

Appendix I

The Ramsey Notes on Time and Mathematics

Edited by Nuno Venturinha, with an English Translation by James M. Thompson

In July 1929, Wittgenstein read a paper at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, which took place in Nottingham. As he told Bertrand Russell in a letter written some days before the meeting, the paper published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, ‘Some Remarks on Logical Form’, would not correspond to the piece that would be delivered. The relevant part of the letter reads as follows:

On Saturday the 13th I will read a paper to the Aristotelian Society in Nottingham and I would like to ask you if you could possibly manage to come there, as your presence would improve the discussion *immensely* and perhaps would be the only thing making it worth while at all. My paper (the one *written* for the meeting) is ‘Some remarks on logical form’, but I intend to read something else to them about generality and infinity in mathematics which, I believe, will be greater fun*. – I fear that whatever one says to them will either fall flat or arouse irrelevant troubles in their minds and questions and therefore I would be much obliged to you if you came, in order – as I said – to make the discussion worth while.

* though it may be all Chinese to them (WC, 125)

We do not have records of what Wittgenstein actually said in Nottingham but, as Brian McGuinness suggested, the notes ‘about generality and infinity in mathematics’ may be preserved in a peculiar document among Frank Ramsey’s papers.¹ These are housed at the Archives of Scientific Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, and the document in question, FR 004-23-01, given the title ‘Time and mathematics’ by the Archives, is published here with an *en face* English translation.² It is in Ramsey’s hand but almost entirely in German, consisting of 20 numbered remarks. Interestingly enough, all the German remarks can be found in Wittgenstein’s Volume II – MS 106 in G. H. von Wright’s catalogue – which dates exactly from 1929. It is possible, as McGuinness conjectures, that Wittgenstein had dictated the notes to Ramsey with a view to preparing a translation of them for the presentation at the Joint Session. Some differences in regard to the punctuation and the text itself suggest indeed that Ramsey did not copy

the German notes from MS 106. Moreover, the English sentences all look like jottings, presumably thought of by Wittgenstein for the first time while dictating. The only possible exception is the penultimate remark, which resembles a couple of remarks in MS 106 (pp. 180–2).

The status of item 004-23-01 is thus completely different from that of other Wittgensteinian materials in the Ramsey collection. Item 002-30-01, for example, dated September 1929, also includes German sentences. However, it appears to be a work by Ramsey, not by Wittgenstein. At least, none of the German passages are found in the surviving manuscripts and typescripts. Here is the text in question:

What is wrong with my probability is its externality. The ‘form of thought’ which makes it impossible to think illogically is a form which thought haben *soll* [should have]. Das Denken hat eine solche Form nicht. Die Form ist eine Idee. [Thinking does not have such a form. The form is an idea.]

Logic, i.e. the laws of thought, is according to L((udwig) W((ittgenstein)) a consequence of analytic psychology. Es liegt im Begriff des Denkens dass man $p . \sim p$ nicht denken *kann*. [It lies in the concept of thinking that one *cannot* think $p . \sim p$.]

Aber dieser Begriff des Denkens ist keiner naturwissenschaftlicher. [But this concept of thinking is not a concept of the natural sciences.]

Die Psychologie von auswärts kann diesen Begriff gar nicht benutzen. [The psychology of the outer cannot use this concept.] (Ramsey, 1991, p. 277)³

My conjecture is that the German passages resulted from discussions between the two men, which we know to have occurred on a regular basis from Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge at the beginning of 1929 until Ramsey’s premature death on 18 January 1930. In another text, item 002-33-01, Ramsey discusses topics that are clearly Wittgensteinian in nature and writes that ‘[u]nderstanding a sentence is an Einheit des Zusammenwirkens [unity of cooperation]’ (1991, p. 62).⁴

Even if much speaks in favour of FR 004-23-01 being the German draft of the paper actually delivered in Nottingham, an intriguing letter Wittgenstein wrote to Moritz Schlick on 24 October 1929 forces us to consider an alternative hypothesis. In this letter we read:

Mr Waismann has given me your Remarks on Logical Form and told me that you are preparing two other publications on the foundations of mathematics. I very much look forward to these works [...]. (GB)⁵

It is a fact that FR 004-23-01 focuses on the foundations of mathematics, but it remains unclear whether it was prepared for the 1929 Joint Session, with Wittgenstein envisaging its posterior publication, or as an outline for an article. In both cases we are left with the idea of another publication on the same topic to which no item in the *Nachlass* of this period corresponds. Of course Wittgenstein could already have had in mind a synopsis like TS 208, which he dictated a few months

later. Yet neither TS 208 nor its reworked version, TS 209, concentrates exclusively on the foundations of mathematics.

