity' or 'radical immanence' amounts to a non-metaphysical conceptualization of essence which, for present purposes, retains most of the characteristic functional features associated with the concept of 'essence' in its philosophical acceptation. Thus when Laruelle speaks of the 'identity' of philosophy, he has in mind something which is a formal invariant, a necessary but non-sufficient condition, and multiply instantiable.
7. Graham Harman has argued that the *Vorhandenheit/Zuzandenheit* distinction not only provides the key to understanding the ontic-ontological difference in *Being and Time*, but ultimately underlies all of Heidegger's thinking, particularly his critique of metaphysics. Cf. *Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects*, Chicago: Open Court, 2002.
8. Cf. Laruelle 1986 and 1989, 104–9.
9. Though this reading is supplemented and informed by parallel readings of Plato, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Deleuze, and Michel Henry, Laruelle's identification of philosophy as 'decision' is nevertheless primarily indebted

- to Heidegger and Derrida, in whom one can already discern the former's pre-occupation with uncovering the conditions of reality for conditions of possibility, and in whose work the notions of 'decision' (*Entscheidung*) and of the 'undecidable' first become privileged as clues to the essence of philosophy.
10. Cf. Kant 1929: B33–B116, 65–119.
 11. Cf. Kant 1929: A95–A130 and B129–B169, 129–75.
 12. Kant 1929: A84–A130, B116–B169, 120–75. Laruelle's account, indebted to his reading of neo-Kantianism, and particularly to Hermann Cohen's *Kant's Theory of Experience* (2nd edn, 1885), which puts the onus of the first *Critique* squarely on the principles of the pure understanding, provides an interesting contrast to certain influential interpretations of Kant which locate the essence of transcendental synthesis in the schematism of the imagination, most famously Heidegger (in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990a), whose interpretation of Kant was developed in explicit opposition to that of Cohen and the Marburg School.
 13. In *The Philosophies of Difference* Laruelle explicitly identifies the Heideggerian shift from being as ontic-ontological *Differenz* to the 'event of appropriation' (*Ereignis*) as *Unterschied* with the decisional transition from metaphysical to transcendental difference (see Laruelle 1986: 48–120). On the Heideggerian notion of 'the turning' (*die Kehre*) see, for example, M. Heidegger, 'The Turning' in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, tr. W. Lovitt, New York: Harper and Row, 1977a, 36–49; and §255 in Heidegger's *Contributions to Philosophy*, tr. P. Emad and K. Maly, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999, 286–8.
 14. See, for example, Miklos Vetö, *De Kant à Schelling. Les deux voix de l'Idéalisme allemand. Tome I*, Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1998, 61–85 and passim; F. W. J. Schelling, *On the History of Modern Philosophy*, tr. A. Bowie, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 95–163; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, op. cit., 209.
 15. See in particular M. Henry, *L'essence de la manifestation*, Paris: PUF, 1963; *The Essence of Manifestation*, tr. G. Etzkorn, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973.
 16. See Heidegger 1999, especially 60–71 for an explicit account of thinking as 'decision' and of the link between being's 'essential unfolding' as *Ereignis* and the 'leap' or 'crossing over' enacted by 'inceptual' (i.e. non-metaphysical) thinking from what Heidegger calls philosophy's 'first' to its 'other' beginning.
 17. Cf. in particular Chapters III and IV of *The Philosophies of Difference*.
 18. F. Laruelle, *La Lutte et l'utopie à la fin des temps philosophiques* [*Struggle and Utopia in the Endtimes of Philosophy*], Paris: Kimé, 2004.
 19. Thus in his book on ethics (*Éthique de l'étranger* [*Ethics of the Stranger*], Paris: Kimé, 2000b) Laruelle does not actually provide anything like a substantive conceptual analysis of ethical tropes in contemporary philosophy; he simply uses potted versions of Plato, Kant, and Levinas to sketch what a non-philosophical theory of 'the ethical' would look like. Similarly, in his *Introduction to Non-Marxism* he does not actually engage in an analysis of Marxist theory and practice; he simply uses two idiosyncratic philosophical readings of Marx, those of Althusser and Henry, as the basis for outlining what a non-philosophical theory of Marxism would look like.
 20. For an account of 'negative dialectics' cf. Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*, tr. E. B. Ashton, London: Routledge, 1973.

