Abstract
A constellation of joint probability estimates is semantically coherent when the quantitative relationship among estimates of P(A), P(B), P(A and B), and P(A or B) is consistent with the relationship among the sets described in the problem statement. The possible probability estimates can form an extremely large number of permutations. However, this entire problem space can be reduced to six theoretically meaningful patterns: logically fallacious (conjunction or disjunction fallacies), identical sets (e.g., water and H2O), mutually exclusive sets (e.g., horses and zebras), subsets (e.g., robins and birds), overlapping sets (e.g., accountants and musicians), and inconsistent overlapping sets. Determining which of these patterns describes any set of probability estimates has been automated using Excel spreadsheet formulae. Researchers may use the semantic coherence technique to examine the consequences of differently worded problems, individual differences, or experimental manipulations. The spreadsheet described above can be downloaded as a supplement from http://brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.
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Wolfe, C.R., Reyna, V.F. Assessing semantic coherence and logical fallacies in joint probability estimates. Behavior Research Methods 42, 373–380 (2010). https://doi.org/10.3758/BRM.42.2.373
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BRM.42.2.373