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BEHAVIOROLOGICAL CORRECTIONS: A NEW CONCEPT OF PRISON FROM A NATURAL SCIENCE DISCIPLINE

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ABSTRACT: A new correctional system, operated from a behaviorological perspective, is described; this system differs substantially from corrections informed by traditional behavior sciences. Relevant basic behaviorological principles are reviewed, followed by the behaviorological definition of corrections. Relations between economics and ethics are examined as facets of the behaviorological technology of criminal justice. A behavior technology of corrections is outlined, including an economic system around which the entire operation is conducted. The nature of the related governmental and educational subsystems is described. The sociology of inmate populations under behaviorological maintenance is examined and related to the culture at large. Special features of transition to life on the outside are discussed.

Introduction

The relative worth of human beings has always preoccupied social analysts. Strong conclusions have emerged in various cultural agencies and have been codified. The natural contingencies of social intercourse have also conditioned attitudes and shaped patterns of behavior with important practical implications for how people regard one another. Traditional behavioral scientists have tended to accept assumptions arising from ancient origins in non-scientific domains of the culture. As Skinner (1971) noted:

> Twenty-five hundred years ago it might have been said that man understood himself as well as any other part of his world. Today he is the thing he understands least. Physics and biology have come a long way, but there has been no comparable development of anything like a science of human behavior. Greek physics and biology are now of historical interest only (no modern physicist or biologist would turn to Aristotle for help), but the dialogues of Plato are still assigned to students and cited as if they threw light on human behavior. Aristotle could not have understood a page of modern physics or biology, but Socrates and his friends would have little trouble in following most current discussions of human affairs. (p. 3)

The inadequacy of the traditional foundation behavior sciences is far ranging and

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transcends the field of corrections. We confront not only our increasingly inadequate behavioral technologies for prisons (e.g., Ellis, 1989 & 1991) but an equally discredited education system (e.g., Skinner, 1984), an unchecked population expansion, and an increasingly insolvent government.

However, an alternative discipline for the study of behavior from a natural science perspective has arisen. Stemming from Hume's early speculations about a natural science of human behavior (Hume,1739/1888), it has developed mainly across the twentieth century. It is independently organized and is now called behaviorology (Fraley, 1987; Fraley & Ledoux, 1993; Fraley & Vargas, 1986; & Vargas, 1987). Within that discipline a science of verbal behavior has developed (see especially Skinner, 1957), and related to it, a science of values and ethics directly applicable to a variety of cultural and social problems, especially problems involving assessments of human contributions (Fraley, 1994b; Krapfl & Vargas, 1977; Vargas, 1975.) Like any natural science, behaviorology has the advantage of supporting effective technologies.

Certain fundamental principles from the science and philosophy of behaviorology are applicable to a social agency like corrections, and a few are briefly described:

1. First, from the philosophy of natural science in general: All behavior is natural. This means that a behavior occurs only as elicited or evoked by independent variables in the environment of the behaving organism. Therefore, all behavior is functionally determined and occurs without any additional control from unnatural causes or influences. Thus, in no instance can behavior be free, autonomous, spontaneous, or under the influence of any other variety of metaphysical event (Skinner, 1971, Ch. 2).

2. A person's values are that person's reinforcers. Primary reinforcers (values) include things like water, food, and shelter. Conditioned reinforcers include all else that one has learned to seek.

3. Rights per se consist of unhindered access to one's reinforcers (values). For example, one's right to drinking water is one's unobstructed capacity to contact it. People often refer to their rights with rights statements, which consist of verbal behavior, and specifically, are claims to unobstructed access to reinforcers (Vargas, 1975). Rights statements, or rights claims, declare one's access to one's reinforcers and often function as demands for others to respect that access (e.g., "I have a right to a water supply").

4. Ethics are behaviors respectful of rights claims. Whenever access to reinforcers is threatened, both rights claims and ethical propositions tend to occur (Fraley, 1994b; Vargas, 1975). Ethical propositions, are statements that bolster rights claims either by denoting as unethical certain specific behaviors that would violate one's rights (i.e., in some way obstruct access to one's reinforcers) or by denoting as ethical certain behaviors that would respect one's rights. For example, the person claiming the right of access to water declares another person's respect for that claim to exemplify ethical behavior.

5. Both the essence and worth of human beings as persons are concepts of their behaviors, not of their bodies (Skinner, 1974, Ch. 13). The worth of a human being

pertains to that person's behavior and to the implications of those behaviors. Human worth does not accrue merely because a live body is involved.

This paper pursues the implications of these behaviorological principles to a recast technology of corrections featuring a broad spectrum of novel yet mission-relevant practices.

Behaviorological Corrections

The term corrections suggests that disapproved behavior is to be corrected, and corrected means changed. Undesired behavior can be suppressed temporarily by physical constraints or by punishment. But the behavior remains suppressed only while constraints remain in place or the punishing agents maintain the punitive contingencies. If the constraints or punitive contingencies are attenuated, suppressed behavior tends to recover (under the unaffected reinforcing contingencies that initially produced it)—a recovery mitigated only by any lingering respondently conditioned aversive emotional responses of the kind known as guilt feelings (Skinner, 1953, Ch. 12). The implications of eliminating the suppressing practices are demonstrated when, upon releasing inmates from prisons and thereby relaxing the punitive controls of the prison environment, 70 to 75% of the former convicts return to lives of crime (Eckerd, 1988).

Punitive suppression and physical constraints are often the only options if the environment that controls the disapproved behavior does not otherwise change. An alternative approach is to arrange sufficiently strong positively reinforcing contingencies for acceptable behavior incompatible with the objectionable forms of behavior. Jack Eckerd's Family Youth Alternative program in Florida (Eckerd, 1988) has been a relatively successful experiment that strongly respects this principle to good effect. Though technologically preferable, that approach is often economically precluded. Instead, simpler and cheaper punitive arrangements prevail.

In the correctional environment described in this paper, punishment and immediate physical constraints are largely, though not entirely, irrelevant. The new controlling environment is arranged to have two principal properties: (1) Escape from the new environment must be precluded by impersonal physical constraints that do not interfere with the continuing careful adjustments of the behavior-controlling contingencies within the correctional environment. (2) Control of behavior within this new environment will come primarily from two sources: a variety of non-punitive behavioral processes openly arranged by the controllers and impersonal aversive consequences covertly designed into the system.

The Capability of Behaviorological Corrections

"Hardened" criminals have always frightened people, who see them as dangerous, but who often do not understand their behavior. In the simplistic view of most citizens, bad acts come out of bad people. Strong emotions have affected decisions about how to deal with criminals in custody, especially those whose crimes hurt the innocent: Michael Hagan, a 23 year old street gang member, with some friends, entered a rival gang's territory armed and looking for trouble, but found no

rival gang members (Hull, 1987). Instead, they encountered four teen-agers with no connection to gang activities. As the teen-agers fled, Hagan fired 15 shots at them—six into the back of a high school girl who worked in an ice cream parlor and had hoped to become a fashion model. In jail following his first-degree murder conviction, Hagan is quoted as saying, "I done did something, and I'm known. I consider myself public enemy No. 1" (Hull, 1987, p.21).

What should be done with such a criminal? As a practical matter, contacts with aversive stimuli produce the greatest decrease in behaviors that immediately precede them. For example, effective punishment for pulling a trigger occurs if the gun then explodes in the user's hands, or if the bullet ricochets back and hits the shooter, or, to a lesser but still significant extent, if the shot draws immediate and harmful return fire. The long delayed delivery of aversive stimuli in prison produces its greatest deterring effect on the immediately preceding behavior that puts the prisoner directly in contact with those aversive events. Thus most of the behavioral effects of encounters with punitive events in prison are much more evident in how the prisoner behaves during the remainder of his or her stay within the institution than in carry-over to very different outside environments.

Capital punishment is, of course, technically not punishment at all; it is riddance. In many cases it functions therapeutically for those who support the practice, and in theory it can be expedient, at least economically, insofar as it terminates the cost of maintaining a prisoner in custody. However, in our culture the cost of a death row convict's pre-execution appeals often runs to millions of dollars and exceeds the cost of imprisoning that person for life (e.g., "The Symbolic", 1988).

As a deterrent to potential criminals, the threat of capital punishment is about as effective as other common death threats: If you smoke, you might die of lung cancer; if you fail to fasten your seat belt, you might not survive a crash; if you consume excessive alcohol, you might be killed while driving home; if you join the military, you might fall in combat; if you commit particular felonies, you might be sentenced to death; if you exchange body fluids during sexual contacts, you might acquire a lethal virus. Descriptions of these consequences all deter, but, in general, relatively little—and nearly everyone agrees that far better solutions are realized through antecedent interventions that preclude rather than merely threaten. Even most persons enthusiastic about executing certain classes of criminals concede that preventing crime would be preferable.

