

Appendix 1: The Brussels Treaty

Treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence

Signed at Brussels on 17 March 1948

between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Belgium, the President of the French Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, and Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands

Article I

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the High Contracting Parties will so organize and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the co-ordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.

The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Consultative Council referred to in Article VII as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organizations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organizations.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in specialized agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries.

The High Contracting Parties will consult with the object of achieving the earliest possible application of recommendations of immediate practical interest, relating to social matters, adopted with their approval in the specialized agencies.

They will endeavour to conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security.

Article III

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.

Article IV

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

Article V

All measures taken as a result of the preceding Article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The present Treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article VI

The High Contracting Parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other of the High Contracting Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

None of the High Contracting Parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the High Contracting Parties.

Article VII

For the purpose of consulting together on all the questions dealt with in the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will create a Consultative Council, which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit.

At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit the High Contracting Parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise; with regard to the attitude to be adopted and the steps to be taken in case of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy; or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability.

Article VIII

In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the High Contracting Parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provisions.

The High Contracting Parties will, while the present Treaty remains in force, settle all disputes falling within the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice by referring them to the Court,

subject only, in the case of each of them, to any reservation already made by that party when accepting this clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the extent that that Party may maintain the reservation.

In addition, the High Contracting Parties will submit to conciliation all disputes outside the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

In the case of a mixed dispute involving both questions for which conciliation is appropriate and other questions for which judicial settlement is appropriate, any Party to the dispute shall have the right to insist that the judicial settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation.

The preceding provisions of this Article in no way affect the application of relevant provisions or agreements prescribing some other method of pacific settlement.

Article IX

The High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to the present Treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited.

Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing an instrument of accession with the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government will inform each of the High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of accession.

Article X

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.

It shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years.

After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government.

Appendix 2: The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington, DC – 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the

right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security

of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

Appendix 3: Modified Brussels Treaty

Treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence signed at Brussels on 17 March 1948, as amended by the 'protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty'

Signed at Paris on 23 October 1954

[The High Contracting Parties]

Resolved:

To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations;

To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage;

To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united;

To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;

To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;

To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe;

To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty of collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the High Contracting Parties will so organise and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the co-ordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.

The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Council referred to in Article VIII, as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organisations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented, but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organisations.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in specialised agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries.

The High Contracting Parties will consult with the object of achieving the earliest possible application of recommendations of immediate practical interest, relating to social matters, adopted with their approval in the specialised agencies.

They will endeavour to conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security.

Article III

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilisation and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.

Article IV

In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

Article V

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

Article VI

All measures taken as a result of the preceding Article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The present Treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article VII

The High Contracting Parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other of

the High Contracting Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

None of the High Contracting Parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the High Contracting Parties.

Article VIII

1. For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between Them and with other European organisations, the High Contracting Parties to the Brussels Treaty shall create a Council to consider matters concerning the execution of this Treaty and of its Protocols and their Annexes.
2. This Council shall be known as the 'Council of Western European Union'; it shall be so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously; it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately an Agency for the Control of Armaments whose functions are defined in Protocol No. IV.
3. At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.
4. The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed. In the cases provided for in Protocols II, III and IV it will follow the various voting procedures, unanimity, two-thirds majority, simple majority, laid down therein. It will decide by simple majority questions submitted to it by the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

Article IX

The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Article X

In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the High Contracting Parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provisions;

The High Contracting Parties will, while the present Treaty remains in force, settle all disputes falling within the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, by referring them to the Court, subject only, in the case of each of them, to any reservation already made by that Party when accepting this clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the extent that that Party may maintain the reservation.

In addition, the High Contracting Parties will submit to conciliation all disputes outside the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

In the case of a mixed dispute involving both questions for which conciliation is appropriate and other questions for which judicial settlement is appropriate, any Party to the dispute shall have the right to insist that the judicial settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation.

The preceding provisions of this Article in no way affect the application of relevant provisions or agreements prescribing some other method of pacific settlement.

Article XI

The High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to the present Treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited.

Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing an instrument of accession with the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government will inform each of the High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of accession.

Article XII

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.

It shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years.

After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government shall inform the Governments of the other High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each notice of denunciation.

Appendix 4: Single European Act (extract)

18 February 1986, Done at The Hague; 1 July 1987, entered into force

TITLE III: Provisions on european cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy

Article 30

European Cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy shall be governed by the following provisions:

1. The High Contracting Parties, being members of the European Communities, shall endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy.
2. (a) The High Contracting Parties undertake to inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest so as to ensure that their combined influence is exercised as effectively as possible through coordination, the convergence of their positions and the implementation of joint action.

(b) Consultations shall take place before the High Contracting Parties decide on their final position.

(c) In adopting its positions and in its national measures each High Contracting Party shall take full account of the positions of the other partners and shall give due consideration to the desirability of adopting and implementing common European positions.

In order to increase their capacity for joint action in the foreign policy field, the High Contracting Parties shall ensure that common principles and objectives are gradually developed and defined.

The determination of common positions shall constitute a point of reference for the policies of the High Contracting Parties.

(d) The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to avoid any action or position which impairs their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations or within international organisations.

3. (a) The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and a member of the Commission shall meet at least four times a year within the framework of European Political Cooperation. They may also discuss foreign policy matters within the framework of Political Cooperation on the occasion of meetings of the Council of the European Communities.

(b) The Commission shall be fully associated with the proceedings of Political Cooperation.

(c) In order to ensure the swift adoption of common positions and the implementation of joint action, the High Contracting Parties shall, as far as possible, refrain from impeding the formation of a consensus and the joint action which this could produce.

4. The High Contracting Parties shall ensure that the European Parliament is closely associated with European Political Cooperation. To that end the Presidency shall regularly inform the European Parliament of the foreign policy issues which are being examined within the framework of Political Cooperation and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration.
5. The external policies of the European Community and the policies agreed in European Political Cooperation must be consistent.

The Presidency and the Commission, each within its own sphere of competence, shall have special responsibility for ensuring that such consistency is sought and maintained.
6. (a) The High Contracting Parties consider that closer cooperation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters. They are ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security.

(b) The High Contracting Parties are determined to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security. They shall work to that end both at national level and, where appropriate, within the framework of the competent institutions and bodies.

(c) Nothing in this Title shall impede closer cooperation in the field of security between certain of the High Contracting Parties within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance.
7. (a) In international institutions and at international conferences which they attend, the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to adopt common positions on the subjects covered by this Title.

(b) In international institutions and at international conferences in which not all the High Contracting Parties participate, those who do participate shall take full account of positions agreed in European Political Cooperation.
8. The High Contracting Parties shall organise a political dialogue with third countries and regional groupings whenever they deem it necessary.
9. The High Contracting Parties and the Commission, through mutual assistance and information, shall intensify cooperation between their representations accredited to third countries and to international organisations.
10. (a) The Presidency of European Political Cooperation shall be held by the High Contracting Party which holds the Presidency of the Council of the European Communities.

(b) The Presidency shall be responsible for initiating action and coordinating and representing the positions of the Member States in relations with third countries in respect of European Political Cooperation activities. It shall also be responsible for the management of Political Cooperation and in particular for drawing up the timetable of meetings and for convening and organising meetings.

(c) The Political Directors shall meet regularly in the Political Committee in order to give the necessary impetus, maintain the continuity of European Political Cooperation and prepare Ministers' discussions.

(d) The Political Committee or, if necessary, a ministerial meeting shall convene within forty-eight hours at the request of at least three Member States.

(e) The European Correspondents' Group shall be responsible, under the direction of the Political Committee, for monitoring the implementation of European Political Cooperation and for studying general organizational problems.

(j) Working groups shall meet as directed by the Political Committee.

(g) A Secretariat based in Brussels shall assist the Presidency in preparing and implementing the activities of European Political Cooperation and in administrative matters. It shall carry out its duties under the authority of the Presidency.

11. As regards privileges and immunities, the members of the European Political Cooperation Secretariat shall be treated in the same way as members of the diplomatic missions of the High Contracting Parties based in the same place as the Secretariat.
12. Five years after the entry into force of this Act the High Contracting Parties shall examine whether any revision of Title III is required.

Appendix 5: WEU Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration

Bonn, 19 June 1992

(Part II only)

II. On strengthening WEU's operational role

1. In accordance with the decision contained in the Declaration of the Member States of WEU at Maastricht on 10 December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU Member States have been examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering, in particular, a WEU planning cell and military units answerable to WEU, in order to strengthen WEU's operational role.
2. WEU Member States declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU.
3. Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of Member States in accordance with national constitutions.
4. Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:
 - humanitarian and rescue tasks;
 - peacekeeping tasks;
 - tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
5. The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all Allies.
6. Military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU Member States, including forces with NATO missions – in this case after consultation with NATO – and will be organized on a multinational and multi-service basis.
7. All WEU Member States will soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational formations drawn from the forces of WEU nations already exist or are planned, these units could be made available for use under the authority of WEU, with agreement of all participating nations.
8. WEU Member States intend to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air to accomplish these tasks.
9. A Planning Cell will be established on 1 October 1992, subject to practical considerations, under the authority of the Council. It will be located with the Secretariat-General in a suitable building in Brussels. The Council has

today appointed Maj.Gen. Caltabiano (Italian Air Force) as its first Director. The Planning Cell will be responsible for:

- preparing contingency plans for the employment for forces under WEU auspices;
 - preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected – keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to WEU for specific operations.
10. The Council of Ministers approved the terms of reference for the Planning Cell.

Appendix 6: Treaty on European Union (extract)

(Maastricht, 7 February 1992)

Title V: Provisions on a common foreign and security policy

Article J

A common foreign and security policy is hereby established which shall be governed by the following provisions.

Article J.1

1. The union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of the Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy.
2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be:
 - to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
 - to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
 - to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
 - to promote international cooperation;
 - to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
3. The Union shall pursue these objectives:
 - by establishing systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy, in accordance with Article J.2;
 - by gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint action in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common.
4. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.

Article J.2

1. Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to

ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.

2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform on the common positions.
3. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora. In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.

Article J.3

The procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by foreign and security policy shall be the following:

1. The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint action. Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay down the specific scope, the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its implementation.
2. The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its development, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority. Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority pursuant to the preceding subparagraph, the votes of its members shall be weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and for their adoption, acts of the Council shall require at least fifty-four votes in favour, cast by at least eight members.
3. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand.
4. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.
5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions.
6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a Council decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures.
7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.

Article J.4

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.
2. The union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.
3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3.
4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.
5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.
6. With a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for in Article N(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then.

Article J.5

1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of common measures; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organisations and international conferences.
3. In the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the presidency shall be assisted if needs be by the previous and next Member States to hold the Presidency. The Commission shall be fully associated in these tasks.
4. Without prejudice to Article J.2(3) and Article J.3(4), Member States represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Article J.6

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organisations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented. They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Article J.7

The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union's foreign and security policy. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Councils or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.

Article J.8

1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines adopted by the European Council. It shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. The Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions and in the case referred to in Article J.3(2).
3. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign policy and may submit proposals to the Council.
4. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at the request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period.
5. Without prejudice to Article 151 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a Political Committee consisting of Political Directors shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission.

Article J.9

The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field.

Article J.10

On the occasion of any review of the security provisions under Article J.4, the Conference which is convened to that effect shall also examine whether any other amendments need to be made to provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy.

Article J.11

1. The provisions referred to in Articles 137, 138, 139 to 142, 146, 147, 150 to 153, 157 to 163 and 217 of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title.
2. Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title entail for the institutions shall be charged to the budget of the European Communities. The Council may also:
 - either decide unanimously that operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise is to be charged to the budget of the European Communities; in that event, the budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Community shall be applicable;
 - or determine that such expenditure shall be charged to the Member States, where appropriate in accordance with a scale to be decided.

Appendix 7: Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union

(Incorporating changes made by the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed 2 October 1997)

Title V – Provisions on a common foreign and security policy

Article 11 (ex Article J.1)

1. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.

The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.

Article 12 (ex Article J.2)

The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article 11 by:

- defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy;
- deciding on common strategies;
- adopting joint actions;
- adopting common positions;
- strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.

Article 13 (ex Article J.3)

1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications.
2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.

Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States.

3. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council.

The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions.

The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.

Article 14 (ex Article J.4)

1. The Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint actions shall address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.
2. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand.
3. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.
4. The Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals relating to the common foreign and security policy to ensure the implementation of a joint action.
5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions.
6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a Council decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures.
7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.

Article 15 (ex Article J.5)

The Council shall adopt common positions. Common positions shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.

Article 16 (ex Article J.6)

Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union's influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.

Article 17 (ex Article J.7)

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.

2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
3. The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.

The competence of the European Council to establish guidelines in accordance with Article 13 shall also obtain in respect of the WEU for those matters for which the Union avails itself of the WEU.

When the Union avails itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on the tasks referred to in paragraph 2 all Member States

of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question. The Council, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, shall adopt the necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU.

Decisions having defence implications dealt with under this paragraph shall be taken without prejudice to the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1, third subparagraph.

4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.
5. With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article, the provisions of this Article will be reviewed in accordance with Article 48.

Article 18 (ex Article J.8)

1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of decisions taken under this Title; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organisations and international conferences.
3. The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy.
4. The Commission shall be fully associated in the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. The Presidency shall be assisted in those tasks if need be by the next Member State to hold the Presidency.
5. The Council may, whenever it deems it necessary, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues.

Article 19 (ex Article J.9)

1. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora.

In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.

2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), Member States represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest.

Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Article 20 (ex Article J.10)

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organisations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.

They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 20 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Article 21 (ex Article J.11)

The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union's foreign and security policy.

The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.