21. Laruelle defends this privileging of the 'name-of-man' over other nominations of the real in *Struggle and Utopia*, 54–9.
22. This indifference is largely feigned, as evinced by Laruelle's occasional displays of indulgence towards Heidegger and Derrida, and his notable impatience with Nietzsche and Deleuze. It becomes difficult to credit Laruelle's pretension to complete impartiality vis-à-vis philosophical disputation when one compares, for example, his devastatingly thorough but relatively sympathetic critiques of Heidegger and Derrida in *The Philosophies of Difference* with his rather severe and unforgiving attitude towards Deleuze. Cf. 'Reply to Deleuze' in *La non-philosophie des contemporains [The Non-Philosophy of Contemporaries]*, *Non-Philosophie. Le Collectif*, Paris: Kimé, 1995, 49–78. This collective volume also contains Laruelle's appraisal of Badiou: 'Badiou and Non-Philosophy: A Comparison', 37–46 (written under the pseudonym 'Tristan Aguilar').

6 The Pure and Empty Form of Death

1. Martin Heidegger, *The Concept of Time* tr. William McNeill, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
2. Gadamer, quoted by Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, London: University of California Press, 1993, 315.
3. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell, 1962.
4. Kisiel 1993: 23–5.
5. 'Augenblick' is of course Nietzsche's term to describe the moment wherein eternal recurrence is confronted. We shall discuss Deleuze's account of the relation between eternal recurrence and ontological transcendence below.
6. Heidegger will contrast *Dasein's* radically individuated, unobjectifiable 'self' to the impersonal anonymity of the metaphysical or transcendental subject.
7. M. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, tr. A. Hofstadter Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982.
8. Cf. Françoise Dastur, 'The Ekstático-Horizional Constitution of Temporality' in C. Macann, ed. *Critical Heidegger*, London: Routledge, 1996, 158–71.
9. No doubt this difficulty had something to do with Heidegger's abandonment of the project of fundamental ontology. But why does the latter unravel precisely at that point where the existential analytic, outlining *Dasein's* ekstastic structure of transcendence, was to be surpassed towards an account of the temporality proper to being as such? Heidegger's retrieval of the ontological problematic in *Being and Time* was to be effected via a critical radicalization of transcendental philosophy. The fundamental question is not just of being but of our access to being: how do we originally access the being of phenomena? *Dasein* is in the world but also not just something in the world. Herein lies the rub: where Kantian transcendentalism cultivated suspicion of unmediated access to phenomena, transcendental phenomenology countered with the revelation that the mediation is immediate, i.e. unmediated. That which is accessed is mediated, but the access as such is not, whether it be intentionality or finite transcendence. Finite transcendence is the condition of possibility for all access to the being of phenomena – indeed, according to Heidegger, it is the condition of possibility for those merely metaphysical

conditions of possibility identified by the ontotheological tradition – but this condition of conditions is necessarily unconditioned: it is ‘the ekstastikon in and for itself’. Recognizing the taint of idealist subjectivism in this latter, Heidegger went on to seek an even more originary access to the primordial ‘happening’, and ever more radical means of unearthing the conditions for conditions: *Ereignis*, the fourfold, etc. The phenomenological radicalization of transcendentalism initiated by Heidegger finds itself excavating deeper and deeper into the primordial: uncovering the conditions for the conditions of the conditions, etc. Yet the deeper it digs towards the pre-originary, the greater its remove from ‘things themselves’ and the more impoverished its resources become. Heidegger and his successors – up to and including Laruelle – end up burrowing ever deeper into reflexivity in order to unearth the pre-reflexive, exacerbating abstraction until it becomes reduced to plying its own exorbitant vacuity. Derrida introduces both a healthy measure of scepticism and a fatal dose of irony into this meta-transcendental problematic by revealing how the immediacy of access was ‘always already’ contaminated by *différance* as inclusive disjunction of mediation and immediacy. But he is trumped by Laruelle, who unveils the unobjectifiable immediacy of ‘man’ as that which is always already presupposed by and hence the ultimate determinant for *différance*’s inclusive disjunction of mediation and immediacy (cf. Chapter 5). Once the problematic of access, and of the access to access, has reached its absurd denouement in the claim that this ‘man without qualities’ is the primal phenomenon determining the conditions of the conditions of access, it is no surprise to see the very notion of a world indifferent to our access to it recede into unintelligibility. But if the idea of a world independent of our access to it becomes unintelligible, then perhaps the fault lies with the correlational criteria of intelligibility stipulated by the philosophy of access, rather than with the world. One cannot but be struck by the comic spectacle of the later Heidegger trying to uncover the roots of the primal phenomenon, the *Ur-etwas*, in old Greek words. The phenomenology that sought to begin again with ‘the things themselves’ is redirected by Heidegger and ends up poring over words, nothing but words Perhaps this is the inevitable fate of the philosophy of access.