Realistically, could people like Michael Hagan be rehabilitated for life in the community? At one level of analysis the answer is easy. It is yes. That conclusion is theory based: A program of conditioning has shaped the criminal's repertoire of antisocial behavior. So, through programs of deconditioning—including behavior change processes to eliminate inappropriate behavior, combined with the shaping of preferable alternative repertoires—the person *can* be overhauled behaviorally and put back into civic operation, a point also made by Ellis, 1991. However, like the insurance company that, for economic reasons, will often opt to "total" a badly damaged car rather than repair it, riddance of behaviorally defective persons is often the elected option—either by execution or by long term storage in a minimal cost facility.

Lifelong contact with contingencies that produced a person like Michael Hagan are evident even in the superficial media accounts (Hull, 1987): raised in slum squalor; deserted by the father when still a child; surrounded by evidence that gang activity produces powerful reinforcers; faced with the requirement of criminal activity for advancement in a gang; and forced into frequent changes of schools, which precluded significant non-gang relations with other types of people. When convicted for murder at age 23, Hagan had over a dozen years of special conditioning for criminal activities and had not acquired the skills to do anything else. Any effective program to make a respectable citizen out of such a person would have to extinguish a rather vast and long strengthened behavioral repertoire and replace it with an extensive alternative. The extremity of Hagan's intolerable condition suggests the required complexity and duration of any program that would reverse and redirect it.

The Human Economics of Corrections

The discipline of behaviorology is sufficiently powerful to support correction technologies capable of behaviorally overhauling a person like Hagan. But the cost is high, and everyone would have to be taxed to pay for the large portion that the convict's own labor would not cover. At one level of analysis, it is a simple economic problem: Do we terminate his sociocultural life, either by executing him at once or confining him to a cage until he dies, or do we pay for his behavioral repair? Scrap him, or fix him?

In our culture at large we have more people than we need. Resources are strained to maintain an already excessive and growing population, so one's individual worth as merely another basically acceptable individual is no longer applicable. In fact, to appeal to two well known ecological principles, (a) in a growing population the combined effects, even of worthwhile individuals, eventually become lethal in a closed ecological system and (b) all ecological systems are closed. A population expands exponentially until it exceeds the support capacity of its environment and then experiences a lethal equilibration—or a catastrophic die-off if the environment has been damaged.

Even if a need existed for more persons, producing new ones is usually more economical than reshaping behaviorally defective ones. That is because the arrangements to produce new people are already in place, dispersed throughout the population as a sort of primal cottage industry. The burden of that productivity is also accepted by the citizens as a personal responsibility at their own expense. Although we do tax ourselves to supplement the production of new people—for example, with subsidized schooling and welfare programs—we do not pay as much tax per individual for those production supplements as would be required to rehabilitate most criminals.

In addition, new humans, produced as finished persons without significant behavioral defects, tend to be more reliable than those with extinguished and subsequently reshaped repertoires, because the behavioral technology for those two remedial procedures is, in general, less well developed than the behavioral technologies for producing original persons. Original models also tend to begin

contributing to the culture at a younger age and have a longer useful life. New persons are in general thus deemed better prepared to fill any needs for more citizens than are reshaped ones, and are preferred—especially when the economic returns on production investments favor new ones anyhow. The validity of these views is obvious. For example, the slogan on the back cover of the *Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychotherapy* (e.g., vol.4, No.3) says "it's better to build a child than to repair an adult."

A common argument posits a moral obligation to reclaim behaviorally defective people at any cost, presumably because human beings are held sacred. But the notion that any human being is worthwhile only because it is alive is arbitrary and becomes increasingly impractical as population surpluses mount. When people are faced with stringent contingencies of survival and the selection of individuals is based on decisions by others, the usual prevailing criterion is the perceived relative quality of the behavioral repertoires of those under consideration. To cast the issue in a familiar form: Suppose that Albert Einstein, Moses, George Washington, Martin Luther King, and Adolph Hitler were alive and trapped together on a sinking ship, and the rescue helicopter could save only four of them. If the choice of whom to abandon were left to a panel of responsible persons, each of whom in the past has held that all human beings are in some fundamental way equally worthwhile, how many of them would actually treat this as a real dilemma, perhaps advocating that the choice be made by random draw?

On what bases then, can we justify the behavioral remaking of a criminal? First, regardless of the seriousness of the committed crimes, we might repair a person whose behavioral flaws are subject to an easy low-cost fix. Second, in rare instances an individual might possess a unique and valued repertoire that would justify the effort. Those special skills would have to have come from a history that cannot readily be duplicated, or else it would be preferable to shape a new person along those lines who would not concurrently be affected by antisocial contingencies. Third, by improving the behavioral technology of corrections, the remaking of persons could be accomplished more cost efficiently so that it would become worthwhile to salvage persons whose behavior problems were increasingly severe. Finally, laboratories are needed for research and development in how to produce a new and better behavioral technology of corrections, and a certain number of criminal subjects are needed to form the experimental prison communities operated for that purpose.

The Behaviorological Technology of Corrections

Because behaviorological corrections would be capable of accomplishing rehabilitation, to merely incapacitate a criminal would be wasteful and unnecessary. Also, a prison devoted to rehabilitation would lack the aversive character that deterrence requires, so deterrence would have to be largely accomplished outside of prison through the initial conditioning of citizens to behave in respectable ways.

Sentences

There would be no metered terms as punishment for crimes of metered severity. The person would simply remain in the corrections program until behavioral repairs were effected and rehabilitation accomplished. Such changes in the purposes for sending people to prison would have to be reflected in changes to laws and constitutions.

Precluding Escape

Within currently existing prison communities only a small though still significant fraction of the inmates attempt escape. Most inmates are heavily dependent on their supporting environment within the institutions and do not try to escape even when it is easy. Programs designed to produce more effective repertoires in inmates would have to produce balanced skill profiles lest supplying a few more skills merely serve to diminish dependency and lead to more escape activity. Clearly, a properly constructed program, while giving prisoners progressively more skills to produce reinforcing effects, must concurrently reduce the aversive conditions from which prisoners would attempt to escape.

To insure that the behaviorological engineers would not be preoccupied with preventing escapes, nor prisoners with escaping, prisons could feature passive and impersonal but naturally lethal environments through which any escape would have to be effected. For impersonal physical constraints to preclude escape yet not interfere with the new internal behavior controlling environment, a corrections facility might be located (a) on an island or on a flotation device surrounded by a body of water, (b) in high latitudes, or at high altitude, or in the desert, (c) underground or underwater, or (d) in a high-rise building. Importantly, the impersonal constraints must keep the prisoner in the facility and must do so without intrusive effect on the carefully contrived behavior controlling environment within the facility.

Ideally, a relatively low cost way might be found to render a prisoner *automatically* dependent on proximity to the institution, perhaps through some physiological intervention such that aversive feedback would increase with distance from the facility. The condition would approximate an addiction to the place.

With distance from the facility an escapee is increasingly uncomfortable and eventually immobilized, or, if still deemed dangerous, perhaps even dies—not directly at the hands of pursuing officers, but as a result of automatic contingencies of survival built into the person's behavior/environment relations. The impersonal consequence would be incurred beyond the ken of the residual community with little disruption there. This represents almost exactly a technologically contrived equivalent to life on an island so remote that inhabitants who would swim away would not survive. But the contrived approximation would offer the advantage of not having to locate the facility in such an expensively remote setting. We could expect the prisoners' adjustments to that circumstance to approximate the sociocultural adjustment of island dwellers anyplace to their insular habitats.

The prisoner who stays could go on about the business of living and would do so in an environment relatively rich in contingent reinforcers, a circumstance that makes life seem worthwhile. The institutional managers would be relatively free of concern with containment and, importantly, they would not become objects of the aversive conditioning that their otherwise necessary aversive containment activities would produce in the prisoners. This proposal approximates closely what prevails aboard ocean-going ships and prevent crew members from leaving. Though confinement is effective, the ship's officers are not held personally responsible for it.