Article 22 (ex Article J.12)

1. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to the Council.
2. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at the request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period.

Article 23 (ex Article J.13)

1. Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions.

When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the decision shall not be adopted.

2. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:
 - when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy;
 - when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position.

If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.

The votes of the members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their adoption, decisions shall require at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members.

This paragraph shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.

3. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.

Article 24 (ex Article J.14)

When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international organisations in implementation of this Title, the Council, acting unanimously, may authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council acting unanimously on a recommendation from the Presidency. No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall apply provisionally to them.

The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title VI.

Article 25 (ex Article J.15)

Without prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a Political Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission.

Article 26 (ex Article J.16)

The Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy

decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.

Article 27 (ex Article J.17)

The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field.

Article 28 (ex Article J.18)

1. Articles 189, 190, 196 to 199, 203, 204, 206 to 209, 213 to 219, 255 and 290 of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title.
2. Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title entail for the institutions shall be charged to the budget of the European Communities.
3. Operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise shall also be charged to the budget of the European Communities, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.

In cases where expenditure is not charged to the budget of the European Communities it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article 23(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof.

4. The budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the expenditure charged to the budget of the European Communities.

Appendix 8: Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation Issued by the Heads of State and Government

Madrid, 8 July 1997

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have come together in Madrid to give shape to the new NATO as we move towards the 21st century. Substantial progress has been achieved in the internal adaptation of the Alliance. As a significant step in the evolutionary process of opening the Alliance, we have invited three countries to begin accession talks. We have substantially strengthened our relationship with Partners through the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and enhancement of the Partnership for Peace. The signature on 27th May of the NATO–Russia Founding Act and the Charter we will sign tomorrow with Ukraine bear witness to our commitment to an undivided Europe. We are also enhancing our Mediterranean dialogue. Our aim is to reinforce peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

A new Europe is emerging, a Europe of greater integration and cooperation. An inclusive European security architecture is evolving to which we are contributing, along with other European organisations. Our Alliance will continue to be a driving force in this process.

2. We are moving towards the realisation of our vision of a just and lasting order of peace for Europe as a whole, based on human rights, freedom and democracy. In looking forward to the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty, we reaffirm our commitment to a strong, dynamic partnership between the European and North American Allies, which has been, and will continue to be, the bedrock of the Alliance and of a free and prosperous Europe. The vitality of the transatlantic link will benefit from the development of a true, balanced partnership in which Europe is taking on greater responsibility. In this spirit, we are building a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests. We welcome the agreements reached at the European Council in Amsterdam. NATO will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.
3. While maintaining our core function of collective defence, we have adapted our political and military structures to improve our ability to meet the new challenges of regional crisis and conflict management. NATO's continued contribution to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the unprecedented scale of cooperation with other countries and international organisations there, reflect the cooperative approach which is key to building our common

security. A new NATO is developing: a new NATO for a new and undivided Europe.

4. The security of NATO's members is inseparably linked to that of the whole of Europe. Improving the security and stability environment for nations in the Euro-Atlantic area where peace is fragile and instability currently prevails remains a major Alliance interest. The consolidation of democratic and free societies on the entire continent, in accordance with OSCE principles, is therefore of direct and material concern to the Alliance. NATO's policy is to build effective cooperation through its outreach activities, including the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, with free nations which share the values of the Alliance, including members of the European Union as well as candidates for EU membership.
5. At our last meeting in Brussels, we said that we would expect and would welcome the accession of new members, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. Twelve European countries have so far requested to join the Alliance. We welcome the aspirations and efforts of these nations. The time has come to start a new phase of this process. The Study on NATO Enlargement – which stated, *inter alia*, that NATO's military effectiveness should be sustained as the Alliance enlarges – the results of the intensified dialogue with interested Partners, and the analyses of relevant factors associated with the admission of new members have provided a basis on which to assess the current state of preparations of the twelve countries aspiring to Alliance membership.
6. Today, we invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO. Our goal is to sign the Protocol of Accession at the time of the Ministerial meetings in December 1997 and to see the ratification process completed in time for membership to become effective by the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty in April 1999. During the period leading to accession, the Alliance will involve invited countries, to the greatest extent possible and where appropriate, in Alliance activities, to ensure that they are best prepared to undertake the responsibilities and obligations of membership in an enlarged Alliance. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to develop appropriate arrangements for this purpose.
7. Admitting new members will entail resource implications for the Alliance. It will involve the Alliance providing the resources which enlargement will necessarily require. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to bring to an early conclusion the concrete analysis of the resource implications of the forthcoming enlargement, drawing on the continuing work on military implications. We are confident that, in line with the security environment of the Europe of today, Alliance costs associated with the integration of new members will be manageable and that the resources necessary to meet those costs will be provided.
8. We reaffirm that NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic

interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. To give substance to this commitment, NATO will maintain an active relationship with those nations that have expressed an interest in NATO membership as well as those who may wish to seek membership in the future. Those nations that have previously expressed an interest in becoming NATO members but that were not invited to begin accession talks today will remain under consideration for future membership. The considerations set forth in our 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement will continue to apply with regard to future aspirants, regardless of their geographic location. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration. Furthermore, in order to enhance overall security and stability in Europe, further steps in the ongoing enlargement process of the Alliance should balance the security concerns of all Allies.

To support this process, we strongly encourage the active participation by aspiring members in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, which will further deepen their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance. We also intend to continue the Alliance's intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO membership or that otherwise wish to pursue a dialogue with NATO on membership questions. To this end, these intensified dialogues will cover the full range of political, military, financial and security issues relating to possible NATO membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision. They will include meeting within the EAPC as well as periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session and the NATO International Staff and with other NATO bodies as appropriate. In keeping with our pledge to maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members in the future, we also direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep that process under continual review and report to us.

We will review the process at our next meeting in 1999. With regard to the aspiring members, we recognise with great interest and take account of the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a number of southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia.

The Alliance recognises the need to build greater stability, security and regional cooperation in the countries of southeast Europe, and in promoting their increasing integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time, we recognise the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region which are also aspiring members. As we look to the future of the Alliance, progress towards these objectives will be important for our overall goal of a free, prosperous and undivided Europe at peace.

9. The establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Sintra constitutes a new dimension in the relations with our Partners. We look forward to tomorrow's meeting with Heads of State and Government under the aegis of the EAPC.

The EAPC will be an essential element in our common endeavour to enhance security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Building on the successful experience with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and with Partnership for Peace, it will provide the overarching framework for all

aspects of our wide-ranging cooperation and raise it to a qualitatively new level. It will deepen and give more focus to our multilateral political and security-related discussions, enhance the scope and substance of our practical cooperation, and increase transparency and confidence in security matters among all EAPC member states. The expanded political dimension of consultation and cooperation which the EAPC will offer will allow Partners, if they wish, to develop a direct political relationship individually or in smaller groups with the Alliance. The EAPC will increase the scope for consultation and cooperation on regional matters and activities.

10. The Partnership for Peace has become the focal point of our efforts to build new patterns of practical cooperation in the security realm. Without PFP, we would not have been able to put together and deploy so effectively and efficiently the Implementation and Stabilisation Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the participation of so many of our Partners.

We welcome and endorse the decision taken in Sintra to enhance the Partnership for Peace by strengthening the political consultation element, increasing the role Partners play in PFP decision-making and planning, and by making PFP more operational. Partners will, in future, be able to involve themselves more closely in PFP programme issues as well as PFP operations, Partner staff elements will be established at various levels of the military structure of the Alliance, and the Planning and Review Process will become more like the NATO force planning process. On the basis of the principles of inclusiveness and self-differentiation, Partner countries will thus be able to draw closer to the Alliance. We invite all Partner countries to take full advantage of the new possibilities which the enhanced PFP will offer.

With the expanded range of opportunities comes also the need for adequate political and military representation at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. We have therefore created the possibility for Partners to establish diplomatic missions to NATO under the Brussels Agreement which entered into force on 28th March 1997. We invite and encourage Partner countries to take advantage of this opportunity.

11. The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed on 27th May 1997 in Paris, is a historic achievement. It opens a new era in European security relations, an era of cooperation between NATO and Russia. The Founding Act reflects our shared commitment to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security. Its provisions contribute to NATO's underlying objective of enhancing the security of all European states, which is reinforced also through our actions here in Madrid. It provides NATO and Russia a framework through which we intend to create a strong, stable and enduring partnership. We are committed to working with Russia to make full use of the provisions of the Founding Act.

Through the new forum created under the Founding Act, the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will consult, cooperate and, where appropriate, act together to address challenges to security in Europe. The activities of the Council will build upon the principles of reciprocity and transparency. The cooperation between Russian and NATO troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina and between the staffs at SHAPE demonstrate what is possible when we work together. We will build on this experience,

including through Pfp, to develop genuine cooperation between NATO and Russia. We look forward to consulting regularly with Russia on a broad range of topics, and to forging closer cooperation, including military-to-military, through the Permanent Joint Council, which will begin work soon.

12. We attach great importance to tomorrow's signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. The NATO-Ukraine Charter will move NATO-Ukraine cooperation onto a more substantive level, offer new potential for strengthening our relationship, and enhance security in the region more widely. We are convinced that Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty are a key factor for ensuring stability in Europe. We continue to support the reform process in Ukraine as it develops as a democratic nation with a market economy.

We want to build on steps taken to date in developing a strong and enduring relationship between NATO and Ukraine. We welcome the practical cooperation achieved with the Alliance through Ukraine's participation within IFOR and SFOR, as well as the recent opening of the NATO Information Office in Kyiv, as important contributions in this regard. We look forward to the early and active implementation of the Charter.

13. The Mediterranean region merits great attention since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the development of the Mediterranean initiative that was launched following our last meeting in Brussels. The dialogue we have established between NATO and a number of Mediterranean countries is developing progressively and successfully, contributes to confidence-building and cooperation in the region, and complements other international efforts. We endorse the measures agreed by NATO Foreign Ministers in Sintra on the widening of the scope and the enhancement of the dialogue and, on the basis of their recommendation, have decided today to establish under the authority of the North Atlantic Council a new committee, the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, which will have the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean dialogue.
14. We welcome the progress made on the Alliance's internal adaptation. Its fundamental objectives are to maintain the Alliance's military effectiveness and its ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and develop the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. We recognise the substantive work which has been carried out on the development of a new command structure for the Alliance; the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept; and the building of ESDI within NATO. We attach great importance to an early and successful completion of this process. Building on the earlier reductions and restructuring of the Alliance's military forces, it will provide the Alliance with the full range of capabilities needed to meet the challenges of the future.
15. We welcome the substantial progress made on the development of a new command structure which will enable the Alliance to carry out the whole range of its missions more effectively and flexibly, support our enhanced relationship with Partners and the admission of new members, and provide, as part of the development of ESDI within NATO, for European command

arrangements able to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations.

We note that essential elements of the new command structure have been identified and will form the basis for further work. We must maintain the momentum of this work. We have, accordingly, directed the Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the Military Committee, to work on the resolution of outstanding issues with the aim of reaching agreement on NATO's future command structure by the time of the Council Ministerial meetings in December.

16. Against this background, the members of the Alliance's integrated military structure warmly welcome today's announcement by Spain of its readiness to participate fully in the Alliance's new command structure, once agreement has been reached upon it. Spain's full participation will enhance its overall contribution to the security of the Alliance, help develop the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO and strengthen the transatlantic link.
17. We are pleased with the progress made in implementing the CJTF concept, including the initial designation of parent headquarters, and look forward to the forthcoming trials. This concept will enhance our ability to command and control multinational and multiservice forces, generated and deployed at short notice, which are capable of conducting a wide range of military operations. Combined Joint Task Forces will also facilitate the possible participation of non-NATO nations in operations and, by enabling the conduct of WEU-led CJTF operations, will contribute to the development of ESDI within the Alliance.
18. We reaffirm, as stated in our 1994 Brussels Declaration, our full support for the development of the European Security and Defence Identity by making available NATO assets and capabilities for WEU operations. With this in mind, the Alliance is building ESDI, grounded on solid military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permitting the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU. We endorse the decisions taken at last year's Ministerial meeting in Berlin in this regard which serve the interests of the Alliance as well as of the WEU.

We further endorse the considerable progress made in implementing these decisions and in developing ESDI within the Alliance. In this context we endorse the decisions taken with regard to European command arrangements within NATO to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities (including provisional terms of reference for Deputy SACEUR covering his ESDI-related responsibilities both permanent and during crises and operations), the arrangements for the identification of NATO assets and capabilities that could support WEU-led operations, and arrangements for NATO-WEU consultation in the context of such operations. We welcome inclusion of the support for the conduct of WEU-led operations in the context of the ongoing implementation of the revised Alliance defence planning process for all Alliance missions. We also welcome the progress made on work regarding the planning and future exercising of WEU-led operations, and in developing the necessary practical arrangements for release, monitoring and return of

NATO assets and the exchange of information between NATO and WEU within the framework of the NATO-WEU Security Agreement.

We note with satisfaction that the building of ESDI within the Alliance has much benefitted from the recent agreement in the WEU on the participation of all European Allies, if they were so to choose, in WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, as well as in planning and preparing for such operations. We also note the desire on Canada's part to participate in such operations when its interests make it desirable and under modalities to be developed. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to complete expeditiously its work on developing ESDI within NATO, in cooperation with the WEU.