10. This disjunction will provide Heidegger’s heirs, such as Levinas, Blanchot, and Derrida, with the ever-popular theme of ‘the impossibility of death’.
11. Cf. M. Heidegger, *The Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, tr. W. McNeill, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995. Heidegger’s attempt to wriggle out of this dichotomy by claiming that the distinction at issue is not between having or not having a world but rather between entities that are ‘rich in world’ (i.e. human beings) and those that are ‘poor in world’ (such as animals) is a desperate sophism since he makes it perfectly clear that there can be no common measure for degrees of ‘richness’ or ‘poverty’ in world and hence no possible transition from one to the other. The fact that such transitions frequently occur within the realm of *Dasein* – e.g. in cases of brain-damage or dementia – only underlines the explanatory poverty of Heidegger’s distinction.
12. It is important to register the way in which Heidegger’s ontologization of *Dasein*’s ‘historicality’ licenses a total disregard for the merely ‘ontic’ details of *Dasein*’s empirical and/or natural history – and it is precisely this disregard which will provide the precondition for Heidegger’s ‘history of being’.

13. G. Deleuze, *Différence et répétition*, Paris: PUF, 1968; *Difference and Repetition*, tr. Paul Patton, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
14. Already in 1956's 'Bergson's Conception of Difference', Deleuze is arguing that to conceive of being as pure self-differentiation is to conceive of it in Bergsonian terms as duration: 'Duration, tendency, is self-differentiating; and what differs from itself is *immediately* the unity of substance and subject'. G. Deleuze, 'La conception de la différence chez Bergson' in *L'île déserte et autres textes*, Paris: Minuit, 2002a, 52. As we shall see, though *Difference and Repetition* will qualify and complicate this claim about the 'immediate' unity of substance and subject, or being and thought, in its account of the third synthesis, the re-inscription of Hegel persists.
15. Deleuze attributes the distinction between death as personal possibility and dying as impersonal impossibility of possibility (the death of the Other in me) to Blanchot, citing three works: *The Space of Literature* (originally published 1955; tr. A. Smock, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1982); *The Book to Come* (originally published 1959, tr. C. Mandell, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); and 'The Laughter of the Gods' (originally published 1965; included in *Friendship*, tr. E. Rottenberg, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). But though Deleuze may not have been aware of it, Blanchot derives this distinction more or less directly from Levinas, whose influence thoroughly pervades Blanchot's *oeuvre*. Indeed, it would be difficult to overestimate the influence of Levinas's key tropes upon Blanchot's thinking – the impersonal anonymity of the '*il y a*', radical passivity, the Other, etc. Thus Blanchot's version of the distinction between death and dying comes from Levinas's critique of Heidegger in *Time and the Other*, originally published in 1948 (tr. R. Cohen, Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press, 1987). However, Levinas's inversion of the relation between possibility and impossibility in *Being and Time* remains entirely dependent upon the conceptual machinery of Heidegger's text, and it is arguable that far from subverting the latter, this reversibility between possibility and impossibility is one of its enabling conditions.
16. H. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, tr. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, New York: Zone Books, 1991.
17. Curiously, this is rendered as 'Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference' in Paul Patton's English translation.
18. Timothy Murphy has pointed out that Deleuze's contrast between *répétition nue* and *répétition vêtue* must be understood in terms of the theatrical metaphors which run throughout *Difference and Repetition*. In French, *répétition vêtue* also means 'dress rehearsal'. Cf. Timothy Murphy, 'The Theatre of (the Philosophy of) Cruelty in *Difference and Repetition*' in *Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 5. *Deleuze and the Transcendental Unconscious*, ed. J. Broadhurst-Dixon, Coventry: University of Warwick, 1992, 105–35.
19. Though Badiou tends to privilege *Difference and Repetition* (alongside Deleuze's two *Cinema* volumes) to the detriment of both volumes of 'Capitalism and Schizophrenia' in his critique of Deleuze, he seems to disregard the role of the third synthesis as locus of thought's conversion from contemplation to production, which at the very least problematizes his depiction of Deleuze's philosophy as essentially contemplative. Cf. A. Badiou, *Deleuze: The Clamour of Being*, tr. L. Burchill, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.
20. Deleuze's account is heavily indebted to Gilbert Simondon's *L'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique*, Paris: PUF, 1964.