Creating a Contingently Reinforcing Environment

Within the institution, behavioral controls would be used to produce appropriate prisoner behavior, with only limited supplements involving physical constraints or restraints. For example, substantial numbers of prisoners would be enrolled in vocational training programs in carpentry, plumbing, painting, and electrical work; others would participate in architectural design, landscape architecture, and interior design. Furniture making, cabinet making, and decorative arts would involve still more of the population. By focusing all of these training programs on the physical plant of the institution, inmates would develop a personal investment in its appearance and utility. Not only would the facility be beautiful and functional—a working in situ museum of design and architecture, most of its salient features would be the direct product of the inmates' labor. They would naturally feel proud of it, respect it, and look forward to its creative evolution and expansion.

A potentially popular feature of the institution would be a special graffiti wall where anyone could write anything. Properly functioning, it would reinforce prisoners' expressing themselves, enhance literacy skills (others quickly correct errors), offer amusement, reduce maintenance costs elsewhere in the institution, and provide useful feedback and research data for the managers and planners.

Unlike the somewhat haphazard shaping that usually produces effective criminal behavior, the corrections environment would be controlled carefully and completely to accelerate the reversal and reshaping processes. In the contingencies of reinforcement (Skinner, 1953, 1974) that control the behavior of prisoners, both punishing and reinforcing postcedent stimuli (Vargas, 1984, 1985) would have to be made stronger than those traditionally employed. To bring such stronger consequating variables into the correction strategies, primary reinforcers and other quality-of-life variables must be included in the arrangements. Everything of importance to living quality could be made contingent in some carefully designed way upon the kind of behavior necessary to the culture.

Traditionally, prisoners have retained rights, many of which have guaranteed noncontingent access to primary reinforcers. Although under the proposed programs all of those rights would be withdrawn in favor of strictly contingent access to primary reinforcers, the prisoners would not be without rights of another sort: They would retain rights to behavioral treatment for their restoration to citizenship. Success would not be guaranteed, but prisoners would be lawfully protected from self-serving exploitation, neglect, or other misuse by their keepers.

Under the behaviorological technologies that are possible when primary reinforcers become contingent variables, a prisoner's quality of life could vary across a much wider range than has been possible within traditional prisons, and the wider the better—from comfortable affluence to a lethal state of degradation, duplicating the range of conditions in the outside culture into which the person must eventually be reintegrated. Under the new behaviorological technology, access to water, food, shelter, heat, light, interpersonal sexual contact, and similar reinforcers would all be contingent upon exhibiting prescribed or approved behavior. Loss of contact with such strong reinforcers can, of course, be very aversive, and that would happen. But the technological emphasis would be on insuring that behavior could occur under positively reinforcing contingencies.

Depersonalizing the Controlling Contingencies

Depersonalization of the controlling contingencies, both aversive and nonaversive, is an important principle. It was evoked earlier in discussing how to reduce preoccupation with escape from the facility. While socially effective behavior is being reinforced and socially ineffective behavior is being extinguished (and if necessary, punished), consequences should follow as naturally as possible directly from an inmate's behavior and should be both automatic and immediate, or nearly so. In particular, aversive consequences should not be mediated conspicuously by staff members, because conspicuous mediators of aversive consequences themselves become targets of countercontrolling actions. This occurs not only in the form of violence and corruption, but also as incidents of petty spite (e.g., pulling buttons off of shirts sent by staff members to the prison laundry).

Within the institution, the problem of how to depersonalize the delivery of consequences would in part be solved by using a generalized reinforcer: For all kinds of appropriate behavior prisoners would earn a special kind of electronic money that has value only within the institution. Each prisoner would carry a photo identification/credit card with which to pay all bills and make purchases. Utilizing long-familiar credit card technology, the electronically read cards would be coded to identify the bearer and make automatic adjustments to that person's account. The cards might be waterproof and worn as necklaces. If lost or stolen, a card could be invalidated immediately and a new one issued. If conspicuously colored, they could be reissued at any time, with a change in color, thus devaluing counterfeit or out-dated cards as resources for illegal activity. Card reading devices would be in many locations, and the cards would be used not only for payments, but also for passage and access and to establish the location of individuals within the facility. Such card systems are now being supplanted by biometric security devices (Garcia, 1989) that are already widely manufactured. Extremely reliable, the computer memory in these systems stores data on certain personal characteristics of individuals.

Prisoners are to be paid for working, for maintaining their environments in good order, for engaging in special projects and tasks, and for making behavioral progress in their rehabilitation programs. Rates would be set individually for the accurate completion of each job, task, or increment of improvement. Inmates also would be

paid for their public service roles in the self-governance programs of the institution. All proper personal and civic behavior would "pay off" for the individual. However, unless that income were maintained by an individual at an appropriate level, that person's quality of life would diminish, simply because, in the special economy of the institution, that person would have to use that income to buy everything that he or she needed, including the absolute necessities. Each inmate would enjoy the quality of life that could be afforded on that person's income. The seemingly natural but aversive consequences of poverty, perceived by inmates as the inevitable indirect outcome of their own personal behavior patterns, would substitute for many of the staff-mediated punitive practices traditionally used to combat unacceptable behavior. These controlling contingencies gain special strength because they incorporate the basic essentials of life as well as less critical amenities.

Prisoners would also have to keep themselves clean, healthy, and presentable in public, but they would not be paid directly for that type of behavior. Rather, those sorts of behaviors would be enabling operations necessary for accessing various social and economic opportunities. Maintaining standards of cleanliness and dress would be a requirement for holding jobs, especially many of the more attractive ones, and for involvement in many kinds of reinforcing group activities. Likewise, those who would neglect health maintenance practices to the extent that they became unreliable on the job would experience similar consequences. Behaviorologically trained system managers would maintain reliability in those contingencies so that the consequences, favorable or adverse, would be encountered more inevitably than might occur in the outside culture.

In addition to the basic job, selected or assigned—and in addition to the basic education program and the self-management program, as well as any other basic tasks that generate a more or less regular income—the inmates would be given opportunities to earn supplementary income by doing odd jobs, special one-time only tasks, errands, or project work. A special desk maintained for persons seeking extra work could operate as Skinner (1948) suggested in Walden II. Available jobs would be posted along with the offered pay. An inmate who wanted a given task at the listed pay could request the assignment. Each completed job would be checked and approved before payment was delivered. If especially lucrative or appealing assignments became available and evoked significant competition, the opportunity might be made available by bid only (the job would go to the highest bidder). Through this work system, a variety of jobs important to the institution could be completed, prisoners could broaden their skills, and those assigned the tasks would be glad to perform them.

In the early stages of a prisoner's personal rehabilitation program, the demands would be modest and simple. The prisoner would be paid contingently, but on a schedule and in amounts established by behaviorological engineers responsible for his or her case. With that income, the prisoner would purchase water, food, hygienic supplies, air conditioning, heat, light, transportation, entertainment, exercise opportunities, short field trips (perhaps a simple stroll outdoors), visits with other inmates, and similar simple necessities—all according to price lists made clear to the individual.

Many of the fees would be small, but each prisoner would soon learn the importance of maintaining a personal current expense fund and the simple financial management practices necessary to keep it solvent. Economic counseling about practical matters would be provided free in the early stages of adjustment to the system—for example, "Don't spend too much on dinner or you won't be able to heat your room tonight or keep the light on until you are ready to sleep." Since the behavioral objectives would be made clear to the prisoners and credit automatically posted for meeting those objectives, the prisoners would not be inclined to regard the officials as directly involved in the contingencies of their survival. Such an arrangement also lowers the possibility of a manager acquiring too much personal power (see Ellis, 1991 for related arguments).

If prisoners neglected their developmental programs, destroyed property, broke rules, or engaged in any antisocial behavior, they simply could not earn as much income as before. They could find themselves without sufficient assets to maintain a pleasant or, at worst, even a viable existence. They might also find themselves cut off from opportunities for supplemental income earned by prisoners who had advanced more successfully in their personal redevelopment programs.

Although an individual's personal economic contract with the institution would always be adjusted to insure the *possibility* of survival with appropriate behavior, economic limits on the institution's capacity to divert resources to an individual case would preclude extensive *disproportionate* efforts in behalf of extreme cases. A rare individual, though theoretically recoverable, might remain a hopeless case for economic reasons. The person's economic condition could fall below critical minimums and that individual could eventually die. The direct causes of the deaths in such cases would probably be diseases of the kind that stem from inadequate diet, poor shelter, or other conditions characteristic of those who occupy the bottom strata in a graded economic system. This is similar to the circumstance now faced by persons living outside of prisons—except that those fortunate enough to be in the kind of prison proposed here will have a team of sensitive experts monitoring their cases, making helpful corrective adjustments to their economic options, and doing all possible within prevailing economic limitations to facilitate behavioral recovery.