In preparing the text for publication, I have tried to be as faithful as possible to the original. Ramsey's spelling has been corrected in square brackets in the following cases: where letters or signs are missing (e.g. 'unendl[i]ch', '3[-]dimensional'); where a letter should be suppressed (e.g. 'zeig[h]t'); and where a word needs to be amended (e.g. '[m|M][o|ö]glichkeit'). Ramsey's (and Wittgenstein's) occasional use of 'c' instead of 'k' has also been corrected (e.g. '[C|K]opula'). All commas inserted in square brackets are in accordance with Wittgenstein's MS 106. Words printed above the line are representatives of a word inserted with or without a caret mark (e.g. ^{was}). Deleted words are reproduced as such when they are readable (e.g. 'Regel') and as 'xxx' when they are unreadable. Italics are used in place of single underlines. Page numbers from the manuscript are given in double brackets.⁶


Notes

1. See McGuinness, 2006, p. 24, as well as his note in WC, p. 172. See also Rothhaupt, 1996, pp. 52–3. Galavotti (1991, p. 17) had already pointed out the similarities between the content of this document and, for example, §140 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophische Bemerkungen*. This derives from TS 209, a reworking of TS 208, prepared by Wittgenstein in April 1930.
2. A first transcription appeared in a note (125) in Kienzler, 1997, pp. 261–3.
3. The translation of the German passages is my own. Compare the first paragraph with MS 106, p. 233.
4. The translation of the German expression is my own. Wittgenstein uses the word 'Zusammenwirken' in MS 105, p. 84.
5. My translation: The German original reads: 'Herr Waismann hat mir Ihre Remarks on Logical Form gegeben und mir erzählt, dass Sie zwei weitere Publikationen über die Grundl. d. Math. vorbereiten. Ich sehe diesen Arbeiten mit freudiger Spannung entgegen [...].'
6. I would like to thank Thomas Baldwin, Arthur Gibson, Peter Golla, Andrew Lugg, Erich Rast, Jonathan Smith and David Stern for helping me check some parts of the transcription against the original.

Translator's note

Translating the work of a thinker such as Wittgenstein's is always a challenge. His fragmented style and lack of jargon lull one into a false sense of straightforwardness and simplicity. However, nothing could be further from the truth. It is often the case that *how* Wittgenstein says something is just as important as what he is saying. As such, I have attempted, at the expense of a more flowing and easy-to-read translation, to remain as faithful to the original German as possible. I felt it was more important to preserve the author's idiosyncratic, yet, unmistakable style.

- [11] 1 Ist die primäre Zeit unendl[i]ch? D. h. ist sie eine unendliche Möglichkeit? Auch wenn sie nur so weit erfüllt ist als die Erinnerung reicht so sagt das keineswegs dass sie endlich ist. Sie ist in demselben Sinne unendlich in dem der 3[-]dimensionale Gesichtsraum es ist auch wenn ich tatsächlich nur bis zu den Wände[n] meines Zimmers sehen kann. Denn was ich sehe präsupponiert die Möglichkeit eines Sehens in grössere Entfernung. Das heisst ich könnte[,] was ich sehe korrekt nur durch eine unendlich[e] Form darstellen[.] [MS 106, pp. 29–31; TS 208, pp. 11–12; TS 209, p. 63¹ (PB, p. 160)]
- 2 Wenn ich mir eine unendliche färbige Ebene denke² so habe ich damit nicht unendlich viele Gegenstände[,] sondern die unendliche Ebene ist ein Gegenstand & die einfachen Farben sind Gegenstände. [MS 106, p. 47]
- 3 Die richtige Ansicht muss am Ende die *natürliche* sein; und ^{was} wir sehen sind nie un[e]ndlich viele Dinge[n] sondern immer eine Anzahl Dinge die das [c]C[hara[c]k]ter[ist]ische unendlich vieler verschiedener Möglichkeiten haben. [MS 106, p. 47]
- 4 Man würde glauben dass ein Satz[,] aus dem unendlich viele S[af]ätze folgen, unendlich viel sagen muss. Aber die unendlich[e] Teilbarkeit drückt sich durch eine Regel aus, nicht dadurch dass das Zeichen die unendlich komplexe ist ~~Regel xxx~~.³ Andererseits ist die unendlich komplexe Regel nur ein Ersatz für ein unendlich komplexes Zeichen. (Etwa ein gemaltes Bild.) [MS 106, p. 57]
- [12] 5 $\varphi(2-5) = \varphi(2-3.15) \cdot \varphi(3.15-4.2)$ [.] $\varphi(4.2-5) = e[tc.]$ ⁴
Das Symbol ist das[,] was alle solche[n] Produkte gemeinsam haben.⁵ Die Regel nach der alle gebildet werden. [MS 106, p. 59]
- 6 Wenn diese Anschauung richtig ist, so gibt es keine Elementa[r]sätze. Die Sätze $\varphi(n-m)$ sind zwar analysierbar[,] aber nur wieder in Sätze von derselben Form. [MS 106, p. 59]
- 7 Wenn aus *einem* Satz unendlich viele folgen so ist jener Satz nicht aus diesen aufgebaut. D. h. Ihr⁶ Verständnis ist nicht nötig um ihn zu verstehen. [MS 106, p. 59]
- 8 Ich möchte so sagen. Zu sagen dass *unendlich* viele Sätze aus *einem* folgen besagt die *unbegrenzte* Möglichkeit solcher Folgesätze nicht ihre Wirklichkeit. Ich meine damit[,] es besagt dass es keine⁷ Anzahl solcher Grund Sätze [Grundsätze]⁸ gibt. Und das ist ja klar: Es gibt dann nicht unendlich viele sondern *keine* Elementa[r]sätze[.] [MS 106, pp. 59–61]
- 9 Daher kann der Satz nur verstanden werden[,] wenn man den zusammengesetzten Satz versteht, denn *er* liegt dann allem zu Grunde[.] [MS 106, p. 61]
- [13] 10 Diese Ansicht hat verschiedene Schwierigkeiten. Wenn ich sage das[s] kleine Quadrat im gross[t]en ^(1/3) ist rot was immer das übrige für eine Farbe haben mag so kann ich mir doch das kleine Quadrat gar nicht vorstellen wenn es nicht von etwas andersfärbigem begrenzt ist[.] [MS 106, p. 61]⁹
- [I may remember it to have been diff[erent], and say ‘but now it is the same’]¹⁰
-
- 11 Aber das würde wieder zu der Ansicht führen dass man nur das ganze Gesichtsfeld auf einmal beschreiben kann ohne Variable zu benutzen. [MS 106, p. 63]