19. The Alliance Strategic Concept, which we adopted at our meeting in Rome in 1991, sets out the principal aims and objectives of the Alliance. Recognising that the strategic environment has changed since then, we have decided to examine the Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's new security situation and challenges. As recommended by our Foreign Ministers in Sintra, we have decided to direct the Council in Permanent Session to develop terms of reference for this examination, and an update as necessary, for endorsement at the Autumn Ministerial meetings. This work will confirm our commitment to the core function of Alliance collective defence and the indispensable transatlantic link.
20. We reiterate our commitment to full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management, including as necessary through joint consultations on how to address contingencies. In this context, we are determined to strengthen the institutional cooperation between the two organisations. We welcome the fact that the WEU has recently undertaken to improve its capacity to plan and conduct crisis management and peacekeeping operations (the Petersberg tasks), including through setting the groundwork for possible WEU-led operations with the support of NATO assets and capabilities, and accepted the Alliance's invitation to contribute to NATO's Ministerial Guidance for defence planning. We will therefore continue to develop the arrangements and procedures necessary for the planning, preparation, conduct and exercise of WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.
21. We reaffirm our commitment to further strengthening the OSCE as a regional organisation according to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and as a primary instrument for preventing conflict, enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and human rights. The OSCE, as the most inclusive European-wide security organisation, plays an essential role in securing peace, stability and security in Europe. The principles and commitments adopted by the OSCE provide a foundation for the development of a comprehensive and cooperative European security architecture. Our goal is to create in Europe, through the widest possible cooperation among OSCE states, a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of particular states.

We continue to support the OSCE's work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, in accordance with the decisions of the 1996 Lisbon Summit, including consideration of developing a Charter on European Security.

22. We welcome the successful holding of elections in Albania as a vital first step in providing the basis for greater stability, democratic government and law and order in the country. We stress, in this context, the importance of a firm commitment by all political forces to continue the process of national reconciliation. We also welcome the crucial role of the Italian-led Multinational Protection Force, with the participation of several Allies and Partners, in helping to create a secure environment for the re-establishment of peace and order. We value the efforts of the OSCE as the coordinating framework for international assistance in Albania, together with the important contributions made by the EU, WEU and the Council of Europe. We are following closely events in Albania and are considering measures through the Partnership for Peace to assist, as soon as the situation permits, in the reconstruction of the armed forces of Albania as an important element of the reform process. Continued international support will be essential in helping to restore stability in Albania.

23. We continue to attach greatest importance to further the means of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

We welcome the progress made since the Brussels Summit, as an integral part of NATO's adaptation, to intensify and expand Alliance political and defence efforts aimed at preventing proliferation and safeguarding NATO's strategic unity and freedom of action despite the risks posed by nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery. We attach the utmost importance to these efforts, welcome the Alliance's substantial achievements, and direct that work continue.

We call on all states which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Recognising that enhancing confidence in compliance would reinforce the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, we reaffirm our determination to complete as soon as possible through negotiation a legally binding and effective verification mechanism. We urge the Russian Federation to ratify the START II Treaty without delay so that negotiation of START III may begin.

We support the vigorous pursuit of an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban world-wide the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines. We note the positive developments in the Conference on Disarmament. We further note the progress made by the Ottawa Process with its goal of achieving a ban by the end of the year.

24. We continue to attach utmost importance to the CFE Treaty and its integrity. In this context, we welcome the entry into force of the CFE Flank Agreement on 15th May 1997 and underline its importance for regional stability. We share the commitment of all thirty States Parties to continue full implementation of the CFE Treaty, its associated documents, and the Flank Agreement. We confirm our readiness to work cooperatively with other States Parties to achieve, as expeditiously as possible, an adapted CFE Treaty that takes account of the changed political and military circumstances in Europe, continues to serve as a cornerstone of stability, and provides undiminished security for all. NATO has advanced a comprehensive proposal for adaptation of the CFE Treaty on the basis of a revised Treaty structure of national and territorial ceilings. The Allies have already stated their intention to reduce significantly their future aggregate national ceilings

for Treaty-Limited Equipment. We look forward to working with other States Parties on the early completion of a Framework Agreement on CFE adaptation.

25. We reaffirm the importance of arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on threats of a wider nature, including those linked to illegal arms trade and acts of terrorism, which affect Alliance security interests. We continue to condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge.
26. The steps we have taken today, and tomorrow's meeting with our Partners under the aegis of the EAPC, bring us closer to our goal of building cooperative security in Europe. We remain committed to a free and undivided Euro-Atlantic community in which all can enjoy peace and prosperity. Renewed in structure and approach, strengthened in purpose and resolve, and with a growing membership, NATO will continue to play its part in achieving this goal and in meeting the security challenges in the times ahead.
27. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of Spain. We are looking forward to meeting again on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1999.

Appendix 9: Historical Highlights of Attempts to Create a European Common Foreign and Security Policy

1952–4	European Defence Community	The EDC aimed to establish a common defence system supported by foreign policy coordination. Six countries sign the EDC Treaty but France fails to ratify.
1962	Fouchet Plan	French diplomat Christian Fouchet establishes an intergovernmental committee on political union. The committee draws up a draft design for a European Union of States, including plans for foreign and security policy integration; the plan is rejected because it is deemed too inter-governmental by some.
1969	Hague Summit	Leaders of the Six call for a 'United Europe' which should be capable of assuming international responsibilities including, by association, those relating to security.
1970	Luxembourg Report	Foreign Ministers create intergovernmental apparatus for political cooperation (EPC), including political and economic aspects of security.
1973	Copenhagen Report	Foreign Ministers of Nine review EPC process and establish procedures for consultation prior to decisions in the foreign policy area.
1981	London Report	Foreign Ministers agree to 'associate' the Commission with the EPC process at all levels. Joint action replaces cooperation as main objective.
1986	Single European Act	EPC institutionalised and parties agree to jointly 'formulate and implement a European foreign policy.' Also agree that 'common principle and objectives' are developed and defined.
1992	Treaty on European Union	CFSP established as intergovernmental second pillar of the European Union. Security included as formal part of co-operation. WEU requested to 'elaborate and implement' decisions and actions of the EU with 'defence implications'. Limited oversight by European Parliament.
1997	Treaty of Amsterdam	CFSP to apply to all questions relating to the security of the EU, including framing of a common defence. WEU to foster closer ties and clearer procedures for voting and budgetary matters. Secretary-General of the Council becomes the High Representative for the CFSP.

Appendix 10: Franco-British Summit – Joint Declaration on European Defence

Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998

The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom are agreed that:

1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union.
2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.

In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.

Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European Union (European Council, General Affairs Council and meetings of Defence Ministers).

The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European states. The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected.

3. In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).

4. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.
5. We are determined to unite in our efforts to enable the European Union to give concrete expression to these objectives.

Notes and References

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6. WEU Council of Ministers, *Common Reflections on the New European Security Conditions*, 15 May 1995, Introduction, Para. 4.
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50. *Ibid.*, pp. 383–400.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 404.
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2 The Rebirth of European Security

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8. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
9. *Ibid.*, 'Memorandum of a conversation, Washington', 25 January 1956, pp. 390–1.
10. *Ibid.*, 'Memorandum of a conversation, Department of State, Washington', 22 November 1955, p. 350.
11. *Ibid.*, 'Telegram from the Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State', 7 February 1956, pp. 407–8.

12. Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, *Official Report*, 1 May 1957, Vol. 1, pp. 73–9.
13. Other signatories to the Stockholm Convention were Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. Finland and Iceland joined later.
14. See, for instance, Article 113 (addressing Common Trade policy), Article 132 (dealing with association with overseas territories), Article 228 (the power to make international treaties and agreements) and Article 238 (agreements with third countries).
15. Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome reads, in part: (a) No Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers essential to the interests of its security, (b) Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes ...
16. These points are made in Douglas Johnson, 'De Gaulle and France's Role in the World', in Hugh Gough and John Horne (eds), *De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France* (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), pp. 93–4.
17. The memorandum is referred to in Sophie Vanhoonaeker, 'La Belgique: responsable ou bouc émissaire de l'échec des négociations Fouchet?', *Res Publica*, 1989 (4), Vol. XXXI, p. 515.
18. The lack of British enthusiasm for de Gaulle's policies was to prove a crucial hindrance to the achievement of de Gaulle's aims.
19. Simon J. Nuttall, *European Political Co-operation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 38.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
21. In an typically blunt summation of his views de Gaulle was quoted as saying, 'quelles sont les réalités de l'Europe? Quels sont les piliers sur lesquels on peut la bâtir? En vérité, ce sont les Etats, des Etats qui sont certes, très différents ... (mais) ... qui sont les seules entités qui ont le droit d'ordonner et le pouvoir d'être obéis. Se figurer qu'on peut bâtir quelque chose d'efficace pour l'action, et que ce soit approuvé par les peuples en dehors ou en-dessus des Etats, c'est un chimère'. Quoted in C.W.A. Timmermans, 'The Uneasy Relationship Between the Communities and the Second Union Pillar: Back to the 'Plan Fouchet'', *Legal Issues of European Integration*, No. 1, 1996, pp. 64–5.
22. Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945–70* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), p. 349.
23. For details see Vanhoonaeker, *Res Publica*, pp. 520–2.
24. Alfred Pijpers, 'National Adaptation and the CFSP: The Case of the Netherlands', *Legal Issues of European Integration*, No. 1, 1996, p. 81.
25. Quoted in Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 140–1.
26. 564, H.C. Deb., cols. 798–9, quoted in M. Margaret Ball, *NATO and the European Union*, p. 419n.
27. The missile system had been viewed by Prime Minister Macmillan as the 'key to Britain's "special relationship" with the U.S.'. Kennedy's Ambassador

to London, David Bruce, and the British Ambassador to Washington, David Ormsby-Gore, failed to warn Washington of the potential gravity of the cancellation of the agreement while Macmillan appears to have chosen to ignore the doubts about the technical efficacy of the Skybolt system voiced by U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. See Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 565.

28. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 566.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 569.
31. 'The Bermuda Meeting, *NATO Letter*, Vol. V (4), 1 April 1957, p. 10 (Emphasis added).
32. *Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation in NATO* (Paris: NATO Information Division, 14 Dec. 1954), Para. 40.
33. Simon Nuttall, *op. cit.* p. 46.
34. Kennedy is quoted as saying, 'That is why [the US] deplores the fact that your treaty has been made outside NATO and without taking the opinions of others into account'. Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle*, p. 376.
35. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 382.
37. For a comprehensive overview of the changes in nuclear strategy during this period, and others, see Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 33–57.
38. US General Accounting Office, *Comptroller General's Report to the Congress, Movement of American Forces from France*, Department of Defense B–161507 (GAO: Washington D.C., 1967), p. 4.
39. For general details of the Luxembourg compromise see, Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945* (New York: Longman, 1991), (2nd ed.), pp. 113–5.
40. Alfred Cahen, 'Relaunching the Western European Union: Implications for the Alliance', *NATO Review*, August 1986 (No. 4), pp. 6–9.
41. Members of the Eurogroup are Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The IEPG's composition is identical but also includes France.
42. The technical sub-groups are: EURO/NATOTRAINING (training); EUROLOG (logistics); EUROCOM (communications); EUROMED (medicine); EURO-LONGTERM (operational concepts).
43. The debate was prompted by Senator Mike Mansfield in a series of debates between 1966–74. For full details of the debate see Simon Duke, *The Burdensharing Debate: A Reassessment* (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 53–86.
44. Nixon's 'one-and-a-half' war strategy required sufficient American forces with the ability to fight one major and one relatively small conflict simultaneously, based on the assumption that the major conflict would be in Europe.
45. Quoted in Duke, *The Burdensharing Debate*, p. 62.
46. The Yaoundé Convention (Yaoundé I) of Association between the Community and Seventeen African states and Madagascar was signed in 1964.
47. A parallel report was to be produced on progress towards economic and monetary union, which later became known as the Werner Report.

48. Quoted in Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945* (second edition) (London: Longman, 1995), p. 148.
49. 'Report of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification' (the Davignon Report), *EC Bulletin*, 11/1970 (Luxembourg, 1970).
50. *Luxembourg Report*, 'Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification', 27 October 1970, Part 2, Ministerial Meetings, I (a–b).
51. *Luxembourg Report*, Part II, Section IV, Matters within the scope of the consultations.
52. Simon Nuttall has perceptively commented that, 'The link between the CSCE and the Community's own policy towards the East European countries was not fortuitous... The governments of the Six intended that the political guidelines for the Community's common commercial policy should be set by them rather than by the Commission'. Simon Nuttall, pp. 60–1.
53. *Luxembourg Report*, Part III, Para. 1.
54. The four new members signed their treaties of accession in the Palais d'Egmont on 22 January 1972.
55. Norway would later withdraw as the result of a referendum on 24–5 September which showed that 53.9 percent of those who voted were opposed to membership while 46.1 percent were in favour.
56. Bull.-EC, 9-1973, pp. 14–21, *The Copenhagen Report*, Second Report on European Political Co-operation on Foreign Policy, 23 July 1973, Part I (i).
57. See note 55.
58. *The Copenhagen Report*, Part I, (ii).
59. *Ibid.*, Part II, 12 (b).
60. *Ibid.*, Part II, 12.c (ii–iii) (Emphasis added).
61. Peter Brückner, 'The European Community and the United Nations', *European Journal of International Law* (1), 1990, p. 177.
62. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pp. 716–7.
63. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 173–4.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 700.
65. *Rapport d'Information déposé par la Délégation de L'Assemblée Nationale pour les Communautés Européennes, L'Europe et sa sécurité: bilan et avenir de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) de L'Union européenne* (France: Assemblée Nationale, 31 mai 1994), p. 12.
66. Elfriede Regelsberger, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent, and Wolfgang Wessels, (eds), *Foreign Policy of the European Union* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997).
67. Simon Nuttall, pp. 152–3.
- 68 Bull.-EC, S.3/81, pp.14–17, *Report on European political cooperation*, London, 13 October 1981, Preamble.
69. Greece became the tenth member of the EC on 1 January 1991.
70. The reference to Gymnich-type agreements takes its name from the location of an informal meeting of the European Foreign Ministers (then at nine) in 1974. At the meeting it was agreed that before a Community member could initiate consultations with a third party through the EPC process, there should be consultation amongst the other members. If they agreed,

the Member State holding the Presidency should be authorised to begin consultations (in the case in point, with the U.S.). More generally Gymnich-type agreements refer to informal arrangements based on a gentleman's agreement.