If such deaths were to occur, each would measure both the state of the evolving behavioral technology in the system and the resource allocation limits for individual cases. With the state of the technology that can be supported by behaviorology, such events should be quite rare—far below the current level of prisoner executions or abandonments to neglectful decay in isolated confinement—and far below the level of similar deaths (attributed to natural causes) in the outside civilian population.

Institutional resources for any prisoner's behavioral reconstruction would be allocated through two channels: (a) administrative and applied behavior science systems that define the formal focus of the institution on each prisoner and (b) governmental and economic systems controlled by the inmates. Through programs of education and self-governance (discussed later in more detail), the prisoners themselves, as the ones who most directly bear the cost of fellow inmates with extreme behavioral maladaptations, would share the responsibility for setting economic limits on efforts to salvage the potentially hopeless cases. Through internal welfare arrangements controlled by their own government, citizens of the prison

community would be compelled to confront the issue of cost/benefit ratios in hard cases.

A core of civics courses offered through the prison education system would dwell on the behaviorological meaning and implications of humanitarianism, and prepare the prisoners themselves to debate and resolve questions about how much of the group's resources should be expended to produce an acceptable member of their community from a raw human resource exhibiting only remote behavioral approximations of what the final product must be. This approximates the exercise whereby taxpayers outside of prison decide at the ballot box on support limits for the recovery of errant or unsuccessful individuals.

Some individuals whose plight could deteriorate to levels critical for survival might be found to be physiologically defective persons instead of merely behaviorally mistrained ones. In such cases, those prisoners would be transferred out of the prison system to another agency established to deal with those who misbehave primarily because they have defective bodies rather than defective histories.

The Internal Economic System

Economic Classes

Through a natural sorting process, the prison community could be expected to exhibit an economic class system featuring a large middle class. Above would be a smaller affluent class, and beneath a similar sized poverty class. Entry into the system for everybody would be at the poverty level, from which each person would be encouraged to rise, an arrangement reminiscent of the poor immigrant confronting the American dream. Economic status and change in status would remain dependent variables, functions of the behavior of individuals.

The reasons for such an economic class system in the prison are, first, that its development represents a kind of establishing operation upon which the functioning of the economic system depends; and second, that the American culture at large features such a system. The behaviorological corrections program presented in this article merely accepts these facts. Prison systems for different cultures might feature different socio-economic class systems reflecting the respective cultures in which they operate. Those who cannot contribute effectively to the success of the group are never able to earn as large a share of the group's resources as the more effective contributors.

At The Individual Level

The "humanization" of a person is the program that conditions effective behaviors that are also fair with respect to the interests of other people. If reinforcers are acquired noncontigently, that conditioning does not occur, and technically cannot occur. As a matter of scientific principle, one makes no progress toward becoming a "better person" simply by receiving reinforcers in some automatic way without relevance to one's behavior. Rights that noncontingently guarantee such reinforcers obstruct the behavioral remaking of a misconditioned person.

With their earnings, prisoners must purchase virtually everything. They must pay their own utility bills. They must rent their quarters and rent or purchase the furnishings. They must rent or lease any institutional equipment they use. They must buy all of their own food; they must buy or rent all of their own clothing. They must purchase all but their most basic educational programs, their recreational opportunities, their transportation, and their passes for both internal and external travel. The economy is adjusted so that better conditions are always available and always attainable, contingent on some further increment of desirable behavior—much of which would be delineated in each prisoner's personal behavior redevelopment program.

Food

A newcomer, or a destitute trouble maker, might be able to afford little more than a bowl of unappealing though nutritious provender passed into a drab barred room through a slot. Small earnings for modest behavior management practices would provide the resources to order slightly better food. With a bit more income, the prisoner might rent a key to the cell door enabling that person to go purchase food in a rather plain dining room serving common fare. A slight improvement in means might allow the inmate to eat in a pleasant and attractive cafeteria offering a variety of better prepared foods at proportionately higher prices. Available at still greater cost might be substantially finer foods served in a special dining area, perhaps with music, a view, and attractive surroundings. A large facility might even have a small exclusive room featuring table service and food comparable to that offered by the better restaurants where appropriately cultured and sufficiently wealthy prisoners could entertain guests or visitors from outside the institution. The critical aspect, of course, remains the extraordinary quantities of appropriate behavior and rates of progress that would be required to attain such a life style and maintain it. And only behavior exhibited within the institution would count. No financial credit would be granted for a history of success on the outside prior to one's incarceration.

Home

In the living quarters, a prisoner might first escape the initial drab holding cell by renting, at low cost, a niche in a shared accommodation. From there the prisoner might become able to rent successively less crowded space, perhaps moving from a four-person cell to a three person dormitory room; then to a double, and eventually to a single, provided the person could afford the successively higher rents. This would correspond to a series of moves, outside of prison, into successively better neighborhoods. A person could rent or lease a better mattress, a rug for the floor, pictures, chairs, lamps, desks, small refrigerator, television, radio, tape deck, or other items. To make such items function as effective reinforcers, prisoners would be allowed to see them on display, perhaps by being encouraged to browse through the commissary and to visit other prisoners who have acquired such items.

School

In the prison school, each person would be paid for his or her academic progress. An individual could rent an office in which to study, perhaps a study carrel in a learning center, but still a quiet and adequate place to work (Cohen, Filipczak, Bis, Cohen, & Larkin, 1970). Those in job training programs could rent more specialized tools and job-related equipment with which to advance into successively higher levels of the training program and thereby gain access to the higher pay scales attached both to progress in those more advanced courses and subsequently to the actual jobs requiring those skills. Directly and indirectly, prisoners would pay for the advanced training that would allow access to the better paying and often more personally satisfying jobs.

Sex

Sexual contact, one of the most powerful reinforcers to which members of our species are susceptible, would be utilized fully as a behavior controlling variable in this system. Limited experiments with sexual contact as a contingent reinforcer have been tried in some conventional prisons. Hopper (1969) described the widely known program at the Mississippi State Penitentiary that allowed married male prisoners to receive private conjugal visits from their wives for purposes of sexual contact. The privilege was subsequently extended to female inmates (Mississippi Department of Corrections, 1991). Hopper also mentioned similar practices in other countries. What is proposed here would go much further. Because the proposed prison community would be closed and controlled, the spread of disease, including sexually transmitted diseases, could be controlled through such measures as the thorough and comprehensive medical testing of newcomers, preliminary quarantine of new inmates, frequent and comprehensive medical testing of all inmates, and the rapid isolation or relocation of infected individuals. Thus the institution could be maintained as a much more sex-safe environment than the outside community.

Prison programs must not only incorporate sexual reinforcers into the general behavior controlling arrangements of the corrections program, but also must shape social/sexual skills that are more effective in certain ways than the normal practices in the ambient society. The prison educational system (discussed in detail in a later section) would feature core instruction in interpersonal relations.

Social-sexual contact would be available, but access to it would remain contingent on proper behavior under controls managed through the economic system of the prison community. Initially, heterosexual men and women inmates would live separately, but with modest economic progress, would be able to share certain public facilities, programs, events, and other aspects of everyday life—all contingent upon being able to afford the price of participation, since a social relations surcharge would be attached to any opportunities for heterosexual social contact. To be near members of the opposite sex would require the income to pay for that privilege. For the socially unskilled, specially managed social events would be arranged; some form of dating and match-making services would be employed to bring potentially compatible people into social contact with one another. For occasions of social/sexual contact, inmates could rent appropriate facilities available in different quality levels

according to what could be afforded. They could also purchase access to conjugal visits from medically and socially approved persons living outside of the institutions.

Parallel programs for homosexual prisoners would also be developed, but would obviously operate differently. Homosexual prisoners of either sex would be identified through special testing programs for all prisoners entering the system. They would be assigned to quarters characterized either by isolation or contact with persons who were sexually uninteresting to them (depending on the other aspects of their respective socialization profiles). That is, these persons would be placed among others in social living units in ways that would create minimal social disruption, but that concurrently would insure the temporary sexual isolation of the newcomers. Effeminate males might even be housed with lesbian women in certain cases, or they might be assigned quarters in larger group facilities somewhat like bunkhouses or open dormitories where various social misfits might live together under a code of mutual tolerance for their respective social peculiarities. From these initial domestic holding patterns, characterized by reasonable social adaptations except for sexual deprivation, homosexual men and women inmates could then begin to take advantage of the same sort of economic pathways to sexual satisfaction available to the heterosexual population.