21. Cf. G. Deleuze, 'La méthode de dramatisation' in *L'île déserte et autres textes*, Paris: Minuit, 2002b, 131–62.
22. I owe this crucial insight to Alberto Toscano's indispensable study, *The Theatre of Production: Philosophy and Individuation between Kant and Deleuze*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Cf. especially Chapter 6 and the Conclusion, 157–201.
23. For accounts of the role of 'expression' in Deleuze's thought which differ from the one presented here, see Len Lawlor, 'The End of Phenomenology: Expressionism in Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty' in *Continental Philosophy Review*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1998, 15–34; and Simon Duffy, 'The Logic of Expression in Deleuze's *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza: A Strategy of Engagement*' in *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2004, 47–60.
24. 'We call this dark precursor, this difference in itself or second-degree difference, which relates disparate or heterogeneous series to one another, "the disparate"' (Deleuze 1968: 157, 1994: 120 tm). 'We call "disparity" this infinitely redoubled, infinitely resonating state of difference. Disparity, i.e. difference or intensity (difference of intensity), is the sufficient reason of the phenomenon, the condition of that which appears. [...] The reason of the sensible, the condition of that which appears, is not space and time, but the Unequal in itself, or *disparateness* such as is comprised and determined in difference of intensity, in intensity as difference' (Deleuze 1968: 287, 1994: 222–3 tm).
25. 'A distribution conforms to good sense when it tends by itself to banish difference in the distributed' (Deleuze 1968: 289, 1994: 224 tm).
26. It is this supplementary dimension constituted by reflection and inherent in representation which Deleuze will denounce ever more emphatically in all his subsequent work. Thus his increasing insistence upon the 'immanence' which is the proper element of philosophical thought, and upon the necessity of simultaneously constructing and expressing it, follows directly from this critical circumscription of the secondary and derivative nature of reflexive consciousness in *Difference and Repetition*.
27. 'Sense is like the Idea which is developed through sub-representative determinations' (Deleuze 1968: 201, 1994: 155 tm).
28. Cf. Keith Ansell-Pearson, 'Dead or Alive' in *Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition*, London: Routledge, 1997, 57–83.
29. 'Every phenomenon flashes forth in a signal-sign system. We call 'signal' the system such as it is constituted by or bounded by at least two heterogeneous series; two disparate orders capable of entering into communication; the phenomenon is a sign, i.e. that which flashes forth in the system when these dispartes enter into communication' (Deleuze 1968: 286–7, 1994: 222 tm). Cf. Daniel W. Smith, 'Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality' in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, ed. P. Patton, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, 34.
30. Cf. D. Deleuze and C. Parnet, *Dialogues*, Paris: Flammarion, 1977, 68–72.
31. '[P]roblematic Ideas are at once the ultimate elements of nature and the subliminal object of small perceptions. Learning always proceeds through the unconscious; it always takes place in the unconscious, thereby establishing the bond of a profound complicity between nature and mind' (Deleuze 1968: 214, 1994: 165 tm).
32. 'Unlike the physico-chemical sphere, where the "code" that underlies forms or qualities is distributed throughout the three-dimensionality of a structure,

in the organic sphere this code becomes detached as a separate one-dimensional structure: the linear sequence of nucleic acids constituting the genetic code.' Manuel De Landa, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*, London: Continuum, 2002, 163–4. While this is in many ways a very useful gloss, the claim that individuating factors constitute a 'code' is problematic on two counts. First, it seems to ignore Deleuze's distinction between individuating and individual differences, which is the distinction between enveloping intensity as clear expression of a distinct difference in the Idea and enveloped intensity as confused expression of the Idea's obscure perplexation: 'Two individuating intensities may be abstractly the same by virtue of what they clearly express; they are never the same on account of the order of intensities which they envelop or the relations which they obscurely express' (Deleuze 1968: 326, 1994: 253 tm). This irreducible variability in the correlation between individuating differences and pre-individual singularities would seem to indicate an order of complexity which is difficult to codify in an information-theoretic register. Second, it is not clear how individuating factors could become detached as a 'separate one-dimensional structure' without themselves becoming individuated. Intensive individuation was supposed to provide part of the 'sufficient reason' for actualization (Deleuze 1968: 285, 1994: 221), not its cause in extensity, and if the individuating factors invoked in order to account for actualization are themselves already individuated then the virtual-actual distinction collapses and an infinite regress looms.