71. *London Report*, Para. 10.
72. *London Report*, Preamble.
73. See Genschler-Colombo Plan of 6 Nov. 1981 in *EC Bulletin*, No. 11 (1981), pp. 99–104.
74. Emilio Colombo, 'European Security at a time of radical change', *NATO Review*, Vol. 40 (3), June 1992, Web edition at www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9203-1.htm.
75. Sanctions were imposed against Argentina based on Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome. It is though worth briefly noting that the Commission suggested the imposition of sanctions.
76. Fred Kaplan, 'Postwar Order Crumbling', *The Boston Globe*, 17 November 1989, p. 3.
77. Quoted in Panos Tsakaloyannis, *The European Community as a Security Community: Problems and Prospects* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996), p. 62.
78. Geoffrey Howe, 'Bearing More of the Burden: In Search of a European Foreign and Security Policy', *The World Today*, Vol. 52 (1), January 1996, p. 23.
79. The differences appear in Nuttall, pp. 246–7.
80. *Statement by Mr Santer, President-in-Office of the European Council*, 11 December 1985, Strasbourg, Doc. 85/317.
81. *Treaties Revising the Treaties establishing the European Communities and Acts Relating to the Communities* (the Single European Act), 11 June 1986, Title I, 'Common Provisions', Article 1.
82. *Single European Act*, Title III, 'Provisions on European Cooperation in the Sphere of Foreign Policy', Art. 30.
83. *Ibid.*, Article 30, Para. 2 (a) (Emphasis added).
84. *Ibid.*, Article 30, Para. 2 (c).
85. *Ibid.*, Article 30, Para. 2 (d).
86. *Ibid.*, Article 20, Para. 5.
87. *Ibid.*, Article 30, Para. 4.
88. The Secretariat consisted of the Presidency-in-Office of EPC together with a seconded official from the two preceding and two following Presidencies. For further details see *Ministerial Decision on the Application of Certain Aspects of Title III of the Single European Act*, Doc. 28/090, 28 February 1986. For further details of the role of the EPC Secretariat see, *Question No. H-341/86 by Sir Peter Vanneck concerning the Secretariat for EPC*, 10 December 1986, Doc. 86/387.
89. *Single European Act*, Title III, Article 30, Para.10 (g).
90. *Ibid.*, Article 30, Para. 6 (a) (Emphasis added).
91. See note 31 above.
92. SEA, Article 30, Para. 6 (b).
93. *Ibid.*, Article 30, Para. 6 (c).
94. *Ibid.*, Article 30, Para. 5.
95. *Statement on the Term-of-Office of the British Presidency*, Strasbourg, 10 December 1986, Doc. 86/402.

96. Panayiotis Ifestos, *European Political Co-operation: Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy?* (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Group, 1987), p. 358.
97. Article IV of the Modified Brussels Treaty actually stipulates that the signatory members and any other organs established by them 'shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation', and recognised the 'undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO'. Thus, the military functions had largely been seceded to NATO from the start.
98. Helmut Schmidt, *A Grand Strategy for the West* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 61.
99. With the repeal of the constraints upon the manufacture of certain conventional arms in 1985, the FRG became more enthusiastic about the WEU.
100. G. Wyn Rees, *The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between Trans-Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p. 22.
101. Alfred Cahen, in Michael Clarke and Rod Hague (eds), *European Defence Co-operation: America, Britain, and NATO* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), p. 56.
102. Full text of the Rome Declaration 26–7 October 1984 quoted in, Alfred Cahen, *The Western European Union and NATO*, pp. 83–90.
103. Alfred Cahen, *The Western European Union and NATO*, p. 38.
104. Quoted in Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 202.
105. Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 745.
106. Garnham, *The Politics of European Defence Cooperation*, p. 118.
107. Quoted in Alfred Cahen, *The Western European Union and NATO*, p. 15 (emphasis added).
108. *European Yearbook*, Vol. 35, 1987, WEU 4–5.
109. *Platform on European Security Interests*, The Hague, 27 October 1987, Section III (a).
110. See *Question No. 2106/87 by Mr. Vandemeulebroucke, Concerning the Platform on European Security and the Single European Act*, 28 April 1988, Strasbourg, Doc. 88/107.
111. Unlike the Washington treaty's Article 6, the WEU has no geographical restrictions imposed on it by treaty.
112. Germany provided replacement minesweeping forces elsewhere and Luxembourg made a financial contribution.
113. Germany's constitutional sensitivities were to provide a significant impediment to the development of a truly European security identity in the practical, military sense, until the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe delivered an official interpretation of the relevant articles of the constitution on 12 July 1994.
114. Willem van Eekelen, *Debating European Security*, p. 49.
115. For further details see, Timothy J. Birch and John H. Crotts, 'European Defence Integration: National Interests, National Sensitivities', in Alan W. Cafruny and Glenda G. Rosenthal (eds), *The State of the European*

- Community: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond* (Vol. 2) (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1993), pp. 265–81.
116. Quoted in Charles Krupnik, 'Not What they wanted: American Policy and the European Security and Defence Identity', in Alexander Moens and Christopher Anstis, *Disconcerted Europe: The Search for a New Security Architecture* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 117–8.
 117. Full text, see *Europe Documents*, No.1608, 29 March 1990.
 118. For the full text see *Agence Europe*, No. 5238, 20 April 1990.
 119. European Parliament, *Session Document* (B-3-1167/90, 7 June 1990).
 120. Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Dublin 25–6 June 1990, in *Europe Documents*, No.1632/1633, 29 June 1990.
 121. Hans van den Broek, 'The Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Context of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference', Speech at the Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, 4 July 1995, *Studia Diplomatique*, Vol. 48 (4), 1995, p. 32.
 122. Secretary James Baker III had also encouraged Germany's federalist tendencies when, in response to Kohl's agitating for a unified Germany, Baker offered support including the hope that not only should Germany remain in NATO, but that it should become part of an 'increasingly integrated European Community'. Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, p. 795.
 123. The unification of Germany had, as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher observed, 'strengthened the hand of Chancellor Kohl and fuelled the desire of President Mitterrand and Jacques Delors for a federal Europe which would "bind in" a new Germany to a structure within which its preponderance would be checked'. Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, pp. 759–760.

3 From Political Community to Uncommon Security

1. For an account of the EC/WEU action in the Gulf War see, Pia Christa Wood, 'European Political Cooperation: Lessons from the Gulf War and Yugoslavia', in Alan W. Cafruny and Glenda G. Rosenthal, *The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond*, Vol. 2 (Harlow, Essex: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 227–44.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 229.
3. Gregor Schöllgen, 'Putting Germany's Post-Unification Foreign Policy to the Test', *NATO Review*, Vol. 41 (2) April 1993, p. 17.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
5. The WEU's condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait followed the example set by the United Nations, which in Security Council Resolution 660 called for full and unconditional withdrawal.
6. Trevor C. Salmon, 'Testing times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990–92', *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (1992), p. 244.
7. Again, Germany did not participate on constitutional grounds and Luxembourg, with no navy, made financial contributions.
8. See especially, Report of the Assembly of the WEU, *Consequences of the Invasion of Kuwait: Continuing Operations in the Gulf Region*, Doc. 1248, Paris, 7 November 1990.

9. Quoted in Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds), *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community* (Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 1992), p. 315.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
11. For full text see Laursen and Vanhoonacker, pp. 318–21.
12. These were, to recap. The Italian proposals on CFSF of 18 September 1990, The Commission's proposal of 21 October 1990, the Franco-German Proposals of 6 December 1990, those made in a speech by Douglas Hurd (based on a speech in Berlin) of 10 December 1990, and the President of the European Council's conclusions, 14–15 December 1990.
13. Laursen and Vanhoonacker, p. 324.
14. The pillar approach consisted of a number of inter-linked policy areas of which foreign and security policy would be but one; the first or 'community' pillar (based on the Treaties of Paris and Rome, as modified in the 1986 SEA); the second or 'foreign and security' sphere; and the third or 'criminal law and home affairs' policy domain.
15. *Europe Documents*, No. 1690, 21 February 1991.
16. Steven Philip Kramer, *Does France Still Count? The French Role in the New Europe* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), p. 35.
17. The latter was essential for Germany to play a role in out-of-area activities. The constitutional issue was a delicate one since it had to be addressed in order for Germany to play a significant role in Europe's evolving security environment. The alternative, as Roger Palin has noted, 'was a renationalisation of Germany's force structure as part of a more independently minded nation – a Germany within Europe, as opposed to a European Germany'. See Roger H. Palin, 'Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects', *Adelphi Paper 294* (London: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 10.
18. *Rapport d'Information déposé par la Délégation de L'Assemblée Nationale pour les Communautés Européennes, L'Europe et sa sécurité: bilan et avenir de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) de L'Union européenne* (France: Assemblée Nationale, 31 mai 1994), p. 19.
19. *Europe Documents*, No. 1706, 16 April 1991.
20. 'Luxembourg Presidency's Concept of Political Union', June 1991, in *Agence Europe*, No. 5524, 30 June 1991, pp. 5–7.
21. *Ibid.*, loc.cit.
22. The proposal called for the European parliament to be given veto power over any EC law which was subject to majority voting in the Council of Ministers and to accord it equal decision power with the Council in matters pertaining to the environment, research and overseas development assistance.
23. *Atlantic News*, No. 2357, 9 October 1991
24. *Ibid.*,
25. *Atlantic Document*, No. 74, 18 October 1991.
26. *Ibid.*, *Treaty on Political Union: Common Foreign and Security Policy*, Article II.
27. *Ibid.*, Section IV, Article 3, 'WEU–NATO Cooperation'.
28. NATO's June 1991 Copenhagen summit had encountered difficulties over this very issue.
29. Panos Tsakaloyannis, *The European Union as a Security Community: Problems and Prospects* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996), p. 130.

30. *Atlantic News*, No. 2360, 18 October 1991.
31. *Agence Europe*, No. 1746/7, 20 November 1991.
32. Address by President George Bush, Oklahoma State University, 4 May 1990, excerpted in – Adam Daniel Rotfeld and Walther Stützle (eds), *Germany and Europe in Transition* (Oxford: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 97.
33. Address by James A. Baker III, U.S. Secretary of State, to the Berlin Press Club, 12 December 1989, quoted in Rotfeld and Stützle (eds), p. 96.
34. Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 796.
35. *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance*, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Alliance, 5–6 July 1990 (Brussels: NATO Press Office).
36. On Franco-German defence integration see, Simon Duke, *The New European Security Disorder* (London: Macmillan/St Antony's, 1996), pp. 215–54.
37. *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, agreed upon by Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome 7–8 November 1991, Part II, Paras. 17,21,22.
38. *Ibid.*, Article 52.
39. *Defending Our Future*, Statement on Defence Estimates 1993, Cm.2270 (London: HMSO, July 1993), p. 16.
40. The Bartholomew Memorandum was attributed to the US Under Secretary of State, Reginald Bartholomew. Exactly who wrote the memorandum remains unclear and speculation has involved not only Bartholomew but also European Bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary, James Dobbins; National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft and State Department Counsellor, Robert Zoellick.
41. Willem van Eekelen, *Debating European Security, 1948–98* (The Hague: Sdu Publishers, 1998). For full text of the Bartholomew Memorandum see Annex II, pp. 340–44.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 342.
43. *Agence Europe*, No. 1746/7, 20 November 1991.
44. Stephen Philip Kramer, *Does France Still Count?*, p. 37.
45. Quoted in Charles Krupnik, p. 126.
46. *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, agreed upon by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 7–8 November 1991, Part II, para. 52.
47. In addition to the British command of ARRC, NATO multinational forces consist of seven corps-strength units (around 50000–70000 troops). Six of the corps are based in Europe. All are multinational, two commanded by Germany, one by Belgium and one by a German–Danish staff. The seventh corps, based in the former DDR, is German commanded and German in composition, in compliance with agreements forbidding NATO to deploy in this area.
48. *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, agreed upon by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 7–8 November 1991, Para. 52.
49. The United Kingdom contributes roughly 60 percent of the headquarters staff and the remainder are international. ARRC was created by the NATO Defence Planning Committee and it is partly headquartered in the United

Kingdom and based in Germany. Troops from Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey and Britain are included in the corps with some ground forces from the US, along with logistical support. The force is designed to respond in five to seven days and would include a British heavy armoured division.

50. Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 182.
51. See below, footnote 60.
52. Mazzuchelli, *France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to create the European Union* (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1997), p. 191.
53. For an authoritative account of the various national positions in the lead up to, during, and after the negotiations, see Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker, *The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates, and Future Implications* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994).
54. *Report of the Assembly of the WEU: The Future of European Security and the Preparation of Maastricht II – Reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council*, 16 May 1995, Doc. 1458, p. 10.
55. On 8 March 1995 Klaus Kinkel spoke in favour of a merger between the EU and WEU. Reported in *Die Zeit*, 10 March 1995. In an interview with *Le Figaro* on 16 March Kinkel reiterated his position and also spoke of the need for a European foreign affairs ministry. See *WEU Assembly Report*, Doc. 1458, 16 May 1995, pp. 11–12.
56. Ambassador Giovanni Jannuzzi, 'Europe and a Security Dimension', *NATO Review*, Vol. 39 (2), April 1991 (Web edition at www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9102.htm).
57. TEU, Article P 2.
58. TEU, Article J 4.3.
59. TEU, Article J 1.1.
60. For example TEU, Article J 1.3.
61. TEU, Article J 4.2.
62. On this issue see C.W.A. Timmermans, 'The Uneasy Relationship between the Communities and the Second Pillar: Back to the 'Plan Fouchet?', *Legal Issues of European Integration*, No. 1, 1996, pp. 61–70.
63. This contrasts with Pillar 1 (the existing European Communities) which is marked by Community competence and not intergovernmentalism.
64. Treaty establishing the European Community, Article 3b. Some have disputed the extent to which the principle of subsidiarity can be applied to the second pillar. For instance, Nanette Neuwahl argues that Title V of the TEU, unlike Title VI on Co-operation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs, does not contain explicit reference to the principle. In another example David O'Keefe and Patrick Twomey argue that, 'The principle of subsidiarity is intended to govern the relations between the Community and its Member States. Therefore, it cannot, *prima facie*, be used in relations between the pillars'. In David O'Keefe and Patrick M. Twomey (eds), *Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty* (Chichester: Chancery Law Publishing, 1994), p. 236–7.
65. TEU, Article F1.
66. TEU, Article D.