Given a sufficient income earned by progressing in their respective personal development programs, homosexuals could afford social contact opportunities with other homosexuals (e.g., attendance at social events, work assignments shared with sexually interesting partners, occasional access to pleasant facilities for sexual contacts, and ultimately, shared living quarters). Special social events and occasions of interest primarily to homosexuals would be permitted and open to those who could afford to participate. In general, the ultimate goal in the personal socialization programs of homosexual inmates would be the individual's participation in a normal, socially healthy, viable homosexual community, a community that would be appropriately interfaced with, and (in nonsexual contexts) integrated with, the heterosexual community at large.

Regardless of the sexual preferences of an inmate, conjugal visits with persons from outside the institution could be purchased. There would be no restrictions on the sex of either participant or on the legally defined social relationship of the couple. However, a visitor would have to be approved by the prison administrators as a nondetrimental social contact and be medically certified to be free of communicable diseases.

Sexual deprivation could remain a condition of those afflicted with sexually communicable diseases, at least until the condition could be cured or a similarly afflicted partner could be found. Sexual deprivation would also be the temporary lot of those whose behavior was so inappropriate that their consequent impecuniosity precluded access to market-valued social/sexual opportunities.

The key to good social relations is making oneself the source of reinforcers for present or potential partners. In general, citizens of the prison community would learn to use their resources to arrange pleasant social circumstances for others who, in turn, would provide social reinforcers to them.

In cases where strong and appropriate relations developed, and the couple's joint economic means permitted it, a couple could not rent appropriate quarters and live

together. Birth control practices would be a strongly conditioned social expectation within the prison community. Any pregnancies that could not be accommodated would either be aborted immediately upon detection, or the couple transferred to a more accommodating facility. In any case, child bearing would be a right extended only to those inmates who were prepared to assume the responsibilities of parenthood and who were prepared to produce a new person likely to contribute positively to society. Child rearing and the education of children might become the focus of certain institutional rehabilitative and educational programs in which inmates could participate.

Drugs, including tobacco and liquor

Drugs (in the currently popular sense of that term) would neither be available nor tolerated within the institution. Although the use of tobacco would not be permitted in the institution for health reasons, and persons accustomed to tobacco use would be required to use their incarceration as an occasion to quit, the moderate use of alcoholic beverages would be permitted on a strictly controlled basis. Alcoholic beverages might be available with food in some locations. A tavern or pub might be available, which alcoholic prisoners could not even enter. (Alcoholics would be enrolled in a behaviorological version of Alcoholics Anonymous.) Consumption would be strictly metered electronically, perhaps even according to individually programmed allowances, so that excess consumption would not be possible. But the powerful gustatory and social reinforcers would be available, within health related limits, to those qualified prisoners whose behavior also sustained an income sufficient to afford access to them.

Personal development

As an inmate became an increasingly skilled self-manager, the person's "general level of reinforcement" (Cautela, 1994) would increase as a direct result of that person's own effective behavior. Emulating the behavior of role models would become less important, and fad-following would diminish. On the economic front, successful progress in a prisoner's personal development program could earn that individual access to a growing line of personal credit, which, to retain, the person would have to learn to manage. One's current credit limit would be a somewhat public indicator of one's personal progress and could become a source of personal pride.

At The Interpersonal Level

An individual might go into business, perhaps by providing a service, or by trading in commodities. After purchasing a business license and becoming a registered and approved business person within the institution, an individual might advertise and solicit business from inmates, staff, and even visitors. Obvious entrepreneurial possibilities include paralegal researcher, scribe, barber, furniture maker, advocate, trader, repairman, cobbler, computer use consultant, and entertainer. Inmates who had been certified health care providers prior to incarceration might be licensed to operate as private professionals who would rent

their facilities and equipment and charge fees for their services. An inmate might offer a specialized food service (e.g., operating cart from which to peddle popcorn, hot dogs, or snow balls). The unusual economic system might also create entrepreneurial opportunities uncommon in prisons such as interior decorator, pawn broker, and investment counselor.

The previously described job desk might be run by a partnership of inmates who would jointly purchase the operating franchise and then run it as an employment agency with a small percentage fee charged to each person accepting a work assignment. The operating cartel would in turn be required to purchase currency, used to pay workers, from the institution administration. To inject money into the system by way of the contingency management scheme, the institutional managers could decrease the value of the money purchased by the operators of the job agency to pay the workers (that is, the amount paid by the job service operators to purchase $10 to pay workers might be reduced from $6 to $2). (To the job agency operators this salary-targeted currency would be illegal tender treated only as another commodity consumed in their business operation. The operators would have to earn their personal monetary incomes through client fees.) This injection of funds would allow the job agency to provide higher salaries and offer more jobs (which could also be required by the prison administration so that the injected funds would be dispersed quickly throughout the general economy).

Electronic accounting maintained by the administration would prevent illegal fund transfers. The operators would be under contingencies to seek out a wide variety of job opportunities in order to offer attractive options in their job market. The community would benefit when increasing numbers of inmates took advantage of those opportunities to earn more money and contribute more to the economy of the whole system.

Cause and interest groups might be permitted to operate, either on a profit or nonprofit basis. Clear statements of purposes and nature, perhaps in the form of by-laws, would be required for permission and recognition. Dues could be required of members. An operating fee would be attached to profit-making status, should the group seek to be licensed as such.

Contests of all socially acceptable kinds could be sponsored featuring individuals or groups. Sports leagues would enable a public interest to be developed and exploited in the form of ticket sales for games. Teams might be owned by prisoners who could afford to purchase the operating franchises and then operate them as businesses. Exceptionally skilled players could be recruited and paid salaries, creating economic niches for inmate professional athletes.

In addition to the behaviorologically trained staff economists available to provide economic counseling to fledgling entrepreneurs, licensed free-lance economic counselors might emerge from the inmate population. With the purchase of their business licenses, they would be permitted to operate for client fees. They would develop economic self-management plans for other inmates who, without guidance, would tend to mismanage their resources and options. This, and other private operations would be permitted to compete in the market place with certain staff-provided services.

All accounts books for inmate controlled business activities would be computerized, and staff auditors would have on-going unilateral access to them. The right to incur interpersonal indebtedness would be withheld until earned. At first, interpersonal indebtedness would not be permitted except between eligible customers or clients and parties licensed by the institutional administration to do business with them (e.g., an inmate could buy a haircut or a hotdog but could not incur a currency-backed gambling debt). In general, the privilege of incurring private interpersonal debts backed by personally controlled, intrainstitutional, electronic currency would be extended only to prisoners in highly advanced stages of their personal development programs—and only then with strict accounting that would prevent socially unacceptable private transactions.

At The Agency or Large Group Level

In this economically based corrections system money is made to be important to every inmate, because almost all variables that define quality of life depend on a person's monetary income and cash flow. Investments of surplus capital, however modest, would be a readily available option for supplementing one's income. In this system, prisoners who would otherwise give no thought to investments of any kind would find themselves predisposed to consider that approach to income enhancement.

A large and complex institutional economic system makes possible larger scale solutions to economic problems. For example, the computer based economic systems of different correctional institutions could be merged into a common market creating an even larger economic system. This would facilitate resource pooling and broaden both the search territory for investors and the range of investment opportunities. On the basis of an electronically distributed prospectus, a prisoner in Maine could invest a day's wages in an inmate operated tie-dye apparel shop opening in an Oregon institution. Four examples of additional investment opportunities will be discussed.

Insurance

Prisoners confront several kinds of important hazards. Possessions might be stolen; individuals might suffer behavioral relapses that jeopardize previous economic gains; a fire could strike at any time; and emotionally volatile associates might physically harm one or damage one's property. Insurance to cover simple medical bills could be much in demand.

A group could form an insurance company to offer easily affordable policies. They would provide simple coverage on a scale tailored to the cash value of whatever might be important to inmates. Protection could be purchased for assets earned through great personal effort, perhaps over a long period of time.

The insurance company might be launched with a fair-interest loan provided by the institution administration or with capital contributed by inmate investors. Or the administration could start it as a demonstration project and then sell it to a group of inmates who would have acquired the skills to operate it. Such enterprises would also create the equivalent of corporate-related jobs (e.g., insurance salesperson, actuary, accountant, etc.), which would, in turn, stimulate the sale of the requisite preparatory training to upwardly mobile inmates.

Banking and credit services

Cash in the form of paper money and coins would not exist. The institutional managers would keep all money or credit "in the bank" through the computer based electronic accounting operation. A modest rate of interest would be paid on an individual's holdings.

