

Consistent contrast aids concept learning.

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(D.B.) School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332;
dorrit.billman@psych.gatech.edu**Impact of varying levels of expertise on decisions of category typicality.**

Kathy E. Johnson—

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kjohnso@iupui.edu**On a variant of Stroop's paradigm: Which cognitions press your buttons?**

Matthew Brown & Derek Besner—

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David E. Copeland & Gabriel A. Radvansky—

(D.E.C.) Department of Psychology, 118 Haggard Hall, Notre Dame University, Notre Dame, IN 46556;
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Taosheng Liu & Lynn A. Cooper—

(T.L.) Department of Psychology, Columbia University, 1190 Amsterdam Ave., New York, NY 10027;
liu@psych.columbia.edu**Imagination inflation is a fact, not an artifact: A reply to Pezdek and Eddy.**

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Erratum

Higham, P. A., & Vokey, J. R. (2000). Judgment heuristics and recognition memory: Prime identification and target-processing fluency. *Memory & Cognition*, **28** (4), 574-584. On page 582, in the fourth paragraph of the General Discussion, the second sentence should read as follows:

However, it is not obvious to us how it could have produced the reversed pattern of results in Experiment 1 and for the 50-msec group in Experiment 3.