- [[1]] 1 Is primary time infinite? That is, is it an infinite possibility? Even if it is only fulfilled insofar as memory reaches, that in no way means that it is finite. It is infinite in the same sense as the three-dimensional visual field, even if I, in actuality, can only see till the walls of my room. For what I see presupposes the possibility of seeing into a larger space. That means I can only represent that which I see correctly by means of an infinite form.
- 2 When I think of an infinitely coloured plane, I do not have infinitely many objects, rather the infinite plane is an object & the simple colours are objects.
- 3 The correct view must, in the end, be the *natural* [one]; and what we see is never infinitely many things, but rather always a number of things that have the characteristic of infinitely many different possibilities.
- 4 One would think that a sentence from which infinitely many sentences follow, must say infinitely much. However, the infinite divisibility is expressed by a rule, [and] not in that the sign is infinitely complex ~~rule-xxx~~. On the other hand, the infinitely complex rule is only a substitution for an infinitely complex sign (for instance a painted picture).
- [[2]] 5 $\varphi(2-5) = \varphi(2-3.15) \cdot \varphi(3.15-4.2)$ [...] $\varphi(4.2-5) = e[tc.]$
The symbol is that which all such products have in common. The rule according to which all are formed.
- 6 If this intuition is correct, then there are no elementary sentences. The sentences $\varphi(n-m)$ are indeed analysable, but only in sentences of the same form.
- 7 If from *one* sentence infinitely many follow, then that sentence is not composed of them. That is, their comprehension is not necessary in order to understand it.
- 8 I would like to say it thusly. To say that *infinitely* many sentences follow from *one* states the *unlimited* possibility of such derived sentence – not their actuality. I mean by this, it states that there is no [definite] number of such fundamental sentences. And that is of course clear: There are not, then, infinitely many, but rather *no* elementary sentences.
- 9 Thus the sentence can only be understood, if one understands the composite sentence; for *it*, then, underlies them all.
- [[3]] 10 This perspective has various difficulties. If I say the small square within the large one  is red, regardless of what colour the remaining one might have, I surely cannot imagine the small square, if it is not limited by something of a different colour.
- [I may remember it to have been diff[erent], and say ‘but now it is the same’]
- - - -
- 11 However, that would again lead to the view that one could describe only the entire visual field at once without using variables.

- 12 Is 5 in there are five men who love one another not the ordinary 5?¹¹
 13 Das Problem ist: [w|W]ie kann man Vorbereitungen zum Empfang von etwas eventuell existierendem treffen[?] [MS 106, p. 158; TS 208, p. 19r; TS 209, p. 42 (PB, p. 124)]
 14 Gibt es denn wirklich ein Stadium wo ich weiss dass ich 2 + 2 Äpfel habe noch ehe ich ^{die} Ersetzung von '2 + 2' durch '4' vollzogen habe?