But a group of inmate investors could form a "private" bank or credit union into which other inmates could transfer all or part of their accumulated assets. The potentially higher interest on those investments would be determined by the market conditions in that bank's loan and investment operations. Loans would be made available to prisoners for personal improvement projects or other activities that would enhance their earning powers. Loans could also be made available to start businesses or initiate other private investments. As substitute for at least some of the normally required collateral, loan applicants whose records would justify the procedure could post their extensive personal reliability data bases maintained in the system management computers of the institution. It is a far more reliable approach to securing a loan than borrowing on one's signature. Repayment arrangements could feature options such as automatic income deductions or personally initiated repayments adjusted according to earnings.

To bolster the confidence of depositors, and insure stability, a private bank, operated by an inmate cartel, would pay insurance premiums to the institutional administration for a small scale in-house version of the kind of protective coverage offered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Nor would the owner-operators of failed businesses, including banks, be permitted to shield themselves behind a corporate veil. If a business failed and investors or depositors lost money, all administrators of that business would be required to suffer personal bankruptcy.

Stock market

Capital to launch or expand prison businesses could be raised by selling stock to inmates. A stock exchange could be operated, and individuals could be licensed to sell stocks and offer stock investment counseling. Prisoners could maintain portfolios of acquired stocks and "play the market" (a kind of socially sanctioned gambling) for both fun and profit, possibly supplementing their incomes both with dividend payments and profit-taking liquidations. Prison newspapers would carry the prison system stock market reports.

Publishing

A group of individuals could pool their resources and go into the publishing business. In addition to a general institution-wide newspaper or newsletter, special purpose newsletters or reports could also be published and sold to subscribers, for example, a chronicle of legal decisions, changes in laws, and other matters of interest to prisoners concerned with their own cases and those of other inmates. A swap-and-trade newsletter might have market possibilities as might publications offering amusement. An occasional substantial literary work of potential interest to the prison community might be published and marketed, along with all sorts of "how-to" manuals aimed at the needs of this special community. Income could be

generated through advertising purchased by inmates and prison businesses. Individuals could purchase subscriptions or buy single copies at vending locations.

Management of Private Outside Capital

Because the proposed behavior management system is economically based, a prisoner would not be permitted to convert real money into institutional money or credit. Prisoners would not receive or contact their outside assets while in the prison system. All such assets would be placed in escrow. Prisoners could be permitted to manage those resources, but they could not benefit directly or immediately from them in any way while in prison nor use them as collateral for any financial purpose, either private or public within the institutional economic system. The only income permitted to a prisoner would be that validly earned within the economic system of the institution, and only with that income could the prisoner participate in the system.

Governance

A community of hard working citizens with assets and investments to protect soon creates group needs for certain kinds of public services typically provided and administered by governmental agencies.

After people gain appropriate behaviors and acquire assets by exercising those skills, they act to maintain the kind of culture that supports such activity. Initiative for governance would follow naturally from the creation of significant personal interests protectable only through the mechanisms of government. government operations, focused on real issues of concern to the population, would necessarily operate largely by manipulating, and responding to, the contingencies of the economic system. Its power and authority would be delegated to it by the institution administration.

The details of how to organize a government appropriate for this institution would be taught in the prison education system. Although the government would assume an appropriate autonomy, its design, development, and maintenance would serve as on-going experiments pursued in part by way of the education system.

In such a government, the balance of control between inmates and institutional managers would be a delicate matter. It appears appropriate to effect a general division of power such that the institutional managers draft the constitution under which the government shall operate and establish operational policy. The institutional managers would also retain a judicial branch of the government that functions like a Supreme Court to hear and rule on constitutional questions. In that way the institutional managers could preserve the technical integrity of the governmental system while preventing inappropriate government-induced drifts in the behaviorological nature of the operations. A new kind of position in behaviorological jurisprudence would emerge naturally out of such governmental operations.

Because prisoners have failed as effective citizens on the outside and are in prison to acquire the skills of citizenship, they might not yet be prepared to exercise voting privileges free of inappropriate biases against minorities (e.g., race, gender, or sex related). Such problems might be addressed constitutionally through quota

systems or through the use of election ballots describing potential behavioral qualifications for candidates to fill an office. The electorate then votes for a set of skills instead of for a "person". The office could then go to the person among all qualified candidates who could score highest on a relevant performance test. One simple device for insuring the representative characteristic of government would be to permit any political faction, regardless of the issues around which it coalesced, to identify itself through petitions signed by its members. Seats in government and government subdivisions would then be apportioned to representatives of each recognized faction, functioning as a political party, according to its relative numerical strength. Each inmate could affiliate with one, but only one, such political party at a time, or with none, and could vote in general elections whether so affiliated or not.

Four kinds of group needs will be mentioned around which the government structure might coalescence: The need for law and order, the need for welfare services, the need for health care, and the need for tax revenues.

Law and Order

The loss of hard won personal gains, fear of crime, and intimidation by bullies sap the vitality of any kind of community, prisons included. But a prison is full of people who are skilled at antisocial shortcuts to their reinforcers. These are problems shared by all members of the community and can be addressed most effectively, not at the individual level, but at the group level (see Skinner, 1953, Chapters 20 & 21).

Consequences for antisocial behavior would be sure, swift, and effective, but as harmless as possible. Temporarily tolerable kinds of antisocial behavior would probably be treated, to the extent possible, with differential reinforcement of alternative behavior and thus be left to extinguish. But dangerous and disruptive behavior would be followed by isolations as appropriate, quick hearings and reviews, and consequential readjustments of status. Typical consequences might include loss of opportunities to supplement income, loss of jobs, and similar setbacks that would have aversive economic implications. The offenders would quickly find their quality of life noticeably decreased, because in the economically driven life of this prison community, a diminished income would soon have a variety of indirect and impersonal adverse consequences (as is true outside of prison). For example, a person who beats and robs somebody might, in addition to paying restitution, be disqualified from his or her job and for lack of the rent money be evicted from quarters. The person's only option at that point might be to accept hard labor, perhaps on a prison farm in a job paying very low wages. The individual might find it necessary to work hard all day just to get enough plain food to avoid frequent hunger and to rent scant nightly shelter from the cold and rain.

No personal aggression would be permitted, even by the prison community's own police officers. The socio-economic system would replace dependence on the gang and any functional need for personal retribution. Some of the law and order officials—police, counselors, and others—might be specially trained and supervised inmates who would simply have those kinds of jobs in the system. Those who exercised authority over others might be elected to their jobs from the ranks of qualified candidates and serve at the pleasure of the electorate over whom their

authority is exercised. However selected, they would be highly trained. Above all, they would not be conditioned to experience personal reinforcement by subjugating the offenders with whom they would work. Their reinforcers would be centered in the effectiveness and efficiency with which they could effect desirable behavior changes supportive of the interests of the community that they would be serving, including those of the offenders.

Welfare

The education system would have to instruct the population on economic realities so that the people would, through their government, invest their resources in appropriately targeted welfare operations. Of obvious beneficial potential are peer counseling for newcomers, support functions for long termers who exhibit chronic behavioral weakness, productive retirement options for seniors, and self-management counseling for everybody. Tangible noncontingent welfare benefits would have no place in the institution. Access to welfare benefits by those who need them would come in the form of special opportunities to earn—in some cases custom fitted as necessary to the individual. Thus, in part through protections afforded by the community's own government welfare programs, no individual would be forced into destitution without the opportunity either to prevent it or escape it through appropriate behavior.

Health Care

Modern health care is expensive, even in prison. Since inmates would have to pay for their health care, some sort of universal health insurance arranged through the prison government would be in demand. It would become the responsibility of that government to develop such health care plans, to set appropriate limits on costs and coverages, and to implement those plans through the internal electronic economic system.

Taxation

To pay for activities that the government would deem necessary for law and order, public safety, welfare, health care, and similar programs, the internal government might have to levy taxes, perhaps on income or sales. The education system would have the burden of preparing the citizenry to assume the rather onerous and abstract responsibility for self-taxing, a formidable educational task not often well accomplished even in the outside culture. The approach is first to produce demands for particular kinds of services, and then to let the recipients face the realities of taxation to pay for something that they already need, want, and expect.

Administrative Salaries

Some opportunities would exist within the institution for inmates to set salaries for themselves or for other inmates. However, strict limits would preclude excessive

salary levels for administrators and other officials. Salary increase scales would be more linear than exponential. No privileged economic class, defined primarily by noncontingently excessive salaries, could emerge and perpetuate itself within the institution.