33. "Possible" here is not to be understood as implying resemblance, but rather as the state of the implicated or the enveloped in its heterogeneity with that which envelops it' (Deleuze 1968: 334, 1994: 260 tm).
34. The proximity to Levinas and Blanchot regarding the theme of 'the death of the Other' has already been noted. Where Deleuze's account differs conspicuously from both, however is in the notable paucity of references to 'radical passivity', a recurring trope whenever Blanchot or Levinas discuss the relation between death and alterity. For Deleuze, by way of contrast, dying seems rather to be a function of *the act* of thinking.
35. 'The indivisibility of the individual pertains exclusively to the property whereby intensive quantities cannot divide without changing in nature' (Deleuze 1968: 327, 1994: 254 tm). The latter is precisely Bergson's definition of duration as qualitative multiplicity, which he contrasts to the quantitative multiplicities proper to space.
36. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, London and New York: The Free Press, 1978; David Chalmers, 'Is Experience Ubiquitous?' in Chapter 8 of Chalmers's *The Conscious Mind*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
37. Thus De Landa (2002), for instance, proposes a reading of Deleuze wherein virtuality becomes the preserve of theoretical entities such as phase spaces and dynamic attractors. But as Alberto Toscano has pointed out, he does so at the cost of eliding Deleuze's fundamental distinction between virtuality and possibility. Cf. Toscano (2006), 184–7.
38. 'Sense is the genesis or production of the true, and truth is merely the empirical result of sense. [...] Nevertheless, the Idea which traverses all the faculties is not reducible to sense. For it is just as much non-sense; and there is no difficulty reconciling this double-aspect through which the Idea is constituted

by structural elements which have no sense in themselves, while constituting the sense of everything it produces (structure and genesis)' (Deleuze 1968: 200, 1994: 154 tm).

7 The Truth of Extinction

1. F. Nietzsche, 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense' in *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870s*, ed. and tr. D. Breazeale, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979a, 79.
2. F. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, tr. W. Kaufman, New York: Vintage, 1974, §109.
3. F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, ed. W. Kaufman, New York: Vintage, 1968, §12.
4. *Grossoktavausgabe*, Leipzig, 1905, XII, 64; cited in Heidegger, *Nietzsche. Vol. II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, ed. D. F. Krell, New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990, 23.
5. Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §1057.
6. Cf. Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §5.
7. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §15; cf. Heidegger, *Nietzsche. Vol. II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, 121–32.
8. 'We have abolished the real world: what world is left? The apparent one perhaps? ... But no! *With the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!* (Mid-day; moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; zenith of mankind; INCIPIIT ZARATHUSTRA.' *Twilight of the Idols*, tr. R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990, 'How the "Real World" at Last Became a Myth', 51.
9. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Preface, 3.
10. As is well known, there are only three explicit mentions of 'eternal recurrence' in Nietzsche's published works: *The Gay Science*, IV, §341, 'The Heaviest Burden'; *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, III, 'Of the Vision and the Riddle' and 'The Convalescent'; and *Beyond Good and Evil*, III, §56. However, some inkling of its importance for Nietzsche is given by the frequency with which it is invoked in his unpublished notebooks. Thus *The Will to Power* contains not only numerous references but also several explicit discussions of the idea: specifically, in sections 617, 708, 1057, 1058, 1059, 1060, 1062, and 1066. Despite their sometimes controversial interpretations, it is to the credit of the 'strong' readings of Nietzsche proposed by Heidegger and Deleuze that they position the doctrine of eternal recurrence (along with the concept of will to power) at the very heart of Nietzsche's philosophy.
11. Nietzsche, 1968: §54, cf. also §708 and §1062.
12. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson, London: Athlone, 1983. Deleuze's famous (not to say notorious) interpretation of eternal recurrence in this book insists that it is not identity – the world as yoked beneath the iron collar of representation – that returns, but rather difference – the world as dynamic flux of pre-individual singularities and impersonal individuations. The trouble with this audacious proposal is that it flies in the face of Nietzsche's own understanding of the nature of eternal recurrence. Nietzsche insists that it is precisely the moment as apprehended from the perspective of the individuated self that will be eternally repeated, not the world as experienced by Deleuze's anonymous, intensive individual, who cannot be confined by the form of the I or the matter of the self (cf. Chapter 6). Zarathustra could not