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \exists \exists \varphi () & & \exists \exists \psi () \\ \Downarrow & & \Downarrow \\ \exists \exists + 4 \varphi () \vee \psi ()^{12} & & \end{array}$$

Man könnte sagen: Ich muss nun¹³ nur erst ausrechnen wie viel [wieviel] 3 + 4 ist[.] [MS 106, p. 107]

- [[4]] 15 Die Gleichungen der Mathematik kann man, so scheint es mir, nur mit sinnvollen Sätzen vergleichen, nicht mit Tautologien. Denn die Gleichung enthält eben dieses aussagende Element – das Gleichheitszeichen – das nicht¹⁴ dazu bestimmt ist etwas zu zeigen. Denn was sich zeigt, das zeigt sich o[h]ne das Gleichheits[z]s]zeichen. Das Gleichheitszeichen entspricht nicht dem \supset in $p \cdot p \supset q : \supset : q^{15}$ ~~xxx~~¹⁶ denn das \supset ist nur *ein* Bestandteil unter allen¹⁷ anderen die zur Bildung der Tautologie gehören. Es fällt nicht aus dem Zusammenhang heraus sondern gehört zum Satz wie das '.' oder ' \supset '. Das '=' aber ist eine [C|K]opula die allein die Gleichung zu etwas Satzartigem macht. Die Tautologie zeigt etwas, die Gleichung zeigt[h]t nichts, sondern weist darauf hin[,] dass ihre Glieder etwas zeigen. [MS 106, pp. 172–4; TS 208, p. 20;¹⁸ TS 209, p. 53 (PB, pp. 142–3)]
- 16 Man könnte meine Auffassung so darstellen: das Wort 'unendlich' ist nur in der Ausdrucksweise 'ad inf'¹⁹ richtig gebraucht[.] [MS 106, p. 174]
- [[5]] 17 – – – – Bedeutet ein endloses logisches Produkt etwas? Ist es nicht eo ipso *unbestimmt*?²⁰
 Aber ist es nicht durch eine Regel bestimmt? Nein[,] denn die Regel bestimmt nur unendlich viele endliche Produkte aber kein unendliches Produkt, es sei denn das[s] man hierunter die Regel selbst versteht, dann aber gehören endlich und unendlich verschiedenen Kategorien an. Die Regel bestimmt nur insofern ein unendliches log. Produkt als sie sich selbst bestimmt. [MS 106, p. 178]
- 18 Wenn er durch kein endliches Produkt wahr gemacht wird[,] so heisst das: er wird durch *kein* Produkt wahr gemacht. Und darum *ist* er kein log. Produkt. [MS 106, p. 180; TS 208, p. 20; TS 209, p. 56²¹ (PB, p. 149)]
- 19 goes on is (x) φx ever lg[.] prod[.]
 e[.]g[.] I have only 3 pencils
 [N.B.] there is a limited rage e[.]g[.] my life 'no acts of arguing except these'²²
- 20 Die unendliche *Möglichkeit* ist durch eine Variable vertreten[,] die eine unbegrenzte [m|M][o|ö]glichkeit der Besetzung *hat*; und auf andre Art darf das Unendliche nicht im Satz vorkommen. [MS 106, p. 184]

- 12 Is 5 in there are five men who love one another not the ordinary 5?
- 13 The problem is: How can one make preparations for the reception of something that potentially exists?
- 14 Is there, then, really a stage where I know that I have $2 + 2$ apples even before I have performed the substitution of ' $2 + 2$ ' with ' 4 '?

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \exists 3 \varphi () & & \exists 4 \psi () \\
 \Downarrow & & \Downarrow \\
 \exists 3 + 4 \varphi () \vee \psi () & &
 \end{array}$$

One could say: I have now only to calculate how much $3 + 4$ is.