Education

The prison education system would be one of the largest programs. It would play a central role in preparing people to make the other correction subsystems function properly. Certificates, transcripts, and diplomas, ultimately transferable to outside education institutions, could be issued when earned.

Core Curriculum

For a certain core curriculum, everybody would have to go to school. This curriculum would feature basic skills in reading, writing, speaking, computing, and social etiquette. Individual prescriptions for training would be based on detailed diagnoses of skill deficiencies. Prisoners would be taught how behaviorally to present themselves effectively in public. Additionally, the curriculum would teach the special structure and function of the prison community, especially its economic system and its governance.

The entire institution would function as a civics lab, and the education curriculum would be heavily focused upon its internal workings. A strong emphasis would be placed on teaching the interrelations between social and economic systems. Finally, the core curriculum would teach the skills of personal self-management in as much depth as possible. Students in this core curriculum would earn income for their academic progress—not in the sense of being paid to sit in class, but rather for meeting the behavioral objectives (motor, verbal, and emotional) of their respective training programs.

The basic education system would also have to focus on personal civic responsibility for a special reason. Many prisoners originally got into trouble by behaving in some anti-cultural way that paid better than more legitimate pursuits. Within the proposed prison such an inmate, who also learned quickly, might self-adjust within a short time to an exemplary mode of prescribed behavior, again because in such a prison that mode of behavior would pay more than any other. However, such a well behaved and hence economically successful prisoner could remain susceptible to self-serving contingencies that would portend a return to lucrative criminal activity when it again became the sort of activity that paid the most. The education system would have to diagnose that behavioral weakness and condition that kind of inmate so that the integrity of the ambient culture functioned as a strong conditioned reinforcer not to be degraded by advancing one's own economic interests at its expense.

Intermediate Curriculum

Qualified students would be admitted, upon their application, to an intermediate job training curriculum to prepare for positions requiring special complex skills.

There too, students would be paid for their progress. Other students would enter vocational training programs featuring apprenticeships in labor occupations, and they also would receive compensation for progress. Again, the incentives would be economic. Only with the jobs accessible through such training could incomes rise to levels necessary to access a wide variety of deliberately conditioned reinforcers of the kind that denote the "good life".

Advanced Curriculum

Advanced training for even more lucrative positions at what might be regarded as a professional level might also be made available, but on a tuition pay basis, and would amount to the institutional equivalent of college. Students would pay for the opportunity to acquire skills in those programs and would work to put themselves through school at that level. They could also attend courses in traditional subjects at the higher education level, again contingent on payment of fees.

Private schooling

Instruction in hobbies, games, sports, and entertaining intellectual pastimes could also be available on a tuition basis, as could courses in less practically relevant but potentially interesting academic subjects. These less critical curricular areas might be featured more in private schools operated by inmates on a strict tuition basis. Such private schools, operated as business ventures, would be licensed in a quality controlling way by the education division of the institution's administration.

School taxes

Essential schooling could be entirely subsidized by the institution, but important lessons in civic responsibility accrue to those who must deal with the realities of how best to pay for such "free" public education. To avoid the loss of that opportunity, the basic prison schools would be supported at least in part by a school tax imposed by the internal government. Even though the funding might originally enter into the economic system by way of a monetary reserve system administered by the institutional administration, it would reach the schools indirectly by way of taxes extracted from the general economy of the community.

Socially Stratified Prisoner Population

The social, political, and economic complexity of the prison community described in this paper reflects that which exists in the culture at large and requires a socially stratified population. Well educated, white-collar criminals, traditionally sent to minimum security facilities presumably to be punished by the mere humiliation of being there, would no longer be wasted in that manner. All prisoners would go to the same prison facility, which would offer a model of life in a big city that included all kinds of people in all kinds of conditions. Flight to white collar prison suburbs would not be an option; sophisticated prisoners would have to use their skills to improve the community in which all would be confined in common.

Members of this more skilled inmate class would face major intellectual and professional challenges as participants in a sophisticated social science laboratory where they would contribute as valuable human resources. From the time they arrived until they left, the white collar criminals would find themselves in the functional equivalent of a graduate program in sociocultural development. Their intellectual skills would find outlets in the business, professional, governmental, and educational operations of the prison community. Varied, multifaceted operations important in the correction and resocialization of less skilled inmates would become a responsibility of this highly educated subset of prisoners.

Individually, they would tend to fare well in the economic system of the community—not because of special privileges, but because of their high capacities to earn within the internal economic system of the prison. Most of them would probably earn enough to rise quickly from the initial poverty and enjoy a life style equal to, or exceeding, that possible in the current minimum security prisons to which they are now dispatched. But in the behaviorological, heterogeneous prison community, they would, by virtue of their skills, assume new and higher levels of social responsibility. The general prevailing economic contingencies within the prison, to which white-collar criminals tend to be sensitive as a result of their histories, would largely insure their constructive and enthusiastic participation. Special training to shape the skills manifested in ways called "social responsibility" would also be directed to this group both as a programmed motivational supplement to strengthen their participation in prison cultural operations and as an aspect of their respective individual rehabilitation programs.

Transition to Life Outside

As a prisoner's behavior progressively improved, the prisoner's environment would be adjusted through a series of transitions in the controlling contingencies to more closely approximate those prevailing in the outside culture. Eventually, the relatively consistent contingencies that had been arranged throughout the earlier correction phases would be blended into increasingly inconsistent contingencies more closely approximating the often conflicting mix of controls operating in the culture at large. Thus, a prisoner's skills of judgment and self-management would be tested for adequacy before that person left the system. A candidate for release would be guided through a program of exercises designed to assess the adequacy of an inmate's problem-solving skills when facing such conflicts. Initially that would be done within the context of the person's normal prison routine and would involve variables in the economic, social, governmental, and other cultural subsystems. It would all seem natural.

Increasingly, certain activities and exercises in prisoners' advanced transition programs could take place outside the institution and would involve the person in various facets of life in the outside community. The person might join organizations, become employed, go to school, engage in interpersonal relationships, or pursue other activities anchored in the outside culture. The individual would at some point be permitted to begin developing an independent personal economic system based in real dollars and managed through outside financial institutions. Money earned in

outside jobs would in most cases enable the initiation of such a personal program of independent economy. If a prisoner, wealthy before entering prison, had substantial frozen assets and after release would probably be living wholly or in part by managing those resources, the prisoner in this phase of transition might be allowed to resume some degree of personal management of those resources and to take some limited but real dollar profits from that activity. For a time, each person in transition would operate concurrently in both economic systems—the intrainstitutional and the outside systems—although transfers of currency between those systems would not be permitted.

The person would not be released from prison in the traditional sense. When the individual's self-management and social responsibility programs were satisfactorily completed and the person's outside-based personal economic system was strong enough, any lingering contingencies binding the person to the institution would be relaxed; thereafter, the person could simply move out at his or her discretion. After a reasonable period, and with continued demonstration that the person could be self-sufficient on the outside, the individual could be encouraged to leave by increasing the economic cost of staying. This would be done by manipulating the person's status in the internal economic system of the institution. Any further state subsidy of the person's stay would be terminated or disallowed, and the person would have to purchase his or her own institutional money with real dollars earned outside at increasingly realistic exchange rates that eventually could become negative. Thus, the person could be made to pay, at increasingly overpriced rates, for the privilege of remaining anchored to the institution.

The person would never be forced to leave for other kinds of reasons. If the person did not leave as the economic penalty of staying became great enough to call into question the person's judgment, that demonstration of irrational dependence would simply be taken as evidence that the transition program had missed the mark. If, under those contingencies, the person did not go, the person clearly would not be ready to go. Some further conditioning for independence would be arranged.

A complex and sophisticated prison community of the kind featured in this proposal depends heavily on the contributions and leadership of a mature, well trained subset of the prisoner population. In contemporary prisons, most inmates stay only for short terms and would not have time to acquire the skills in advanced civics necessary to make this model work effectively. However, most contemporary short-term inmates would be retained in the proposed prison system for longer intervals of time, because the objectives of the new system would go far beyond those entertained in today's prisons.

Convicts would find themselves in a citizenship academy with the equivalent of a degree to earn. A few who might otherwise successfully depart could be offered opportunities to stay in the system as a career track. From among that subset could come recruits for more formal advanced training in behaviorological corrections, perhaps in college and university degree programs in that field. Having been through the system might eventually become an important prerequisite for a professional staff position to share in operating it.

The Science Underlying Public Acceptance of The Concept

The social values required of those who would support, maintain, and operate the system of behaviorological corrections described in this paper differ in many respects from the values in our present culture. A reader might experience a twinge of aversive emotional arousal at some features of the new prison concept (as did the author when first describing them). But one's feelings are not necessarily useful guides to cultural change, because those feelings themselves are arbitrary behavioral products of whatever arrangements for respondent conditioning have been in place.