67. TEU, Article J.8.1.
68. TEU, Article J.3.6.
69. TEU, Article J.3.7.
70. The non-jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the second pillar is a matter of dispute amongst legal experts since some of the organs of the first pillar also operate in the second pillar, albeit with different roles and powers (for instance, the European Council is integrated into the legal framework of the community via Article 103 of the Treaty establishing the European Community) which may then imply that they are subject to the indirect scrutiny of the Court of Justice. See Christian Tietje, 'The Concept of Coherence in the Treaty on European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, No. 2, 1997, p. 232.
71. TEU, Article J.8.2
72. Article J 3.2 (the article also refers to Article 148(2) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community which specifies the weighted voting procedure for qualified majority votes.
73. Fraser Cameron, 'Where the European Commission Comes In: From the Single European Act to Maastricht', in Elfriede Regelsberger, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent, Wolfgang Wessels (eds), *Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 100.
74. TEU Article J 8.5.
75. Mathias Jopp, 'The Defense Dimension of the European Union: The Role and Performance of the WEU', *Ibid.*, p. 166.
76. TEU Article J 4.4.
77. TEU Article J 4.1 (Emphasis added).
78. Willem van Eekelen, p. 118.
79. For text of document see, Auke Venema and Henriette Romijn, *Documents on International Security Policy*, May 1989–December 1991 (Brussels: Netherlands Atlantic Commission, NATO Office of Information and Press, February 1992).
80. *NATO's Core Security Functions in a New Europe*, statement issued by the North Atlantic Council meeting in ministerial session, Copenhagen, 6–7 June 1991, Para. 7.
81. NATO Press Communiqué M–NAC–(92)51, 4 June 1992, para. 11.
82. The tasks are defined in *Petersberg Declaration*, Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, as including, 'humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking', (Section II: On Strengthening WEU's Operational Role, Para. 4).
83. 'Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy', Noordwijk, 14 November 1994, in *Europe Documents*, No. 1911, 22 November 1994.
84. *Ibid.*, Para. 160.
85. *Ibid.*, Para. 164.
86. *Ibid.*, Para. 172
87. Final Text of the Ministerial Council of the WEU, Madrid, 14 November 1995, Para. 5, in *Atlantic Document*, No. 92, 17 November 1995.
88. Named after the town near Venice where EC Ministers held informal talks on security-related issues on 6 October 1990.

89. 'Report to the European Council in Lisbon on the Likely Development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with a view to Identifying Areas Open to Joint Action *vis-à-vis* Particular Countries or Groups of Countries', *Europe* No. 5761, 29–30 June 1992 (Hereafter, *Lisbon Report*).
90. *Lisbon Report*, Para. 2.
91. *Lisbon Report*, Para. 3.
92. *Lisbon Report*, Paras. 9–10.
93. *Lisbon Report*, Para. 10.
94. *Lisbon Report*, Para. 12.
95. *Lisbon Report*, Para. 35. This list was added to, with the possibility of more being added in future, at the European Council's Edinburgh summit of 11–12 December 1992.
96. In the case of South Africa the Nine found a course of action very difficult to agree upon in spite of the underlying condemnation of apartheid. The outcome was the adoption of a Code of Conduct applying to EC companies conducting business with South Africa. But the Code was voluntary and there were no mechanisms for penalties in case of violation. For a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of the sanctions against South Africa, see Martin Holland, *European Union Common Foreign Policy: From EPC to CFSP Joint Action and South Africa* (New York: Macmillan/St Martin's Press, 1995).
97. Jacques Santer, 'The European Union's Security and Defense Policy: How To Avoid Missing the 1996 Rendez-Vous', *NATO Review*, Vol. 43 (6), November 1995, Web edition at <www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9506-1.htm>.
98. *Lisbon Report*, Para. 38.
99. European Council of Edinburgh, Presidential Conclusions, Part 1, Annex, *Agence Europe*, No. 5878, 13–14 December 1992.
100. *Report on Joint Action and the Development of the CFSP in the Field of Security*, Ad Hoc Working Group on Security, 7 December 1992.
101. *Ibid.*, Section IV 'Wider Issues', Para. 9.
102. The five subcommittees were: Evaluation of Risks and Threats (Chair: Michael Sturmer); EU–WEU–NATO Institutional Coherence (Chair: Henri Froment-Meurice); Economic Aspects (Chair: Herman Mulder); Values (Chair: Revd. Edourd Herr); and The Decision-Making Process (Chair: Edmond Wallenstein).
103. High-level group of experts on the CFSP, First Report, *European Security Policy towards 2000: ways and means to establish genuine credibility* (Brussels: Commission of the European Union, 19 December 1994), p. 3.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
105. Article V of the Brussels Treaty reads: If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.
106. *European Security Policy towards 2000*, p. 4.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
110. 'Relations with Western Partners', *Report to the European Parliament on Progress towards European Union*, Brussels, Doc. 91/419, 27 November 1991.

111. Vlad Sobell, 'NATO, Russia and the Yugoslav war', *The World Today*, No. 11, November 1995, p. 211.
112. For a detailed discussion of 'permissive consensus' and policy legitimacy within the EU, see Daniela Obradovic, 'Policy Legitimacy and the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34(2), June 1996, pp. 191–221.
113. Simon Nuttall, *European Political Co-operation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 11.
114. Edouard Balladur, *French Proposals for a Pact on Stability in Europe*, Copenhagen, 22 June 1993.
115. These were, Albania, Austria, Belarus, Cyprus, Finland, FYROM, Holy See, Iceland, Malta, Moldova, Norway, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine.
116. In 1987 the WEU established a Working Group on security in the Mediterranean. The EU also produced a report on the implications of developments in the region for European security. The CFSP Working Group concluded that security in the Mediterranean region, which is fundamental to European security, is a responsibility for the EU as a whole. The WEU concurred, in its Kirchberg Declaration, and as a result expanded its existing agreement with the Maghreb countries to Egypt and other non-WEU Mediterranean states.
117. *Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy*, Permanent Council Report, 10 November 1994.
118. *Ibid.*, Part II 'Definition and Scope', Para. 2.
119. *Ibid.*, Para. 4.
120. *Ibid.*, Para. 6.
121. *Ibid.*, Section V, 'The Relationship between WEU and NATO', Para. 17.
122. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
123. *Ibid.*, Part B: 'The Construction of a Common European Defence Policy', Para. 24. (Emphasis added).
124. These might include 'joint actions' on the following issues: provision of humanitarian assistance in the former Yugoslavia; administration of Mostar; support for the extension of the NPT; support for the Middle East peace process; agreement on export controls for dual use goods; and promotion of the 'Stability Pact' (the Balladur Plan) as a means of addressing minority and border issues in central and eastern Europe.
125. Hans van den Broek, 'The Common Foreign and Security Policy', pp. 33–4.
126. *Report on the Functioning of the Treaty on European Union*, 10 May 1995, Doc. IP/95/465.

4 Expanding Europe, Decreasing Security

1. Article N.2 of the TEU provides that, 'A conference of representatives of the government of the Member States shall be convened in 1996 to examine those provisions of this Treaty for which revision is provided.'
2. Full text of 'Reflections on European Policy', in *Agence Europe*, No. 1895/6, 7 September 1994.
3. *WEU's Contribution to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference of 1996*, WEU Council of Ministers, 14 November 1995 (Brussels: Press and Information Service, 1995).

4. See interview with Prime Minister Edouard Balladur from *Le Figaro* reproduced in *Agence Europe*, No. 1891, 3 September 1994.
5. Since the document emanated from a parliamentary group (headed by Wolfgang Schäuble) it was not a document that necessarily expressed the position of the government or the Chancellor (although he was aware of its contents) and it therefore left Germany's position in the IGC relatively unconstrained.
6. *WEU's Contribution to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference of 1996*, WEU Council of Ministers, 14 November 1995, Para. 99 (Brussels: Press and Information Service, 1995).
7. Peter Norman, 'Franco-German Defence Strains', *Financial Times*, 5 March 1996, p. 5.
8. The other two were making the Union 'more relevant to its citizens in the field of human rights, internal security, employment and the environment', and 'improving the Union's efficiency and democracy'.
9. UNSC Resolution 1011, 2 March 1997.
10. Press Conference by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Robin Cook, Luxembourg, 2 June 1997, at <http://britain-info.org/bis/fordom/eu/97602fs.htm>.
11. *Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997).
12. For the text of the Treaty of Amsterdam see, *Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997); the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, appears in *European Union: Consolidated Treaties* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997). Care should be taken since the Consolidated Treaties comprise both the *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union* and the *Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community*. The relevant CFSP sections appear in Title V, Articles 11–29 of the former although there are things of relevance to the CFSP in the second treaty.
13. CTEU, Article 3.
14. Christian Tietje notes that the English language version of the TEU refers to 'consistency' while the French and German versions refer to 'cohérence' and 'Kohärenz' respectively. He noted that 'one of the first tasks of the Review Conference in 1996 should be to clarify the language of the English version of the treaty.' As is indicated in the main text, this was not done. See Christian Tietje, 'The Concept of Coherence in the Treaty on European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, No. 2, 1997, pp. 211–33.
15. CTEU, Article 17.1 (former Article J 4 .5 of the TEU).
16. CTEU, Article 17.2.
17. CTEU, Article 24.
18. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, 17 June 1992, UN Doc, A/47/277.
19. CTEU, Article 18.1–5.
20. CTEU, Article 18.3.

21. The idea of a High Representative had in fact been broached at least three years earlier but the post remained unfilled due to differences over the mandate that should be attached to the post and the highly sensitive question of who should be appointed. See Bulletin EU6-1966, Annexes to the Conclusions of the Presidency (98/108).
22. *Treaty of Amsterdam*, Declarations adopted by the Conference, Declaration 6 on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit, 2 October 1997.
23. Details in *Agence Europe*, No. 7257, 6/7 July 1998, p. 4.
24. CTEU, Article 14.4.
25. CTEU, Article 18.5
26. Mark Turner, 'CFSP Gets New Marching Orders', *European Voice*, 5–11 February 1998, p. 6.
27. CTEU, Article 23.2.
28. Under Article 205 (ex Article 148.2 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community) of the *Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community*, the votes for a qualified majority vote in the Council are weighted as follows:

Belgium	5	France	10	Austria	4
Denmark	3	Ireland	3	Portugal	5
Germany	10	Italy	10	Finland	3
Greece	5	Luxembourg	2	Sweden	4
Spain	8	Netherlands	5	United Kingdom	10

29. CTEU, Article 17.1.
30. CTEU, loc. cit.
31. CTEU, Article 17.3.
32. CTEU, loc. cit.
33. 'Declaration of Western European Union on the Role of Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance', Text in *Treaty of Amsterdam* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997), pp. 125–31.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 129 (emphasis added).
35. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
36. CTEU, Article 19.2.
37. *The Draft Treaty of Amsterdam, Inter Institutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission on provisions regarding financing of the Common Foreign and Security Policy* Doc. CONF/4001/97, June 1997.
38. 'Interinstitutional Agreement on the financing of the common foreign and security policy', *Bulletin EU*, 7/8–1997.
39. CTEU, Article 28.3.
40. David Allen, 'The European Rescue of National Foreign Policy', in Christopher Hill, *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 298.
41. Applications for membership have been addressed to the Council from Turkey (14 April 1987 – rejected 20 December 1989 by the Commission), Cyprus (12 July 1990), Malta (16 July 1990) and Switzerland (20 May 1992 – a public

- referendum in December 1992 voted against membership). The ten associated CEE countries addressed applications to the Council in the following order: Hungary (31 March 1994), Poland (5 April 1994), Romania (22 June 1995), Slovakia (27 June 1995), Latvia (13 October 1995), Estonia (24 November 1995), Lithuania (8 December 1995), Bulgaria (14 December 1995), Czech Republic (17 January 1996) and Slovenia (10 June 1996).
42. The list appears in *Enlargement: Questions and Answers* (Brussels: European Commission, 30 July 1996) See <<http://europe.eu.int/comm/dg1a/enlargement>>. The Madrid European Council meeting in December 1995 confirmed the criteria and added that there was a need to 'create the conditions for the gradual, harmonious integration of the candidate countries' through the development of the market economy, the adjustment of their administrative structures and the creation of a stable economic and monetary environment.
 43. Communication of the Commission, *Agenda 2000*, Part One 'The Policies of the Union', Section iv. 'The Union and the World', Strasbourg, 15 July 1997, Doc.97/6.
 44. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
 45. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
 46. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
 47. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
 48. 'The Effects on the Union's Policies of Enlargement to the Applicant Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', Part II Analysis, 1. The External Dimension, *Agenda 2000*, Part 1.1.
 49. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
 50. Gediminius Vitkus, 'Lithuania and the European Union: Membership Conditions – the Security Dimension', in Klaudijus Maniokas and Gediminas Vitkus (eds), *Lithuania's Integration into the European Union* (Vilnius: European Integration Studies Centre, 1997), p. 29.
 51. 'The Effects on the Union's Policies of Enlargement to the Applicant Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', Part II Analysis, 1. The External Dimension, *Agenda 2000*, Part 1.1.
 52. *Enlargement: Questions and Answers* (Brussels, European Commission, DG1A, 30 July 1996).
 53. *Ibid.*, Chapter 1, Para. 4 (emphasis added).
 54. The Effects on the Union's Policies of Enlargement to the Applicant Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', Part II Analysis, 1. The External Dimension, *Agenda 2000*, Part 1.1.
 55. *Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Co-operation*, Issued by the Heads of State and Government meeting in Madrid, 8 July 1997, NATO Press release M-1(97)81, para. 1.
 56. *Ibid.*, para. 2.
 57. *Ibid.*, para. 8.
 58. *Ibid.*, para. 13.
 59. For further details of the MCG see, Jette Nordam, 'The Mediterranean Dialogue: Dispelling misconceptions and building confidence', *NATO Review*, Vol. 45(4), July–August 1997, pp. 26–9.
 60. *Madrid Declaration*, para. 16.
 61. *Ibid.*, para.18.