- [[4]] 15 The equations of mathematics, as I see it, can only be compared with sensical sentences, not with tautologies. For the equation contains precisely this predicative element – the equals sign – which is not designated to show something. For what it shows it shows without the equals sign. The equals sign does not correspond to the \supset in $p \cdot p \supset q : \supset : q$ ~~xxx~~, for the \supset is only *a* component amongst all the others belonging to the formation of the tautology. It does not drop out of the connection, but rather belongs to the sentence as the ' \cdot ' or ' \supset '. The ' $=$ ' however is a copula which alone makes the equation something sentence-like. The tautology shows something, the equation shows nothing, but it indicates that its parts show something.
- 16 One could state my position so: the word 'infinite' is only used correctly in the expression 'ad inf'.
- [[5]] 17 – – – – Does an endless logical product mean anything? Is it not eo ipso *indeterminate*?
But, is it not determined by a rule? No, for the rule only determines infinitely many finite products but not an infinite product, unless of course one understands by it the rule itself; then, however, finite and infinite belong to different categories. The rule determines an infinite log. product only insofar as it itself determines.
- 18 If it is not made true by a finite product, then it means: it is not made true by *any* product. And that is why it *is* not a log. product.
- 19 goes on is (x) φx ever lg[.] prod[.]
e[.]g[.] I have only 3 pencils
[N.B[.] there is a limited rage e[.]g[.] my life 'no acts of arguing except these']
- 20 The infinite *possibility* is represented by a variable which *has* an unlimited possibility of replacement; and in another way the infinite should not appear in the sentence.

Notes

1. Whereas in TS 208 the fourth sentence reads 'Sie ist in demselben Sinne unendlich, in dem der dreidimensionale Gesichtsraum das ist, ...', in TS 209 the word 'das' was replaced by 'es'. The words 'Gesichts- & Bewegungsraum' were also inserted above the line as an alternative to 'Gesichtsraum'.
2. In MS 106, Wittgenstein first wrote 'Fläche denke'.
3. The deleted words do not appear in MS 106, which correctly reads: '... dass das Zeichen unendlich komplex ist.' This seems to be the result of a confusion in the dictation (or copy) since a bit further on in the text we find 'die unendlich komplexe Regel nur ...'. Ramsey will have inserted 'ist' but did not delete 'die', which looks like a previous insertion. He also left the last 'e' in 'komplexe'. Kienzler (1997, p. 262) cites the passage in question in accordance with the wording of MS 106.
4. In citing this paragraph, Kienzler (1997, p. 262) considers the last symbol illegible, but there are good reasons to believe that it is an abbreviation for 'etc.'. In fact, the formula in MS 106 runs as follows: ' $\varphi (2 - 5) = \varphi (2 - 3.15) . \varphi (3.15 - 4.2) . \varphi (4.2 - 5) = \varphi (2 - 2.6) . \varphi (2.6 - 5) = \text{etc. etc.}$ '
5. The original formulation in MS 106 was: 'Das Symbol ist das, was allen solchen Produkten gemeinsam ist.'
6. The word 'ihr' appears underlined in MS 106.
7. The word 'keine' appears underlined in MS 106.
8. Wittgenstein's first option in MS 106 was 'Element' (correctly 'Elemente'), which he replaced by 'Grund-Sätze' (correctly 'Grundsätze').
9. The picture is absent from Kienzler's citation of this remark (1997, p. 262).
10. The abbreviation for 'different' is not entirely clear. See the facsimile of this paragraph below.
11. The word 'ordinary' is not completely discernible, hence Kienzler (1997, p. 262) does not hazard a guess for it in citing this remark. See the facsimile below.
12. The scheme is only partially transcribed by Kienzler (1997, pp. 262–3) in his citation of this remark.
13. The same remark in MS 106 reads 'mir' instead of 'nun'.
14. In MS 106, Wittgenstein inserted 'nicht' above the line.
15. Wittgenstein's notation in MS 106 is ' $p . (p \supset q) . \supset . q$ '.
16. The deleted words, which are no longer readable, have no correspondence in MS 106.
17. The word 'allen' was not included in either TS 208 or TS 209.
18. The last sentence was crossed out in this typescript.
19. In MS 106, Wittgenstein did not abbreviate 'ad infinitum'.
20. This remark in MS 106 begins with: 'Haben wir hier nicht einen Fall wo die Allgemeinheit nicht auf Produkt oder Disjunktion reduziert werden kann? Was heisst es, wenn ich sage *alle* (unendlich vielen) Sätze einer bestimmten Form sind wahr?'
21. The beginning of this remark in the typescripts reads: 'Wenn der Satz durch...'

22. Some words are not completely discernible. In citing this remark, Kienzler (1997, p. 263) takes 'ever' to be illegible. In the case of 'rage', one may speculate, like Kienzler, whether Ramsey intended to write 'ra[n]ge'. In relation to the last word, Kienzler reads 'three' instead of 'these'. See the facsimile below.

