for 5 sec the slide which gave him the win, loss, or tie. In the event of a non-information seeking response, he was shown, also for 5 sec, a standard slide containing four ones. There was a 5 sec intertrial interval.

In Condition 2, the S did not know the outcome before the buzzer came on. On each trial, the buzzer came on for 5 sec, and during this interval S could make either an information seeking response or a non-information seeking response. If an information seeking response was made, he was shown for 5 sec a slide which gave him a win, loss, or tie. If a non-information seeking response was made, he was shown the standard slide for 5 sec. Then the monetary outcome was delivered; a dime was either given to him, taken from him, or not exchanged. Again there was a 5 sec intertrial interval. Thus, for both conditions, each trial took 20 sec.

Subjects were given 10 dimes to begin with, and were told that the money they had left at the end would be theirs. Before each set of trials, E announced which outcomes would be possible and emphasized that they were equally likely.

Results and Discussion

In both conditions, the mean number of information seeking responses is significantly greater than chance for all cells except one (see Table 1). This was determined by testing each cell mean against the null hypothesis of five information seeking responses. A two way analysis of variance showed no significant effect due to outcome conditions, a significant conditions effect ($F=4.76$, $df=1/54$, $p<.05$), and a significant interaction ($F=20.07$, $df=2/54$, $p<.01$). The percentages of information seeking responses in Condition 2 are quite similar to those found by Lanzetta and Driscoll (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Mean Percent of Information Seeking Responses over 10 Trials

Treatment	Outcome combination		
	Win-tie	Lose-tie	Win-lose
Condition 1	70.0	62.0	87.0
Condition 2	66.0	62.0	62.0
Lanzetta & Driscoll (1966; adjusted means)	60.0	65.0	63.0

Errata

Gold, D. The effect of generalized and specific expectancies upon eyelid conditioning. *Psychon. Sci.*, 1967, 8, 147-148—The last sentence of the first paragraph on page 148 should read: "All eyelid closures occurring between 300 and 440 msec were considered CRs."

Table 2. Frequency of Information Seeking Responses in Condition 1 as a Function of Announced Outcome and Outcome Combination

Announced Outcome	Outcome combination		
	Win-tie	Lose-tie	Win-lose
Win	42	--	46
Lose	--	37	41
Tie	28	25	--

When information seeking responses from Condition 1 are plotted as a function of the monetary outcome announced by E (Table 2), there are clear differences among the frequencies. These show that Ss in Condition 1 requested information most often when E announced a "win," and slightly less often when E announced a "loss." Ss did not seek information above the chance level after an announced "tie." An overall F-test showed these differences to be significant at the .01 level.

The fact that there was significantly greater preference for information about certain rather than uncertain outcomes casts doubt on the validity of the preparatory-response explanation for information seeking. The reason for this is as follows: The Lanzetta & Driscoll (1966) findings, as well as the data from Condition 2, could be attributed to a preparatory-response mechanism, but the data from Condition 1 clearly cannot, since the outcome is already known to the S. It is possible that the preparatory-response hypothesis is true for that class of situations in which there is outcome uncertainty, and there is some other explanation which holds when there is no outcome uncertainty. It seems more economical, however, from the point of view of theory, to maintain that the underlying motive for the acquisition of information is the same in either case, and is yet to be found.

Reference

Lanzetta, J. T., & Driscoll, J. M. Preference for information about an uncertain but unavoidable outcome. *J. Pers. soc. Psychol.*, 1966, 3, 96-102.

Note

1. This research was carried out at the Group Dynamics Laboratory, Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. The authors wish to thank Dr. Robert B. Zajonc for his helpful suggestions.

Eisenman, R. Complexity-simplicity: I. Preference for symmetry and rejection of complexity. *Psychon. Sci.*, 1967, 8, 169-170.—Several words were omitted from the abstract. The last three lines should be revised to read: "findings. In Study 1 it was found that Ss preferred symmetrical shapes to a highly significant extent. In Study 2, when Ss were presented with symmetrical shapes, Ss rejected complexity to a highly significant extent, although they did not necessarily prefer the simplest shapes."