62. *The Economist*, 12–18 July 1997, p. 17.
63. *Statement by President Clinton on NATO Enlargement*, 12 June 1997. [〈http://dns.usis.if/publish/armscontrol/archive/1997/june/nat0612b.html〉](http://dns.usis.if/publish/armscontrol/archive/1997/june/nat0612b.html)
64. 'A Bigger NATO: Europe Takes Shape', *The Economist*, 12–18 July 1997, p. 17.
65. *Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications* (Washington DC: Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 24 February 1997), p. 2.
66. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
67. Jonathan Dean, 'The NATO Mistake: Expansion for all the wrong reasons', *The Washington Monthly*, Vol. 29 (7), July/August 1997, p. 36.
68. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
70. *Speech by NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana*, NATO Summit meeting, Madrid, 8 July 1997, available on the Web at <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970708d.htm>.
71. Patrick Worsnip, 'Albright Tells Russia Baltics can join NATO', *Reuters*, 13 July 1997.
72. Remarks by His Excellency Lennart Meri, President of Estonia, Madrid, 9 July 1997, available on the Web at <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970709l.htm>.
73. *The Economist*, 12–18 July 1997, p. 17.
74. Statement by Mr Victor Sheiman, Official Representative of President A. Lukashenko, State Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus, at the inaugural meeting of the EAPC, Madrid, 9 July 1997, available on the Web at [〈http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970709j.htm〉](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970709j.htm).
75. William Drozdiak, 'Growing Pains at a New NATO: Will Alliance's Popularity Diminish its Efficiency', *International Herald Tribune*, 11 July 1997, p. 1.
76. They are respectively, *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation*, Paris, 27 May 1997, and the *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine*, Madrid, 9 July 1997.
77. *Founding Act on Mutual Relations*, Part 1, Principles.
78. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
79. *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine*, Madrid, 9 July 1997. Text in *NATO Review*, Vol. 45 (4), July–August 1997, p. 5–6.
80. *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine*, Madrid, 9 July 1997, paras. 6–7.
81. *Ibid.*, paras. 14–15.
82. *NATO Study on Enlargement*, September 1995, Chapter 1, Para. 5.
83. *Ibid.*, Chapter 4, Para. 45(g).
84. *Ibid.*, Chapter 4, Para. 59.
85. *Ibid.*, Chapter 4, Para. 65.
86. *Ibid.*, Chapter 4. Paras. 66–7.
87. *Ibid.*, Chapter 5. Para. 76.
88. The first widely available figures were those supplied by Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Adapting NATO: What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?', *Survival*, Autumn 1996, Vol. 38(3), pp. 5–27.

89. The figures represent the total of incremental costs plus the cost of measures to improve modernization and restructuring incurred between the years 1997–2009 (two/three years prior to accession and ten years thereafter). For full details see *Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement*, pp. 12–22.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
91. This estimate does not include the financial costs of U.S. assistance programmes to Central and Eastern Europe to modernise their militaries and to prepare them for possible NATO membership. Since FY 1995 these various programmes, including the Warsaw Initiative, have totalled \$200 million.
92. *NATO Enlargement: Costs Estimates Developed to Date are Notional*, 18 August 1997, GAO/NSIAD–97–209 (Washington DC: General Accounting Office, 1997), p. 2.
93. *Ibid.*, loc cit.
94. *NATO Enlargement and International Law*, Critical Memorandum July 1997, www.ddh.nl/org/ialana/nato.html.
95. *Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement*, p. 20.
96. Calculations are based on SIPRI Military Expenditure data, *SIPRI Yearbook 1996* (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1996), p. 366. If the latest reported military expenditure figures are taken, expressed in 1990 prices and exchange rates, the combined military expenditure for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland is \$ 2.3 billion dollars (using 1995 figures for all except Hungary which uses a 1994 figure). The estimated DoD new member costs represent between 10.02–15.24 percent of their combined defence expenditure.
97. *Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement*, p. 18.
98. Paul Taylor, 'U.S., Europeans Clash Over NATO Enlargement', *Reuters*, 9 July 1997.
99. *Ibid.*
100. William Drozdiak, 'Snag in NATO Expansion', *International Herald Tribune*, 3 October 1997, p. 1.
101. 'NATO enlargement cost debate begins in earnest', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 June 1997, at www.janes.com./public/defence/editors/nato/dw970611-nato.html.
102. Tasos Kokkinides, 'NATO's U-Turn on Cost Study', *Basic Reports*, No. 62, 15 December 1997, pp. 1–2.
103. Amos Perlmutter and Ted Galen Carpenter, 'NATO's Expensive Trip East: The Folly of Enlargement', *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1998, p. 5.
104. For a particularly good examination of the methodological pitfalls of public opinion data in the European security area, see Richard Sinnott, 'European Public Opinion and Security Policy', *Chaillot Papers*, (28) July 1997, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies WEU, 1997).
105. *Ibid.*, Table 1, p. 50.
106. *Ibid.*, Table 3, p. 52.
107. *Ibid.*, Tables 7–8, p. 55.
108. *Ibid.*, Table 5, p. 53.
109. See *Standard Eurobarometer 47*, Tables and Questions, Table 2.2 (Support for Current Issues), (Brussels: EU Commission, 1997).
110. *Standard Eurobarometer, 47* (Brussels: EU Commission, 1997), p. B.18.

111. *Ibid.*, Table 2.1 (Support for Current Issues), p. B.16.
112. *Ibid.*, Tables and Questions, Table 2.1 (Support for Current Issues), p. B.16.
113. *Ibid.*, Fig.5.1 (Fieldwork March–April 1997), p. 56.
114. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
115. *Standard Eurobarometer* 46, Fig. 4.1 (Fieldwork October–November 1996), p. 40.
116. Scores are based on means calculated by applying the coefficients 4,3,2 and 1 respectively to the categories lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust and no trust at all, which respondents chose. The mid-point is 2.50; below this negative answers predominate and above, positive ones. For full data see *Standard Eurobarometer* 46, Tables and Questions, Table 4.4 (Trust Among Nationalities), (Brussels: EU Commission, 1996), p. B.46.

5 Transatlantic Relations and European Security

1. Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History', *The National Interest* (Summer 1989), No. 16, pp. 3–19.
2. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72 (3), Summer 1993, pp. 22–49.
3. It should be noted that a debate was already established on declinism amongst economists, IPE scholars, and economic historians. Paul Kennedy's work acted as a catalyst for the more general debate. For earlier work in the 'declinist' genre see, Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–39* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Stephen Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', *World Politics*, 28 (3) (April 1976), pp. 317–47; George Modelski, 'The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 20 (2) (April 1978), pp. 214–35; and Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
4. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), p. xxiii.
5. David P. Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance* (New York: Basic Books, 1987). For a more recent argument in the 'declinist' tradition, see Donald W. White, *The American Century: The Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
6. Calleo, *Beyond Hegemony*, pp. 3–4.
7. See, for instance, Henry R. Nau, *The Myth of America's Decline* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Samuel P. Huntington, 'The U.S. – Decline or Renewal?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 67 (2) (Winter 1988/89), pp. 76–96.
8. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Change in the Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 261.
9. Joint Chiefs of Staff 1769/1 'United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National Security', 29 April 1947, quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 40.
10. See Samuel P. Huntington, *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1996, p. 44 for an overview of the differences.

11. Address by President Clinton to the people of Detroit, *The Legacy of America's Leadership as We Enter the 21st Century*, 22 October 1996 (Washington DC: Department of State, 1996).
12. *Ibid.*, (emphasis added).
13. Warren Christopher, 'America's Leadership, America's Opportunity', *Foreign Policy*, No. 98, Spring 1995, p. 8.
14. Strobe Talbott, 'Democracy and National Interest', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75(6), November/December 1996, p. 63.
15. Barry M. Blechman, William J. Durch, David F. Gordon and Catherine Gwin with Todd Moss and Jolie M.F. Wood, *The Partnership Imperative: Maintaining American Leadership in a New Era* (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center and the Overseas Development Council, 1997), p. 1.
16. Douglas Brinkley, 'Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine', *Foreign Policy*, No. 106, Spring 1997, pp. 114–16. For an examination of the same theme see, Vincent A. Auger, 'Seeking "Simplicity of Statement": The Search for a New U.S. Foreign Policy Doctrine', *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Spring 1997, Vol. III (2), pp. 1–21.
17. Jacob Heilbrunn, 'Clothed Ambition: Warren Christopher', *The New Republic*, Vol. 208 (5) p. 25. See also Jurek Martin, 'Clinton's Foreign Policy', *The Financial Times*, 18 August 1994, p. 5; and 'William Jefferson Bonaparte', *The Economist*, 17 September 1994, p. 25.
18. *Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power* (Washington DC: National Defense University), pp. 96–9.
19. John M. Goshko, 'Reduced U.S. Role Outlined: But Soon Altered', *Washington Post*, 26 May 1993.
20. Executive summary text of PDD–25 may be found in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 5 (20), 16 May 1994, pp. 318–21.
21. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 'Back to the Womb?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74(4), July/August 1995, p. 7.
22. Strobe Talbott has made the interesting point that the criticism of the Clinton administration's emphasis on enhancing democracy overseas comes not only from isolationists but also from some internationalists who warn that 'a "crusade" on behalf of democracy will overstretch American resources and mire the United States in endless, debilitating brawls, often on the side of undeserving clients'. See 'Democracy and the National Interest', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75(6), November/December 1996, pp. 47–64.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, (1996), p. 5.
25. See NATO Press Communiqué M–1 (91)44, 7 June 1991.
26. Philip H. Gordon, 'Does the WEU Have a Role?', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 20 (1), Winter 1997, p. 131.
27. USECOM has deployed forces 51 times to 30 countries since the end of the Gulf War. The six operations referred to are PROVIDE COMFORT (N.Iraq, 1991–), SHARP GUARD (Adriatic, April-1993), DENY FLIGHT (Bosnia, April 1993–...), ABLE SENTRY (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Spring 1993–), SUPPORT HOPE (Rwanda, June–September 1994).
28. See Raymond Seitz, 'America's Foreign Policy: From the Jaws of Victory', *The Economist*, 25 May 1995, pp. 21–3.

29. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
30. Martin Walker, 'China Preys on American Minds', *Guardian Weekly*, 6 April 1997, p. 6.
31. 'U.S. Census 1990', extracts in *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, 1996).
32. William Branigin, 'One in 10 Americans is Foreign-Born', *Guardian Weekly*, Vol. 156 (16), 20 April 1997, p. 15. The report also points out that the racial and ethnic make-up of the foreign born population has also changed strikingly. Nearly 85.8 percent of the foreign born who arrived before the 1970s were whites, that proportion dropped to 62.1 percent for the first six years of the 1990s. During the same period, the percentage of African-Americans more than doubled, to 8.7 percent, and the proportion of Asians and Pacific Islanders tripled to 28.6 percent. Hispanics (who may be of any race) accounted for 43 percent of newcomers since 1990 and 32.2 percent before 1970. The Census Bureau lists the current U.S. population as 84.2 percent white, 13.3 percent black, 1.6 percent Asian-Pacific Islander, and 7.4 percent classified as Hispanic.
33. For a contrasting view on this issue see Philip Gordon, 'Recasting the Alliance', *Survival*, Vol. 38(1), Spring 1996, pp. 32–58.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
35. Richard Halloran, 'The Rising East', *Foreign Policy*, No. 102, Spring 1996, p. 21.
36. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The West: Unique, Not Divided', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75 (6), November/December 1996, p. 44.
37. Office of European Union and Regional Affairs, Bureau for European and Canadian Affairs, *US–European Union Relations*, 3 December 1996.
38. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
39. 'Strategic Assessment 1995' (INSS) quoted in *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, 1996).
40. Christoph Bertram, *Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995) p. 3.
41. Sir Leon Brittan commented, 'It comes as no surprise to me that the first meeting you are holding should be with the representatives of the European Union. It comes as no surprise, but a great pleasure'. In Remarks by the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans von Mierlo, and the Vice President of the European Commission, Sir Leon Brittan, *The U.S.–EU Ministerial*, Remarks to the Press, 28 January 1997 (Washington DC: Department of State, 1997).
42. *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, (1996) p. 15.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
44. James B. Steinberg, Director, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State, *Advancing NATO's Adaptation*, Remarks before the Atlantic Council of the United States, 13 June 1996 (Washington DC: Department of State, 1996).
45. *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO* (1996), p. 1.
46. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
48. See, for instance, Charles Kupchan, 'Reviving the West', *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1996, Vol. 75 (3), pp. 92–105; and Simon Serfaty, 'America and