I'm remembering it to have been diff, and say but
how it is the same 'T

Page 3, §10b

12 9s 5 in There are five men who love one another
not the other way? &

Page 3, §12

19 goes on is a 1/4 of every hour
or I have only 3 pencils
[N.B. there is a limited range of my life "no acts of paying
credit there" }

Page 5, §19

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Appendix II

Wittgenstein's 1938 Preface

Edited by Nuno Venturinha

This is a transcription of a previously unpublished typescript of Wittgenstein's. It consists of an English translation of item 225 in G. H. von Wright's catalogue and is dated, like the German original, 'August 1938'.¹ The document is housed at the Austrian National Library in Vienna and belongs to the Collection of Manuscripts and Old Printings, bearing the reference Cod. Ser. n. 39,544.

Although the library catalogue describes the text as a translation by Rush Rhees, there are reasons to believe that the work was done by Wittgenstein himself with the assistance of Theodore Redpath.

As a note on the covering sheet added by the services explains, this is a Preface to TS 226, which was indeed produced by Rhees. But the typescripts were clearly composed at two different times. TS 226 is a translation of part of TS 220, the so-called pre-war version of the *Philosophical Investigations*, containing extensive corrections in Wittgenstein's hand. A letter from Wittgenstein to Rhees of 13 July 1938 hints at the beginning of that collaboration. He writes:

[...] I am thinking of publishing something before long after all so as to end the constant misunderstandings and misinterpretations. I very much want to talk the business over with you. (WC, 227)

Also instructive is a letter from J. M. Keynes to Wittgenstein dated 30 August 1938. The relevant passage runs as follows:

Very glad to hear that you are near publishing. I should feel perfectly certain that the Press would take the book as soon as they asked any competent person's advice about it. (WC, 229)

The 'Press' Keynes alludes to is Cambridge University Press, whose Syndics, as von Wright reports, 'on 30 September 1938 offered to publish the German original with a parallel English translation of a work referred to as Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Remarks*' (1982b, pp. 120–1).² Wittgenstein actually tells Rhees in a letter sent on 6 October that '[t]he University Press has accepted [his] book' (WC, 234). However, the minutes of the Syndics for 21 October record that 'the Secretary reported that Wittgenstein was uncertain about the publication of his

Philosophical Remarks but was making arrangements with a translator' (quoted in von Wright, 1982b, p. 121). This suggests that Rhees was not yet working on the translation. As a matter of fact, three letters from Wittgenstein to Rhees sent on 9 September and on 3 and 6 October show that the latter had been occupied with a thesis for a Fellowship (cf. WC, 230 and 233–4). It seems thus very likely that the translation was prepared between the end of October 1938 and the end of January 1939. The date of its conclusion can be inferred from a letter Wittgenstein wrote to Keynes on 1 February. It reads:

I went round to King's College last night with the M.S. but was told that you had gone to London; so I took it back again and shall keep it till Friday unless you want it before then. I want to use the two days to look a little through the translation and perhaps correct some of the worst mistakes. I haven'[t yet had time to do this (queer as this may sound). My translator did about half of the first volume and then had to leave for America where his father died some weeks ago. I'll also give you the German text – in case it's any use to you. Not that I think that it's worth your while looking at it, or at the translation; but as you wish to see it of course you'll get it. (Moore has read most of the German text and might possibly be able to give some information about it.) I'm afraid there's *only one* copy of the English in existence and only one *corrected* copy of the German; you'll get these two copies.

Thanks ever so much for taking all this trouble (in what I believe to be a lost cause). (WC, 239)

The 'lost cause' Wittgenstein refers to here is his application for the Professorship of Philosophy, to which he would eventually be elected on 11 February 1939, succeeding G. E. Moore (cf. WC, 243). In a letter to Moore of 2 February, Wittgenstein confesses that 'the translation is pretty awful', but he adds that 'Rhees did his very best and [that] the stuff is damn difficult to translate' (WC, 240; cp. 241–2). We are also told in this letter that Yorick Smythies has helped with the revision and, in fact, a notebook of Smythies' headed 'Translation of Some Remarks of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (preliminary version)' is preserved. However, this does not contain the Preface.³ In all probability Wittgenstein had it typed much earlier, and one may wonder if the material received by Keynes really included any Preface. Against this possibility seems to speak only a letter from James Taylor to Wittgenstein of 24 February, in which it is said:

Thank you for sending a copy of the Preface to your book. It seems to me, so far as I can judge, to be the right one, to make the things clear that need to be made clear. I think it will do good to get it out and get these things clear in people's heads.

[...]

Since you didn't ask me to return the copy of the Preface you sent, I'm supposed I can keep it. (WC, 247)

The text Wittgenstein sent was evidently the English version. But why did he send his Preface to Taylor? Writing to Rhees on 15 July 1938, Wittgenstein lets

him know that '[t]here is going to be a discussion in Taylor's room [...] tomorrow (Saturday) at 5 p.m.' (GB). This is surely one of the discussions known as the 'Lectures on Aesthetics' which, as Cyril Barrett informs us in his Preface to the *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, 'were delivered in private rooms in Cambridge in the summer of 1938' (LC, p. vii). Barrett goes on to write.