be more explicit: 'I shall return, with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with this serpent – not to a new life or a better life or a similar life: I shall return eternally to this identical and self-same life, in the greatest things and in the smallest, to teach once more the eternal recurrence of things.' (*Thus Spake Zarathustra*, tr. R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, 237–8.) Elsewhere Nietzsche explicitly evokes the 'infinite recurrence of identical cases' (1968: §1066, emphasis added) – just as he insists that the hypothesis proceeds on the assumption that the world comprises 'a certain *definite quantity* of force and a certain *definite number* of certain *centers* of force' (ibid., emphasis added) – in other words, individuated loci of will to power, and not the process of intensive individuation privileged by Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*. Here we may detect a tension between Deleuze's anti-mechanistic conception of will to power in terms of quanta of force which are inherently unequalizable and hence beyond the reach of scientific quantification (cf. Deleuze 1983: 42–6), and Nietzsche's own blunt avowal that he wishes to reconcile mechanism and Platonism (cf. 1968: §1061) – precisely the arch-representatives of identitarian thinking to which Deleuze's Nietzsche is supposed to be opposed. Moreover, for Nietzsche, it is the *finitude* of force in conjunction with the *infinity* of time that necessitates the hypothesis of eternal recurrence (cf. 1968: §1066). Thus, in §1062 of *Will to Power*, Nietzsche warns against the temptation to conclude from the disqualification of teleology that becoming harbours a 'miraculous power of infinite novelty in its form and states'. In what effectively amounts to a pre-emptive critique of Deleuze's subsequent attempt to align the notion of will to power with Spinoza's *natura naturans* and Bergson's *élan vital*, Nietzsche writes: '[This] is still the old religious way of thinking and desiring, a kind of longing to believe that *in some way* the world is like the old beloved, infinite, boundlessly creative God – that in some way, "the old God still lives" – that longing of Spinoza which was expressed in the words "*deus sive natura*" (he even felt "*natura sive deus*")' (1968: §1062). Keith Ansell-Pearson provides a critically nuanced appraisal of Deleuze's Nietzsche, specifically with regard to the topic of eternal recurrence, in his *Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition*, London: Routledge, 1997, esp. 42–7. However, elsewhere in the same book, Ansell-Pearson seems to endorse the Deleuzean interpretation of recurrence: 'The repetition implicated in the eternal return is not the repeating of an original model since there is no original moment which can be subjected to a law of repetition. Eternal return already takes place within the element of difference and simulacra' (Ansell-Pearson 1997: 62). It is precisely this Deleuzean characterization of eternal recurrence – as the repetition of difference rather than identity – which we believe to be incompatible with Nietzsche's own understanding of the doctrine.

13. This is undoubtedly why it is a demon who first broaches the idea under the heading 'The Heaviest Burden' in *The Gay Science*, IV, §341.
14. '[M]y world has just become perfect, midnight is also midday, pain is also a joy, a curse is also a blessing, the night is also a sun' *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, IV, 'The Intoxicated Song' (1969: 331).
15. Nietzsche 1968: §664–7.
16. Nietzsche 1968: §1011.
17. Nietzsche 1968: §1067.