- Europe Beyond Bosnia', *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 19(3), Summer 1996, pp. 31–44.
49. Charles Kupchan, 'Reviving the West', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 3, May/June 1996, p. 94.
 50. Margaret Ball, *NATO and the European Union Movement* (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1959), p. 402.
 51. For a full discussion of the Helms-Burton legislation from a European perspective, see Kinka Gerke, 'The Transatlantic Rift over Cuba, The Damage is Done', *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXXII(2), April–June 1997, pp. 27–52.
 52. Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, *US–European Union Cooperation*, Remarks by Secretary of State Christopher, Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli, and Vice President of the European Commission, Sir Leon Brittan. 11 April 1996.
 53. *Joint U.S./EU Action Plan*, 3 December 1995, (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, 1996).
 54. *The New Transatlantic Agenda: Update*, Prepared by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, 4 February 1997).
 55. See Simon Duke, *The Burdensharing Debate: A Reassessment* (London: Macmillan, 1993).
 56. Mark M. Nelson, 'Joint Foreign Policy Remains Distant Dream for European Union', *The Wall Street Journal*, 26 September 1996.
 57. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
 58. Stuart Eizenstat, 'Why Europe Must Forge Stronger Security Links', *Financial Times*, 2 December 1995, quoted in Terrence R. Guay, 'The European Union's Intergovernmental Conference: Pressures for a Common Defence Policy', *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Spring 1997, Vol. III (2), p. 51.
 59. Lionel Barber, 'Europe Urged to End Reliance on U.S.', *Financial Times*, 25 May 1993, quoted in Terrence R. Guay, p. 52.
 60. Roy Denman, 'A Common European Foreign Policy? Not Yet, But In Time', *International Herald Tribune*, 6 November 1996.
 61. *Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council*, Brussels, 18 December 1990, Para. 5.
 62. NATO Press Communiqué M–1 (94)3, *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, Brussels, 11 January 1994.
 63. *Ibid.*
 64. *Ibid.*, Para. 6.
 65. *Ibid.*, Para. 9 (emphasis added).
 66. *Statement of the President* (Washington DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary), 6 September 1996 (emphasis added).
 67. *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, (1996), p. 35.
 68. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
 69. *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, (1996), p. 26.
 70. Press Briefing by National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, 5 May 1994, *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, 16 May 1994, Vol. 5(20), p. 319.
 71. Lionel Barber, 'Reinvigorating the Transatlantic Alliance', *Agence Europe*, February 1996, pp. 21–2.

72. Special Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10 January 1994 (Brussels: NATO Information Service), Opening Statement.
73. 'A Russian–German Axis?', *Foreign Report*, 20 January 1994.
74. Arguably this happened in May 1994 with the passage of President Clinton's PDD–25 which emphasised that U.S. participation in peacekeeping would henceforth be more 'selective and effective' and that one of the main criteria for involvement would be whether issues of vital national interest were involved.
75. WEU Kirchberg Declaration, 9 May 1994, *Atlantic Document* No. 85, Para. 3.
76. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
77. North Atlantic Council, Istanbul, Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, *Final Communiqué*, 9 June 1994, Para. 2.
78. WEU Council of Ministers, *Noordwijk Declaration*, 14 November 1994, Para. 20.
79. *Western European Union, The Future of European Security and Preparations for Maastricht II*, Doc. 1458, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mrs. Aguiar, Rapporteur, to the Assembly of the WEU, 16 May 1995, p. 25.
80. *Atlantic News*, No. 2772, 6 December 1995.
81. G. Wyn Rees, *The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between Trans-Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1998), p. 83.
82. *Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin*, 3 June 1996, Press Communiqué M–NAC–1 (96) 63.
83. *Fact Sheet: NATO Adaptation/Enlargement*, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, 12 February 1997 (Washington DC: Department of State, 1997) (Emphasis added).
84. *Fact Sheet: NATO Adaptation/Enlargement*.
85. *Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin*, 3 June 1996, Para. 7.
86. *Fact Sheet: NATO Adaptation/Enlargement*, (Emphasis added).
87. *Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin*, 3 June 1996, Para. 8.
88. James B. Steinberg, *Advancing NATO's Adaptation*, Remarks by the Director, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State, before the Atlantic Council of the US, 13 June 1996 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, 1996).
89. David S. Huntington, 'A Peacekeeping Role for the Western European Union', in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds), *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), p. 437.
90. On this topic see, Jim Eberle, 'NATO's higher command', in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), *Military Power in Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1990).
91. Yves Boyer, 'WEU: A French Perspective', in Anne Deighton (ed.), *Western European Union 1954–1997: Defence, Security, Integration* (Oxford: St Antony's College, 1997), p. 68.
92. Anthony Cragg, 'Internal Adaptation: Reshaping NATO for the challenges of tomorrow', *NATO Review*, Vol. 45 (4) July–August 1997, p. 33.
93. 'War over Naples', *The Economist*, Vol. 341 (7994), 30 November 1996, p. 34.
94. Joseph Fitchett, 'U.S. Tried to Fend Off Paris on a NATO Post', *International Herald Tribune*, 4 December 1996, p. 8.
95. Pauline Neville-Jones, 'Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia', *Survival*, Vol. 38(4), p. 50.

96. U.S. non-combat forces served under a Turkish commander in Somalia, a Swede in Macedonia, and a Canadian in Bosnia.
97. *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, (1996), p. 20 (emphasis added).
98. For details of the respective command positions and attached responsibilities see *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), pp. 168–87.
99. Stanley Sloan, 'Combined Joint Task Force and New Missions for NATO', *CRS Report for Congress*, 94–249S, 17 March 1994, pp. CRS–5–6.
100. For an excellent overview of America's post-cold war use of military force see Thomas Halverson, 'Disengagement by Stealth: The Emerging Gap Between America's Rhetoric and the Reality of Future European Conflicts', Lawrence Freedman (ed.), *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Oxford: Blackwells Publishers, 1994), pp. 76–94.

6 Transatlantic and 'Euro' options – Yugoslavia

1. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which states, 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter'.
2. Quoted in David Buchan, *Europe: The Strange Superpower* (Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1993), p. 67.
3. In the preceding month a majority of the *Bundestag* had supported recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.
4. David Buchan, *Europe: The Strange Superpower*, p. 68.
5. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 117.
6. Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 221.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
8. David Schoenbaum and Elizabeth Pond, *The German Question and Other German Questions* (New York: St Martin's Press in association with St Antony's College, Oxford, 1996), p. 190.
9. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Myth-making and Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia', *European Security*, Vol. 4(3), Autumn 1995, p. 404.
10. Wolfgang Krieger, 'Towards a Gaullist Germany? Some lessons from the Yugoslav Crisis', *World Policy Journal*, Spring 1994, p. 32.
11. George Ross, 'After Maastricht: Hard Choices for Europe', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 9(3), Summer 1992, p. 497.
12. Andreas G. Kintis, 'The EU's Foreign Policy and War in Former Yugoslavia', in Martin Holland (ed.), *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record and Reforms* (London: Pinter, 1997), p. 155.
13. WEU Council of Ministers, *Ostend Declaration*, 19 November 1996, Section III, Para. 21.
14. The operations grew in scope and were renamed Operations Maritime Guard and Sharp Fence in November 1992.

15. Quoted in Brigitte Sauerwein, 'WEU Closing in on NATO', *International Defense Review*, Vol. 26 (3), 1993, p. 187.
16. Maynard Glitman, 'US Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach', *Survival*, Vol. 38, no. 4, p. 73.
17. The WEU Ministers noted 'with regret' the U.S. measures to modify its participation with respect to the enforcement of the arms control embargo in the combined WEU/NATO Operation Sharp Guard.
18. Reuter, *Agence Europe*, 'EC President Scalfaro stresses the need for "Direct and Effective" links between EC and NATO', 6 March 1993.
19. Willem van Eeklen, *Debating European Security 1948-98* (The Hague: Sdu Publishers, 1998), p. 169.
20. For a comprehensive examination of this issue see, Panos Tsakaloyannis and Dimitris Bourantonis, 'The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Reform of the Security Council', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, (2) 1997, pp. 197-209.
21. Bhaskar Menon, 'Making and Keeping the Peace', in John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson (eds), *A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), pp. 15-16.
22. NATO Press release (98)18, *Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Continuation of a NATO-led Multinational Military Presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 20 February 1998.
23. For an overview of SFOR's responsibilities see, General Wesley Clark, 'Building a lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *NATO Review*, Vol. 46(1), Spring 1998, pp. 19-22.
24. *Agence Europe*, 27 February 1998, No. 7169, p. 2.
25. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
26. *Ibid.*, loc. cit (emphasis added).
27. Quoted in G. Wyn Rees, *The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between Trans-Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p. 84.
28. *Crisis News Centre '97*, Direct from Tirana, 9 March 1997, Available on the Web at <<http://www.albania.co.uk/crisis>>.
29. Hanspeter Neuhold, 'The Common Foreign and Security Policy: A Poor Record and Meagre Prospects', *CFSP Forum*, 3/97, p. 4.
30. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
31. *Agence Europe*, 13 May 1998, No. 7220, p. 3.
32. *Agence Europe*, 9 May 1998, No. 7218, p. 2.
33. Carl Bildt, 'Déjà vu in Kosovo', *Financial Times*, 9 June 1998, p. 12.
34. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia.
35. Roughly 1.8 million Albanians live in Kosovo.
36. For instance, on 28 September 1998 diplomats were shown the bodies of 15 ethnic Albanian men, women and children who were shot in the back of the head and mutilated at a makeshift camp in a heavily wooded section of the Drenica region, west of Pristina. Serbs claimed that at least 39 Serbs were tortured, mutilated and killed in early September near Glodjane.
37. Aleska Djilas, 'Imagining Kosovo', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77(5), September/October 1998, p. 127.
38. Statement by US Ambassador to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, to the UN Security Council on Kosovo Resolution, 31 March 1998.

39. S/RES/1160, 31 March 1998.
40. The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal was established by resolution 827 of 25 May 1993 to address war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as Rwanda at a later date.
41. *Determined Falcon* was assembled at four days' notice and involved 85 aircraft from 13 air forces.
42. Alexander Nicoll, 'NATO Breaks its chains', *Financial Times*, 18 June 1998, p. 14.
43. The comments also applied to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Cyprus. See *Agence Europe*, 19 March 1998, No. 7183, p. 2.
44. UNPREDEP is the UN prevention force in Skopje.
45. S/RES/1199, 23 September 1998.
46. Resoftlinks, 7 October 1998, <http://news.resoftlinks.com/981007>.
47. Associated Press, 8 October 1998.
48. NATO Press statement, 'Statement by the Secretary General following the ACTWARN decision', 24 September 1998, Vilamoura, Portugal.
49. Press Conference, Secretary of Defense William Cohen and U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry S. Shelton, NATO Defence Ministers Meeting, Vilamoura, Portugal, 24 September 1998.
50. The Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, told the press on 6 October 1998 that Russia would veto any move to approve NATO strikes on Yugoslavia by the Security Council.
51. As note 47.
52. *Resoftlinks*, 23 September 1998, <http://news.resoftlinks.com>.
53. Russia voted in favour of resolution 1199 but this was based on the understanding that the Security Council was introducing no measures of force.
54. *Financial Times*, 8 October 1998, p. 8.
55. *The Economist*, 17 October 1998, p. 33.
56. *The Economist*, 24 October 1998, p. 39.
57. *Financial Times*, 19 November 1998, p. 2.
58. According to *The Economist*, 1 October 1998, radical elements of the KLA were behind the September murder of the 'defence minister' in Ibrahim Rugova's unrecognised 'government', p. 33.
59. For instance, the bodies of two Serb policemen were found by U.S. observers in Malisevo on 9 November 1998 in what was apparently a retaliatory killing for the earlier deaths of five KLA members.
60. North Atlantic Council, Press Release (98)130, 19 November 1998.
61. Carl Bildt, *Financial Times*, 9 June 1998, p.12.
62. For a good overview of the EU and conflict prevention see Reinhardt Rummel, 'The CFSP's Conflict Prevention Policy', in Martin Holland (ed.), *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record and Reforms* (London: Pinter, 1997), pp. 105–20.

7 Progress towards Defining the Common Defence Policy

1. *Agence Europe*, No. 7216, 7 May 1998, p. 1.
2. WEU Declaration I, *The Role of the WEU and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance*, annexed to the Treaty on European Union

- (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992), Section A&B.
3. *Petersberg Declaration*, Section I, 'On WEU and European Security', 19 June 1992, Paras. 1–3.
 4. From 1999 the WEU and EU Presidencies will be held by the same country for the first six months of the year.
 5. *Ibid.*, Section II, Para. 3.
 6. Michael O'Hanlon, 'Transforming NATO: The Role of European Forces', *Survival*, Vol. 39(3), Autumn 1997, p. 5.
 7. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
 8. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
 9. *Petersberg Declaration*, Section II, Para. 8.
 10. *Ibid.*, Section II, Para. 9.
 11. Under an agreement signed in January 1993 between France, Germany and NATO, French contributions to the Eurocorps could come under NATO *operational command* in a crisis. Certain specific conditions applied however to the control arrangements, such as the need for Franco-German agreement on the release of forces to the Eurocorps only after France had agreed to a mission plan.
 12. *North Atlantic Council, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10–11 January 1994* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Communiqué, M-1 (94(3)), Para. 3.
 13. WEU Council of Ministers, *Lisbon Declaration*, 15 May 1995, Para. 5.
 14. WEU Council of Ministers, *Ostend Declaration*, 19 November 1996, p. 1.
 15. Roger Palin, *Adelphi Paper 294*, p. 55 (emphasis added).
 16. 'Jane's Defence Weekly Interview: José Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 27 (18), 7 May 1997, available on the Web at <<http://www.janes.com/public/defence/interviews>>.
 17. Colonel Bernard Vezinhet, Head of Logistic/Movements and Finance Section of the WEU Planning Cell, *Symposium on European cooperation on the procurement of defence equipment*, Munich 1–2 October 1997 (Paris: Assembly of the Western European Union, 1997). Colonel Vezinhet notes that the Plans section has a staff of eight whose tasks are to monitor FAWEU, joint defence planning with NATO and liaison with Eurolongterm (evaluation of military requirements over a 10 year span) and WEAG, p. 62.
 18. *NATO Brief*, No. 6 (1990), p. 6, quoted in Werner J. Feld, *The Future of European Security and Defense Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 9.
 19. WEU Council of Ministers, *Ostend Declaration*, 19 November 1996, p. 1.
 20. *Agence Europe*, No. 7193, 2 April 1998, p. 2.
 21. General Pierre Forterre, Commander of the European Corps, at a symposium on *European cooperation on the procurement of defence equipment*, Munich 1–2 October 1997 (Paris: Assembly of the Western European Union, 1997), p. 59.
 22. Simon Duke, *The New European Security Disorder*, p. 223.
 23. For details of the December compromise see, Robert J. Art, 'Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO', *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 111 (1), Spring 1996, p. 29.
 24. 'US, Bonn Clash over Pact with France', *Wall Street Journal*, 27 May 1992, p. A9.