They were given to a small group of students, which included Rush Rhees, Yorick Smythies, James Taylor, Casimir Lewy, Theodore Redpath and Maurice Drury (whose names occur in the text).

Here we have the core of Wittgenstein's disciples at the time and a letter to W. H. Watson dated 28 July 1938 shows that Wittgenstein had great regard for Taylor:

A friend of mine Mr. J. C. Taylor from Toronto may be passing through Montreal and I want to recommend him most warmly to you. He has been studying philosophy here and is an excellent man in every way. Please give him any assistance you can if he should come to you. – (WC, 228)

Besides the letter of 24 February 1939 only one other piece of correspondence between the two men is known to exist from this period. It is a letter of 24 September 1938 that Taylor sent from America.⁴ Both letters reveal a close friendship and my conjecture is that Wittgenstein gave a copy of his Preface to Taylor as a farewell gift. Of course Taylor might have helped Wittgenstein with the translation, but a paragraph in his first letter seems to exclude that he had been involved in the project. Taylor writes.

I hope the small volume you mentioned does get published. I'll look forward to seeing it. (WC, 231)

There are, however, other documents that throw light on the date and provenance of our text. The first one is an unpublished manuscript that can be found among Moore's papers at the Cambridge University Library. It is titled 'Wittgenstein' and has a cover sheet in the handwriting of Moore's wife, Dorothy Moore, saying 'Extracts from diary 1929–39'. Under the date '1938', Moore records:

Aug. 24 W. comes about Preface to his book & for 2 hrs. later; again 2 hrs., 27th, when finish his Preface & talk of Rhees; 30th write to Press about W.'s book. (MS. Add. 8330–1/5, p. 8)⁵

It is unclear whether Moore took part in the preparation of the Preface or simply discussed it, and actually if this was the German or the English version of the text. What is certain is that he acted as an advisor to Cambridge University Press and it is likely that his report had been based on the English Preface. In regard to the role played by Rhees here, I myself lean towards the opinion that his name was brought to the discussion only as a prospective translator of the book.⁶ I say this

because there is an important memoir written by Redpath in which he mentions the following:

[...] in the summer of 1938 Wittgenstein asked me if I would be willing to assist him in translating the Preface to a book which he was thinking of publishing. I said I should be very glad to try to help. I had not realized what an exhausting task it would be. We sat for several hours one day thinking out not only every sentence, but pretty well every word, and Wittgenstein sometimes got very worked up when he (or we) could not find words or phrases which entirely satisfied him. Time and again I found myself wishing to heaven that he would let me work on the German quite alone and present him with a version which he could then comment on and revise, but he pushed inexorably on, and though his interpositions were sometimes quite awry, as well as exasperating, one did learn something from the procedure, and it gave one an insight into Wittgenstein's fanatical care both for accuracy and for style. In August 1938 he sent me a typescript. (1990, pp. 72–3)

That this 'typescript' corresponds to the same Preface is confirmed by the fact that all the quotations made by Redpath (pp. 73–5) match our text. Taking into consideration that the item classified as Cod. Ser. n. 39,545 is Redpath's copy of the *Brown Book* (which, interestingly enough, is not coincident with number 310 available in the *Bergen Electronic Edition*), I am convinced that Cod. Ser. n. 39,544 is in fact this 'typescript' – the Taylor 'copy' being a carbon copy. Wittgenstein's only handwritten words in the text, '*Better*, though not good', inserted at the top of the right-hand margin of the first page, also coheres perfectly with the story told by Redpath. Wittgenstein probably wrote the words in fun, even if he really did not think much of the final result.

We are thus in the presence of a work by Wittgenstein. Michael Nedo's observation that '[t]here is a translation by Theodore Redpath of the August 1938 preface' (1998, p. xvi) is not entirely true. Wittgenstein must have produced the typescript alone and this is certainly the reason why the punctuation and style are so German like. Additional evidence is given by a series of jottings at the end of MS 160 (pp. 32v–iii) for a passage that occurs on page 1 of our Preface. They run as follows:

My intention was that *some* day all this should be one book.

to make a book (out) of them

My intention was ^{some day} to make a book out of all ^{this} ~~these thoughts~~

to make a book out of them all

to make out of all of them a book

It can be argued that these jottings were recorded only after the end of August 1938 since the first date in MS 160, which occurs on page 19v, is 14 September 1938. Nedo dates in fact the beginning of the notebook to 14 September (cf. 1993, p. 38), in what appears to be a confusion. But the horizontal position of

Wittgenstein's handwriting in these pages suggests that these were afterthoughts, which may have been inserted at any time, including in August.