18. Cf. Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 171–5.
19. '[T]he world of "phenomena" is the adapted world which we feel to be real. The "reality" lies in the continual recurrence of identical, familiar, related things in their logicized character, in the belief that here we are able to reckon and calculate. [...] The antithesis of this phenomenal world is not "the true world", but the formless, unformulable world of the chaos of sensations – another kind of phenomenal world, a kind "unknowable" for us; [...] [Q]uestions, what things in themselves may be like, apart from our sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be rebutted with the question: how could we know that things exist? "Thingness" was first created by us' (Nietzsche 1968: §569). Such remarks provoke an obvious rejoinder: if, as Nietzsche so often insists, it makes no sense to talk about what the world is like independently of our relation to it, and ergo in abstraction from those things with which our senses and understanding reckon and calculate, then why even suppose there to be a 'formless, unformulable' and hence unknowable world beyond the world of identical, familiar, related, logicized things? Why suppose that a 'chaos' of sensations prior to their logicization as things exists? Moreover, the premise that this 'chaos' must be assumed to be the cause of our orderly, logicized sensations is insupportable given Nietzsche's critiques of causality and his restriction of the notion of cause to the realm of logicized sensation.
20. Nietzsche himself seems to have been perfectly aware of this: 'What actually arouses indignation over suffering is not the suffering itself but the *senselessness* of suffering: but neither for the Christian, who saw in suffering a whole hidden machinery of salvation, nor for naïve man in ancient times, who saw all suffering in relation to spectators or to instigators of suffering, was there any such *senseless* suffering. [...] "All evil is justified if a God takes pleasure in it": so ran the primitive logic of feeling – and was this logic really restricted to primitive times? The gods viewed as the friends of *cruel* spectacles – how deeply this primeval concept still penetrates into our European civilization!' (Nietzsche 1994: 48).
21. Cf. Nietzsche 1969: 45–7.
22. Cf. Deleuze 1983: 68.
23. On the will to power as 'will to will' cf. Heidegger (1990c) *Nietzsche. Vol. III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics*, ed. D. F. Krell, HarperSanFrancisco, 1990, 196.
24. Cf. Nietzsche 1968, §617, 330–1.
25. Cf. *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, IV, 'The Ass-Festival', 321–6.
26. Cf. Deleuze 1983: 186.
27. For a trenchant critique of this Nietzschean–Deleuzean motif, cf. Peter Hallward's *Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation*, London: Verso, 2006.
28. 'Judgements, value judgements concerning life, for or against, can in the last resort never be true: they possess value only as symptoms, they come into consideration only as symptoms – in themselves such judgements are stupidities. One must reach out and try to reach this astonishing finesse, that the value of life cannot be estimated. Not by a living man, because he is a party to the dispute, indeed its object, and not the judge of it; not by a dead one, for another reason. For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of

- life thus even constitutes an objection to him, a question mark as to his wisdom, a piece of un-wisdom.' 'The Problem of Socrates' in *Twilight of the Idols*, tr. R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990, 40.
29. Cf. Deleuze 1983: 171–94.
 30. F. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, tr. R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin 1979b XV, §8.
 31. 'To redeem the past and transform every "it was" into an "I wanted it thus" – that alone do I call redemption!' (Nietzsche 1969: 161).
 32. Cf. Hegel 1989: 390–408.
 33. Realism of any sort never seems to have been a serious option for Nietzsche, even after his break with Schopenhauer. As he himself puts it in a remark from 1872: 'Time in itself is nonsense: time exists only for a sensate creature. The same is true for space. Every structure appertains to the subject' (Nietzsche 1995: 46). In many regards, Nietzsche's perspectivism is simply an exacerbation of his mentor's transcendental idealism: just as the will to life subtends the relation between knowing subject and known object for Schopenhauer, the will to power is at once the agent and patient of evaluation for Nietzsche.
 34. J-F. Lyotard, *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*, tr. G. Bennington and R. Bowlby, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991.
 35. Cf. Edmund Husserl, 'The Original Ark: The Earth Does Not Move' in *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, ed. L. Lawlor with B. Bergo, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2002; Martin Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art' in *Basic Writings*, ed. D. F. Krell, HarperSanFrancisco, 1977b; Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, tr. B. Massumi, London: Athlone, 1988.
 36. S. Freud, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' in *The Penguin Freud Library Vol. 11: On Metapsychology*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1991: 310.
 37. Stephen Jay Gould, *Life's Grandeur: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1996, 173.
 38. Cf. S. Odenwald, *Patterns in the Void: Why Nothing is Important*, S. F. Odenwald, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2002, 163; and L. Krauss and G. Starkman, 'Life, The Universe, and Nothing: Life and Death in an Ever Expanding Universe' in *The Astrophysical Journal* Vol. 531, No. 1 (2000), 22–30.
 39. E. Levinas, *De Dieu qui vient a l'idée*, Paris: Vrin, 1992.
 40. Cf. E. Levinas, *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence*, Folio/Livre de Poche, 1990; *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, tr. A. Lingis, Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1998.
 41. Cf. E. Levinas, *De l'existence à l'existant*, Paris: Vrin, 1993.
 42. Cf. S. Freud, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' in *The Penguin Freud Library. Vol. 11: On Metapsychology*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1991, 296, and "The "Mystic Writing-Pad"", op. cit., 430.

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