Proposals to change sociocultural values are facilitated when values and ethic are defined as in the Introduction of this article (for more detail, see Fraley, 1994b). If particular rights claims are shared in common by many people, group sanctions and protective arrangements can be established by organizations created largely for that purpose—among them, social agencies such as law, government, education, and religion (Skinner, 1953, chapters 21-26).

Punitive enforcement practices, impinging on individuals from these and other agencies within the culture or subculture, respondently condition aversive emotional reactions elicited automatically on future occasions of any deviation from the strictures of the punitive ethical community, an aversive emotional condition from which one then escapes by doing what is expected by the community, "doing one's duty," or "facing up to a difficult situation." These desirable behavioral outcomes thus occur under the behavioral process called negative reinforcement. (Fraley, 1994a; Skinner, 1953, Chap. 12.) So, acts said to be guided by one's conscience, as well the rights that one claims for oneself or others, are all relative and arbitrary. A person's convictions and the emotions that bolster those beliefs are characteristics produced by, and reflecting the peculiarities of, one's culture or subculture.

Public acceptance of the concept of corrections presented in this article might have to await a higher level of public sophistication with respect to a science of human behavior. The concept of prison must change toward the concept of academy, in this case, one devoted to economically based civics. It is to be supported by the public in the same spirit as a college or university is supported, and for many of the same reasons.

Of course, the behaviorological model presented in this paper would have to bend to the temper of engineering realities. But that is the normal expectation for technological development and remains a matter different from public readiness for the implications of a more sophisticated and advanced science of behavior.

Summary And Discussion

Behaviorologists will recognize that this roughly sketched system of corrections draws on ideas from Walden II (Skinner, 1948), especially the community economic system, and Cohen's (1973) experiments at the National Training School for Boys in Washington, D.C. (Cohen, Goldiamond, Filipczak, & Pooley, 1968; Cohen, et al., 1970). Similar experiments have occasionally been tried in settings other than prisons, for example, Ernest Vargas (personal communication, December, 1987) has described a training program that he designed in the late 1960s for community action

organizers. Primary reinforcers were made contingent on the trainees emitting prescribed behavior during their attendance at a training camp.

Critics, accustomed to traditional aversive controls imposed on convicts, point to the present overcrowded prisons, some housing violent and misconditioned persons like Michael Hagan, and insist that the socialization of such "animals" is unrealistic. However, under the arrangements set forth in this paper, those who would enter this system exhibiting the kind of behavior that characterizes Hagan would neither range at large disrupting the cultural system of the prison community nor be abandoned "as is" in caged isolation. Such a person would quickly be subjected to rather extreme constructive contingencies that include the most powerful primary reinforcers and aversers.

Prisoners who exhibit extreme antisocial behavior would quickly find themselves cold, hungry, and alone in the dark—not because the authorities punished them directly in that manner, but because their earning level, limited by that pattern of conduct, would be insufficient to purchase better alternatives. They would find themselves out of contact with the community mainstream and would be facing the serious and immediate problems of how to quickly earn sufficient income to get some food delivered, some heat turned on, some light by which to see, and the use of a rental toilet so that it would not be necessary to trod in their own excrement.

There would be little sympathy or concern on the part of others that could be exploited by the newcomer to evoke personal favors in the form of system circumventions. But it would also be made obvious that most every one else was enjoying a much richer and fulfilling life style and that it was not difficult for a person to make that happen—and, importantly, that it could be done merely by bettering oneself in small easy steps. The relation between the required improvements and the prisoner's own immediate personal interests would be made obvious. So would the fact that to make these gains prisoners would not have to subordinate themselves in a demeaning way. It is just that in this system heaven and hell are both at hand—at opposite ends of the street on which everybody lives, and there is no free lunch any place.

Redemption and improvement are always possible, but not inevitable. A critical limit to what the system can accomplish with a given individual is always resolved between the effectiveness of the theoretically available behaviorological technology and the resources available to support the effort. Even persons with as severely distorted behaviors as Michael Hagan's would not typically remain long under the severe contingencies of survival described above. After all, Hagan enters prison as an already somewhat successful and rather extensively socialized citizen of a street community that maintains stringent contingencies of survival and enculturation. It is just that it is an outlaw community and respects values disapproved in the culture at large. But because Michael Hagan is clearly susceptible to contingencies of socialization (that's how he arrived at his present behavioral extreme), he could be re-conditioned to respond just as readily to the kind of socialization valued in the larger culture. In fact, within the carefully and expertly controlled community of the prison, the re-enculturation process should be more efficient than his original haphazard shaping on the streets.

Security functions would not dominate the system nor be an operational part of its more prevalent arrangements for control. Troublesome inmates would be regarded as having behavioral disorders comparable to the biological ones treated with medicine (a concept popularized in Erewhon by Samuel Butler, 1965); however, they would be made to contact the behaviorological treatment contingencies even more surely than the typical medical patient is made to participate in prescribed medicinal procedures.

The community would operate as an idealized model of the outside world. It would differ in that contingencies would be controlled better and would often be more obvious to those affected by them. It would be relatively free of the cultural dissonance that characterizes the outside cultural milieu. Within the prison system cultural level operations would respect more consistent values, and fewer of its cultural-level operations would function in mutually countercontrolling interrelations. Noncontingent benefits would essentially be eliminated. That would strengthen the behavioral technology and make possible the accelerated behavioral progress expected in publicly subsidized behavior change agencies.

The behavior management system would remain flexible. The corrections technology would remain experimental. Despite system complexity, the institutional culture would remain under the control of applied social scientists, but interventions would be more at the policy level, and less through legal codes, which tend to fix operations. That is because the technology must never be permitted to fixate. Its corrective evolution and fine tuning would continue indefinitely. The institution would be, above all, an applied science laboratory and would continue to operate as such in service to its inmate citizens.

A community of the kind described in this article could present an excessive challenge to most if not all of this planet's cultures. As one retired Federal prison administrator responded after reading a draft of this paper, "the plan to establish a 'new world' in prison was too far removed from the problems that face prison managers today" (personal communication). People appropriately trained to do it do not exist in sufficient numbers, nor does the culture respect the values that would be necessary for its support. Contemporary approximations based on fragments of this concept are adopted and abandoned in cycles, as isolated ideas based on intuition and experience are tried in systems not prepared to run such tests (Allen, 1989). Implementing the model presented in this article would require a professional staff of behaviorological engineers, some of whom would be economists with economic laboratory skills. Also, complex computer assisted economic management would be necessary.

The range of advanced skills needed to operate an institution of the kind described here is broad and calls for many different and often new kinds of specialists. Such a team would require persons with expertise in education, criminal justice, jurisprudence, economics, sociology, behavior management, business, government, and other areas, but all based strictly on behaviorological foundations that today are lacking in all of those fields. Today's prison systems have been criticized for not rehabilitating inmates in the sense of molding law-abiding citizens. As Allen (1989) noted about the Federal prison system, "What the system does do is force inmates to act like law-abiding citizens while in prison, giving them a chance

to rehabilitate themselves on their own if they want to" (p. 15). Faced with often desperate needs for an effective science of behavior, our culture has been failed by its dependence on ineffective cobbled eclectic disciplinary mixes. Only when those so-called "soft science" foundations give way to a comprehensive science of behavior, with an essential natural science epistemology, will social agencies and institutions with behavior-related missions enjoy the kind of coherent, experimentally informed, integral science needed to support effective behavioral technologies in their respective fields.

The prison described in this article would be more like a school, a preparatory academy for citizens. Its graduates would be well disciplined for the responsibilities of citizenship in the culture at large. They would, of course, have engaged in more analysis of the essence and nature of social order than the typical citizen. But more importantly, the graduates would be schooled to high performance levels in the skills of good citizenry.

Our present culture generates so many criminals that the current prisoner load would probably overwhelm the proposed kind of prison system. But the kind of culture that could create and maintain the kind of prison system proposed here would be operating on the outside in much the same way as the new prison system would operate internally. Such a culture would generate a much smaller percentage of persons who would fail as citizens and require remediation in the skills of citizenship.

Epilogue

This article emphasizes and exemplifies the economic facet of the discipline of behaviorology. Close relations are suggested between behaviorology and economic theory, and much of the behaviorological analysis and system design presented in this paper rest on the assumption that contingencies of reinforcement are fundamentally economic propositions.

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