25. Belgium and Spain signed the SACEUR Agreement of January 1993 and Luxembourg announced its intention to do so shortly thereafter in May 1994.
26. General Pierre Forterre, p. 59.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
28. Quoted in Andreas Kintis, 'The EU and the War in Former Yugoslavia', in Martin Holland (ed.), *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record and Reforms* (London: Pinter, 1997), p. 161.
29. Michael O'Hanlon, p. 9.
30. *A European Intelligence Policy*, Assembly of the Western European Union, Doc. 1517, 13 May 1996, submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Baumel, Chairman and Rapporteur, para. xxvii.
31. François de Rose, 'A Future Perspective for the Alliance', *NATO Review*, Vol. 43(4), July 1995, Web edition at www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9504-2.htm.
32. *A European Intelligence Policy*, para. xxviii.
33. *Ibid.*, Part III 'Is the CJTF concept the ultimate solution for Europe's intelligence deficiencies?', Paras. liv–lv.
34. *Ibid.*, para. xxxix.
35. Helios 1 imagery was used from 17 April 1993 following the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between the WEU and the three operating countries, France, Italy and Spain.
36. *A European Intelligence Policy*, Section IV. 'Towards a European observation satellite system', para. lxi.
37. The Secretary-General currently employs 101 personnel while the Satellite Centre accounts for 64. In terms of the 1998 budget they account, respectively, for 322.8 million Belgian francs and 356.3 million Belgian francs respectively, out of a total budget of 1319.9 million.
38. *Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy*, WEU 1994, Part II, 'WEU's Operational Role', Para. 32, at com94–184 at marvin.nc3a.nato.int
39. François Heisbourg, 'La politique de défense à l'aube d'un nouveau mandat présidentiel', *Politique Étrangère*, No. 1, 1995, p. 74.
40. 'Rühe stirs weapons controversy', *Financial Times*, 26 November 1996, p. 3.
41. Ralph Atkins and David Owen, 'France drops satellite project', *Financial Times*, 11–12 April 1998, p. 2.
42. 'Britain withdraws from military satellite project', *Financial Times*, 13 August 1998, p. 1.
43. *A European Intelligence Policy*, para. xlv.
44. *Ibid.*, para. lvii.
45. *Ibid.*, para. lxxxv.
46. *Ibid.*, para. lxxxvi.
47. *Agence Europe*, No. 7195, 4 April 1998, p. 2.
48. WEU Council of Ministers, *Ostend Declaration*, p. 1.
49. *Ibid.*, para. xcii.
50. *Ibid.*, para. xcvii.
51. The 1996 budget was in the region of \$40 million. Salaries and allowances for attached military personnel are paid by the core group outside the WEU budget. Figures in, 'Jane's Defence Weekly Interview: José Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 27(18), 7 May 1997.

52. For a detailed discussions of this theme see Jörg Monar, 'The Financial Dimensions of the CFSP', in Martin Holland (ed.), *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record and the Reforms* (London: Pinter, 1997), pp. 34–52; and Thomas Hagleitner, 'Financing the CFSP: A Step towards Communitarisation or Institutional Deadlock?', *CFSP Forum*, 2.95, pp. 6–7.
53. Thomas Hagleitner, *CFSP Forum*, 2.95, p. 7.
54. See Simon Duke, *The Burdensharing Debate: A Reassessment* (London: Macmillan, 1993).
55. Center for Strategic and International Studies, ed., *Defense in the late 1990s: avoiding the train wreck* (Washington DC: CSIS, 1995), p. 12.
56. Ethan Kapstein, 'Towards an American arms trade monopoly', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73(3), May/June 1994, pp. 13–19.
57. FINABEL'S principal task was to promote interoperability amongst the land forces of the participant countries. See Willem van Eekelen, *Debating European Security 1948–1998* (The Hague: Sdu Publishers, 1998), p. 282.
58. Alessandro Politi, 'Western European Union and Europe's Defence Industry', in Anne Deighton (ed.), *Western European Union 1954–1997: Defence, Security, Integration* (Oxford: St Antony's College, 1997), p. 135.
59. See *SIPRI Annual 1996: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1996).
60. Peter Van Ham, 'The Prospects for a European Security and Defence Identity', *European Security*, Vol. 4(4), Winter 1995, p. 539.
61. In fact the situation is more absurd than Van Ham indicates since there are *ten* combat tank manufacturers in Europe, compared to *two* in the U.S.
62. 'Raytheon's Rise', *The Economist*, January 18–24, 1997, p. 69.
63. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
64. Airbus currently involves Aerospatiale, BAe, Dasa and Casa.
65. A more realistic comparison though would consider not just the size of combined defence budgets but the amounts spent on research and development and the proportion of expenditure which may be recovered through arms sales. In general, the European NATO members tend to spend more on costs associated directly or indirectly with personnel and not as much on research and development. The procurement sector of the US budget is approximately twice that of combined European budgets. This would logically suggest that changes not just to, but also within, defence budgets should be considered.
66. Deputy Director-General of Aerospatiale, Jean-Louis Fache, *Symposium on European Cooperation on the Procurement of Defence Equipment*, Munich, 1–2 October 1997, p. 74.
67. For a brief but detailed overview of the developments in the US arms industry and their implications for European security, see Jens van Scherpenberg, 'Transatlantic competition and European defence industries: a new look at the trade–defence linkage', *International Affairs*, Vol. 73 (1), 1997, pp. 99–122.
68. Lord Levene, Former Head of Defence Procurement, UK Ministry of Defence, *Symposium on European Cooperation on the Procurement of Defence Equipment*, Munich, 1–2 October 1997, p. 35.
69. Luís María de Puig, President of the WEU Assembly, *Ibid.*, p. 15.
70. Jacques Santer, 'The European Union and the world in 1998', The Inaugural City Europe Lecture – Guildhall, London, 29 January 1998, at

<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg_1a/01-98/speech>>. The Commission had, as Santer observed, previously outlined in detail the challenges facing the European defence industries and reached the conclusions mentioned above. See, *The Challenges facing the European defence-related industry – a contribution for action at European level*, COM (96) Final, 24 January (Brussels: European Commission, 1996).

71. 'Conclusions of the Presidency', 31/31, *Bulletin* EU 6–1997.
72. *The Economist*, 'Global Defence Industry Survey: Divided continent', June 14–20, 1997, p. 11.
73. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
74. Graham Woodcock, Secretary-General, EDIG, *Symposium on European Cooperation on the Procurement of Defence Equipment*, p. 43.
75. *Ibid.*, General Schlieper, Chairman WEAG National Armaments Directors, p. 51.
76. Article 223 (b) reads: 'Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes'.
77. Article 223 was modified thus, 'The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments', *Treaty of Amsterdam*, Article J.7(1).
78. *The Economist*, 'Global Defence Industry Survey', 14–20 June 1997, p. 13.
79. Wolfgang Piller, Member of the Board of Management, External Relations and Governmental and Political Affairs, Daimler-Benz Aerospace AG, Germany, in *Symposium on European Cooperation on the Procurement of Defence Equipment*, Munich, 1–2 October 1997 (Paris: Assembly of the WEU), p. 79.
80. Information from Alexander Nicoll, 'Eurofighter missile bids start in UK', *Financial Times*, 29 May 1998, p. 6.
81. Alexander Nicoll, 'Eurofighter project may unite military aircraft sector', *Financial Times*, 7 July 1998, p. 1.
82. EADC, as envisaged at the time of the July meeting, would ring together BAe (UK), Dasa (Germany), Aerospaciale and Dassault (France), and interests of Finmeccanica (Italy), Casa (Spain) and Saab (Sweden).
83. Alexander Nicoll, 'Eurofighter tempts Norway in bid to win key contract', *Financial Times*, 23 July 1998, p. 6.
84. 'Britain opts out of Europe', *The Economist*, 23 January 1999, pp. 72–4.
85. See Timothy J. Birch and John H. Crotts, 'European Defense Integration: National Interests, National Sensitivities', in Alan W. Cafruny and Glenda G. Rosenthal, *The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond*, Vol. 2 (Harlow, Essex: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 265–81.
86. Quoted by Colonel Bernard Vezinhet, in *Symposium on European Cooperation on the Procurement of Defence Equipment*, pp. 63–4.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
88. Rear Admiral Guillermo Leira, NATO Director of Armaments Planning, Programmes and Policy, in *Symposium on European Cooperation on the Procurement of Defence Equipment*, p. 66.

89. Report published June 1998.
90. The future tense is used since the conditions for incorporating the WEAO under the WEAG are not present yet. In recognition of this France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom established a quadrilateral development and procurement structure (OCCAR) in November 1996 as a step towards the eventual formation of a European Armaments Agency.
91. Mr de Puig, (President of the Assembly of the WEU) in, *Symposium on European Cooperation on the Procurement of Defence Equipment*, Munich, 1–2 October 1997 (Paris: Assembly of the WEU), p. 14.
92. All thirteen European NATO members are WEAO members.
93. WEU Council of Ministers, *Ostend Declaration*, 19 November 1996, Section VI, Para. 32.
94. The European Defence Industries Group consists of representatives of all member states of the WEAG, plus Sweden and Finland, who have observer status.
95. Alexander Nicoll and David Owen, 'European defence consolidation accelerates', *Financial Times*, 21 April 1998, p. 1.
96. EFTA was founded, with Britain as a founder member, as a less restrictive version of the EEC. It appealed to the minimalist free-trade principles of the Member States. The other members were Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.
97. Report of the European Commission, 'The Challenge of Enlargement', *Europe Documents*, No. 1790, 3 July 1992.
98. See, for example, M. Rosch, 'Switzerland's Security Policy in Transition', *NATO Review*, No. 6, 1993; and A. Mock, 'Austria's Role in the New Europe', *NATO Review*, 1995.
99. Kaj Sundberg, Former Ambassador of Sweden to Belgium, 'The New European Security Architecture: A Swedish Perspective', *NATO Review*, Vol. 39(3), June 1991, Web edition at <www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9103-3.htm>.
100. Surya P. Subedi, 'The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and Neutrality: Towards Co-Existence?', *Netherlands International Law Review*, XLII, 1995, pp. 408, 411.
101. WEU Council of Ministers, *Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy*, Noordwijk, 14 November 1994, p. Section II, Para. 6.
102. 'Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement', Commission Report, Supplement to the Conclusions of the European Council in Lisbon, *Europe Documents*, No. 1790, 3 July 1992, p. 2.
103. It was also agreed at Corfu that expansion should include Malta and Cyprus.
104. Petersberg Declaration, June 1992, Section II, Para. 3.
105. *Ibid.*, Section 7.
106. Kirchberg Declaration, 9 May 1994, *Document on a Status of Association with WEU*. The category 'associate partnership' should not be confused with 'associate membership' which applies generally to all of those who are members of NATO but not of the WEU (Iceland, Norway and Turkey). Under the Maastricht Declaration of 10 December 1991, 'other European member States of NATO were invited to become members of WEU in a way which would give them the possibility to participate fully in the activities

- of WEU'. See, 'Document on Associate Membership' agreed to at the Ministerial Council in Rome on 20 November 1992.
107. WEU Council of Ministers, *Madrid Declaration*, 14 November 1995, Para. 21.
 108. *Ibid.*, Section III, Paras. A–B.
 109. Kirchberg Declaration, Part III, Declaration following from the 'Documents of Associate Membership' of 20 November 1992, 9 May 1994 (Paris: Western European Union, 1994).
 110. It should though be noted that in the event of either/and observers or associate partners participating in a WEU operation, they would be asked to contribute to its costs.
 111. *Communiqué of the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin*, 3 June 1996, M-NACC-1(96)64.
 112. WEU Council of Ministers, *WEU Contribution to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference of 1996*, Madrid, 14 November 1995, Section 1.A Para. 28.
 113. Western European Union, Declaration II, Annexed to the Treaty on European Union, 11 December 1991 (Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992).
 114. *Ibid.*, Para. 18.
 115. North Atlantic Council, Brussels, January 1994. Annex.
 116. North Atlantic Council, Communiqué issued by the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 1 December 1994, Para. 5. Text may be found in *NATO Review*, No. 1, January 1995, pp. 26–8.
 117. Dmitri Trenin, 'Avoiding a New Confrontation with NATO', *NATO Review*, Vol. 44, No. 3, May 1996, p. 17.
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8 Conclusion

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