In editing the text, I have not interfered with the original punctuation and spelling. Words that were underlined are printed in italics, the same happening with the title *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, originally in double quotation marks. Page numbers from the typescript are indicated in double brackets.

Notes

1. I discuss some important differences between the two versions in Chapter 9.
2. These *Philosophical Remarks* cannot be confused with the book posthumously published under that title. There are actually in the *Nachlass* various manuscript volumes headed *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, and Wittgenstein is even reported by M. O'C. Drury to have said as late as 1949: 'I have been wondering what title to give my book. I have thought of something like "Philosophical Remarks" ' (1996, p. 160). My thanks to Josef Rothhaupt for his refusing to let me forget this particularly interesting remark.
3. For a description of the Smythies papers, see Volker Munz's contribution to this book. The notebook, numbered XIII, can be consulted at Trinity College Library, Cambridge (Microfilm 00J00003C, Box 3). It covers only part of TS 239, which corresponds to the 'Revised Early Version' of Part I of the printed *Investigations*.
4. Extracts from this letter are also published in WC (231). Full versions of the letters are available in GB. There remains a third letter from Taylor but it is dated 22 January 1946. This is published in full in WC (347).
5. I am indebted to Josef Rothhaupt for bringing this passage to my attention. It is quoted by kind permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library.
6. Also on p. 8 of his 'Extracts', Moore records that Rhees came twice on 10 October because of Wittgenstein's manuscript.

Preface

In this and the following volumes I wish to publish a selection of the philosophical remarks which I have written down in the course of the last nine years. They concern many topics of philosophical speculation: the concepts of 'meaning', 'understanding', 'proposition', 'logic', the foundations of mathematics, sensedata, the conflict between realism and idealism, and others. All these thoughts were originally written down in the form of *remarks* (short paragraphs) sometimes forming connected series on the same subject, sometimes shifting rapidly from one subject to another. My intention was – some day to bring them all together in a book; regarding the form of this book I had various ideas at different times. It seemed essential however that the thoughts in it should pass from one subject to another in an ordered sequence.

About four years ago I made the first attempt to collect my remarks in this way. The result was unsatisfactory and I made various further attempts. Until, two years later, I arrived at the conclusion that it was all in vain and I ought to give up any such attempt. It became clear to me that the best I ever could write would just be philosophical remarks; that my thoughts soon grew lame if, against their natural inclination, I forced them [[2]] along a single track.– This, however, was not unconnected with the nature of the subject itself. This subject compels us to travel through the field of thought in all directions by a host of different routes. And thus the thoughts do not naturally form a simple sequence but a complicated network.

I begin these publications with the fragment of my last attempt to arrange my philosophical thoughts in an ordered sequence. This fragment has perhaps the advantage of giving comparatively easily an idea of my method. I intend to follow up this fragment with a mass of remarks more or less loosely arranged; and I shall explain the connections between my remarks, where the arrangement does not itself make them apparent, by a system of cross-references thus: each remark shall have a current number and besides this the numbers of those remarks which stand to it in important relations.

I wish all these remarks were better than they are. They are – to put it shortly – lacking in force and in precision.– I am here publishing those which do not seem to me too dull.

Until a short time ago I had practically given up the idea of publishing them during my lifetime. But the idea was revived in me, perhaps chiefly, by the fact that I found that the results of my work, which I had passed on in lectures and discussions, were circulating, frequently misunderstood, more or less watered down or mutilated. By this my vanity was stung and it threatened [[3]] to pester me again and again if I did not settle the matter, at least for myself, by publishing. And this seemed the most desirable thing from other points of view as well.

For *various* reasons what I publish here will coincide with what others are writing to-day. If my remarks do not bear a stamp which marks them as mine,– I will lay no further claim to them.

Since, about ten years ago, I again started to work at philosophy I have had to recognise grave mistakes in what I once set down in my book *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*. What helped me to recognise these mistakes was – in a measure which I can hardly now estimate – the forceful criticism which my ideas received from F. P. Ramsey; with whom I went over them in innumerable discussions during the last two years of his life. – Even more, however, I owe to the criticism which Mr P. Sraffa, Lecturer in Economics at this University, has incessantly offered on my views. To this stimulus I owe the most fruitful of the thoughts I here communicate.

I publish them not without misgivings. I don't dare to hope that it should fall to the lot of this inadequate work to throw light into this or that brain, in our dark age.

I don't by my writing wish to save others the trouble of thinking; but rather, if it were possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own.

Cambridge, August 1938.

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